1. In controversies between citizens of different states, where
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States depends upon
the citizenship of the parties, if there are several co-plaintiffs,
each plaintiff must be competent to sue, and, if there are several
co-defendants, each defendant must be liable to be sued in those
courts, or the jurisdiction cannot be entertained.
2. Executors and trustees suing for others' benefit form no
exception to this rule. If they are personally qualified by their
citizenship to bring suit in the courts of the United States, the
jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that the parties whom they
represent may be disqualified, and if they are not personally
qualified by their citizenship, the courts of the United States
will not entertain jurisdiction, although the parties they
represent may be qualified.
3. The cases of
Browne v. Strode, 5 Cranch 303, and
McNutt v.
Bland, 2 How. 10, commented upon and explained.
4. When the citizenship of the parties is averred in the bill of
complaint, and it thus appears that some of the plaintiffs are
disqualified by their citizenship from maintaining the suit, the
defect may be taken advantage of by demurrer, or without demurrer,
on motion, at any stage of the proceedings. A plea in abatement is
required only when the citizenship averred is such as to support
the jurisdiction of the court and the defendant desires to
controvert the averment.
The eleventh section of the Judiciary Act enacts:
"That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance . . . of
all suits of a civil nature &c., where an alien is a party or
the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is
brought and a citizen of another state."
With this provision in force, R. M. Blatchford and J. B. Newman
filed their bill for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the
Susquehanna & Wyoming Valley Railroad & Coal Company to
them as trustees, to secure the payment of the company's bonds and
for the sale of the mortgaged property. The mortgage conferred upon
the plaintiffs the usual rights and powers of mortgagees, and
contained stipulations authorizing them to use different
Page 78 U. S. 173
remedies in case default was made in the payments provided.
The bill stated that the defendant was a corporation created and
organized under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania; that the
plaintiff, Blatchford was a citizen of the State of New York; that
the plaintiff, Newman, was a citizen of the State of Pennsylvania,
and that they as trustees sued solely for the use of Henry Beckett,
an alien and a subject of the Queen of Great Britain, and Joseph
Loyd, a citizen of New Jersey, both residing in New Jersey. The
defendant demurred to the bill on the ground that the plaintiff
Newman and the defendant corporation, being citizens of the same
state, the court had not jurisdiction of the cause. The court
overruled the demurrer, and an answer and replication having been
filed, the case was heard on the pleadings and a decree rendered
for the plaintiffs. From this decree the appeal was taken, and the
question presented for consideration here was whether the
jurisdiction of the federal court depended upon the citizenship of
the trustees, who were the plaintiffs, or of the parties for whose
benefit the suit was averred to have been brought.
Page 78 U. S. 174
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The eleventh section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 vests in the
circuit courts original jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature, at
law and in equity, when the matter involved exceeds, exclusive of
costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, in three classes
of cases: 1st, when the United States are plaintiffs or
petitioners; 2d, when an alien is a party; and 3d, when the suit is
between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a
citizen of another state.
In the last two classes, the designation of the party, plaintiff
or defendant, is in the singular number, but the designation is
intended to embrace all the persons who are on one side, however
numerous, so that each distinct interest must be represented by
persons all of whom are entitled to sue or are liable to be sued in
the federal courts. [
Footnote
1] In other words, if there are several co-plaintiffs, the
intention of the act is that each plaintiff must be competent to
sue,
Page 78 U. S. 175
and if there are several co-defendants, each defendant must be
liable to be sued or the jurisdiction cannot be entertained.
Executors and trustees suing for others' benefit form no exception
to this rule. If they are personally qualified by their citizenship
to bring suit in the federal courts, the jurisdiction is not
defeated by the fact that the parties whom they represent may be
disqualified. This has been repeatedly adjudged. It was so adjudged
as early as 1808 in
Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, [
Footnote 2] where the complainants,
though citizens of France, brought suit, one as residuary legatee
and the other as administrator
de bonis non of a testator,
who had been a citizen of Georgia, against the defendant, who was a
citizen of that state. Counsel, on opening the question of
jurisdiction, was stopped by the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
observing that the impression of the Court was that the case was
clearly within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,
that the plaintiffs were aliens, and, although they sued as
trustees, they were entitled to sue in the circuit court. This
ruling was followed in
Childress v. Emory, [
Footnote 3] and in
Osborn v. Bank of the
United States the Chief Justice laid it down as a universal
rule that in controversies between citizens of different states,
the jurisdiction of the federal courts depended not upon the
relative situation of the parties concerned in interest, but upon
the relative situation of the parties named in the record.
These authorities are conclusive of the present case. The
defendant is a corporation created under the laws of Pennsylvania.
One of the plaintiffs, Blatchford describes himself in the bill as
a citizen of the State of New York, and the plaintiff Newman
describes himself as a citizen of Pennsylvania, and they both
describe themselves as trustees, who sue solely for the use of
Henry Beckett, an alien and a subject of the Queen of Great
Britain, and of Joseph Loyd, a citizen of New Jersey. The demurrer
of the defendant raises the objection that the plaintiff, Newman,
is a citizen of the
Page 78 U. S. 176
same state with the defendant, and that the court has in
consequence no jurisdiction of the case. If there were no other
parties, the suit clearly would not lie, for the eleventh section
of the Judiciary Act only authorizes a suit between citizens of
different states, not between citizens of the same state. And the
objection, according to the construction we give to that section
and to the authorities cited, is equally available when a
disqualified party is joined with others who are qualified.
The cases of
Browne v. Strode, [
Footnote 4] and
McNutt v. Bland, [
Footnote 5] upon which the plaintiffs
rely, do not aid them. In the first case the action was on a bond
given by an executor for the faithful execution of his testator's
will, in conformity with the statute of Virginia, which required
all such bonds to be made payable to the justices of the peace of
the county where administration was granted, but allowed suits to
be brought upon them at the instance of any party aggrieved. The
object of the action was to recover of the defendant, a citizen of
Virginia, a debt due by the testator to a British subject, and was
brought in the name of the justices of the peace of the county, who
were also citizens of that state. It was held that the circuit
court had jurisdiction.
In
McNutt v. Bland, the action was on a bond given by a
sheriff of a county in Mississippi. By the law of that state
sheriffs were required to execute bonds to the governor of the
state and his successors, conditioned for the faithful performance
of the duties of their office, which bond could be prosecuted at
any time by any party injured until the whole amount of the penalty
was recovered. The action in the case cited was brought in the name
of the governor for the use of citizens of New York, against the
defendants, who were citizens of Mississippi. Upon demurrer it was
held by this Court that the circuit court had jurisdiction.
"In this case," said the Court,
"there is a controversy and suit between citizens of New York
and Mississippi; there is neither between the governor and the
defendants. As
Page 78 U. S. 177
the instrument of the state law to afford a remedy against the
sheriff and his sureties, his name is on the bond and to the suit
upon it, but in no just view of the Constitution or law can he be
considered as a litigant party; both look to things, not names; to
the actors in controversies and suits, not to the mere forms or
inactive instruments used in conducting them in virtue of some
positive law."
The court then cites the case of
Browne v. Strode, and
states the principle, on which it was decided, to be,
"that where the real and only controversy is between citizens of
different states, of an alien or a citizen, and the plaintiff is by
some positive law compelled to use the name of a public officer who
has not, or ever had any interest in or control over it, the courts
of the United States will not consider any others as parties to the
suit, than the persons between whom the litigation before them
exists."
There is no analogy between these cases and the case at bar. The
nominal plaintiffs in those cases were not trustees, and held
nothing for the use or benefit of the real parties in interest.
They could not, as is said in
McNutt v. Bland prevent the
institution or prosecution of the actions or exercise any control
over them. The justices of the peace in the one case, and the
governor in the other, were the mere conduits through whom the law
afforded a remedy to the parties aggrieved.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs are the real prosecutors of
the suit. They are parties to the mortgage contract negotiating its
terms and stipulations, and to them the usual rights and powers of
the mortgagees are reserved, and to them the usual obligations of
mortgagors are made. The right to use different remedies is
expressly provided upon default in the payments stipulated, and the
adoption of either rests at the option of the plaintiffs. So long
as they do not refuse to discharge the trusts reposed in them,
other parties are not authorized to institute or prosecute any
proceedings for the enforcement of the mortgage, or to exercise any
control over them.
The case is not one where a plea in abatement was required
Page 78 U. S. 178
to raise the question of citizenship. Here, the citizenship of
the parties is averred in the bill of complaint, and the consequent
defect in the jurisdiction of the court is apparent, and a defect
of this character thus disclosed may be reached on demurrer or
taken advantage of without demurrer, on motion, at any stage of the
proceedings. A plea in abatement is required only where the
citizenship averred is such as to support the jurisdiction of the
court and the defendant desires to controvert the averment. The
question of citizenship constitutes no part of the issue upon the
merits.
It follows, from the views expressed, that the decree of the
court below must be
Reversed and that the cause must be remanded with directions
to the court to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 1]
Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267.
[
Footnote 2]
8 U. S. 4 Cranch
307.
[
Footnote 3]
21 U. S. 8
Wheat. 669.
[
Footnote 4]
5 Cranch 303.
[
Footnote 5]
43 U. S. 2 How.
10.
