1. Statutes authorizing redemption from sales for taxes, are to
be construed favorably to the owners of the land, and particularly
when such statutes provide full indemnity to the purchaser and
impose a penalty on the delinquent.
2. Mrs. H., a resident at the time of Virginia, devised in
April, 1863, certain lands situated in that state, and also other
lands situated in the District of Columbia to N. in trust for two
married women. On bill filed by the
cestuis que trust, the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia appointed M. trustee in
place of N., and with the latter's powers and duties
Held:
That although the appointment was invalid so far as the land in
Virginia was concerned; and that B1. wits thus not legally trustee
of
that land, yet inasmuch as he was apparently clothed by
the decree of the court appointing him with the legal title and
acted as trustee, and was treated as such trustee by the
cestuis que trust, the tax commissioners under the Act of
June 7, 1862, to collect taxes in the insurrectionary districts,
and which provides that if the owner of land be under a legal
disability the trustee or other person having charge of the person
or estate of such owner may redeem the land sold for unpaid taxes,
were authorized to allow him to redeem the lands in Virginia sold
under the said act, in which such
cestuis que trust were
interested; that the commissioners were not obliged to inquire into
the validity of the decree; and that it was sufficient for them to
allow the redemption, when they found that the party offering to
redeem furnished
prima facie evidence of possessing the
character which entitled him under the statute to do so.
That M being thus clothed apparently with the legal title, and
acting under his appointment with the consent of the
cestuis
que trust, was a person "having charge" of their estate, and
was thus entitled to make redemption for them of the lands sold for
taxes within the meaning of the said act.
3. The 7th section of the amendatory Act of March 3, 1865, which
declares
"that no owner shall be entitled to redeem unless, in addition
to the oath prescribed by existing laws, he shall swear that he has
not taken part with the insurgents in the present rebellion, or any
way given them aid or comfort, and shall satisfy the board of
commissioners that the said oath is true,"
applies only to owners seeking in person to redeem, and not to
trustees, guardians, and agents redeeming for others whose property
they have in charge.
4. The voluntary residence of a person within the Confederate
lines during the late rebellion did not incapacitate him, under the
Act of July 17, 1862, "to suppress insurrection, to punish treason
and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and
for other purposes," which act makes null and void all
sales,
transfers, and conveyances, of any estate
Page 77 U. S. 465
and property, of persons engaged in armed rebellion against the
United States, or aiding and abetting such rebellion, who after
sixty days' warning and proclamation duly given and made by the
President, did not cease to aid, countenance and abet such
rebellion and return to their allegiance to the United States, and
which act prescribes proceedings to condemn such property, and
apply the proceeds to the support of the army, from making a last
will and testament, further, if at all, than as against the United
States.
5. Assuming (what is not decided) that a devise is within the
terms "sales, transfers, and conveyances," invalidated by the act,
and that a person who during the rebellion left loyal territory,
and went to and resided in and died in the rebel lines, is within
the category of persons for whom the warning and proclamation of
the President prescribed by the act was intended, the invalidity
declared is to be regarded as limited, and not absolute; and it is
only as against the United States that the "sales, transfers, and
conveyance," of property liable to seizure, are null and void. They
are not void as between private persons or against any other party
than the United States.
6. Where land sold under the said Act of June 7, 1862, has been
redeemed, the owner is entitled to recover it from the purchaser at
the tax sale, without showing that the certificate of redemption
has been forwarded to the Secretary of the Treasury, and that the
purchaser has been paid his purchase money by draft drawn on the
Treasury of the United States.
The seventh section of the Act of June 7, 1862, for the
collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts, after
directing the advertisement and sale of lands, upon which taxes due
the United States remained unpaid, after a time specified, enacts:
[
Footnote 1]
By a first clause, that the
owner of the land, or any
loyal person of the United States having any interest in it, may at
any time,
within sixty days after the sale, appear before
the board of tax commissioners, in proper person, and redeem it
from sale upon paying the amount of the tax and penalty, with the
interest and expenses prescribed, and taking an oath, if a citizen,
to support the Constitution of the United States.
And by a second clause, that if the owner of the land be
Page 77 U. S. 466
under a legal disability, the
trustee, or
other person
having charge of the person or estate of such
owner, may redeem
at any time within two years after the
sale.
An Act of March 3, 1865, amendatory of the act just mentioned,
enacts that when a redemption is made the board of tax
commissioners shall certify the fact to the Secretary of the
Treasury, and that he shall repay the purchaser, by draft on the
Treasury, the principal and interest of the purchase money; and
that the purchaser shall deliver possession to the owner
redeeming.
It also enacts [
Footnote
2]
"That no
owner shall be entitled to redeem unless, in
addition to the oath prescribed by existing laws, he shall swear
that he has not taken part with the insurgents in the present
rebellion, or any way given them aid or comfort, and shall satisfy
the board of commissioners that the said oath is true."
An Act of July 17, 1862, originating like the other two in the
exigencies of the late civil war, and entitled "An act to suppress
insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and
confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," enacts
by its fifth section, [
Footnote
3] that
"To insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion, it
shall be the duty of the President of the United States to cause
the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits,
and effects of the persons"
thereinafter named,
"and to apply and use the same, and the
proceeds thereof, for the support of the army of the United
States."
The section then enumerates six classes of persons whose
property is thus made subject to seizure. The fourth class embraces
persons "who, having held an office of honor, trust, or profit
under the United States, shall thereafter hold office in the
so-called Confederate States."
The sixth section enacts that
"If any person within any state or territory of the United
States, other than those named in the previous section, being
engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, or aiding or
abetting such
Page 77 U. S. 467
rebellion, shall not, within sixty days after public warning and
proclamation by the President of the United States, cease to aid,
countenance, and abet such rebellion and return to his allegiance
to the United States, all the estate and property, money, stocks,
and credits of such person shall be liable to seizure as aforesaid,
and it shall be the duty of the President to seize and use them as
aforesaid, or the proceeds thereof."
It continues:
"And
all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such
property, after the expiration of the said sixty days from the date
of such warning and proclamation,
shall be null and void,
and it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person
for the possession or the use of such property, or any of it, to
allege and prove that he is one of the persons described in this
section."
[The proclamation of the President was made July 25, 1862.]
The seventh section directs the proceedings to be instituted for
the condemnation and sale of the property seized.
With these enactments of June and July, 1862, in force, Mrs.
Louisa Hunter died, April, 1863, seized of a tract of land
consisting of sixty acres, situated in the County of Alexandria, in
the State of Virginia, leaving a last will and testament, by which
she devised the premises, along with certain real estate in the
City of Washington, to one W. D. Nutt, in trust for Marion Young,
her adopted daughter, and Emily Featherstonaugh, her niece, both of
whom were then and still are married women.
Prior to the war, Mrs. Hunter resided in the County of
Alexandria, in Virginia, but after the occupation of Alexandria by
the forces of the United States, she went within the Confederate
lines,\ and there remained until her death.
Immediately preceding the commencement of the war, Nutt held an
office under the government of the United States. This he resigned
in February, 1861, and in September following went within the
Confederate lines, and took
Page 77 U. S. 468
office under the Confederate government, which he held at the
time of Mrs. Hunter's death.
On the 29th of February, 1864, the land in Virginia was sold for
taxes due the United States under the first of the above quoted
acts of Congress -- the Act, namely, of June 7, 1862, providing for
the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts within
the United States; and at the sale one W. P. Corbett became the
purchaser, received the commissioners' certificate of sale, and
took possession of the premises under the title thus acquired.
In July, 1865, the
cestuis que trust, under the will of
Mrs. Hunter, filed a bill in the Supreme Court of
the District
of Columbia to obtain the appointment of a new trustee in
place of the one named in the bill, setting forth that the
testatrix had left a large and valuable estate, the greater part of
which lay within the district; that the settlement of the estate
was impossible, by the terms of the will, without the intervention
of the trustee named therein, or another in his stead, invested
with his powers and duties; and that they were informed that the
trustee named declined to qualify, or to accept the trusts reposed
in him.
Nutt appeared to the suit and answered the bill, admitting that
he was the person named in the will, and that he had declined to
accept the trust thereunder. The court thereupon, at the hearing,
adjudged that the complainants, the
cestuis que trust,
were entitled to the relief prayed, and by its decree appointed J.
D. McPherson, of Washington, D.C., trustee, in "the name, place,
and stead," "clothed with all the powers and charged with all the
duties reposed and vested in said Nutt as trustee, by the testatrix
mentioned in the will," first requiring of him the execution of a
bond in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, conditioned for the
faithful performance of his trust.
On the 10th of February, 1866, McPherson, as trustee, appeared
before the tax commissioners and paid to them the several sums
required for the purpose of effecting a redemption of the property
from the tax sale, and received from them a certificate of
redemption, stating the payments made
Page 77 U. S. 469
by him, and that he had taken an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States, and that Marion Young and Emily
Featherstonaugh, owners of the property, and married women at the
time of the sale, and still under the same disability, had sworn
that they had not taken part with the insurgents in the rebellion,
or in any way given them aid or comfort, and had satisfied the
commissioners that the oath was true.
Nutt, the trustee appointed by Mrs. Hunter's will, now brought
suit in one of the state courts of Virginia to recover the
property, and on the trial offered in evidence the certificate of
redemption against the objection of the defendant that the
redemption was illegal and did not sustain the claim of the
plaintiff. The court admitted it. To this ruling of the court the
defendant excepted.
The testimony being closed, the defendant requested instructions
thus:
1. If the jury shall believe from the evidence that Nutt, the
plaintiff, who sues as trustee, held a position under the
government of the United States, and resigned said office, went
voluntarily within the lines of the Confederate States, and
accepted office under the Confederate government, and held said
office at the time of the death of the testatrix, and that the said
Louisa Hunter was a resident of the County of Alexandria at the
time of the breaking out of the civil war, and after its breaking
out went voluntarily into the Confederate lines and resided therein
up to the time of her death, and that the premises in the summons
described were at all times in the military lines and under the
jurisdiction of the United States, then that said devise to the
plaintiff was inoperative to pass or transfer any title to him, and
he cannot therefore recover in this action.
2. That to enable the plaintiff to recover in this action, he
must show that the certificate of redemption was forwarded to the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the defendant repaid his purchase
money by draft drawn on the Treasury of the United States.
The object of the instruction prayed, the defendant stated
Page 77 U. S. 470
in his petition to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, was to
raise the question as to the effect and meaning of the sixth
section of the above-quoted act of Congress of the 17th of July,
1862, "to suppress insurrection, punish treason," &c.
The court refused to give the instructions thus asked for, and
the defendant excepted. Verdict and judgment having gone for the
plaintiff, the case was taken to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, which sustained the judgment. The case was now brought
here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act; the only ground
of error alleged in this Court being that there was drawn in
question the construction of,
1st. The Act of Congress of June 7, 1862, "for the collection of
direct taxes in the insurrectionary districts within the United
States, and for other purposes."
2d. The Act passed July 17, 1862, "to suppress insurrection, to
punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property
of rebels, and for other purposes."
3d. The Act of March 3, 1865, amendatory of this last act.
And that the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia was adverse to the right and title claimed under the said
acts.
Page 77 U. S. 473
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Several questions were raised and elaborately examined in this
case in the courts of Virginia, both in the lower courts and in the
Court of Appeals of the state, which are not open for consideration
here. The only questions which we can consider, under the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, arise upon the ruling of
the court admitting the certificate of redemption issued to
McPherson, and the refusal to give certain instructions prayed by
the defendant.
The seventh section of the Act of June 7, 1862, for the
collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts, after
directing the advertisement and sale of lands, upon which taxes due
the United States remained unpaid, after a designated period,
contains two clauses relating to the redemption of the land from
such sale. [
Footnote 4] The
first clause provides that the owner of the land, or any loyal
person of the United States having any valid lieu upon or interest
in the land, may at any time, within sixty days after the sale,
appear before the board of tax commissioners, in proper person, and
redeem the land from sale upon paying the amount of the tax and
penalty, with the interest and expenses prescribed, and taking an
oath, if a citizen, to support the Constitution of the United
States. The second clause provides that if the owner of the land
sold be a minor, a nonresident alien, a loyal citizen beyond the
seas, a person of unsound mind, or under a legal
Page 77 U. S. 474
disability, the guardian, trustee, or other person having charge
of the person or estate of such owner, may, in the same manner and
with like effect, redeem the land at any time within two years
after the sale.
By these provisions, persons entitled to make redemption are
divided into two classes. The first class embraces persons who are
residents in the country, and are not laboring under any legal
disability. They may well be supposed to have had personal
knowledge of the assessment of the taxes and of the sale made, and
for this reason, it may be inferred, their privilege of redemption
was limited by Congress within the narrow period prescribed.
The second class embraces loyal citizens beyond the seas,
nonresident aliens, and persons laboring under some legal
disability, to whom the reason for the limitation prescribed to the
first class was not applicable. To those absent from the country,
personal knowledge, either of the assessment or sale, could not be
justly imputed; and those under disability, if possessed of the
knowledge, might reasonably expect that the matter would receive
the attention of the parties entrusted with the charge of the
property. Congress, therefore, gave to the persons of this class a
much more extended period within which to exercise the privilege of
redemption, and allowed the redemption to be made by "the guardian,
trustee, or other person having charge of the person or estate" of
the owner. The position of the persons composing this class, absent
from the country, or under legal disability, was such that their
property would, in the ordinary course of things, be in the
"charge" of others, but, lest the latter might, from any cause,
neglect the interests of the owners, the period of redemption was
prolonged to two years. It was for the benefit of the owners of the
property, that they might not suffer from the remissness or
faithlessness of their guardians, trustees, or agents, that the
privilege was thus extended, and to secure that benefit the act
should be liberally construed. It is the general rule of courts to
give to statutes authorizing redemption from tax sales a
construction favorable to owners, particularly when
Page 77 U. S. 475
they provide, as in the present case, full indemnity to the
purchaser, and impose a penalty upon the delinquent. [
Footnote 5]
In this case, it appears to be conceded that the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia exceeded its authority in appointing
McPherson trustee, in place of Nutt, of the land in Virginia. That
court could not by the mere force of its decree transfer the title
to land lying without its jurisdiction from the party in whom it
was vested by the will of Mrs. Hunter. A court of equity acting
upon the person of a defendant may control the disposition of real
property belonging to him situated in another jurisdiction, and
even in a foreign country. It may decree a conveyance and enforce
its execution by process against the defendant, but neither its
decree nor any conveyance under it, except by the party in whom the
title is vested, is of any efficacy beyond the jurisdiction of the
court. This is familiar law, and was declared by this Court in
Watkins v. Holman, [
Footnote 6] the court observing that
"no principle was better established than that the disposition
of real estate, whether by deed, descent, or by any other mode,
must be governed by the law of the state where the land is
situated."
McPherson was not, therefore, legally trustee of the property in
Virginia, and if his right to interpose for the redemption depended
upon the possession of the legal title, his action might be treated
as that of a stranger to the land. But the absolute possession of
such title by him was not essential under the circumstances. He
regarded himself as trustee of the property. The
cestuis que
trust so regarded him. He professedly acted in their behalf
and for their interests. He was apparently, from the decree of the
Supreme Court of the District, clothed with the legal title. The
commissioners treated him as a person entitled to make the
redemption. They were not obliged to inquire into the validity of
the decree. They were not expected to enter upon investigations of
title any further than was necessary to prevent the impertinent
intermeddling of strangers. It was
Page 77 U. S. 476
sufficient for the commissioners to allow the redemption, when
they found that the party offering to redeem furnished
prima
facie evidence of possessing the character which entitled him
under the statute to make the redemption.
The trustee named in the will not having accepted the trust
reposed in him when the decree of the Supreme Court of the District
was made, it is reasonable to suppose from the subsequent conduct
of McPherson that he immediately took actual charge of the estate
for the
cestuis que trust, and was in such charge when the
redemption was made. If such were the case, and we think there is
little doubt of it, McPherson was by the very words of the statute
authorized, without regard to the validity of the decree, as a
person "having charge" of the estate of the owners, who were
laboring under disability by reason of their coverture, to make the
redemption; although from the ineffectual parol disclaimer of his
trust by Nutt, the legal title may have remained in the latter,
which required the present action for the recovery of the property
to be brought in his name.
It is further objected that, assuming that McPherson was
entitled to redeem, the redemption was ineffectual because he did
not take the oath required by the seventh section of the Amendatory
Act of March 3, 1865, which declares
"That no owner shall be entitled to redeem unless, in addition
to the oath prescribed by existing laws, he shall swear that he has
not taken part with the insurgents in the present rebellion, or any
way given them aid or comfort, and shall satisfy the board of
commissioners that the said oath is true. [
Footnote 7]"
But the objection is untenable. McPherson did not redeem as
owner, but as trustee of the owners, or as a person "having charge"
of their property. The act of 1862 distinguishes between owners
appearing in their proper persons and redeeming, and owners beyond
the seas or laboring under some legal disability and redeeming
through trustees, guardians, or persons having charge of the
property. [
Footnote 8] It
Page 77 U. S. 477
requires both of the owners redeeming in person, and of the
trustees, guardians, and agents redeeming for others, an oath to
support the Constitution of the United States. It specifies the
taking of the oath as one of the terms on which the redemption can
be made by owners and loyal persons having a lien upon or interest
in the property sold, when appearing in person before the
commissioners. And it subsequently authorizes a redemption by
trustees, guardians, and parties acting for others, "in the manner
above provided" -- that is, by making the like payments and taking
a similar oath. But the additional oath imposed by the act of 1865
is, in our judgment, required only of owners seeking in person to
redeem. It declares that "no owner shall be entitled to redeem"
unless he take the additional oath. If the requirement extended
also to owners beyond the seas or laboring under legal disability,
it could not in many cases be complied with, and the beneficial
object of the act, which was to secure to them the right of
redemption, would be defeated.
We have not overlooked the fact that in the present case the
certificate of redemption states that the additional oath was taken
by the owners. This circumstance is not entitled to weight because
the owners do not themselves make the redemption, and if they could
be themselves considered as redemptions, they failed to take the
oath to support the Constitution required by the act of 1862.
We proceed to consider the prayers for instructions presented by
the defendant and refused by the court. By the first of these
prayers, the court was requested to declare, in effect, that the
voluntary residence of the testatrix within the Confederate lines
incapacitated her from making a last will and testament, and the
resignation by the plaintiff of an office under the United States,
and acceptance of an office under the Confederate government
incapacitated him from acting as trustee under her will, and taking
the devise in that capacity.
The object of the instruction prayed, says the defendant
Page 77 U. S. 478
in his petition to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, was to
raise the question as to the effect and meaning of the sixth
section of the Act of Congress, passed on the 17th of July, 1862,
entitled "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and
rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for
other purposes."
The previous section of the act provides that
"To insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion, it
shall be the duty of the President of the United States to cause
the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits,
and effects of the persons"
thereinafter named, "and to apply and use the same, and the
proceeds thereof, for the support of the Army of the United
States." [
Footnote 9]
The section then enumerates six classes of persons whose
property is thus made subject to seizure. The fourth class embraces
persons "who, having held an office of honor, trust, or profit
under the United States, shall thereafter hold office in the
so-called Confederate States." The section concludes by declaring
that "all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such property
shall be null and void."
The sixth section provides that if any person within any state
or territory of the United States, other than those named in the
previous section,
"being engaged in armed rebellion against the United States or
aiding or abetting such rebellion, shall not, within sixty days
after public warning and proclamation duly given and made by the
President of the United States, cease to aid, countenance, and abet
such rebellion, and return to his allegiance to the United States,
all the estate and property, moneys, stocks, and credits of such
person shall be liable to seizure as aforesaid, and it shall be the
duty of the President to seize and use them as aforesaid, or the
proceeds thereof."
"And all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such property,
after the expiration of the said sixty days from the date of such
warning and proclamation, shall be null and void; and it shall be a
sufficient bar to any suit brought by
Page 77 U. S. 479
such person for the possession or the use of such property, or
any of it, to allege and prove that he is one of the persons
described in this section."
The seventh section of the act directs the proceedings to be
instituted for the condemnation and sale of the property
seized.
If the devise of Mrs. Hunter can be brought within the language
of this last section, it must be because a devise is embraced
within the terms "sales, transfers, and conveyances," and because
her "aiding and abetting" the rebellion, and her refusal to return
to her allegiance to the United States, are legitimate and
necessary inferences from her voluntary and continued residence
within the Confederate lines, for there is no direct evidence on
either of these latter points, nor any evidence tending to
establish either of them except such voluntary residence. Assuming,
however, that a devise is within the "sales, transfers, and
conveyances" invalidated by the act, and that Mrs. Hunter is within
the category of persons for whom the warning and proclamation of
the President were intended, we are of the opinion that the
invalidity declared is limited and not absolute; that it is only as
against the United States that the "sales, transfers, and
conveyances" of property liable to seizure are null and void; and
that they are not void as between private persons, or against any
other party than the United States.
The object of the provisions cited is manifest. It is declared
in express terms to insure the speedy termination of the existing
rebellion. The confiscation of the property of persons engaged in
the rebellion, and the appropriation of it, or its proceeds, to the
support of the Army of the United States, were supposed to have a
tendency to advance that object. The seizure of the property of
particularly designated classes, and of others engaged in the
rebellion, or aiding and abetting it, who should not heed the
public warning and proclamation of the President, was therefore
directed, as also the institution of proceedings required in the
courts of the United States for its condemnation and sale.
It was to prevent these provisions from being evaded by
Page 77 U. S. 480
the parties whose property was liable to seizure that "sales,
transfers, and conveyances" of the property were declared invalid.
They were null and void as against the belligerent or sovereign
right of the United States to appropriate and use the property for
the purpose designated, but in no other respect, and not as against
any other party. Neither the object sought nor the language of the
act requires any greater extension of the terms used. The United
States were the only party who could institute the proceedings for
condemnation; the offense for which such condemnation was decreed
was against the United States, and the property condemned, or its
proceeds, went to their sole use. They alone could therefore be
affected by the sales.
Any other construction would impute to the United States a
severity in their legislation entirely foreign to their history. No
people can exist without exchanging commodities. There must be
buying and selling and exchanging in every community, or the
greater part of its inhabitants would have neither food nor
raiment. And yet the argument of the defendant, if good for
anything, goes to this extent, that by the act of Congress "all
sales, transfers, and conveyances" of property of the vast numbers
engaged in the late rebellion against the United States,
constituting the great majority of many towns, and cities, and even
of several states, were utterly null and void; that even the
commonest transactions of exchange in the daily life of these
people were tainted with invalidity. It is difficult to conceive
the misery which would follow from a legislative decree of this
wide-sweeping character in any community, where its execution was
conceived to be possible, or confidence was reposed in its
validity.
We do not notice that part of the instruction prayed which
relates to the status of the plaintiff as an office-holder under
the United States just previous to the commencement of the war, and
subsequently taking office under the Confederate government, as it
was not his property, the sale of which is assailed. If he was
incapable of taking the devise, it was not from his participation
in the rebellion, but because
Page 77 U. S. 481
the testatrix was incapable of passing her property by will
under the act of Congress, a position which we have already shown
to be untenable.
The second, and the only other prayer for instruction presented
by the defendant, and refused by the court, which we can take
notice of, is this:
"That to enable the plaintiff to recover he must show that the
certificate of redemption was forwarded to the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the defendant repaid his purchase money by a draft
drawn or the Treasury of the United States."
This prayer was based upon a misapprehension of the seventh
section of the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1865, [
Footnote 10] which provides that when a
redemption is made the board of tax commissioners shall certify the
fact to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the secretary shall
repay the purchaser, by draft on the Treasury, the principal and
interest of the purchase money; and that the purchaser shall
deliver possession to the owner redeeming. These provisions only
prescribe the duty both of the secretary and purchaser when the
redemption is made, but they do not make the performance of the
duty of the purchaser dependent upon the previous performance of
the duty resting on the secretary. The act was intended for the
benefit of the purchaser, to enable him to obtain the repayment of
the purchase money and interest thereon, but the validity of the
redemption does not depend upon such repayment. That is a matter
between the purchaser and the secretary, with which the owner or
redemptioner has no concern.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia must be, therefore,
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
12 Stat. at Large 423, 424.
[
Footnote 2]
13 Stat. at Large 502.
[
Footnote 3]
12
id. 590.
[
Footnote 4]
12 Stat. at Large 423, 424.
[
Footnote 5]
Dubois v.
Hepburn, 10 Pet. 22.
[
Footnote 6]
41 U. S. 16 Pet.
57.
[
Footnote 7]
13 Stat. at Large 502.
[
Footnote 8]
12 Stat. at Large 423-424.
[
Footnote 9]
12 Stat. at Large 590.
[
Footnote 10]
13 Stat. at Large 502.
