The Court, admitting that an administrator of a decedent
appointed in one state (that of his decedent's residence) cannot,
in the absence of statute, maintain an action in another state to
enforce an obligation there given to his decedent, yet refused to
set aside a decree given by it nine terms ago in favor of such an
administrator, who, after an appeal taken and perfected to this
Court by his decedent, in a suit by him to enforce an obligation in
a state where be was not domiciled, had been substituted by order
of court as appellee in the suit, the decedent dying and the
substitution having been made in the absence of all ancillary
administration, and without opposition by the debtor or by
anyone.
Lee, domiciled in New York, sold and conveyed in 1855 to Noonan,
domiciled in Wisconsin, a tract of land in the latter state, taking
his bond and mortgage for the purchase money. But there being at
the time a question as to the validity of Lee's title, he agreed
that if the title failed, he would not enforce the bond.
Noonan having made default in his payment, Lee filed a bill in
the federal court for Wisconsin praying for a sale of the mortgaged
premises, the payment of the mortgage debt,
Page 79 U. S. 122
and for general relief. That court, on an issue made as to
whether the title had failed or not, adjudged that it had not
failed, and giving judgment in favor of Lee, ordered a sale of the
mortgaged premises, and if the mortgaged property did not satisfy
the debt, that Noonan should pay the deficiency. From that decree
Noonan appealed to this Court, the appeal being the case known as
Noonan v. Lee, and reported in <|2 Black 500|>2d
Black 500. While that appeal was pending in this Court, Lee died,
and one Bradley having received from the proper authority in New
York letters of administration on his estate, made suggestion to
this Court of Lee's death and asked to be made party on the record.
The court granted the request, and ordered "that the said
administrator be and hereby is made appellee in the case." The
appeal coming on to be heard after this substitution of Bradley,
the administrator, as the appellee, the decree was at the December
Term, 1862, affirmed except in so far as it ordered Noonan to pay
any deficiency. On that minor point it was reversed on grounds of
practice.
From the time of the substitution of Bradley on the record, he
stood, of course, as the appellee in the case, and all the
subsequent proceedings in it from that date were made
accordingly.
After this substitution and this decree, this same Bradley, as
administrator, sued Noonan personally on his bond in the Circuit
Court for Wisconsin. One Ogden had, however, after the date of the
substitution and decree but before Bradley's suit on the bond, been
appointed by the proper authority in Wisconsin, administrator in
that state. And this appointment of an ancillary administrator, and
his investiture accordingly as such administrator, with all Lee's
assets in Wisconsin -- among which, as of course, was the debt due
by Noonan, domiciled there -- Noonan now pleaded in bar to
Bradley's suit, against him personally. The circuit court gave
judgment for Bradley, the New York administrator, but on the matter
coming here at December Term, 1869, in
Noonan v. Bradley,
reported in <|9 Wall. 394|>9th Wallace 394, on appeal from
that judgment, this Court reversed the judgment, declaring
Page 79 U. S. 123
very fully that Bradley, an administrator, appointed in New
York, could not by virtue of his appointment there enforce in
Wisconsin an obligation due to his intestate by a resident of the
latter state, there being in that state an existing administrator,
with letters granted by its authority.
In consequence of this decision, Messrs. N. J. Emmons and J. S.
Brown, in behalf of Ogden, administrator, as aforesaid, appointed
in Wisconsin, now moved the Court to set aside all the proceedings
in the case of
Noonan v. Lee (the case reported in 2d
Black) subsequent to the suggestion of Lee's death, and for an
order directing the clerk of this Court to certify to the court
below that the appeal of Noonan had abated because Bradley,
appointed administrator by a court of New York, was not the legal
representative of the deceased as to the already mentioned bond and
mortgage, and that Ogden was, and because the appellant, Noonan,
did not take measures to compel the appearance of the said true
representative, Ogden.
This motion the counsel argued followed as a corollary from the
decision of this Court in
Noonan v. Bradley in <|9
Wall. 394|>9th Wall. 394, for that the mortgage under which
Bradley had finally had a decree was assets in Wisconsin, and
assets therefore to which, as was elaborately shown in the opinion
given in the case just mentioned, Bradley, appointed by a foreign
jurisdiction, could have no right whatsoever. It may perhaps be
added that after the decision of this Court in
Noonan v.
Lee that Lee's title had not failed, Wisconsin courts decided
that it had.
Page 79 U. S. 124
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Particular reference to the nature of the controversy and the
prior adjudications in respect to the same are indispensable in
order that the motion and the effect of it, if granted, may be
properly understood.
Noonan, on the first day of October, 1855, purchased of Lee
certain real estate situated in Wisconsin by deed of warranty, and
gave his bond for the purchase money conditioned to pay four
thousand dollars in four equal annual installments, with interest,
and gave a mortgage on the premises to secure the payments as
specified in the bond, and the mortgage also contained a
stipulation that upon any default on the part of the mortgagor in
making the payments, including the interest and taxes as well as
the principal, the whole of the mortgage debt, with interest,
should, at the option of the mortgagee, become due and should be
collectible on demand.
At the time the conveyances were executed, the premises were in
the possession of one John J. Orton, holding the same adversely to
the grantor, in consequence of which the grantee required from the
grantor an agreement to the effect that if the title failed, the
bond should not be enforced, and that if any encumbrances existed
on the premises, the amount of the same should be deducted from the
stipulated consideration.
On the fourth of March, 1859, Lee filed a bill in equity in
Page 79 U. S. 125
the district court of the United states for that district,
exercising circuit court powers, setting forth that the grantee and
mortgagor had not paid either principal or interest of the mortgage
debt; that he, the complainant, had notified the party that he
claimed that the whole debt had become due, and praying for a sale
of the mortgaged premises, the payment of the mortgaged debt, and
for general relief.
Such proceedings were had in the cause that the court rendered a
final decree in the same, the court finding that the sum of five
thousand two hundred and sixty-seven dollars and twenty cents was
due to the grantor and mortgagee of the said premises, and the
decree also directed the sale of the premises, the payment of the
mortgage debt, and that the surplus, if any, should be brought into
court; that if the moneys arising from the sale were insufficient
to pay the mortgage debt, interest, and costs, the marshal, in his
report of the sale, should specify the amount of the deficiency,
and that the respondent should pay the deficiency with interest,
"and that the complainant may have execution therefor."
From that decree the respondent appealed to this Court, and at
the December Term, 1862, the appeal was duly entered here on the
calendar. When the cause was reached, the parties were heard and
this Court decided that the complainant, upon the proofs exhibited,
was entitled to a decree for the whole amount of the mortgage debt
by virtue of the special stipulation in the mortgage, although one
of the installments, according to the terms of the bond, was not
due when the bill was filed. Pursuant to that decision, the Court
affirmed that part of the decree, but the Court also decided that
in the absence of a rule of the court conferring such authority,
the court below could not enter a decree in such a case, that the
complainant should have execution for the balance found to be due
to him over and above the proceeds of the sale, and reversed that
part of the decree. [
Footnote
1]
Pending the appeal, however, and before the parties were heard
in this Court, to-wit, on the seventh of February, 1862,
Page 79 U. S. 126
the death of the respondent, John B. Lee, was suggested, and on
motion, leave was granted that the appearance of Alfred F. R,.
Bradley might be entered as administrator of the estate of the
deceased, and he was admitted as appellee in the case. Doubts
arising as to the validity of the title acquired by Noonan from his
grantor, he commenced an action of ejectment in the state court
against John J. Orton, the party in possession at the date of the
conveyances, and gave notice to his grantor that he might appear
and defend the title to the premises. Lee accordingly employed
counsel, but the decision of the state court, rendered in January,
1863, was that the party in possession was seized in fee of the
premises.
Both parties concede that Lee, when he died, was domiciled in
New York and that Bradley was duly appointed administrator by the
proper tribunal in that state. When Lee died, he also had effects
of value in Wisconsin, and in February, 1865, the party who filed
the motion, Thomas L. 0gden, was duly appointed administrator of
those effects by the proper tribunal having jurisdiction of the
matter in that state. On the sixth day of September, 1866, Bradley,
as administrator of the estate of John B. Lee, deceased, commenced
an action of debt against Josiah A. Noonan, counting on the
before-mentioned bond given by the latter to the decedent for the
purchase money of the said real estate, as more fully set forth in
the record. [
Footnote 2]
Three defenses were set up by the defendant to the suit:
(1) That the plaintiff was not and never had been administrator
of the estate of the deceased.
(2) That the deceased, at the time of his death, had effects in
that state, among which was the bond in suit, and that the
defendant was duly appointed administrator of those effects, and
that the letters issued to the plaintiff, as applied to the cause
of action in the declaration mentioned, were void and of no
effect.
(3) That the title to the premises had failed, the plea setting
up the judgment in the ejectment suit rendered in the state
court.
Page 79 U. S. 127
To the several pleas the plaintiff demurred, and judgment was
rendered against the defendant for the sum of seven thousand five
hundred and eighty-nine dollars and seventy-five cents, and the
defendant appealed to this Court, where the judgment of the Circuit
Court was reversed, the court holding that an administrator
appointed in one state cannot, by virtue of such an appointment,
maintain an action in another state in the absence of a statute of
the latter state giving effect to that appointment to enforce an
obligation due his intestate.
Based on the conclusion announced in that case, the proposition
of the party submitting the motion is that all the proceedings in
the case first mentioned, subsequent to the time when the death of
the respondent in that suit was suggested, were irregular, that the
administrator appointed by the tribunal of the jurisdiction where
the intestate had his domicile at his decease was improperly
admitted as appellee, and that the final decree in the case should
be set aside, and that a decree or order should be entered that the
suit abated at the death of the appellee in the appeal, and that
the clerk here should be directed to transmit a certificate to that
effect to the court below.
Apart from the novel character of the motion and the grave
doubts which arise whether the proposed certificate, even if the
party is entitled to a remedy, is an appropriate process to be sent
from an appellate to a subordinate tribunal, the Court is of the
opinion that the relief sought in the case cannot be granted, and
that the motion must be denied upon three grounds, either of which
is a complete and satisfactory answer to the application. They are
as follows:
1. That the administrator of the domicile where the intestate
resided at his decease was properly admitted as the appellee in the
case because, at that time, no ancillary administration had been
granted in the State of Wisconsin.
Admitted, as he was, without objection from the appellant, it
may well be doubted whether the appellant in this case,
Page 79 U. S. 128
inasmuch as his appointment bears date subsequent to those
proceedings, can be permitted to intervene, in the absence of
fraud, for the purpose of setting aside what had passed
in rem
judicatam before he was appointed, but the Court is not
inclined to rest its decision upon that ground, as the statute of
the state authorizes foreign executors and administrators to sue
its the courts of the state in cases where no executor or
administrator of the estate of the decedent has been appointed in
the state. [
Footnote 3]
Responsive to that, it may be suggested that the right so
conceded is subject to the condition that such representative party
has filed in the probate court an authenticated copy of his
appointment, but it is a sufficient answer to that suggestion in
this case to say that nothing appears in the record to show that
the condition, if it be one, was not fulfilled, and the Court is of
the opinion that a compliance, under the circumstances of this
case, must be presumed, as the record shows that this Court passed
an order that the appearance of the administrator be entered and
"that the said administrator be, and he hereby is, made the
appellee in this case."
2. Grant that an administrator appointed in one state cannot, by
virtue of such an appointment, maintain an action in another state
unless so authorized by statute, still it does not follow that the
proceedings in this case were irregular, as the suit was commenced
by the appellee in his lifetime and was prosecuted by him in the
court below to a final decree, and from that decree the respondent
appealed to this Court. All these proceedings took place while the
intestate was in full life, and it appears that the appeal was
pending in this Court at the time that his death was suggested and
that the administrator appointed in the jurisdiction of the
decedent's domicile was admitted as the appellee by the order of
the court, as before explained. He did not commence the suit, and
as he was the only administrator appointed, the court is of the
opinion that he was a competent party to appear and support the
decree.
Page 79 U. S. 129
3. Suppose, however, that neither of those propositions is
correct, still the Court is of the opinion that the motion must be
denied, as this Court, subsequent to the term when a judgment or
decree is rendered, possesses no power to review its own final
judgments or decrees. Where the merits of a case are decided in the
circuit court and the decree on appeal is reversed in this Court
and the mandate of the court is sent down directing the court below
to execute the decree, it is well settled law that it is too late
to call in question the jurisdiction of the subordinate court.
[
Footnote 4] Repeated decisions
of this Court have established the rule that a final judgment or
decree of this Court is conclusive upon the parties, and that it
cannot be reexamined at a subsequent term, as there is no act of
Congress which confers any such authority. [
Footnote 5] Second appeals or writs of error are
allowed, but the rule is universal that they bring up only the
proceedings subsequent to the mandate, and do not authorize an
inquiry into the merits of the original judgment or decree.
Rehearings are never granted where a final decree has been entered
and the mandate sent down unless the application is made at the
same term, except in cases of fraud. [
Footnote 6] Appellate power is exercised over the
proceedings of subordinate courts, and not on those of the
appellate court, and the express decision of this Court in several
cases is that the "Court has do power to review its decisions,
whether in a case at law or in equity, and that a final decree in
equity is as conclusive as a judgment at law." [
Footnote 7] Other cases to the same effect might
be referred to, but it does not seem to be necessary, as the views
of the Court from its organization to the present time appear to
have been uniform and consistent, as is sufficiently exemplified by
the cases to which reference is made.
Motion denied.
[
Footnote 1]
<|2 Black 501|>Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black 501; Rule
94.
[
Footnote 2]
<|9 Wall. 399|>Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall.
399.
[
Footnote 3]
Sessions Acts 1860, 24.
[
Footnote 4]
<|6 Cranch 267|>Skillern's Executors v. May's
Executors, 6 Cranch 267.
[
Footnote 5]
<|1 Wheat. 355|>Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1
Wheat. 355.
[
Footnote 6]
<|7 Wheat. 58|>Browder v. McArthur, 7 Wheat. 58;
<|10 Wheat. 442|>The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 442.
[
Footnote 7]
<|3 How. 424|>Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3
How. 424;
<|12 Pet. 492|>Ex Parte Sibbald, 12 Pet.
492;
<|18 How. 42|>Peck v. Sanderson, 18 How.
42.
