Rogers v. Ritter
Annotate this Case
79 U.S. 317 (1870)
U.S. Supreme Court
Rogers v. Ritter, 79 U.S. 12 Wall. 317 317 (1870)
Rogers v. Ritter
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 317
Where a court on the preliminary examination of a witness can see that he has that degree of knowledge of a party's handwriting which will enable him to judge of its genuineness, he should be permitted to give to the jury his opinion on the subject, though he have never seen the party write nor corresponded with him.
Rogers brought ejectment against Ritter in the court below to recover a lot of land in San Francisco known by the name of Yerba Buena. The plaintiff having given in evidence various deeds and rested, the defendants offered a writing, dated Yerba Buena, December 5, 1845, purporting to be a petition by one Briones for the grant of the lot, under which was written an instrument dated December 7, 1845, purporting to be a grant of the lot by "the citizen Jose de la Cruz Sanchez, justice of the peace of the jurisdiction." The "grant" was objected to on the ground that the name of Sanchez was forged. To prove its genuineness, the defendant called three witnesses. One Sears, who had been clerk in the recorder's office of San Francisco for eight years, and having the especial charge of the records; R. C. Hopkins, who had resided in California for fourteen years, had had charge of the Spanish archives in the office of the Surveyor General of the United States for California for nine years, "whose business called upon him to investigate questions of the genuineness of documents," and who "thought that he had a facility from his profession of detecting writing which was not genuine;" and one Fisher, who had been in California for fourteen years and was secretary, interpreter, and custodian of the archives for over four years, and until its expiration, of the Land Commission of the United States, which sat in California under the Act of March 3, 1851.
In order to lay a foundation for his competency, each witness, as called, was requested to state whether he was acquainted with the handwriting of Sanchez and to give his
means of knowledge. Each and all answered that they were familiar with it, and told how they knew it.
Sears had frequently seen it in his office, and had many times made certified copies of the papers to which it was attached, for the use of the courts, and knew it to his own satisfaction. In speaking of it and the handwriting of another person, he said, "I have seen so many instruments and papers passing through my hands that these signatures (naming them) are like household implements with us." But he had not corresponded with Sanchez nor actually seen him write.
Hopkins had examined the correspondence of Sanchez, while justice of the peace, with the governor, and other papers in the archives to which his signature was affixed, quite often, and conceived himself, therefore, well acquainted with it; "I think," was his testimony, "no one living is so familiar with these California archives as I am." But he had not corresponded with Sanchez nor actually seen him write.
Fisher testified that he thought that he would know the signature of Sanchez because he had the custody, during the whole term of the board of land commissioners, of all the depositions taken by them, and acted as interpreter for those who could not speak the English language. The party making the depositions was required, as the witness testified, to sign them after one of the commissioners had administered the oath. Then they passed into Fisher's hands as secretary, who endorsed them and put them among the papers of the case. Sanchez's testimony with many others, was taken, and although Fisher could not swear he had actually seen him write his name, he believed he had, and at any rate he should know his signature from having seen it to the depositions.
The circuit court, after the witnesses had stated the manner in which they formed their knowledge of the handwriting of Sanchez, allowed them, exception being duly taken, to testify whether his signature to the grant in controversy was genuine or not. And they testifying that they believed it to be genuine, the grant was allowed to go to the
jury, no objection being taken to it from the fact of its purporting to be made by a "justice of the peace of the jurisdiction," A.D. 1845.
Verdict and judgment having gone for the defendant, the case was brought here.
It was one incident of the trial that Sanchez himself, who was alleged to have made the grant, swore that though he had been "a justice of the peace of the jurisdiction" in 1845, he had never made this grant nor any grant of the lot in controversy; as it was another that Hopkins, who was examined to rebut the evidence of Sanchez, testified that he
"knew it to be generally the case, or sometimes the case, that in regard to the genuineness of the signatures and acts of officers of the old Mexican government, the true test is not what they will swear to, but the testimony of experts. "