When, after opposition by a creditor to the discharge of a
petitioner in bankruptcy, the district court discharges him and the
opposing creditor files in the circuit court a "petition of appeal"
-- a petition setting forth the application for the benefit of the
Bankrupt Act, the opposition, and the discharge, and praying the
circuit court for a reversal of the orders of discharge of the
district court -- such "petition of appeal" must be regarded as
being a petition for review under the first clause of the second
section of the, Bankrupt Act, which gives the circuit courts a
general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions
arising under the act, and on an affirmance by the circuit court of
the decree of discharge by the district court, no appeal lies to
this Court, though the debt of the opposing creditor discharged be
more than $2,000.
On motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York affirming a decree of the district
court in bankruptcy forever discharging, in the usual way, two
persons, partners in trade, from payment of all debts and claims
against them &c., including a debt of one Coit, to a greater
amount than $2,000.
The case was thus:
Robinson & Chamberlain, partners in trade, applied to the
District Court for the Southern District of New York for a
discharge under the Bankrupt Act of March 2, 1867. [
Footnote 1] Coit opposed their discharge,
notwithstanding which the court held them entitled to be
discharged, and by its decree discharged them accordingly.
Thereupon Coit petitioned the circuit court for a reversal of the
decree of the district court, and on the same day filed a bond with
surety for costs, and, pursuant to the notice given, filed in the
circuit court a paper entitled "petition of appeal" in which he
referred to the petition in bankruptcy of Robinson &
Chamberlain and stated that he was a creditor, that he had proved a
part of his claim and filed his proof, that the bankrupts were
examined at his instance, that he made opposition
Page 86 U. S. 275
to their discharge, and that he filed the grounds of his
opposition with the district court; that he was heard in support of
his opposition before that court, and that the court overruled his
opposition and granted a discharge with costs against him, the
opposing creditor. The petition concluded thus:
"Your petitioner, feeling aggrieved thereby, prays the circuit
court for a reversal of the said several
orders of the
said district court as being contrary to law and to the
evidence."
All the proceedings, including the evidence, had in the district
court were filed with this petition.
The petition of appeal was heard in the circuit court and a
decree made which, after reciting that
"at a stated term of the
said court,"
"the petition of W. A. Coit, one of the creditors &c.,
praying for a review and reversal of the
decree of the
district court &c., granting a discharge to the bankrupts, and
the appeal thereon had been brought to a hearing before the said
circuit court,"
concluded:
"Now on all the papers and proceedings herein, and after
hearing, Mr. Charles Tracy, of counsel for said creditor and
appellant Coit, on behalf of said petition and Mr. G. A. Seixas of
counsel for said bankrupts and respondents, in opposition thereto.
It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said decree said
district court be and the same is hereby affirmed."
Coit thereupon filed in the circuit court a petition, addressed
to this Court, giving a statement of the proceedings already
referred to, both in the district court and in the circuit court,
and concluding as follows:
"Your petitioner therefore prays that all and singular the
records and proceedings of said circuit court upon the said case
and the appeal thereon may be removed to the Supreme Court, and
that the said decree of the circuit court may be reversed, and that
your petitioner may have such other and further relief as may be
deemed fit and proper."
Before filing this petition, he filed in the same office where
he had filed it a bond in $1,000, conditioned to prosecute the
Page 86 U. S. 276
appeal with effect, and approved by the circuit judge "as to
form and sufficiency of sureties."
The appeal being entered in this Court, the bankrupts moved to
dismiss it on the ground that no appeal would lie in such a case
from the circuit court. And whether one would or would not was the
question before this Court.
The question depended largely upon certain enactments of
Congress, including specially clauses of the Judiciary Act of 1789
and of the Bankrupt Act of March 2, 1867, under which the discharge
took place. The sections referred to or relied on in the opinion of
the court run thus:
"
Judiciary Act [Footnote 2]"
"SECTION 11. The circuit courts shall have appellate
jurisdiction from the district courts under the regulations and
restrictions hereinafter provided."
"SECTION 22. Final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a
district court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value
of $50, exclusive of costs, may be reexamined and reversed or
affirmed in a circuit court upon a writ of error."
"And upon a like process may final judgments and decrees in
civil actions and suits in equity in a circuit court . . . removed
there by appeal from a district court, where the matter in dispute
exceeds the sum or value of $2,000, exclusive of costs, be
reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court."
[By act of March, 1803, [
Footnote 3] an appeal is given to the Supreme Court from
all final judgments or decrees rendered in any circuit court in any
cases of equity, of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, of prize
or no prize, under the same conditions as to the sum or value of
the matter in dispute as before existed in regard to writs of
error.]
Bankrupt Act
This act, after constituting the several district courts of the
United States, "courts of bankruptcy" and after giving to them
"original jurisdiction in their respective districts in all matters
and proceedings in bankruptcy," enacts by its
Page 86 U. S. 277
second section (the same, for the convenience of the reader of
the Court's opinion, being here broken into clauses), as
follows:
"SECTION 2. The several courts of the United States, within and
for the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be
pending, shall have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of
all
cases and questions arising under this act, and except
when special provision in otherwise made may, upon bill, petition,
or other proper process of any party aggrieved, hear and determine
the case as a court of equity."
"The powers and jurisdiction hereby granted may be exercised
either by said court or by any justice thereof, in term time or in
vacation."
"Said circuit courts shall also have concurrent jurisdiction
with the district courts of the same district of all suits at law
or equity, which may or shall be brought by the assignee in
bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by
such person against such assignee touching any property or rights
of property of said bankrupt, transferable to or vested in such
assignee &c."
"SECTION 8. Appeals may be taken from the district courts to the
circuit courts in all cases in equity, and writs of error may be
allowed to said circuit courts from said district courts, in cases
at law, under the jurisdiction created by this act, when the debt
or damages claimed amount to more than $500."
"And any supposed creditor whose claim is wholly or in part
rejected, or an assignee who is dissatisfied with the allowance of
a claim, may appeal from the decision of the district court to the
circuit court for the same district &c. &c."
"SECTION 9. In cases arising under this act, no appeal or writ
of error shall be allowed in any case from the circuit courts to
the Supreme Court of the United States unless the matter in dispute
in such case shall exceed $2,000."
The twenty-ninth section authorizes a discharge by the district
court of the petitioning debtor when there has been no fraud on the
act. The act goes on:
"SECTION 31. Any creditor opposing the discharge of any
bankrupt, may file a specification in writing of the grounds of his
opposition, and the court may, in its discretion, order any
Page 86 U. S. 278
question of fact so presented to be tried at a stated session of
the district court."
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
District courts have original jurisdiction, in their respective
districts, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, and are
authorized to hear and adjudicate the same according to the
provisions of the Bankrupt Act. [
Footnote 4] Circuit courts have a general superintendence
and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under that act
within and for the districts where the proceedings under the act
are pending, and except when special provision is otherwise made,
may, upon bill, petition, or other proper process, of any party
aggrieved, hear and determine the case as in a court of equity, the
provision also being that the circuit court, or any justice
thereof, may exercise the powers and jurisdiction granted by that
clause,
"in term time or vacation." [
Footnote 5]
Page 86 U. S. 279
On the 29th of February, 1868, the respondents filed their
petition in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, representing that they owed debts within the judicial
district exceeding $300 and that they were unable to pay all their
debts in full; that they were willing to surrender all their estate
and effects for the benefit of their creditors, and stating that
they desired to obtain the benefit of the Bankrupt Act; and prayed
that, after due proceedings had, they might, by a decree of the
court, be adjudged to be bankrupts, and that, upon complying with
all the requirements of that act, they may severally be decreed to
have a certificate of discharge from all their debts provable under
the said act. By the record it also appears that the petitioners,
on the 12th of June in the same year, were adjudged to be bankrupts
within the true intent and meaning of the Bankrupt Act.
Complete jurisdiction of the case was by those means acquired by
the district court, and it further appears that such proceedings
were had that the respondents, on the 17th of July following, were,
by the decree of the district court, discharged from all debts and
claims provable under that act against them on the day their
petition to be adjudged bankrupts was filed.
Opposition to their discharge was made by the present appellant,
and the district court, on the 24th of the same month, heard the
parties and passed an order that the bankrupts recover of him, as
such opposing creditor, the costs incurred by them in resisting
such opposition, amounting to the sum of $129.50. Three days later,
the appellant, as such opposing creditor, gave notice that he
intended to petition the circuit court for the same district for a
reversal of the aforesaid decree of the district judge, and on the
same day he filed a bond for costs, executed by himself and a
surety, and pursuant to the notice given, on the 6th of August
following he filed in the circuit court a certain paper called the
"petition of appeal," in which he refers to the petition in
bankruptcy of the respondents and states that he is a creditor of
their estate; that he proved a part of his claim in
Page 86 U. S. 280
that proceeding, and that he filed proof of the same with the
register; that the bankrupts were examined at his instance, and
that he made opposition to their discharge, and that he filed the
grounds of his opposition in that behalf with the district court;
that he was heard in support of his opposition before the district
judge, and that the district judge overruled his opposition and
granted the respective certificates of discharge to the alleged
bankrupts, and awarded such costs to them as they incurred in
resisting his opposition, and concludes as follows:
"Your petitioner, feeling aggrieved thereby, prays the circuit
court for a reversal of the said several orders of the said
district court as being contrary to law and to the evidence,"
as more fully set forth in the petition, to which he made oath
before the register and caused notice thereof to be served on the
solicitor of the bankrupts.
Duly certified copies of the proceedings in bankruptcy, as well
those that took place before the register as those before the
district judge, whether in term time or vacation, were, on the 17th
of September in the following year, filed in the office of the
clerk of the circuit court for the same district, together with a
copy of the minutes of the testimony taken before the register,
filling more than three hundred and sixty closely printed pages of
the transcript, without including the numerous exhibits which are
annexed to the certificate of the clerk. Hearing was had in the
circuit court on the petition for review, and the circuit court, on
the 28th of March last, adjudged and decreed that the decree of the
district court be in all things affirmed, and that the bankrupts
recover such costs of the petitioner as they incurred in resisting
his opposition, amounting to the sum of $94.25.
Beyond all question, the case in the circuit court was a
petition for review under the first clause of the second section of
the Bankrupt Act, which gives to the circuit courts within and for
the districts where the proceedings in bankruptcy are pending, a
general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions
arising under the Bankrupt
Page 86 U. S. 281
Act, except where special provision is otherwise made. Such
courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, may hear
and determine any such case or question upon bill, petition, or
other proper process of any party aggrieved, as in a court of
equity. Cases and questions of the kind may be heard and determined
by the proper circuit court, or by any justice thereof, in term
time or vacation, which of itself is quite sufficient to show that
the power and jurisdiction conferred by that clause of the second
section are not the same as that conferred upon the circuit courts
by the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act. [
Footnote 6]
Special provision is not otherwise made in the Bankrupt Act for
the review or revision by the circuit court of either of the
questions involved in the orders or decrees of the district court
which are the subject of complaint in the case, and for that reason
it follows that the power and jurisdiction of the circuit court to
hear and determine the complaint of the appellant and to review or
revise the orders or decrees of the district court in the case were
decided under the first clause of the second section of the
Bankrupt Act.
Said circuit courts also have jurisdiction, concurrent with the
district courts, of all suits at law or in equity, which may or
shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person
claiming and adverse interest, or by such person against such
assignee, touching any property or rights of property of said
bankrupt, transferable to or vested in such assignee.
Concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of all suits at
law or in equity are the words of that clause, showing conclusively
that the jurisdiction intended to be conferred is the regular
jurisdiction between party and party, as described in the eleventh
section of the Judiciary Act and the third article of the
Constitution. Consequently it follows that final judgments in such
civil actions, or final decrees in such suits in equity, rendered
in cases where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs,
the sum or
Page 86 U. S. 282
value of $2000, may be reexamined in this Court under the
twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act, when properly removed
here by writ of error or appeal, as required by existing laws.
[
Footnote 7]
Like jurisdiction in all such suits at law or in equity is also
vested in the district courts concurrent with the circuit courts,
but inasmuch as such controversies are made the subject of special
provision, neither the judgment nor the decree of the district
court in such a suit can be reviewed or revised by the circuit
court under the first clause of the second section of the Bankrupt
Act, nor in any other manner than that provided in the
twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act and the subsequent act
regulating appeals. [
Footnote
8]
Opportunity for further litigation, either in the district or
circuit court, being closed, the appellant, on the 11th of April
last, filed in the circuit court a petition, addressed to the
justices of this Court, giving a full summary statement of the
aforesaid proceedings, both in the district court and in the
circuit court, and concluding as follows:
"Your petitioner therefore prays that all and singular the
records and proceedings of said circuit court upon the said case
and the appeal thereon may be removed to the Supreme Court, and
that the said decree of the circuit court may be reversed, and that
you petitioner may have such other and further relief as may be
deemed fit and proper."
Before lodging that petition in the clerk's office of the
circuit court, the appellant filed in the same office a bond in the
sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned to prosecute the appeal
with effect, dated one day earlier, and approved by the circuit
judge "as to form and sufficiency of sureties."
Since the case was entered in this Court, the respondents have
appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the want of
jurisdiction, which is the principal question for the consideration
of the court at the present time.
Cases arising under the third clause of the second section
Page 86 U. S. 283
of the Bankrupt Act, where the amount is sufficient, are plainly
within the ninth section of the Bankrupt Act, and as such, when the
case has proceeded to final judgment or decree, may be removed here
for reexamination by writ of error or appeal, as the case may be,
but the review and revision contemplated by the first clause of the
same section is evidently the same in substance and effect as that
given to the circuit courts in the prior Bankrupt Act, as
sufficiently appears from the words, "general superintendence,"
preceding and qualifying the word "jurisdiction;" and more clearly
from the fact that the revisory jurisdiction extends to mere
questions, as contradistinguished from judgments or decrees, as
well as to cases; and from the further fact that the jurisdiction
in that behalf may be exercised in chambers as well as in court,
and in vacation as well as in term time. [
Footnote 9]
Suits in equity and cases at law, under the jurisdiction created
by that act, may be removed to the circuit court for reexamination,
as provided by the eighth section of the act, but it is quite clear
that the removal in such cases must be effected under the
regulations prescribed in the twenty-second section of the
Judiciary Act and the subsequent act allowing appeals in cases of
equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. [
Footnote 10]
Mere questions are not reexaminable under the regulations
prescribed in those acts, nor would any judgment or decree be
regarded as a regular final judgment or decree for such a purpose,
unless it was rendered in term time when the court was in
session.
By that section "all cases in equity" and "cases at law," when
the debt or damages claimed amount to more than $500, may be
removed into the circuit court for reexamination, and the further
provision is that any supposed creditor whose claim is wholly or in
part rejected, or any assignee who is dissatisfied with the
allowance of a claim, may appeal from the decision of the district
court to the circuit court for the same district, if claimed and
due notice thereof is
Page 86 U. S. 284
given, as therein required, within ten days after the entry of
the decree or decision in the district court. Nor can any writ of
error be allowed under that section unless the party claiming it
shall comply with the statutes regulating the granting of such
writs, and the better opinion is that the writ of error must be
sued out within the same time as that allowed for claiming an
appeal in an equity suit. [
Footnote 11]
Appellate jurisdiction may unquestionably be exercised by the
circuit courts in four classes of cases under the Bankrupt Act:
(1) By appeal from the final decree of the district courts, in
suits in equity commenced and prosecuted in the latter courts by
virtue of the jurisdiction created by the third clause of the
second section of the act.
(2) By writs of error sued out to the district courts in civil
actions finally decided by such courts in the exercise of
jurisdiction created by the same clause of that section. Where the
amount in dispute in such cases exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of $2,000, the final judgment or decree in the case,
as rendered in the circuit court, may be removed into this Court
for reexamination, as provided in cases originally brought in the
circuit court.
(3) By appeal from the decision of the district court rejecting
wholly or in part the claim of a creditor, as provided in the
eighth section of the act.
(4) By appeal from the decision of the district court allowing
such a claim when the same is opposed by the assignee.
Doubts are entertained whether the cases mentioned in the last
two propositions are reexaminable in this Court, but the question
is not presented for decision in this case.
Whether the bankrupt is entitled to a discharge pursuant to the
twenty-ninth section of the Bankrupt Act is always a question to be
decided by the district court under the conditions prescribed in
that section. Creditors opposing the discharge may file a
specification in writing of the grounds of their opposition, but
the only effect of such a specification, as declared in the
thirty-first section of the act, is to
Page 86 U. S. 285
authorize the court,
"in its discretion," to postpone
the question of fact to be tried at a stated session of the court,
as the thirty-second section provides that if it shall appear to
the court that the bankrupt has in all things conformed to his duty
under the act, the court shall grant the prescribed discharge.
[
Footnote 12]
Regulations of a different character are prescribed in a case
where the question is whether the alleged insolvent shall be
adjudged a bankrupt without his consent, as in that event the
provision is that the court shall, if the debtor, on the return day
of the notice, required to be given on the petition, so demand in
writing, order a trial by jury as therein provided, but the
Bankrupt Act contains no provision for a jury trial on the question
of discharge, and in the judgment of the court the only power
vested in the circuit court to review and revise the decision of
the district court, made in granting or refusing such a discharge,
is that conferred by the first clause of the second section of that
act.
Except when special provision is otherwise made the circuit
courts under that clause have a general superintendence and
jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under the Bankrupt
Act. Special provision is not otherwise made for the reexamination
by the circuit court of the decision of the district court in
granting or refusing a discharge in bankruptcy, and, of course, it
can only be done under the power conferred by that clause.
Nothing remains for consideration in this case except to inquire
whether an appeal lies to this Court from a decree of the circuit
court rendered in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction
conferred upon that court by the first clause of the second section
of the Bankrupt Act, which is the very question that was presented
to this Court in the case of
Morgan v. Thornhill,
[
Footnote 13] where this
Court unanimously decided the question in the negative. Since that
opinion was delivered, this Court has decided the same question
in
Page 86 U. S. 286
the same way in four other cases, all of which are published in
the regular series of the reports of the Supreme Court. [
Footnote 14] None of these
statements can be successfully contradicted, and it follows that
this Court has no jurisdiction of the appeal in this case.
Motion granted and the case dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 1]
14 Stat. at Large 518.
[
Footnote 2]
1 Stat. at Large 79.
[
Footnote 3]
Ib.
[
Footnote 4]
14 Stat. at Large 517.
[
Footnote 5]
Ib., 518.
[
Footnote 6]
1 Stat. at Large 78.
[
Footnote 7]
Morgan v.
Thornbill, 11 Wall. 80.
[
Footnote 8]
1 Stat. at Large 84; 2
id. 244.
[
Footnote 9]
Morgan v.
Thornhill, 11 Wall. 80.
[
Footnote 10]
2 Stat. at Large 244.
[
Footnote 11]
Insurance Co. v.
Comstock, 16 Wall. 258.
[
Footnote 12]
14 Stat. at Large 533.
[
Footnote 13]
78 U. S. 11 Wall.
65.
[
Footnote 14]
Hall v. Allen,
12 Wall. 452;
Smith v.
Mason, 14 Wall. 430;
Mead
v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 638;
Marshall v.
Knox, 16 Wall. 555.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE MILLER,
dissenting:
I dissent from the judgment of the Court in this case. The
Judiciary Act gives a writ of error to this Court from all final
judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in the
circuit courts, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or
value of two thousand dollars. The Act of March 3 1803, converts
this writ of error into an appeal in cases of equity, and admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction and prize cases. The cases in which
appeals in bankruptcy have heretofore been disallowed were cased of
interlocutory orders or decrees, and therefore not within the terms
of the law. The decree appealed from in this case has all the
elements of a final decree, and belongs to a system of proceeding
which has always been regarded in England as of equitable
cognizance. The fact that it depends upon statutory regulation does
not divest it of that character. A bankruptcy proceeding, by which
the estate of a debtor is administered, is essentially an equitable
one. In a case of such importance as that which involves a man's
liability or nonliability for his debts after he has given up all
his property, he ought not to be deprived of the right of appeal if
the law, fairly considered, gives it to him. I think it does give
it to him in this case.
