Black v. Curran,
Annotate this Case
81 U.S. 463 (1871)
- Syllabus |
U.S. Supreme Court
Black v. Curran, 81 U.S. 14 Wall. 463 463 (1871)
Black v. Curran
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 463
1. Under the homestead laws of Illinois, the homestead right is not in an absolute sense an estate in the land. The fee is left as it was before the statutes, subject to a right of occupancy, which cannot be disturbed while the homestead character exists.
2. The disposition of the property by judicial sale is accordingly left unaffected, except so far as is necessary to secure a homestead for the family of the occupant.
3. Hence the land in fee can be sold under execution, subject to the homestead right, and the purchaser has the absolute title when the homestead right ceases.
The statutes of Illinois [Footnote 1] relating to homesteads enact:
"SECTION 1. . . . There shall be exempt from levy and forced sale, under any process or order from any court in this state, for debts contracted, the lot of ground and buildings thereon, occupied as a residence, and owned by the debtor, being a householder and having a family, to the value of $1,000. Such exemption shall continue after the death of such householder, for the benefit of the widow and family, some or one of them continuing to occupy such homestead, until the youngest child shall become
21 years of age, and until the death of such widow, and no release or waiver of such exemption shall be valid unless the same shall be in writing subscribed by such householder and his wife, if he have one, and acknowledged in same manner as conveyances of real estate are by law required to be acknowledged."
"SECTION 3. If in the opinion of the creditors or officer holding an execution against such householder, the premises claimed by him or her as exempt, are worth more than $1,000, such officer shall summon six qualified jurors of his county, who shall appraise said premises, and if, in their opinion, the property may be divided without injury to the interest of the parties, they shall set off so much of said premises, including the dwelling house, as in their opinion shall be worth $1,000, and the residue of said premises may be advertised and sold by such officer."
"SECTION 4. In case the value of the premises shall in the opinion of the jury be more than $1,000, and cannot be divided as provided for in this act, they shall make an appraisal of the value thereof, and deliver the same to the officer, who shall deliver a copy thereof to the execution debtor, with a notice thereto attached that unless the execution debtor shall pay to said officer the surplus over and above $1,000, on the amount due on said execution, within 60 days thereafter that such premises will be sold."
"SECTION 5. In case such surplus, or the amount due on said execution, shall not be paid within the said 60 days, it shall be lawful for the officer to advertise and sell the said premises, and out of the proceeds of such sale to pay to such execution debtor the said sum of $1,000, which shall be exempt from execution for one year thereafter, and apply the balance on such execution, provided that no sale shall be made unless a greater sum than $1,000 shall be bid therefor, in which case the officer may return the execution for want of property."
With this statute in force, one Craddock, the head of a family, was from 1853 till 1863 the owner of a lot in Illinois which constituted his homestead; his house being built on one half, and the other half, exceeding in value $2,000, being used for its necessary purposes, both halves alike, however, constituting, as was assumed by the court, the homestead of himself and family.
In 1858, one Spear obtained a judgment against Craddock, but although the homestead property was sufficient to pay his demand and set off to the debtor what he was entitled to under the law, Spear did not pursue any of the modes pointed out by the statute of obtaining satisfaction of his property, but caused the western half to be sold at sheriff's sale under his execution, and having obtained a sheriff's deed for this half conveyed it to one Curran.
Subsequent to this -- that is to say, in 1863 -- Craddock and wife conveyed the whole lot, east and west halves alike, in fee simple by deed with full covenants releasing the home stead, and properly acknowledged, to certain persons who subsequently conveyed to one Black. In two weeks after Craddock and his wife thus conveyed the premises, Craddock with his family removed from them and ceased to occupy them afterwards.
In this state of things, A.D. 1866, Curran claiming title through the judicial sale to Spear brought suit against Black for the west half of the lot; Black defending himself under the title, if any, acquired under the deed from Craddock and wife to his vendors.
The court below, relying, as was said here by counsel, on McDonald v. Crandall and Coe v. Smith, decisions in the Supreme Court of Illinois, [Footnote 2] and considering that the sheriff could levy on and sell and convey a part of the homestead lot, while in occupancy of the judgment debtor, and that the deed would take effect if the debtor and his family abandoned the homestead, adjudged that the plaintiff was entitled to the property claimed by him, that is to say the western half of the lot, in fee simple, and gave judgment accordingly. That judgment was now here for review.