1. Under the statutory provisions, Treasury regulations, and
executive orders concerning the purchase of the products of
insurrectionary states, a purchasing agent, acting on behalf of the
United States, had no authority to negotiate with anyone in
relation to the purchase of such products, unless at the time of
the negotiation the party either owned or controlled them.
2. Private citizens were prohibited from trading at all in the
insurrectionary districts. The object of the law, and the
regulations made to carry it into effect, was to encourage the
insurgents themselves to bring their products to loyal people.
3.
United States v.
Lane, 8 Wall. 185, affirmed, on the two points
above quoted.
H. A. Risley, Treasury agent at Norfolk for the purchase of the
products of insurrectionary states, in November, 1864, contracted
in writing to purchase from Maddox and certain persons associated
with him, loyal citizens of the United States, a large quantity of
tobacco, rosin, and turpentine, situated in the States of Virginia
and North Carolina, to be delivered in Norfolk or New York, and
sold at certain points mentioned, under the same conditions as
other sales of like public property.
With the contract Risley delivered to Maddox and his associates
a request for safe conduct and means of transportation.
This request was presented to the President of the United
States, who endorsed on it that the property to be transported
under the contract should be free from seizure or detention, and
that the military and naval authorities be requested to furnish the
necessary facilities for getting the products within our lines.
These products, at the time the contract was made, and the military
safe conduct delivered, were not owned or controlled by Maddox and
the others, but they expected to procure them in or about the City
of Richmond, in the state of Virginia. In the months of January and
February, 1865, they succeeded, in part performance
Page 82 U. S. 59
of their contract, in purchasing a large number of boxes of
tobacco -- less, however, than they had agreed to do -- which were
subsequently either burned by our military forces, appropriated by
them to the use of the United States, or destroyed in the fires in
Richmond at the time it was captured in April, 1865.
Hereupon Maddox and his associates filed a petition in the Court
of Claims for an alleged breach of contract, and praying judgment
for $735,644, with interest.
The United States demurred and the court sustained the demurrer.
To reverse that decision this appeal was prosecuted.
Page 82 U. S. 60
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States are called on to make good the loss caused by
the alleged wrongful conduct of their military officers, and the
inquiry is, can they be required to do it in this suit?
The main question involved in this inquiry is important, on
account of the large pecuniary interests at stake, but is freed
from all difficulty since the decision of this Court in
United
States v. Lane. The cases are not distinguishable. In both the
right to recover was based on contracts made by the same Treasury
agent with private citizens, for the purchase from them of products
which were within the lines held by the insurrectionary forces. In
each case, the agent requested safe conduct for the parties and
their necessary means of transportation through the federal
military lines. In neither case were the products owned, or even
under the control, of those who had contracted to sell them, but in
each case the parties expected, after they had secured their
contracts, to go within the rebel lines and obtain the products
which they had agreed to deliver. It is true, in Lane's case there
were greater facilities for the execution of the contract and
better security for its performance, for Lane was allowed to take
out a cargo of goods to exchange for the cotton to be purchased,
and this cargo was in charge of a sub-agent, under instructions not
to deliver it until treble its value in cotton should be put on
board the vessel.
But these proceedings were intended only as a means to an end.
The performance of the contract was the principal thing to be
effected, and the license to take out a cargo of
Page 82 U. S. 61
goods, under certain restrictions, was, of necessity, given for
the mere purpose of securing a desired result. If Maddox did not
enjoy the advantage of a similar license, he had the use of other
means not accorded to Lane, which were expected to accomplish a
similar result. It is easy to see that he could have few things
better adapted to fortify him against failure than the certificate
of the President that the products moved by him should be free from
seizure, accompanied by an order on the commandants of military
districts and naval stations to aid him in his enterprise. Whether
the facilities extended to Lane were more ample than those which
Maddox possessed is an immaterial subject of inquiry. It is enough
to say that the difference in the character of these facilities
constitutes the only distinction between the cases, and that this
difference is incidental merely -- not necessary to the chief
purpose in each, and in no wise affecting the validity of the
contracts. If this be so, there is an end of this litigation, for
the entire subject embraced in this contract was before us in
Lane's case and passed on. Lane, in his petition to the Court of
Claims, stated that he made a contract with Risley, the Treasury
agent, at Norfolk, similar to the one in controversy, and for the
purpose of executing it purchased a steamer at great cost, with
which he proceeded to Chowan River, North Carolina, and loaded with
cotton procured there, and that on the return voyage the steamer
and cargo were forcibly seized by the naval authorities, and the
cotton appropriated to the use of the United States. For this
alleged wrongful seizure of the vessel and appropriation of the
cotton he claimed that his contract was violated, and that he was
entitled to remuneration. Nothing is said in the petition about an
outward cargo, but the Court of Claims found, as one of the facts
of the case, that Lane had a license to take out in his steamer
certain articles, a schedule of which was attached to the safe
conduct given by the military commander. Manifestly, from this
statement of the case, the contract was the foundation of the whole
proceeding, and if made without authority of law, the vessel
Page 82 U. S. 62
and cargo were not protected, but were subject to seizure and
detention.
It was therefore necessary, in order to see whether the citizen
had the privilege of trading with the enemy in the manner
contemplated by this contract, to review the statutory provisions,
Treasury regulations, and executive orders concerning the purchase
of the products of insurrectionary states. This was done, and after
careful consideration we held that a purchasing agent, acting on
behalf of the United States, had no authority to negotiate with
anyone in relation to the purchase of such products, unless at the
time of the negotiation the party either owned or controlled them;
that neither was the law nor were the regulations through which it
was administered, designed to protect a speculation wherein the
products contracted to be sold were to be procured by the
contractor within the rebel lines after the contract was made.
Besides this, we decided that private citizens were prohibited from
trading at all in the insurrectionary districts; that the object of
the law, and the regulations made to carry it into effect, was to
encourage the insurgents themselves to bring their products to
us.
There were other elements of decision, but as they are not
applicable to this suit they will not be noticed. It is unnecessary
to restate the argument in support of the judgment in Lane's case.
At the time the subject received our best thoughts, and reflection
has only served to confirm the correctness of the decision.
These claimants occupy exactly the status of Lane. Risley,
therefore, in his character of Treasury agent, had no power to deal
with them at all; but if it were otherwise, the contract which he
did make was unlawful, for they were not the owners of the tobacco
in question, nor did they control it even at the time the contract
was made, purchased it long afterwards within the Confederate
lines.
Judgment affirmed.
