1. Although it is the clear duty of an ocean steamer sailing at
night to keep out of the way of a sailing vessel, yet if the course
of the sailing vessel, when first seen, is such that, compared with
her own, no collision is probable, the steamer is not bound to
change, her course. She need but watch and see that the courses of
the two vessels are preserved. It is only when the sailing vessel
does change her course, so its to render a collision possible, that
the steamer must change hers also, and if she then makes the proper
maneuvers to take herself from the sailing vessel, and when
collision becomes more probable slows, stops, and backs, all as the
best judgment that can be formed in the emergency suggests, she is
not liable for the collision.
2. The statutes of the United States and the orders in council
of Great Britain having each prescribed the sort of lights which,
on the one hand, their steamers are to carry at night, and the
different sort which, on the other, their sailing vessels are to
carry, and both nations adopting in this form the same distinction
in the sorts of lights for the two sorts of vessels respectively,
the Court declares that where a British steamer and an American
sailing vessel are navigating at night in the known path of vessels
navigating between the United States and Great Britain, so that
there is a reasonable probability that vessels in that path would
be either American or British, a steamer may, in the absence of
knowledge, act upon the probability that a vessel whose light she
sees while she cannot distinguish at all the vessel herself, is
such a vessel as her light indicates, and apply the rule of
navigation common to the two countries accordingly.
3. Under the existing statutory regulations of the United States
and Great Britain (stated more fully
infra, pp.
81 U. S.
171-172), both of which on the one hand require sailing
vessels to carry colored lights and not to carry a white one, and
both of which, on another, require steamers to carry a white light
at their mastheads -- when an American sailing vessel carries in
mid-ocean at night a white light hung at her bow, fastened low
Page 81 U. S. 171
down, and carries no colored lights anywhere, a British steamer,
not able to discover what she really is, may be excused for
mistaking her for a steamer, and a steamer at a distance instead of
near at hand.
4.
Semble that the navigation laws of the United States
requiring different sorts of vessels to carry different sorts of
lights, bind American vessels on the high seas as well as in
American waters, and that the people of other nations navigating
the high seas may properly sue our citizens in our courts for
injuries occurring through the disregard of them.
5. The rules of navigation established in the British orders in
council, of January 9, 1863 (prescribing the sorts of lights to be
used on British vessels), and in our act of Congress of 1861,
having, before the close of the year 1864, been accepted as
obligatory by more than thirty of the principal commercial states
of the world, including almost till which have any shipping on the
Atlantic Ocean, were in April, 1867, to be regarded, so far as
relates to the vessels of these states, as laws of the sea. And of
the historical fact that by common consent of mankind, they have
been acquiesced in as of general obligation, courts may take
judicial notice.
6. Those rules having prescribed that sailing vessels should not
carry a white light, and that steamers should carry one at their
masthead, a sailing vessel which carried a white light low down, so
that she, looked like a steamer yet at a distance, was held to be
without remedy where she had collided with a steamer which mistook
her for another steamer and maneuvered accordingly.
Appeal from the circuit court for the Southern District of New
York in a case of collision between the American ship
Berkshire and the British steamer
Scotia, by
which the ship was sunk and totally lost.
On the 9th of January, 1863, a British order in council,
authorized by virtue of the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act of July
29, 1862, 25 and 26 Victoria, made a body of "Regulations for
preventing collisions at sea." Among these were "Rules concerning
lights," and "Steering and sailing rules."
In the first class were these:
"
LIGHTS FOR STEAMSHIPS"
"ART. 3. Sea-going steamships when under way shall carry --"
"(a) At the foremast head, a bright white light . . . of such a
character as to be visible on a dark night, with a clear
atmosphere, at a distance of at least five miles."
"(b) On the starboard side, a green light &c., visible on a
dark
Page 81 U. S. 172
night, with a clear atmosphere, at a distance of at least two
miles."
"(c) On the port side, a red light &c., visible on a dark
night, with a clear atmosphere, at a distance of at least two
miles."
"(d) The said green and red side lights shall be fitted with
inboard screens, projecting at least three feet forward from the
light so as to prevent these lights being seen across the bow."
"
LIGHTS FOR SAILING SHIPS"
"ART. 6. Sailing vessels under way . . . shall carry the same
lights as steamships under way,
with the exception of the white
masthead lights, which they shall never carry."
In the steering and sailing rules was this one:
"
SAILING SHIP AND SHIP UNDER STEAM"
"If two ships, one of which is a sailing ship and the other a
steamship are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of
collision, the steamship shall keep out of the way of the sailing
ship."
All these regulations, as originally promulgated by Great
Britain, were made applicable to all ships, whatever their
nationality, within the limits of British jurisdiction, and to
British and French ships whether within British jurisdiction or
not. The Merchant Shipping Amendment Act, in virtue of which these
regulations were passed, provided also that whenever it should be
made to appear to the British government that the government of any
foreign country was willing that these regulations should apply to
the ships of such country, when beyond the limits of British
jurisdiction, Her Britannic Majesty might, by order in council,
direct that such regulations should apply to the ships of such
foreign country whether within British jurisdiction or not.
On the 29th April, 1864, [
Footnote 1] the Congress of the United States passed its
"act fixing certain rules and regulations for preventing collisions
on the water," and these rules as respects seagoing vessels being,
to all intents, identical with those above quoted from the British
act, the British government
Page 81 U. S. 173
regarded the act of Congress as an expression by our government,
that it was willing that the British regulations should apply to
our ships when beyond the limits of British jurisdiction. The
British government accordingly, by order in council, directed that
the regulations should apply to all seagoing vessels of the United
States, whether within British jurisdiction or not.
The governments of various other countries soon also manifested
their willingness that the British regulations should apply to
their ships respectively when beyond the limits of British
jurisdiction, and orders in council accordingly directed that such
regulations should apply to the ships of such countries
respectively, whether within British jurisdiction or not. The
countries referred to were Austria, the Argentine Republic,
Belgium, Brazil, Bremen, Chili, Denmark proper, the Republic of the
Equator, France, Greece, Hamburg, Hanover, the Hawaiian Islands,
Hayti, Italy, Lubeck, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Oldenburg, Peru, Portugal, Prussia, the Roman
States, Russia, Schleswig, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay. These
orders in council were published at various dates, from January 13,
1863, to February 6, 1866. All countries named except Denmark,
Greece, the Hawaiian Islands, Schleswig, and the United States
adopted the regulations in 1863.
With these various statutes and orders in existence, the
Scotia, a British steamer of the Cunard line, steering
west by north one-half north, was sailing about midnight on the 8th
of April, 1867, near mid-ocean, from Liverpool towards New York.
Her lookouts were properly set, and her lights rightly stationed --
that is to say, a white light was at her masthead, a green light on
her starboard or right side, and a red light on her port or left
side, all burning brightly.
Sailing at the same hour, equally about mid-ocean, the
Berkshire, a sailing ship belonging to the American
marine, was on her voyage from New Orleans to Havre, and with a
wind free, blowing from about south-southwest, was pursuing a
course southeast by east one-half east, as indicated by the
Page 81 U. S. 174
following diagram. The courses of the two vessels thus
intersected at an angle of exactly one point.
image:a
The
Berkshire had no colored lights anywhere, nor any
light but a white light, and this was at her bow, fastened to her
anchor stock and raised about four feet above her deck. Of course,
if the
Scotia should mistake this light for a light
fastened on the
masthead of the
Berkshire, she
would infer from its apparent proximity to the water that the
Berkshire was far off.
The
Scotia was first seen from the
Berkshire
bearing one point or so off the ship's port bow, at a distance
apparently of five or six miles. Then the steamer's white masthead
light only was seen.
Immediately on her sighting the steamer, which was at most from
fifteen to twenty minutes before the collision, her mate gave an
order to luff, and she did luff, so as to head more into the wind.
The effect of this was to make her go further to the south and thus
diverge farther from the course of the steamer. She continued in
this new direction ten or fifteen minutes, when, moving at the rate
at which it was proved that the vessels were moving, she could not
have been more than one or two miles from the
Scotia. Her
helm was then suddenly put to starboard, then steadied for a brief
period, then put hard a-starboard and kept there, thus pointing her
directly across the bow of the approaching vessel. By keeping her
helm hard a-starboard, she was made to
Page 81 U. S. 175
change her course constantly. The diagram on the preceding page
may perhaps assist the reader's comprehension. The dotted lines
represent the
Berkshire's movements.
Before she bore away, the red light of the steamer was seen by
her wheelsman, and probably by her lookout, if not indeed by her
master.
The
Scotia saw the white light on the
Berkshire in due time, and first saw it off her port bow,
from one to two points. Seeing a white light, the deck officer of
the
Scotia took the vessel for a steamer, and from the
proximity of the light to the water inferred that she was far off,
coming in fact just above the horizon, and accounting for the
nonappearance of the usual colored lights because he supposed that
they had not come up to view. [
Footnote 2] He thus not only supposed the
Berkshire to be a steamer, but judged that the supposed
steamer was at a much greater distance than it was in fact. As
already signified, the location of the light warranted the
supposition, and its color gave no indication that it was on a
sailing vessel. After its discovery, the ship's light opened on the
steamer's port bow; how much it opened was a matter somewhat
agitated by the witnesses and the counsel, though this Court
considered that matter immaterial, because if it receded at all it
indicated that there was then no danger of collision without some
change of course, and consequently no necessity to take measures to
avoid one. The weight of the evidence was that the ship had not
then turned her course northward, but if she had, it was still
proved that her light opened on the
Scotia's port side,
after it was first seen, and before the steamer's course was
changed. Soon after, and because of the ship's change of course,
her light began to close in on the steamer's bow, and then for the
first time was there any apparent danger of collision. Then the
Scotia's helm was immediately ported, then hard ported,
and observing that the ship's light still closed in, orders were
given, in quick succession, to half-speed, slow, reverse, and
Page 81 U. S. 176
back, but notwithstanding these orders, which were all promptly
obeyed, the vessels came together in the position indicated on the
diagram, and the
Berkshire with her cargo went right down
in mid-ocean.
image:b
The owners of the
Berkshire, one Sears and others, now
for themselves and the owners of the cargo, filed their libel in
the district court at New York to recover the loss sustained by the
collision. The libel charged, of course, that the collision
occurred through the fault of the
Scotia. The district
court decreed for the respondents. The view of that court was that
courts of admiralty were now required to take judicial notice of
the existence of the British orders in council, and of the fact
that so numerous maritime states had accepted them; that so general
and adoption by such states of one rule had made a rule and usage
of the sea; that by this rule and usage -- in other words, by the
law of the sea as it existed at the time of the collision -- the
Berkshire was bound to exhibit colored lights, and colored
lights alone; and that as she had not done so, she had no
remedy.
Page 81 U. S. 177
The decree therefore was, that the libel be dismissed, and the
circuit court affirming this decree, the case was now here for
review.
Page 81 U. S. 180
MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is plain that had the ship continued on her course after she
first saw the steamer's bright light, there could have been no
collision. And still more, had she not afterwards and when near the
steamer put her helm to starboard, she would have been out of all
danger. Even when she first sighted the
Scotia, she had
passed the point at which her course and that of the steamer
intersected. This is a necessary sequence from the facts that the
angle between the courses of the two vessels was exactly one point,
and that the light of the steamer, when first seen, bore from a
point to a point and a half off her port bow. Besides, when the
Page 81 U. S. 181
ship was first seen from the steamer, her bearing, it is clearly
proved, was from a point to two points off the steamer's port bow.
Such a bearing was impossible unless the ship had already crossed
the line of the
Scotia's course, and passed the point at
which the vessels could have come together unless one or the other
had taken a new direction. They must have passed with a wide berth
between had the ship made no change of her helm, or had she kept
her luff in obedience to the mate's order. But by putting her helm
hard a-starboard, she was made to change her course constantly till
the collision occurred. Even before she bore away, the red light of
the steamer was seen by her wheelsman, and probably by her lookout,
if not indeed by her master, doubtless in time even then to escape
harm. Had it not been then for the unfortunate order of the master
to starboard her helm, and bear away before the wind, this case
could not have arisen.
It must, however, be conceded that this of itself is not
sufficient to excuse the
Scotia if she failed to adopt
such precautions as were in her power and were necessary to avoid a
collision. Meeting a sailing vessel proceeding in such a direction
as to involve risk, it was her duty to keep out of the way, and
nothing but inevitable accident or the conduct and movements of the
ship can repel the presumption that she was negligent arising from
the fact of collision. But this duty of the steamer implies a
correlative obligation of the ship to keep her course and to do
nothing to mislead. Nor is a steamer called to act except when she
is approaching a vessel in such a direction as to involve risk of
collision. She is required to take no precautions when there is no
apparent danger.
Was, then, the
Scotia in fault? If she was, the fault
must have been either that she did not change her helm sooner, or
that she ported, or that she was unjustifiably late in slackening
her speed and reversing her engines. No other fault is imputed to
her. We have already said that she was not bound to take any steps
to avoid a collision until danger of collision should have been
apprehended, and we think
Page 81 U. S. 182
there was no reason for apprehension until the ship's light was
seen closing in upon her. Assuming for the present that she had no
right to conclude that the light was on a steamer and to maneuver
accordingly, and therefore that it was her duty to keep out of the
way, it is still true that all her duty at first was to watch the
light in order to discover certainly what it was, and to observe
its course and notice whether it crossed her own course. It is not
the law that a steamer must change her course, or must slacken her
speed the instant she comes in sight of another vessel's light, no
matter in what direction it may be. With such a rule, navigation
cannot be conducted. Nor is such a rule necessary to safety. It is
therefore no fault that, seeing the ship's light off her port bow,
apparently at a distance of several miles, the
Scotia
continued on her course without slackening her speed until that
light began to close in upon her. Then she ported her helm, the
obvious effect of which was to take her farther away from the
approaching vessel. Then she slowed her engines, stopped and
backed, until, at the time when the collision took place, she had
almost, if not entirely, ceased to move through the water. Had she
starboarded instead of porting, the movement would have turned her
toward the
Berkshire, and apparently would have rendered
collision more probable. Of the propriety of her slowing her
engines, stopping, and backing there can be no doubt. If now it be
considered that she had been misled by the nature and location of
the light on the
Berkshire, which indicated that the ship
was at a much greater distance than she was in fact; that
consequently the peril came upon her suddenly, leaving short time
for deliberation, and if it be considered that she had been brought
into this extremity first by the ill-judged and causeless change of
the ship's course, and second by the persistent effort of the
ship's master to cross her bow after he had seen her red light and
discovered certainly that she was a steamer, it would be unjust to
impute to her as a fault that she did what she ought to have done
had the approaching vessel been in fact a steamer, and that which
at all events seemed
Page 81 U. S. 183
most likely to avoid a collision. Certainly it was not her fault
that she did not know the
Berkshire to be a sailing
vessel. And in all human probability the measures taken by her to
avoid a collision would have been successful if they had not been
counteracted by the constant veering of the
Berkshire,
with her helm kept hard a-starboard.
Independently, therefore, of any statutory regulations, and
looking to the facts with reference to the old maritime law alone,
as it was before any modern legislation, we think the
Scotia was not chargeable with fault.
But we think the
Scotia had a right to conclude that
the
Berkshire was a steamer rather than a sailing vessel,
and that, when first seen, she was at the distance of four or five
miles, instead of being near at hand. Such was the information
given her by the ship's white light, fastened as it was to the
anchor stock on deck, and no watchfulness could have enabled her to
detect the misrepresentation until it was too late. Both vessels
were moving under similar regulations. The
Berkshire was
an American ship, belonging to the mercantile marine, and she was
required by the Act of Congress of April 29, 1864, to carry green
and red lights, which she did not carry, and she was forbidden to
carry the white light, which she did carry. By exhibiting a white
light, she therefore held herself forth as a steamer, and by
exhibiting it from her deck, instead of from her masthead, she
misrepresented her distance from approaching vessels. It is clear
the
Scotia would have been justified in taking her for a
steamer had she been known to be an American ship. But it is
insisted on behalf of the appellants that inasmuch as the act of
Congress is a mere municipal regulation, obligatory as a statute
only upon American vessels, the
Scotia, a British steamer,
cannot avail herself of it to fault an American ship, or to justify
her own conduct. Waiving for the moment consideration of the
question whether this position is well taken, it is yet true that
the
Berkshire was under the statute, though on the high
seas, and that the
Scotia was subject to and sailing under
similar regulations (the British orders in council of January 9,
1863); that the collision
Page 81 U. S. 184
happened in the known path of vessels navigating between the
United States and Great Britain, and that there was a reasonable
probability that vessels in that path would be either American or
British, and would therefore carry the lights prescribed by the
laws of those countries. The steamer might well, therefore, in the
absence of knowledge, act upon that probability, and in the
emergency into which she had been brought, might, without fault,
apply the rule of navigation common to the ships of both
countries.
But, to return to the question, we think that independently of
the act of Congress, considered as a mere municipal regulation, the
Berkshire was bound to show a green light on her
starboard, and a red light on her port side, without exhibiting any
white light, and that the
Scotia may set up in defense her
failure to carry such green and red lights, as also the fact that
she did improperly show a white light. And we think that her breach
of duty in these respects misled the officers of the steamer and
caused them to act on the assumption that she was a steamer, and
therefore under obligation to pass on the port side. If so, the
collision was solely due to the fault of the ship. We rest this
conclusion not solely or mainly upon the ground that the navigation
laws of the United States control the conduct of foreign vessels,
or that they have, as such, any extraterritorial authority, except
over American shipping. Doubtless they are municipal regulations,
yet binding upon American vessels, either in American waters or on
the high seas. Nor can the British orders in council control our
vessels, though they may their own. We concede also that whether an
act is tortious or not must generally be determined by the laws of
the place where the act was committed. But every American vessel
outside of the jurisdiction of a foreign power is, for some
purposes at least, a part of the American territory, and our laws
are the rules for its guidance. Equally true is it that a British
vessel is controlled by British rules of navigation. If it were
that the rules of the two nations conflicted, which would the
British vessel and which would the American be bound to obey?
Undoubtedly the rule
Page 81 U. S. 185
prescribed by the government to which it belonged. And if, in
consequence, collision should ensue between an American and a
British vessel, shall the latter be condemned in an American court
of admiralty? If so, then our law is given an extraterritorial
effect, and is held obligatory upon British ships not within our
jurisdiction. Or might an American vessel be faulted in a British
court of admiralty for having done what our statute required? Then
Britain is truly not only mistress of the seas, but of all who
traverse the great waters. It is difficult to see how a ship can be
condemned for doing that which by the laws of its origin or
ownership it was required to do, or how, on the other hand, it can
secure an advantage by violation of those laws unless it is beyond
their domain when upon the high seas. But our navigation laws were
intended to secure the safety of life and property, as well as the
convenience of commerce. They are not in terms confined to the
regulation of shipping in our own waters. They attempt to govern a
business that is conducted on every sea. If they do not reach the
conduct of mariners in its relation to the ships and people of
other nations, they are at least designed for the security of the
lives and property of our own people. For that purpose they are as
useful and as necessary on the ocean as they are upon inland
waters. How, then, can our courts ignore them in any case? Why
should it ever be held that what is a wrong when done to an
American citizen is right if the injured party be an
Englishman?
But we need not affirm that the
Berkshire was under
obligation to show colored lights or to refrain from showing a
white light merely because of an act of Congress, nor need we
affirm that the
Scotia can protect herself by setting up
the ship's violation of that act. Nor is it necessary to our
conclusions that the British rules in regard to lights are the same
as ours, though that is an important consideration. We are not
unmindful that the English courts of admiralty have ruled that a
foreigner cannot set up against a British vessel with which his
ship has collided that the British vessel violated the British
mercantile marine act on the
Page 81 U. S. 186
high seas, for the reason, as given, that the foreigner was not
bound by it, inasmuch as it is beyond the power of Parliament to
make rules applicable to foreign vessels outside of British waters.
This decision was made in 1856, in the case of
The
Zollverein. [
Footnote 3] A
similar rule was asserted also in
The Dumfries, [
Footnote 4] decided the same year; in
The Saxonia, [
Footnote
5] decided in the High Court of Admiralty in 1858, and by the
Privy Council in 1862. The same doctrine was laid down in 1858 in
the case of
Cope v. Doherty, [
Footnote 6] and in
The Chancellor, [
Footnote 7] decided in 1861. All these
decisions were made before the passage of the Merchant Shipping
Amendment Act, which took effect on the 1st day of June, 1863. By
that act, the same rules in regard to lights and movements of
steamers and sailing vessels on the high seas were adopted as those
which were prescribed by the act of Congress of 1864, and by the
same act it was provided that the government of any foreign state
might assent to the regulations, and consent to their application
to the ships of such state, and that thereupon the Queen, by order
in council, might direct that such regulations should apply to
ships of such foreign state when within or without British
jurisdiction. The act further provided that whenever an order in
council should be issued applying any regulation made under it to
the ships of any foreign country, such ships should in all cases
arising in British courts be deemed to be subject to such
regulations, and for the purpose thereof be treated as British
ships. Historically we know that before the close of the year 1864,
nearly all the commercial nations of the world had adopted the same
regulations respecting lights, and that they were recognized as
having adopted them. These nations were the following: Austria, the
Argentine Republic, Belgium, Brazil, Bremen, Chili, Denmark,
Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hamburg, Hanover, Hawaii,
Hayti, Italy, Lubeck, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Morocco,
Page 81 U. S. 187
Netherlands, Norway, Oldenburg, Peru, Portugal, Prussia, Roman
States, Russia, Schleswig, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States,
and Uruguay -- almost every commercial nation in existence.
[
Footnote 8] Had this libel
then been filed in a British court, the
Berkshire must
have been found solely in fault, because her white light and her
neglect to exhibit colored lights signaled to the
Scotia
that she was a steamer, and directed the
Scotia to do
exactly what she did.
It must be conceded, however, that the rights and merits of a
case may be governed by a different law from that which controls a
court in which a remedy may be sought. The question still remains
what was the law of the place where the collision occurred and at
the time when it occurred. Conceding that it was not the law of the
United States, nor that of Great Britain, nor the concurrent
regulations of the two governments, but that it was the law of the
sea, was it the ancient maritime law, that which existed before the
commercial nations of the world adopted the regulations of 1863 and
1864, or the law changed after those regulations were adopted?
Undoubtedly no single nation can change the law of the sea. That
law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two
nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of
nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities.
It is of force not because it was prescribed by any superior power,
but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct.
Whatever may have been its origin, whether in the usages of
navigation or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it
has become the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction of
those nations who may be said to constitute the commercial world.
Many of the usages which prevail and which have the force of law
doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of some single
state, which were at first of limited effect, but which when
generally accepted became of universal obligation. The Rhodian law
is supposed to have been the earliest system of marine rules.
Page 81 U. S. 188
It was a code for Rhodians only, but it soon became of general
authority because accepted and assented to as a wise and desirable
system by other maritime nations. The same may be said of the
Amalphitan table, of the ordinances of the Hanseatic League, and of
parts of the marine ordinances of Louis XIV. They all became the
law of the sea not on account of their origin, but by reason of
their acceptance as such. And it is evident that unless general
assent is efficacious to give sanction to international law, there
never can be that growth and development of maritime rules which
the constant changes in the instruments and necessities of
navigation require. Changes in nautical rules have taken place. How
have they been accomplished, if not by the concurrent assent,
express or understood, of maritime nations? When, therefore, we
find such rules of navigation as are mentioned in the British
orders in council of January 9, 1863, and in our act of Congress of
1864, accepted as obligatory rules by more than thirty of the
principal commercial states of the world, including almost all
which have any shipping on the Atlantic Ocean, we are constrained
to regard them as in part at least, and so far as relates to these
vessels, the laws of the sea, and as having been the law at the
time when the collision of which the libellants complain took
place.
This is not giving to the statutes of any nation
extraterritorial effect. It is not treating them as general
maritime laws, but it is recognition of the historical fact that by
common consent of mankind, these rules have been acquiesced in as
of general obligation. Of that fact we think we may take judicial
notice. Foreign municipal laws must indeed by proved as facts, but
it is not so with the law of nations.
The consequences of this ruling are decisive of the case before
us. The violation of maritime law by the
Berkshire in
carrying a white light (to say nothing of her neglect to carry
colored lights) and her carrying it on deck instead of at her
masthead were false representations to the
Scotia. They
proclaimed that the
Berkshire was a steamer, and
Page 81 U. S. 189
such she was manifestly taken to be. The movements of the
Scotia were therefore entirely proper, and she was without
fault.
Decree affirmed with costs.
[
Footnote 1]
13 Stat. at Large 58.
[
Footnote 2]
The "Rules concerning Lights," it will be remembered,
see
supra, pp.
81 U. S.
171-172, requires the white light of steamers to be such
as shall be visible five miles off, while the colored lights need
be visible but two miles off.
[
Footnote 3]
1 Swabey 96.
[
Footnote 4]
Ib., 63.
[
Footnote 5]
1 Lushington 410.
[
Footnote 6]
4 Kay & Johnson 367; 2 De Gex & Jones 626.
[
Footnote 7]
4 Law Times 627.
[
Footnote 8]
See Holt's Rule of the Road, page 2.
