1. No judgment for the payment of money can be rendered against
the United States in any court other than the Court of Claims
without a special act of Congress conferring jurisdiction.
2. A receiver of a national bank whose operations have been
suspended by the Comptroller of the Currency for causes specified
in the national Currency Act in no sense represents the government,
and cannot subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts.
3. Nor can the Comptroller of the Currency, though he be sued
himself and submit to it, subject the government to the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to determine the conflicting
claims of the United States and other creditors in the funds of
such a bank.
Page 78 U. S. 200
4. It is doubtful if he has a right to submit himself to the
control of the courts in the discharge of duties specially
entrusted to him by law.
Terrell and others, creditors of the First national Bank of New
Orleans, which had failed and been put into liquidation, brought
this bill in chancery in the court below against one Case, who on
the failure of the bank had been appointed receiver of it,
Hurlburd, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, and one
May and Beauregard, citizens of Louisiana.
The prayer for relief was that a certain admitted debt due to
the United States from the bank be ascertained; that they
(the
United States) be charged with certain sums and required to
account for them, and that a writ of injunction issue restraining
the Comptroller from making a dividend of the funds of the bank
until this account be adjusted.
Case and Hurlburd, the receiver and Comptroller as aforesaid,
appeared and answered, the answer of the latter being put in for
him by the district attorney, and neither signed by Hurlburd nor
sworn to by him. In it,
"He submits, on behalf of the United States, to the decision of
the court the claims of the United States
to priority of
payment over the allowed claims of the creditors of said bank
that are not disputed."
The final decree, besides making a general order on the
Comptroller to distribute the funds of the bank in his hands
ratably among its creditors as the law directs, decreed against the
United States in favor of the creditors of the bank for the sum of
$206,039.91, and that no claim of the United States shall have any
priority in the distribution of the funds of the bank except as to
the bonds pledged to secure its circulation.
From this decree, Case, the receiver, and Hurlburd, the
Comptroller, appealed.
Page 78 U. S. 201
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is seen from the bill and decree that while the United States
was not made a defendant, and while it is well settled that it
could not be sued in the court below, the only relief prayed by the
bill was relief against the United States, and the only decree
rendered which was not merely formal was a decree against the
United States for over $200,000, and a further decree barring the
right to assert her priority as a creditor of the bank in the
distribution of its funds.
It is strange that in any court professing to administer the
English system of equitable jurisprudence, such a decree could be
rendered against anyone not made a party to the suit, and who had
in no manner appeared in the case; and it is almost incredible that
in any federal court of this Union, except the Court of Claims, a
moneyed judgment could be rendered against the United States.
The contrary has been so repeatedly decided that it is a waste
of time to reargue the proposition, which will be found fully
asserted in the recent cases of
De Groot v. United States,
[
Footnote 1]
United States
v. Eckford, [
Footnote 2]
The Siren, [
Footnote
3] and
The Davis. [
Footnote 4] In the case of
United States v.
Eckford, it was held that although in a suit in which the
United States was plaintiff, a setoff could be pleaded and allowed,
yet no judgment could be rendered for a balance found to be due to
the defendant by the verdict of the jury, either in the circuit
court, where the case was tried, or in the Court of Claims, where
suit had been brought on the verdict. It is true that in the two
last cases cited above it was held that in a case in admiralty,
where the
res was rightfully before the court and was
taken into possession by its officer without the necessity of suit
or process against the United States, it could be subjected to
certain maritime liens though the ownership was in the government.
But in these cases, the government came into court of its own
volition to assert its claim to the property,
Page 78 U. S. 202
and could only do so on condition of recognizing the superior
rights of others.
We are quite at a loss to know on what principle the
jurisdiction in the present case is asserted, for the briefs for
the appellees are devoted wholly to the merits of the controversy.
But we must suppose that it is claimed on the ground that the
receiver and Comptroller, both of whom appeared and answered the
bill, represent the United States, and can subject the government
to the jurisdiction of the court.
As to the receiver, the claim, if any such be made, is not worth
serious consideration. He represents the bank, its stockholders,
its creditors, and does not in any sense represent the
government.
Nor can such authority be conceded to the Comptroller of the
Currency. It may very well admit of doubt whether it is within his
competency to submit himself, in the exercise of duties specially
confided to him by acts of Congress, to the control of the courts,
and especially of those which can assert no such jurisdiction by
reason of their territorial limits. We are not called upon here to
decide this question. But we have no hesitation in holding that
however he may submit himself to the jurisdiction of those courts
and consent to be governed in his official action by their decrees,
so far as they affect rights of parties who may come into court and
be impleaded in the same suit, he has no authority to subject the
United States to such jurisdiction, and to submit the rights of the
government to litigation in any court, without some provision of
law authorizing him to do so.
There is no analogy in the case before us to suits against
officers of the customs or of the internal revenue to recover for
illegal assessments or collections of taxes or duties, for they are
suits against the officer for a tort or for money had and received,
and when a judgment is rendered against him, the government
protects him by paying it, because the money was received for its
use. But this is by virtue of statute, and the mode of proceeding
is pointed out and well defined, and the remedy is limited to cases
where the mode is strictly pursued.
Page 78 U. S. 203
In the answer filed for the Comptroller in this case, he says,
or is made to say (for it is neither signed nor sworn to by him)
that he
"submits, on behalf of the United States, to the decision of the
court the claims of the United States to priority of payment over
the alleged claims of the creditors of said bank that are not
disputed."
We have already said that the Comptroller has no power to
subject the United States to such jurisdiction.
But he here seems only to submit the question of the
government's claim to priority of payment, while the court not only
decides against this priority, but renders a further decree
requiring repayment of money had and received from the bank, and
the payment of money which the United States is supposed to have
assumed to pay in a contract with private parties not before the
court. If the government is liable to the bank or its receiver or
its creditors for either of these claims, it would seem that it
would be, in the first case, on an implied contract for money had
and received, and in the second, on the express contract to pay as
alleged. When such liability is denied or payment is refused, the
Court of Claims has jurisdiction, and no other court has. The
United States cannot be subjected to litigation growing out of its
relations to these banks in all the various courts in which their
affairs may be the subject of judicial controversy.
But it is useless to pursue the matter further. The only
substantial relief asked by the bill or granted by the decree is
against the United States. The manifest purpose of the proceeding
was to subject the government to a tribunal which could rightfully
exercise no jurisdiction in the premises. It was no party to the
suit, nor did any party represent its interests who had authority
to bind it.
Decree reversed with directions to the court below to
dismiss the bill.
[
Footnote 1]
72 U. S. 5 Wall.
419.
[
Footnote 2]
73 U. S. 6 Wall.
484.
[
Footnote 3]
74 U. S. 7 Wall.
152.
[
Footnote 4]
77 U. S. 10 Wall.
15.
