If a vessel seized by a French privateer within the territorial
jurisdiction of the government of St. Domingo for breach of the
French municipal law prohibiting all intercourse with certain ports
in that island be carried by the captors directly to a Spanish port
in the Island of Cuba, she may, while lying there, be lawfully
proceeded against and condemned by a French tribunal sitting at
Guadaloupe.
The possession of the sovereign of the captors gives
jurisdiction to his Courts. The possession of the captors in a
neutral port is the possession of their sovereign. If the
possession be lost by recapture, escape, or voluntary discharge,
the courts of the captor lose the jurisdiction which they had
acquired by the seizure.
The trial of a municipal seizure must be regulated exclusively
by municipal law. No foreign court can question the correctness of
what is done unless the court passing the sentence loses its
jurisdiction by some circumstance which the law of nations can
notice.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court as
follows:
This case differs from that of
Rose v. Himely in one
material fact. The vessel and cargo which constitute the subject of
controversy were seized within the territorial jurisdiction of the
government of St. Domingo and carried into a Spanish port. While
lying in that port, proceedings were regularly instituted in the
court for the Island of Guadaloupe, the cargo was sold by a
provisional order of that court, after which the vessel and cargo
were condemned. The single question, therefore, which exists in
this case is did the court of the captor lose its jurisdiction over
the captured vessel by its being carried into a Spanish port?
Page 8 U. S. 294
The seizure was indisputably a valid seizure, and vested the
lawful possession of the vessel in the sovereign of the captor. The
right consequently existed in full force to apply immediately to
the proper tribunals for an examination of and decision on the
offense alleged to have been committed. The jurisdiction of those
tribunals had attached, and this right to decide upon the offense
was complete.
When a seizure is thus made for the violation of a municipal
law, the mode of proceeding must be exclusively regulated by the
sovereign power of the country, and no foreign court is at liberty
to question the correctness of what is done unless the court
passing the sentence loses its jurisdiction by some circumstance
which the law of nations can notice. Recapture, escape, or a
voluntary discharge of the captured vessel would be such a
circumstance, because the sovereign would be thereby deprived of
the possession of the thing, and of his power over it. While this
possession remains, the
res may be either restored or
sold, the sentence of the court can be executed, and therefore this
possession seems to be the essential fact on which the jurisdiction
of the court depends.
The laws of the United States require that a vessel which has
been seized for violating them should be tried in the district
where the offense is committed, and certainly it would be irregular
and illegal for the tribunal of a different district to act upon
the case. But of this irregularity it is believed no foreign court
could take notice. The United States might enable the admiralty
courts of one district to decide on captures made for offenses
committed in another district. It is an internal regulation, to be
expounded by our own courts, and of which the law of nations can
take no notice. The possession of the thing would be in the
sovereign power of the state, and it is competent to that power to
give jurisdiction over it to any of its tribunals. There exists a
full power over the subject and an ability to execute the sentence
of the court. The sovereign power possessing jurisdiction over the
thing must be presumed by foreign tribunals to have exercised that
jurisdiction properly. But if the
res be out of the power
of the sovereign, he cannot act upon it nor delegate authority to
act upon it to his courts.
Page 8 U. S. 295
If these principles be correct, it remains to inquire whether
the brig
Sea Flower remained in the possession and in the
power of the sovereign of the captor after being carried into a
Spanish port.
Had this been a prize of war, we have precedents and principles
which would guide us. The cases cited from Robinson's Reports and
the regulations made by Louis XVI in November, 1779, show that the
practice of condemning prizes of war while lying in neutral ports
has prevailed in England and has been adopted in France. The
objections to this practice may perhaps be sufficient to induce
nations to change it by common consent, but until they change it,
the practice must be submitted to, and the sentence of condemnation
passed under such circumstances will bind the property unless the
Legislature of the country in which the captured vessel may be
claimed or the law of nations, shall otherwise direct.
The sovereign whose officer has in his name captured a vessel as
prize of war remains in possession of that vessel and has full
power over her so long as she is in a situation in which that
possession cannot be rightfully divested. The fact whether she is
an enemy vessel or not ought however to be judicially inquired into
and decided, and therefore the property in a neutral captured as an
enemy is never changed until sentence of condemnation has passed,
and the practice of nations requires that the vessel shall be in a
place of safety before such sentence can be rendered. In the port
of a neutral she is in a place of safety, and the possession of the
captor cannot be lawfully divested, because the neutral sovereign,
by himself or by his courts, can take no cognizance of the question
of prize or no prize. This position is not intended to apply to the
case of a sovereign bound by particular treaties to one of the
belligerents; it is intended to apply only to those neutrals who
are free to act according to the general law of nations. In such
case, the neutral sovereign cannot wrest from the possession of the
captor a prize of war brought into his ports.
A vessel captured as prize of war is then, while lying in the
port of a neutral, still in the possession of the sovereign
Page 8 U. S. 296
of the captor, and that possession cannot be rightfully
divested.
It is objected that his courts can take no jurisdiction of a
vessel under such circumstances, because they cannot enforce a
sentence of restitution.
But it is to be recollected that the possession of the captor is
in principle the possession of his sovereign; he is commissioned to
seize in the name of the sovereign, and is as much an officer
appointed for that purpose as one who in the body of a county
serves a civil process. He is under the control and direction of
the sovereign, and must be considered as ready to obey his commands
legally communicated through his courts.
It is true that in point of fact cruisers are often commanded by
men who do not feel a due respect for the laws, and who are not of
sufficient responsibility to compensate the injuries their improper
conduct may occasion; but in principle they must be considered as
officers commissioned by their sovereign to make a seizure in the
particular case, and to be ready to obey the legitimate mandate of
the sovereign directing a restitution. The property therefore may
be restored while lying in a neutral port, and whether it may or
may not be sold in the neutral port, the condemnation without a
sale may change the property if such condemnation be valid.
In cases of prize of war, then, the difficulty of executing the
sentence does not seem to afford any conclusive argument against
the jurisdiction of the court of the captor over a vessel in
possession of the captor, but lying in a neutral or friendly
port.
Do the same principles apply to a seizure made within the
territory of a state for the violation of its municipal laws?
In the solution of this question, the Court can derive no aid
from precedent. The case perhaps has only occurred in the wars
which have been carried on since the year 1793, and the Court, in
deciding it, finds itself reduced to the necessity of reasoning
from analogy.
Page 8 U. S. 297
The seizure, it has been already observed, vests the possession
in the sovereign of the captor and subjects the vessel to the
jurisdiction of his courts. The vessel, when carried into a foreign
port, is still in his possession, and he is as capable of restoring
it if the offense should not have been committed as he is of
restoring a neutral vessel unjustly captured as an enemy. The
sentence in the one case may be executed with as much facility as
in the other.
Possession of the
res by the sovereign has been
considered as giving the jurisdiction to his court; the particular
mode of introducing the subject into the court -- or in other words
of instituting the particular process which is preliminary to the
sentence -- is properly of municipal regulation, uncontrolled by
the law of nations, and therefore is not examinable by a foreign
tribunal. It would seem then that the principles which have been
stated as applicable in this respect to a prize of war may be
applied to a vessel rightfully seized for violating the municipal
laws of a nation if the sovereign of the captor possesses the same
right to maintain his possession against the claim of the original
owner in the latter as in the former case. If, on a libel filed by
the original owner in the courts of the country into which the
vessel might be brought, the possession could be defended by
alleging that she was seized for the violation of a municipal law,
and the right of the court to decide the cause would be thereby
defeated, then that possession would seem to be sufficiently firm
to maintain the jurisdiction of the courts of the captor.
Upon this point much doubt has been entertained. It is, however,
the opinion of a majority of the judges that a possession thus
lawfully acquired under the authority of a sovereign state could
not be divested by the tribunals of that country into whose ports
the captured vessel was brought -- at least that it could not be
divested unless there should be such obvious delay in proceeding to
a condemnation as would justify the opinion that no such measure
was intended, and thus convert the seizure into a trespass.
The judgment of the circuit court is to be
reversed.
Page 8 U. S. 298
CHASE and LIVINGSTON, Justices, dissented from the opinion of
the Court in these cases because the vessel, which was seized for
the violation of a French
arrete or municipal regulation,
was not brought into any port of France for trial, but was
voluntarily carried by the captain of the privateer to St. Jago de
Cuba, a Spanish port, and while lying there was, with her cargo,
condemned as forfeited by a French tribunal sitting at
Guadaloupe.
JOHNSON, J.
I concur in the reversal of the decision in the court below, but
on different grounds from those which influence the opinion of my
brethren. I had occasion in the case of
The Sarah to
express my ideas on most of the points arising in this case, and to
that opinion I refer for the reasons of my present conclusion.
To me it appears immaterial whether the capture was made in
exercise of municipal or belligerent rights, or whether within the
jurisdictional limits of France, where she is supreme, or beyond
those limits and upon the high seas, where her authority is
concurrent with that of every other nation. We find the property in
possession of the captor, under authority derived from his
sovereign, whose conduct cannot be submitted to our
jurisdiction.
The modern practice of nations sanctions the condemnation of
vessels lying in a foreign port, and that practice is not
inconsistent with principle.
The plaintiff below has lost all remedy at law, and must look
elsewhere for redress if he has sustained an injury.