Where an act of 1861 exempted from duty "animals of all kinds;
birds, singing and other, and land and water fowls," and a later
act levied a duty of 20 percent "on all horses, mules, cattle,
sheep, hogs, and other
live animals,"
held that
birds were not included in the terms "other live animals." The
second statute must be read by the light of the first.
The 23d section of the act of March 2, 1861, chap. 68, [
Footnote 1] provides, that
"The importation of the articles hereinafter mentioned and
embraced in this section shall be exempt from duty:"
" Animals, living, of all kinds; birds, singing and other, and
land and water fowls."
This provision being in force, an act of May 16, 1866, [
Footnote 2] was passed, which
provided:
"That on and after the passage of this act there shall be
Page 80 U. S. 163
levied, collected, and paid, on all
horses, mules, cattle,
sheep, hogs, and
other live animals imported from
foreign countries, a duty of 20 percentum
ad valorem."
In this state of legislation, and after the passage of the
second of the above-mentioned acts, one Reiche imported into New
York a lot of canary and other birds, on which the collector
exacted a duty of 20 percentum
ad valorem, which was paid
under protest. Reiche brought this suit in the court below to
recover the money. The only inquiry was whether living birds at the
date of this importation were dutiable.
The court below decided that they were, and judgment being given
accordingly the importer brought the case here.
Page 80 U. S. 164
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The act of 1866 in its terms is comprehensive enough to include
birds, and all other living things endowed with sensation and the
power of voluntary motion, and if there had not been previous
legislation on the subject, there might be some justification for
the position that Congress did not intend to narrow the meaning of
the language employed. If it be true that it is the duty of the
court to ascertain the meaning of the legislature from the words
used in the statute and the subject matter to which it relates,
there is an equal duty to restrict the meaning of general words,
whenever it is found necessary to do so, in order to carry out the
legislative intention. [
Footnote
3] And it is fair to presume in case a special meaning were
attached to certain words in a prior tariff act, that Congress
intended they should have the same signification when used in a
subsequent act in relation to the same subject matter.
This act of 1861 was in force when the act of 1866 -- the act in
controversy -- was passed, and it will be seen that birds and fowls
are not embraced in the term "animals," and that they are free from
duty not because they belong to the class of "living animals of all
kinds," but for the
Page 80 U. S. 165
reason that they are especially designated. It is quite manifest
that Congress, adopting the popular signification of the word
"animals," applied it to quadrupeds and placed birds and fowls in a
different classification. Congress having therefore defined the
word in one act so as to limit its application, how can it be
contended that the definition shall be enlarged in the next act on
the same subject when there is no language used indicating an
intention to produce such a result? Both acts are
in pari
materia, and it will be presumed that if the same word be used
in both, and a special meaning were given it in the first act, that
it was intended it should receive the same interpretation in the
latter act in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention.
[
Footnote 4]
If it be used in a different sense in the act of 1866, its
meaning instead of being extended is narrowed, for all animals not
ejusdem generis "with horses, mules, cattle, sheep, and
hogs" are excluded from the operation of the revenue laws. By the
act of 1861, living animals of all kinds, whether domesticated or
not, could be imported without paying a duty. The law of 1866 steps
in and imposes a duty on domestic quadrupeds, leaving the act of
1861 applicable to all other quadrupeds, and to birds and
fowls.
The case of
Homer v. Collector [
Footnote 5] is in principle not unlike this. The object
of that suit was to ascertain whether, under the tariff act of
1857, almonds were placed in the category of dried fruits, on which
a small duty was imposed. It was contended as the article was
popularly classed among the dried fruits of the table, with
raisins, dates &c., and as it was not named specifically in the
changes in the act of 1857, that it properly belonged to the
schedule providing for dried fruits. But the Court held that as a
duty had been imposed on almonds
eo nomine in previous
tariff acts, the article was not, for revenue purposes, within the
general term of dried fruit, although in popular language and
commercial usage such was its signification.
Judgment reversed and a venire de novo awarded.
[
Footnote 1]
12 Stat. at Large 193.
[
Footnote 2]
14
ib. 48.
[
Footnote 3]
Brewer v.
Blougher, 14 Pet. 178.
[
Footnote 4]
Dwarris on Statutes, pp. 701-766.
[
Footnote 5]
68 U. S. 1 Wall.
486.
