1. A tax deed executed by a county auditor under a statute of
Minnesota of 1866 declaring that where lands sold for taxes were
not redeemed within the time allowed by law, such deed should be
prima facie evidence of a good and valid title in the
grantee, his heirs, and assigns, did not dispense with the
performance of all the requirements prescribed by law for the sale
of the land. It only shifted the burden of proof of such
performance from the party claiming under the deed to the party
attacking it.
2. The construction of a state law upon a question affecting the
titles to real property in the state by its highest court is
binding upon the federal courts.
This was an action of ejectment for the possession of certain
real property situated in the City of St. Paul in the State of
Minnesota. The declaration was in the form usual
Page 80 U. S. 307
in Minnesota. The plea was the general issue, and by consent of
parties a jury was waived and the cause tried by the court. The
plaintiff claimed the premises under a deed executed in 1864, by
the auditor of Ramsey County of that state upon a sale for unpaid
taxes.
The statute of Minnesota of March 11, 1862, under which the sale
was made, provided that certain lands sold for taxes of the year
1859, and
of previous years, and lands upon which
delinquent taxes were due on the passage of the act to any city, or
to the state, might be redeemed by payment of the amount of the
taxes, with interest and costs, on or before November 1, 1862; that
if any such lands remained unredeemed, or such delinquent taxes on
lands remained unpaid at that time, the lands should become
forfeited to the state, and that thereupon it should be the duty of
the county auditor to advertise the property for sale, stating that
such lands would be sold as forfeited to the state under the
provisions of the act, and the time and place of sale,
which
time should be the second Monday in January, 1863.
The statute also contained provisions requiring publication of
notices of the sale, prescribing the manner in which the sale
should be conducted, for the issue of certificates of sale to the
purchasers, and, upon the return of the certificates, for the
execution and delivery to him, or his assignee, of a deed in fee
simple for the premises, which should recite the sale and the fact
that the property was unredeemed. And the statute declared that the
deed thus executed should vest in the grantee an absolute title,
both at law and in equity, except where the tax returned delinquent
was actually paid, and
"that any person or persons having or claiming any right, title,
or interest in or to any land or premises after a sale under the
provisions of this act, adverse to the title or claim of the
purchaser at any such tax sale, his heirs or assigns shall within
one year from the time of the recording of the tax deed for such
premises commence an action for the purpose of testing the validity
of such sale, or be forever barred in the premises."
A statute of the state passed in 1866 provides that where
Page 80 U. S. 308
lands sold for taxes were not redeemed within the time allowed
by law, the deed executed by the county auditor should be
prima
facie evidence of a good and valid title in the grantee, his
heirs, and assigns.
The deed recited that the sale was made on the 11th of February,
1863, and did not recite any cause for disregarding the day
designated for the sale in the statute, namely the second Monday in
January, 1863. The deed also recited that the sale was
"for the sum of $337.80; being the amount of taxes for the years
1853, 1854, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1859, 1860, 1861, with interests and
costs chargeable on said tract of land."
After the deed was received in evidence, the defendant, to
maintain the issue on his part, produced as a witness the treasurer
of Ramsey County at the time of the sale mentioned in the deed, and
offered
to prove that the notice of the sale was
insufficient, but the plaintiff objected to the proof on the
ground that it was
incompetent and immaterial, and the
objection was sustained by the court. The defendant excepted. The
court thereupon found that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
for the possession of the premises in controversy, by virtue of the
tax deed, and rendered judgment accordingly, and the defendant
brought the case here on writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
We agree with counsel that the provision in the statute of March
11, 1862, that the tax deed executed by the county auditor should
vest in the grantee an absolute title, both at law and in equity,
except where the tax returned delinquent was actually paid, only
declared the effect of a deed such as the statute contemplated, and
did not dispense with proof of compliance with the preliminary
requirements of the act. The officer, in making the sale and
executing the deed, acted under a special power, and as in all
such
Page 80 U. S. 309
cases, was bound to keep strictly within the limits of his
authority. No attempt was made by the plaintiff to show the levy of
any tax upon the property, or its nonpayment, or that any sale was
ever had. He relied, to supply the want of such proof, upon a
provision of the statute of 1866, declaring that where lands sold
for taxes were not redeemed within the time allowed by law, the
deed executed by the county auditor should be
prima facie
evidence of a good and valid title in the grantee, his heirs, and
assigns. [
Footnote 1]
It is admitted that a deed executed under these circumstances
would, if valid on its face, have dispensed, in the first instance,
with proof of the previous proceedings, upon the performance of
which a sale only could be made. But it is contended that it was
essential to the admission of a tax deed, having of itself such
effect as evidence, that it should appear that the lands sold for
taxes had not been redeemed when the deed was executed and
delivered. And it is stated that this has been expressly adjudged
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota upon the construction of the
provision of the statute of 1866 cited by the plaintiff. [
Footnote 2] Such is undoubtedly the
case, and had the objection been taken when the deed was offered,
the deed would not have been admissible, in the absence of such
proof, to establish a title in the plaintiff. But the plaintiff is
precluded from availing himself of the objection here, as it was
not urged in the court below and is not covered by any of the
several objections presented by him.
It may admit of much doubt, as also contended by counsel,
whether the deed was not invalid on its face. The act of 1862
declares that notice of the sale should be given for the second
Monday of January, 1863. The deed shows that the sale took place on
the 11th of February following, and contains no recitals explaining
the disregard of the day designated by the statute and the
selection of a different day.
The act of 1862 also provides for sale of certain lands upon
which the taxes of 1859 and of preceding years were
Page 80 U. S. 310
unpaid. The deed shows that the sale was made for delinquent
taxes not only of these years, but also of the subsequent years of
1860 and 1861, and counsel have not called our attention to any
statute of Minnesota which authorizes a sale for the taxes of these
years added to the taxes of the previous years.
But it is not necessary to express any opinion upon these
objections until we have the entire statutes of the state on the
subject of these tax sales before us. There is one error in the
ruling of the court below which will require a reversal of the
judgment. Giving to the deed full effect as
prima facie
evidence of title, its validity was open to question by the
defendant. The statute does not dispense with the performance of
all the requirements of the law prescribed for the sale of the
land. It only shifts the burden of proof of such compliance from
the party claiming under the deed to the party attacking it. The
deed itself, when admitted, creates under the statute a presumption
that all essential preliminary steps in the assessment and levy of
the tax and sale of the property have been complied with. This
presumption the defendant desired to rebut. He offered to prove
that the notice of the sale was insufficient, but the offer was
rejected under the objection that the proof was incompetent and
immaterial. In this the court below erred.
Some criticism was made upon the form of the offer that it was
not to prove any particular fact, but a conclusion of law. It would
undoubtedly have been better for counsel to have stated the facts
he desired to establish, but no objection was taken to the form of
the offer; the objection was only to the competency and materiality
of the proof, and it would be unjust to the defendant to deprive
him in this Court of the benefit of his offer on grounds not
presented in the court below. That court evidently considered the
right of the defendant to question the validity of the deed as lost
by the operation of the 7th section of the act of 1862, which
declared:
"That any person or persons having or claiming any right, title,
or interest in or to any land or premises after a sale under the
provisions of this act adverse to the title or
Page 80 U. S. 311
claim of the purchaser at any such tax sale, his heirs or
assigns shall within one year from the time of the recording of the
tax deed for such premises commence an action for the purpose of
testing the validity of such sale or be forever barred in the
premises."
It is a sufficient answer to this view of the operation of this
statute that the Supreme Court of Minnesota has adjudged that the
statute does not apply to cases where the owner of the property
defends against a tax deed in an action of ejectment, and if it
were susceptible of such application, that the statute itself would
be in conflict with the Constitution of the state. [
Footnote 3] This construction of a state law
upon a question affecting the titles to real property in the state
by its highest court is binding upon the federal courts.
Judgment reversed and the cause remanded for a new
trial.
[
Footnote 1]
General Statutes of Minnesota of 1866, chap. 11, ยงยง 139,
140.
[
Footnote 2]
Greve v. Coffin, 14 Minn. 355.
[
Footnote 3]
Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480.
