l. The claims of American citizens against Spain, for which by
the convention (subsequently becoming the treaty) of February 22,
1819, the United States undertook to make satisfaction to an amount
not exceeding $5,000,000 were such claims as, at the date of the
convention, were unliquidated, and statements of which had been
presented to the Department of State or to the minister of the
United States. And within this class, on the said 22d of February,
were the claims of the late Richard W. Meade. And this was the only
class that the commissioners appointed subsequently, on the
ratification of the treaty, to pass upon claims had power to pass
upon.
2. The convention, as signed February 22, 1819, subject to
ratification within six months, though it was not ratified within
the time stipulated, was never abandoned, though some expressions
in the notification of August 21, 1819, by the United States to
Spain (notifying to that government that after the next day, "as
the ratifications of the convention will not have been exchanged,"
all the claims and pretensions of the United States will stand in
the same situation as if that convention had never been made)
indicated that the United States might be induced to refuse to
carry it into effect.
3. This notification did not, by the nonratification within the
six months, make revocable the power which citizens of the United
States, by filing their claims with it, had given their government
to make reclamations against Spain in their behalf, nor did Mr.
Meade in point of fact revoke the power which he had so given his
government.
4. Mr. Meade having subsequently to the appointment of
commissioners presented to them his claims not in an unliquidated
form, but in the shape of a debt acknowledged by Spain in a
judgment against it given by a royal junta or special judicial
tribunal of that country, made after the above-mentioned
notification by the United States, the commissioners properly
rejected the claims as thus made. They did not reject his claims in
their unliquidated form and as filed previously to the convention
in the Department of State and with the American minister.
5. The fact that before the said commission rejected the claim
of Mr. Meade in the form in which he had presented it -- the form,
namely, of an award or judgment by a Spanish tribunal for a sum
certain -- he requested the government of the United States to
procure from the Spanish government his original vouchers and
evidences of debt, under a clause of the treaty which obliged the
Spanish government to furnish, at the instance of the said
commissioners, all such documents and elucidations as might be in
their possession for the adjustment of the unliquidated claims
provided for by the treaty does not, even assuming that it shows
that he meant to present his claims in an unliquidated form, show
any cause of action against the United States over which the Court
of Claims could exercise jurisdiction.
Page 76 U. S. 692
6. The award of the tribunal of the Spanish government in favor
of Mr. Meade, made on the 19th May, 1820, was not, in that form,
included by the 5th article of the convention of February 22, 1819,
renouncing certain unliquidated claims then existing.
7. There having been no evidence in a finding of the Court of
Claims that an assurance, which that court found as matter of fact
had been given by the minister of the United States at the court of
Madrid to the government of Spain that a debt due by the last-named
government to Mr. Meade would certainly be paid if a treaty whose
ratification had been suspended was ratified, and which treaty was
afterwards ratified, was given in pursuance of any instructions
from the President or by virtue of any authority from the United
States, the said assurance is to be regarded as having been given
without authority, and therefore to be held void.
8. This Court does not agree with the Court of Claims in its
opinion that, on the facts found by it, the United States, by the
acceptance of the Treaty of Spain of February 22, 1819, and the
cession of the Floridas, unencumbered by certain private grants, to
a recognition of which as valid our government had objected,
appropriated the property of Mr. Meade, and that he acquired a good
claim against them for $373,879.88, for which they were not liable
legally and judicially except by and through the investigation,
allowance, and award of the commissioners appointed under the
treaty. But they do agree with that court in the opinion that the
decision of the commissioners dismissing the claim in the form in
which it was presented to them barred a recovery in the Court of
Claims on merits. And that the joint resolution of Congress of July
25, 1866, referring the case back to the Court of Claims after it
had been once decided adversely to the claimant, was not a waiver
of the bar, and did not allow that court to consider it upon merits
irrespectively of the dismissal by the commissioners.
9. This Court, in conclusion, expresses its regret that entitled
as Mr. Meade clearly was to prove his unliquidated claims before
the commissioners, he did not do so, and they observe that now the
only remedy of his representatives is by "an appeal to the equity
of Congress."
Richard W. Meade, of Philadelphia, a native-born citizen of the
United States, went to Spain towards the beginning of this century
and became engaged extensively in commerce with that country. He
was there during the invasion of the French under Napoleon, and
continued to reside there until the year 1821. While so resident,
he entered into numerous contracts with the Spanish government
after the year 1802 and before the year 1819 which involved
large
Page 76 U. S. 693
amounts of money, and his resources contributed to the support
of that government during its contests with the French. By this
means, Spain became largely his debtor. After the restoration of
the King of Spain to the throne, Mr. Meade was seized and
imprisoned by order of the government, confined for a long period
of time, and finally released only by reason of the active
interposition of the government of the United States in his behalf.
About the time of his release, our government and Spain were in
negotiations in regard to claims which citizens of the United
States were making upon Spain for wrongs done to them, in which
negotiations a cession of the region known as the Floridas to the
United States had been proposed. And on the 6th June, 1818, Mr.
Meade, being then in Spain, addressed a letter to Mr. Adams, our
then Secretary of State, informing him of a hint which he had
received that his just claims against the government of Spain, and
such further sum as he might advance, might be satisfied by a
cession of lands in that region, and desiring to know whether this
would interfere with the designs of the United States. In reply to
this letter, he was informed that no such cession would be
recognized if made after a certain date, to be fixed by the
contracting parties. Mr. Meade thereupon abandoned the idea of
getting satisfaction of his claim by a grant of land, and there
being now a prospect that a treaty would be made in which all
claims, including his own, would be provided for, he submitted,
January 17, 1819, the claim to the Department of State "for that
protection which his government might think proper to grant." The
claim, as sent by Mr. Meade to the United States, showed an
aggregate of near $400,000.
On the 22d of February, 1819, a treaty was signed [
Footnote 1] between the United States and
Spain by which the Floridas were agreed to be ceded to the United
States, we contracting that all grants made therein by Spain before
January 24th, 1818 (the date when the proposal for cession was
made) should be
Page 76 U. S. 694
confirmed to the persons in the possession, and both parties
agreeing that all grants made subsequently to that date should be
void. By the 9th article, the two governments reciprocally
renounced.
"All claims for damages or injuries which they themselves, as
well as their respective citizens and subjects, may have suffered
until the time of signing this treaty."
In the same article (one which brought Mr. Meade's notices
within the treaty) it was specified (Specification 5) that this
renunciation extended
"To all claims of citizens of the United States upon the Spanish
government, statements of which, soliciting the interposition of
the government of the United States, have been presented to the
Department of State or to the minister of the United States in
Spain since the date of the convention of 1802 and until the
signature of this treaty."
The 11th article of the treaty opened as follows:
"The United States, exonerating Spain from all demands in future
on account of the claims of their citizens to which the
renunciations herein contained extend, and considering
them entirely cancelled, undertake to make satisfaction for the
same to
an amount not exceeding five millions of
dollars."
It was agreed that there should be a commission "to ascertain
the full amount and validity of those claims;" such commission to
"hear, examine, and decide upon the same within three years from
the time of their first meeting." And it was agreed further
that
"the Spanish government shall furnish all such documents and
elucidations as may be in their possession for the adjustment of
the said claims, the said documents to be specified, when demanded,
at the instance of said commissioners."
The final ratification of this treaty was limited by its
terms to the 22d of August, 1819.
On the 10th of March, 1819, after the treaty had been ratified
by the United States, but before it was ratified by
Page 76 U. S. 695
Spain, the government of the United States notified to the
government of Spain that the article in the treaty which provided
that all grants of lands made by Spain in the Floridas after the
24th of January, 1818, should be declared null and void,
"had been agreed to on the part of the United States, with a
clear understanding that it included certain grants alleged to have
been made, in the course of the preceding winter, by the King to
the Duke of Alagon, the Count Rostro, and a certain Mr.
Vargas,"
and that the exchange of ratifications must be "with a full and
clear understanding" that these were "among the grants thus
declared null and void." In point of fact, the grants which the
United States insisted were by the treaty declared null and void
had been made prior to the 24th day of January, 1818 (the date when
the cession was proposed). And upon the notification given by our
government, the government of Spain refused to exchange
ratifications, alleging that such declaration or understanding,
with regard to the intent and meaning of the treaty, would "annul
one of its most clear, precise, and conclusive articles." And that
government continued to refuse to ratify the treaty until the 22d
of August (the limit of time provided for the ratification) had
passed.
On the 21st of August, 1819, the United States notified to Spain
that
"
after the 22d day of the present month, as the
ratifications of the convention of the 22d of February will not
have been exchanged,
all the claims and pretensions of the
United States, which, with the spirit of moderation, the love
of peace, and
the delusive expectation that all causes of
difference and dispute with Spain would be thereby adjusted and
settled, that consented to modify or waive,
will stand in the
same situation as if that convention had never been made."
After the notices above mentioned had been given by the
United States to Spain, and
after the time for exchanging
ratifications of the treaty of 22d of February, 1819, had expired,
Mr. Meade proceeded to prosecute his several claims before a royal
junta of Spain, [
Footnote 2]
which had been appointed to
Page 76 U. S. 696
hear and determine his claims by the government of Spain,
at
the solicitation and with the approval of the government of the
United States, expressed before the signing of the treaty of
22d of February, 1819. While the ratifications of the treaty were
held in abeyance as already stated, Mr. Meade refrained from
prosecuting his claims before this junta; but after the notices
given by the United States to Spain, to-wit, on the 31st of August,
1819, and at various times thereafter, he appeared before the junta
and produced, under and in presence of a decision thereof, all his
original documents, vouchers, and evidences of debt, and also
evidence as to his alleged personal injuries. And on the 19th day
of May, 1820, the junta, with the approval of the King of Spain,
made a decree by which it was adjudged that the government of Spain
was indebted to him upon his claims and accounts, and for interest
on them down to the time of the award, and for his personal
injuries, in a sum in gross, given in Spanish money, and
equivalent, in the currency of the United States, to $373,879.88.
The King of Spain at the same time approved, transmitted, and
delivered to Mr. Meade the formal certificate or evidence of such
award, which was, by the laws and customs of Spain, final and
conclusive upon the respective parties, and possessed all the
solemnity and verity of a judgment, and the record thereof, in
courts of the common law. Mr. Meade was, however, at the same time,
by the junta,
required to, and did surrender to the
government of Spain all his original documents, vouchers, and
evidences of debt establishing his claims. These were received by
the Spanish government, "cancelled," and carried, in its fiscal
department, to the various accounts to which they respectively
belonged, and were considered and treated by that government as
forever
discharged and merged. They were never restored to
Mr. Meade, nor to his representatives. Immediately after the decree
was rendered, the government of Spain and Mr. Meade each duly
notified it to the government of the United States,
which
government raised no objection to it, but, on the contrary,
expressed its approval to both the government of Spain and to Mr.
Meade.
Page 76 U. S. 697
In addition to what immediately precedes (the first four
findings, in substance, of the Court of Claims), that court went on
to find, in terms, as follows:
"
Fifth. -- After the award rendered by the junta,
to-wit, in August, 1820, the government of Spain resumed the
consideration of the treaty of 22d February, 1819, and of the
demand made by the United States, that the three certain private
grants of lands in the Floridas, made by Spain to her own citizens,
not included in the terms of the treaty, should be annulled. And
the Cortes of Spain, in which body was vested the sole
constitutional power to annul such private grants or cessions,
refused to annul the same until the United States should agree to
pay and discharge in full the indebtedness of Spain to the said
Meade, upon the award of the royal junta. And thereupon the United
States, by their minister at the Court of Madrid, gave to
Spain"
"a clear and distinct assurance that the debt due to Richard W.
Meade would certainly be paid to him by the United States if the
treaty were ratified by the Spanish government, and the cessions
(to the Duke of Alagon, and the Count Rastro, and Mr. Vargas)
totally annulled."
"And upon the faith of these assurances the Spanish government
annulled such three private cessions, and duly ratified the said
treaty, whereby the Floridas, free of and unencumbered by these
private grants, passed to the United States. And the said Meade
duly notified the government of the United States of the assurances
given by their minister, and that the Spanish government had acted
upon the faith thereof when annulling the private grants and
ratifying the treaty, which notice was duly received by the
President, and by him transmitted to the Senate while that body was
considering the acceptance or re-ratification of the treaty. And
the United States, with full notice and knowledge of all the facts
and circumstances set forth in this finding, did, on the 19th of
February, 1821, accept and assent to the treaty as ratified by
Spain, and became seized and possessed of the Floridas
thereby."
"
Sixth. -- And the said Meade, at the time the
acceptance of the treaty, as ratified by Spain, was under
consideration in the Senate, notified the United States that the
award of the royal junta was a good and valid certificate or
evidence of indebtedness, and that he protested against the same's
being appropriated by the United States unless express provision
should at the
Page 76 U. S. 698
same time be made for the full payment thereof by them exclusive
of any provision which might be made for American claimants, by the
terms of the treaty. And he also requested that such award held by
him be expressly excepted and excluded from any operation of the
treaty, and that he be allowed to seek the payment thereof from
Spain. But the United States, on the contrary, against the will and
consent of said Meade, did take and appropriate such indebtedness
of the Spanish government, and did
relinquish the same to
Spain and
discharge and release Spain from the payment thereof.
And such claim, demand, or award belonging to the said Meade, so
taken and appropriated, constituted and was in fact a part of the
consideration paid by the United States to Spain for the cession of
the Floridas, and the sole consideration paid to Spain by the
United States for an annulment of the three private
grants."
The treaty being thus finally ratified, commissioners were
appointed in accordance with its terms. The findings of the Court
of Claims give the subsequent history of the case thus:
"
Seventh. -- The said Meade, after the taking or
appropriation of his property or award by the defendants, as set
forth in the sixth finding, did demand payment therefor from the
defendants, but was not paid; and, on the contrary, he was
required to present his demand to the commissioners
appointed under and by virtue of the terms of the treaty of 22d of
February, 1819. And the commissioners,
upon such award or
decree of the royal junta being presented to them, did refuse
to allow the same; and on the contrary, did determine and decide
that the only claims against Spain which they had authority to
investigate and allow were claims existing prior to the date of the
treaty of 22d of February, 1819, and that inasmuch as the award or
decree of the royal junta was subsequent to the date of the treaty,
they had no authority to investigate or allow it; and the
commissioners accordingly did, on the 29th day of May, 1824, reject
and dismiss the same."
The next finding had reference to a matter which made another
topic in the case. It was thus:
Eighth. -- As soon as the commissioners notified the
said Meade of their determination to reject his demand for the
payment of
Page 76 U. S. 699
his award by the royal junta, but before their final decision or
rejection of the same, he duly requested, to-wit, on the 17th of
April, 1823, the defendants to procure from the Spanish government
his original vouchers and evidences of indebtedness described in
the fourth finding, and the defendants accordingly did request the
Spanish government to furnish and transmit the same to them. But
the Spanish government did positively refuse to produce and deliver
up such vouchers and evidences of indebtedness upon the ground that
the award of the royal junta was a judicial decree, and final and
conclusive upon the parties by the laws and customs of Spain, and
that the said vouchers were merged therein, and had been given up
to and duly filed and credited in the department of finance. And
the Spanish government did subsequently assure the defendants that
such cancelled vouchers would be given up as requested; but the
same never were so produced and given up, and have ever since been
and are still held by the government of Spain. And by reason of
such refusal and neglect on the part of Spain to deliver up and
surrender such vouchers, the commission never considered or allowed
the same, nor any portion of the demand of the said Meade. And on
the contrary, the commission allowed the claims of other persons
existing prior to the date of the treaty, to an amount in the
aggregate of $5,454,545.13. And the defendants thereupon paid away
upon such allowed claims
pro rata the sum of $5,000,000,
being the whole of the amount provided by said treaty and the acts
of Congress in furtherance for the liquidation thereof. And on the
8th of June, 1824, after making such awards, the said commission
expired.
Being thus unable to proceed further in any way before the
commission, Mr. Meade brought the matter before Congress. It was
steadily kept before the attention of that body until the
establishment of the Court of Claims. After the establishment of
the Court of Claims, 11th of February, 1856, the Senate, by
resolution, referred the case to that court for adjudication, and
on the 17th of October, 1859, a decision was given (by a divided
court) adverse to the claim.
At that time, the decisions of the court were reported to
Congress, and the claim went back and received the further
Page 76 U. S. 700
consideration of Congress. In 1863, the Court of Claims was
reorganized by an act of Congress, [
Footnote 3] which gave it jurisdiction over private claims
against the government,
"founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an
executive department, or upon
any contract, express
or
implied, with the government of the United States,"
and subsequently to this, Congress by a joint resolution
reciting that doubts were entertained whether the claim of the
estate of Mr. Meade was within a section of the said act,
resolved
"That the said claim be and the same hereby is referred to the
Court of Claims for adjudication thereof pursuant to authority
conferred upon said court by any existing law to examine and decide
claims against the United States."
The court then heard the case anew, and in accordance with the
rules laid down by this Court regulating appeals from the Court of
Claims, [
Footnote 4] made a
finding, which was meant to be a finding of facts, and reported
also the conclusions in law of the court upon them. The "finding of
facts" is given in what precedes. It purported to be made in
accordance with the rule of this Court which should govern such
finding, a rule in these words:
"The facts so found are to be the
ultimate facts or
propositions which the evidence shall establish in the nature of a
special verdict, and
not the evidence on which these ultimate
facts are founded."
Upon the findings of fact as made by it, the Court of Claims, as
a conclusion of law, decided:
1. That by the acceptance of the Treaty with Spain of 22
February, 1819, and the cession of the Floridas, free of and
unencumbered by the three private grants, the United States took
and appropriated the property of Mr. Meade, and that he thereby, on
the 19th of February, 1821, acquired a good and valid claim against
them for $373,879.88.
2. That the United States were not liable legally and judicially
for such appropriation so taken for the public use,
Page 76 U. S. 701
except by and through the investigation, allowance, and award of
the commission appointed by the United States, under and in
pursuance of the Treaty with Spain of 22d of February, 1819, and
that the decision of such commission dismissing the same was final
and conclusive upon the claimant, and bars a recovery upon the
merits in this Court.
3. That the joint resolution, 25 July, 1866, referring back this
case after the same had been once decided by the former Court of
Claims adversely to the claimant, was not a waiver of the said bar,
and did not allow this Court to adjudge and decide the case upon
the merits irrespective of the decision and dismissal by the said
commission.
And that judgment should be rendered herein for the defendants,
and the petition be dismissed.
From this decree the representative of Mr. Meade took an appeal
here.
Page 76 U. S. 709
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Private claims against the government of the United States,
founded upon any law of Congress or upon any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied,
with the government are within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims, as appears by the second section of the act passed to amend
the act establishing that court. [
Footnote 5]
Comprehensive as that provision is, still doubts were
entertained whether the claim of the appellant was not excluded
from the jurisdiction of the court by the ninth section of the
amendatory act, but all doubt upon the subject was removed by the
joint resolution subsequently passed, by which Congress,
Page 76 U. S. 710
in express terms, referred the claim to that court for
adjudication, to be examined and decided in the same manner as
other claims against the United States under existing laws.
[
Footnote 6]
I. Pursuant to that authority, the appellant, as the
representative of the deceased claimant, presented his petition to
the Court of Claims, setting forth very fully the nature of his
alleged cause of action and the ground upon which he claims to
recover in this case. His ancestor, the decedent, was a native-born
citizen of the United States. Early in the present century, he went
to Spain, and while resident there became extensively engaged in
commerce with that country. He was there during the invasion of the
French under Napoleon, and continued to reside there until the
treaty of amity, settlement and limits between Spain and the United
States was ratified by both parties. Throughout that period, he was
constantly engaged in mercantile pursuits, and he also entered into
numerous contracts with the government of that country prior to the
date of the treaty, by means of which Spain became very largely his
debtor.
Part of his claims consisted of fourteen unliquidated accounts
for goods sold and delivered, and it also appears that he was
illegally arrested during that period, and that he was imprisoned
by the order of the government, for which wrongs and personal
injuries he also held large unliquidated claims. Unable to regain
his freedom from the unjust imprisonment, he sought the aid of the
United States, and it appears that it was not until our government
interfered that he was released from his confinement. Both before
and after the date of the treaty, he invoked the aid of the
government of the United States in collecting his claims, as well
those arising from contracts as those arising from unjust
imprisonment and personal injuries.
Prior to the date of the treaty, the claimant filed in the
office of the Secretary of State a notice of his claims against
that government, amounting, as he alleged, to four hundred
Page 76 U. S. 711
thousand dollars, and the finding of the court below shows that
the notice so filed was one of the notices referred to and included
in the treaty between the two countries. Reclamations were also
made by many other citizens of the United States upon Spain for
wrongs and injuries suffered by them through the acts or official
orders of that government, notices of which were either filed in
the State Department or had been presented to the minister of the
United States resident in that country. Questions of great
magnitude also touching treaty obligations previously contracted,
the settlement of disputed territorial limits, and the cession of
new territorial possessions were under diplomatic discussion
between the plenipotentiaries of the two governments.
Pending these reclamations, and at a moment when the state of
the negotiations presented strong hopes that they might terminate
successfully, the claimant informed the Secretary of State that it
had been intimated to him that if he would advance a further sum of
money to that government, he might procure a grant of lands in
Florida sufficient to cover the whole amount of his claims.
Evidently his purpose was to ascertain whether such a grant, if
made, would be sanctioned and respected by the United States in
case the then pending negotiations should be successful and Florida
should be ceded to our jurisdiction.
II. Equal and exact justice to all the claimants was what our
government was endeavoring to secure by the negotiations, and of
course the suggestion received no encouragement whatever, as it
contemplated a separate provision for one to the exclusion of the
rest. On the contrary, the reply of the Secretary was to the effect
that if the treaty of cession was concluded, it would contain a
provision that all grants made after a given date, to be fixed by
the contracting parties, should be null and of no effect.
Influenced by that reply, he abandoned any further attempt to
collect his claims by procuring a grant of land and submitted the
same to the State Department "for that protection which his
government may think proper to grant."
On the twenty-second of February, 1819, the treaty of
Page 76 U. S. 712
amity, settlement and limits was signed by the respective
plenipotentiaries of the two countries, and the Senate of the
United States ratified the same on the twenty-fourth of the same
month. [
Footnote 7]
All the territories which belonged to Spain situated to the
eastward of the Mississippi, known by the name of East and West
Florida, were agreed to be ceded to the United States in full
property and sovereignty, the United States contracting that all
the grants of land made therein by Spain or by her lawful
authorities before the twenty-fourth of January, 1818, the date
when the first proposal for the cession was made, shall be ratified
and confirmed to the persons in the possession of the lands to the
same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories
had remained under the dominion of the former sovereign, but the
contracting parties also stipulated in the same article of the
treaty that all grants made subsequent to that date "are hereby
declared and agreed to be null and void."
Animated with a desire of conciliation and with the object of
putting an end to all differences existing between them, the
contracting parties reciprocally renounced all claims for damages
which they themselves or their respective citizens and subjects
"have suffered until the time of signing this treaty." Such claims
for damages so renounced by the respective parties, on the one side
or the other, were classified in the ninth article of the treaty
under different heads, but it will not be necessary to refer to any
of the classifications with much particularity except to the fifth
class renounced by the United States, which releases all claims of
our citizens "until the signature of this treaty," statements of
which soliciting the interposition of the government of the United
States have been presented to the Department of State or to the
minister of the United States subsequent to the antecedent
convention between the two countries.
Claims to which the described renunciation extends were declared
by the eleventh article of the treaty to be entirely cancelled, and
the United States contracted not only to
Page 76 U. S. 713
exonerate Spain from all demands in future on account of such
claims, but also "to make satisfaction to their citizens for the
same to an amount not exceeding five millions of dollars."
Subsequent demand by the United States for any such claim was
entirely prohibited, and the United States also contracted to
appoint three commissioners to ascertain and adjudicate the full
amount of all such claims, and the stipulation was that the
commissioners should receive, examine, and decide upon the amount
and validity of all the claims of citizens of the United States so
renounced and cancelled. They were also authorized to hear and
examine on oath every question relative to the said claims and to
receive all suitable authentic testimony concerning the same, and
the sovereign of Spain contracted to furnish all such documents and
elucidations as were in the possession of that government for the
adjustment of the claims according to the principles of justice,
the law of nations, and the stipulations of the prior treaty
between the contracting parties.
III. Viewed in the light of these several suggestions nothing
can be more certain than the conclusion that the claims in
question, at the time the treaty was signed, were included in its
provisions, and
"that the authority and the trust of examining, ascertaining,
and deciding upon their amount and validity were solely and
exclusively committed to the commissioners"
to be appointed under the treaty. Beyond question, they were at
that date unliquidated claims of a citizen of the United States,
statements of which, soliciting the interposition of our
government, had not only been presented to the Department of State,
but also to the minister of the United States, showing to a
demonstration that the claims of the ancestor of the appellant were
within the very words of the treaty.
Prompt action by the United States in ratifying the treaty did
not, however, have the effect to secure corresponding promptitude
on the part of the other contracting party. Delay ensued which for
a time was wholly unexplained, but it soon came to be understood
that it arose from the fact that pending the negotiations, three
grants of large tracts of
Page 76 U. S. 714
land situated in the ceded territories had been made which our
government regarded as null and void under the closing provision of
the eighth article of the treaty. Determined not to protect those
grants, the Secretary of State instructed our minister to explain
and declare, upon the exchange of ratifications, that the exchange
was made
"with a full and clear understanding between the
plenipotentiaries of both the high contracting parties that these
grants were among the grants thus declared null and void."
On the receipt of that dispatch, Spain refused to ratify the
treaty, and, through her minister sent here for that purpose
objected to that requirement as inconsistent with the treaty, and
he insisted that such a declaration, if made, would "tend directly
to annul one of its most clear, precise, and conclusive articles."
Pending this discussion, the period fixed by the treaty for the
exchange of the ratifications expired; but the United States
notified the Spanish government the day previous that if the six
months expired without such ratification, they should hold
themselves free to press and enforce their claims and pretensions
in any and every mode consistent with honor that their interests
may require.
Confessedly, some of the expressions of that dispatch indicated
that the United States might, under some circumstances, be induced
to refuse to carry the treaty into effect; but they never made any
such decision, and never did any act or uttered a sentiment which
authorized the claimants interested in its provisions to assume
that they had come to any such conclusion. Nothing of the kind was
ever intimated by the minister sent here from Spain, and the
correspondence which ensued shows conclusively that neither party
contemplated any such result. He came for explanations, but he was
told, before any reply was given to that part of his communication,
that the President wished to be informed whether he was the bearer
of the ratifications of the treaty previously signed and committed
to the charge of our minister for that purpose. Obliged to answer
that inquiry in the negative, he found it necessary to give
explanations in behalf of his own government before requiring
Page 76 U. S. 715
any from the United States. Reference is made to that
correspondence to show that the treaty as signed was never
abandoned by either party, and nothing was ever given or promised
by the United States except what is therein stipulated to secure
its ratification.
New articles to the treaty were not required by the new
minister, and he was emphatically told by the Secretary of State
that the United States could not, consistently with what was due to
themselves, stipulate any new engagements as the price of obtaining
the ratification of the old; that the declaration which our
minister was instructed to deliver at the exchange of the
ratifications of the treaty with regard to the eighth article was
not intended to annul or in the slightest degree to alter or impair
the stipulations of that article; that the only object in view was
to guard his government and all persons interested in any of the
annulled grants against the possible expectation or pretense that
those grants would be made valid by the treaty.
Although the Secretary of State informed the minister sent here
for explanations that the question of ratification on the part of
the United States must be again submitted to the Senate because the
six months had expired, still he insisted that it should be
ratified by the other contracting party without delay and without
any alterations, showing conclusively that the consummation of the
arrangement was both contemplated and desired. [
Footnote 8]
IV. Power to annul the grants in question or to declare them
null and void, as required by our government, it was insisted by
the Spanish negotiators, did not reside in the King alone, that the
consent of the Cortes must first be had before the required
declaration could be made, and it does not appear that any attempt
was made on the part of our government to controvert that
proposition. Further delay necessarily ensued, but the consent of
the Cortes was given on the fifth of October, 1820, and on the
twenty-fourth of the same month, Spain ratified the treaty without
alteration or amendment.
Page 76 U. S. 716
Occurring as these matters did in the recess of the Senate,
further action was necessarily deferred until the meeting of
Congress. By special message, the President, on the thirteenth of
February, 1821, informed the Senate that the minister of Spain had
given notice that he was ready to exchange the ratifications of the
treaty, and it appears that the Senate, on the nineteenth of the
same month, again consented to and advised the President to ratify
it without making any amendment to the same or suggesting any
qualification whatever to any of its provisions. [
Footnote 9]
Application had been made by the deceased claimant to the
government of Spain, before his claims were transmitted to the
State Department, requesting that the King would appoint a
commission to liquidate his claims; but, on the seventeenth of
January, 1819, when the prospect brightened that a treaty would be
concluded, he submitted his claims to the Department of State "for
that protection which his government may think proper to
grant."
No such commission was appointed until after the minister who
signed the treaty had been recalled and the United States had been
informed by his successor that his government regarded the
declaration which our minister was instructed to exact, when the
ratifications of the treaty should be exchanged, as tending
"directly to annul one of its most clear, precise, and conclusive
articles." Reluctant to make the required declaration, Spain
recalled her minister and "suspended the ratification of the
treaty," and on the seventh of May, 1819, she appointed the
commission previously requested by the claimant, and it appears
that the commission in eleven days afterwards informed the claimant
that they were prepared to receive his proofs and hear his
explanations. [
Footnote
10]
They, the commissioners, proceeded promptly to the discharge of
their duties, and on the thirty-first of August following they
notified the claimant to produce the documentary evidences to
support his claims, and it appears that he,
Page 76 U. S. 717
in the course of a few weeks, transmitted the originals to the
commission. Perfect success attended his efforts, as the
commission, with the express and formal approval of the King, on
the nineteenth of May, 1820, made an award in his favor for the sum
of three hundred and seventy-three thousand eight hundred and
seventy-nine dollars and eighty-eight cents, in our currency, which
included his fourteen unliquidated contract claims, with interest
to the time of such liquidation, and also a sum in gross on account
of his claims for personal injuries.
Justice had been denied him for years, but it was now promptly
accorded in the award, and the finding of the court below shows
that the King at the same time approved a certificate of the award,
in accordance with the laws and customs of the country, and
delivered the same to the claimant as conclusive evidence of the
verity of the award. By the fourth finding of the court below it
also appears that the United States was notified of that result
both by the government of Spain and by the claimant, and that the
Secretary of State expressed his approval of it to both parties.
Five days before the treaty was the second time submitted to the
Senate for their advice, the claimant addressed a memorial to the
President making known for the first time what his pretensions were
in the new aspect of his claim.
V. Briefly stated, they were to the effect that the Senate, if
the treaty should be submitted for ratification, should either
annex a new article recognizing his claim as expressed in the award
made after the treaty was signed, or, if that could not be
conceded, that the fifth renunciation should be explicitly excepted
from the ratification and expunged from the treaty. Unless he could
have a distinct recognition of his claim, he asked, as an act of
justice, that the alternative request might be granted, that he
might "be left free to prosecute the claim where it is
unquestionably due, unembarrassed with the imposing renunciation of
my country." Stronger language to express his convictions that his
claim, as it existed when the treaty was signed, was included in
the fifth renunciation of the same, could not well be chosen than
he
Page 76 U. S. 718
employed in that memorial, where he says that it is his
"decided election to abide the issue of an appeal to the moral
sense and good faith of that nation rather than the chances of that
contingent and long-deferred indemnity provided for the other
claims into whose company mine has been introduced by the
treaty."
Addressed as the memorial was to the President, he referred it
to the Secretary of State for his opinion, and nothing can be more
conclusive as to the views of the Executive than the report of the
head of the State Department. By the statement of the memorial
itself, said Mr. Adams, it was questionable to the Cortes and to
the Minister of Finance whether or not the claim was included in
the renunciation of the ninth article. If it was, said the
Secretary, the claimant will be entitled to the immunities
stipulated by the treaty and in the form provided by the same
instrument; if it was not, his resort is, as it originally was,
exclusively to the Spanish government, and the Cortes, in
recognizing his claim, have given directions for his payment. Both
the memorial and the report of the Secretary of State were
communicated to the Senate the next day after the treaty was
transmitted for the consideration of that body.
Authority to appoint commissioners was conferred upon the
President, as stipulated in the eleventh article of the treaty, by
the fourth section of the Act of the third of March, 1821, and it
is well known that they were duly appointed and commissioned as
therein required. [
Footnote
11]
They were duly organized, as required, and exercised the
functions of their office for the period of three years. During
that time, the claimant, as the finding of the subordinate court
shows, presented his claim to the commissioners as expressed in the
award made by the Spanish commission, and it appears that the
commissioners of the United States refused to allow the claim in
that form. He was fully heard, but they ruled and decided that the
only claims which they had authority to investigate and allow were
claims existing prior
Page 76 U. S. 719
to the date of the treaty, and that inasmuch as the award
presented was subsequent to the date of the treaty, they had no
authority to investigate or allow it, and it appears that they
accordingly rejected and dismissed the petition upon the ground
that the evidence produced was not sufficient to establish the
claim.
Plain as the decree of the commissioners is, it is not possible
to misunderstand their views. They held that all unliquidated
claims of our citizens upon that government, statements of which,
soliciting the interposition of our government, had been presented
to the Department of State, or to the minister of the United States
in Spain, since the former convention and prior to the signature of
the treaty, were within their jurisdiction, but that liquidated
claims or claims of a subsequent date were not within their
jurisdiction. Such also were the views of the Secretary of State in
his very able dispatch of the twenty-ninth of April, 1823,
addressed to the charge d'affaires from Spain. [
Footnote 12]
He shows to a demonstration that the time of the signature, and
not that of the ratification of either of the parties nor that of
the exchange of ratifications, is expressly agreed upon as the time
until which the claims and the statements of them to the Department
of State, or to the minister of the United States in Spain, had
been received, which claims were, on the part of the United States,
renounced by the fifth renunciation.
His reasoning is that it could not have been the intention of
the parties that they should renounce claims, or admit statements
of them, not known to the party assuming the obligation at the time
of contracting it, and the Court here entirely concurs in that
construction of the article. Whatever claims, therefore, might
arise, or whatever statements of them might be made after the
signature of the treaty, were not within that provision, because
they could not with propriety be provided for in any such
stipulation.
Beyond all doubt it was unliquidated claims for which
provision
Page 76 U. S. 720
was made, and neither party contracted that the other should
determine their amount or validity, but the stipulation on the part
of the United States was that three commissioners should be
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, and that the commissioners should determine the amount
and validity of all such claims of our citizens.
Examined in the light of these suggestions, we concur in the
views of Mr. Adams, as expressed in that dispatch, that
"if anything in human intention can be made clear by human
language, it is that the claims provided for by the above
stipulation were in the condition as they had been exhibited at the
time of the treaty. [
Footnote
13]"
VI. Transactions between the claimant and the government of
Spain subsequent to the signature of the treaty could not be
evidence to the commissioners of the condition of the claim at the
time of that signature, and for that reason the Court is of the
opinion that the decision of the commissioners rejecting the claim,
as expressed in that award, was correct. They did not reject the
unliquidated claims of the appellant, as filed in the State
Department, nor as presented to our minister in Madrid before the
treaty was signed. [
Footnote
14]
Unambiguous as the decision of the commissioners is, there is no
reason to suppose that the claimant was misled even for a moment.
He knew that he had a right to present his claims to the
commissioners as they existed at the time the treaty was signed,
but he elected to stand upon the claim as it was expressed in the
award, and he must abide the result, as in the opinion of this
Court, the decision of the commissioners that the award was not
within the stipulations of the treaty is correct.
Suppose all the preceding suggestions are correct, still the
claimant insists that the judgment must be reversed on account of
what appears in the fifth finding of the court. Unexplained, the
court below there find as follows:
(1) That the Cortes refused to annul the three grants in
question until
Page 76 U. S. 721
the United States should agree to pay and discharge in full the
indebtedness of Spain to the deceased claimant, as recognized in
the award of the Spanish commission.
(2) That the United States, by their minister at the court of
Madrid, gave to Spain
"a clear and distinct assurance that the debt due to the
claimant would certainly be paid to him by the United States if the
treaty was ratified, and the said grants were totally
annulled."
(3) That the Spanish government, upon the faith of those
assurances, annulled the grants and ratified the treaty.
(4) That the claimant duly notified the government of the United
States of these facts and of the assurances so given by our
minister, and that the notice was duly received by the President
and was by him communicated to the Senate, at the same time that
the advice of that body was asked, the second time, as to the
ratification of the treaty.
(5) That the United States, with full notice and knowledge of
all the facts and circumstances set forth in that finding, did
accept and assent to the treaty as ratified by Spain and became
seized and possessed of the ceded territories.
Without stopping to show that the findings are contradicted by
the testimony of our minister, or that they are improbable in
themselves, or that they are unsupported by any satisfactory
evidence, we proceed at once to remark that the claimant is
entitled to the full benefit of the rule that the facts found in
the court below are to be regarded as in the nature of a special
verdict. Grant all that, still the findings are subject to many
criticisms.
By what means did the court become judicially informed that the
Cortes refused to annul the grants in question until the United
States should agree to pay and discharge in full the award held by
the claimant? Oral proof to that effect could hardly be obtained
which would be of a satisfactory character, and if proof of that
kind was not introduced, then the inquiry arises: upon what
evidence does the finding rest?
Legislative bodies usually act by decree, resolution, order, or
vote, but nothing of the kind is referred to as existing in this
case. Depositions of two witnesses were introduced to show that our
minister gave the assurances specified in the
Page 76 U. S. 722
finding, but he states in his deposition that he does not
remember that he ever gave any such assurances, and there is no
reason to conclude that he ever intended to enter into any contract
upon that subject. Who knows that the government of Spain, in
deciding to annul those grants, acted upon the faith of the
assurances given by our minister that the claims of the ancestor of
the appellant would be paid in full, as expressed in the award made
long after the treaty was signed, and if no one is able to give
testimony to that effect, by what means was the conclusion formed?
Tested by these or any similar considerations, it is easy to see
that the several conclusions embraced in the fifth finding are
conclusions of law, rather than conclusions of fact, as they depend
mainly, if not entirely, upon the construction of public acts,
diplomatic dispatches, and treaty stipulations.
Regarded in that light, the finding of the court below may be
reexamined here on appeal, but it is not necessary to rest the
decision in this case upon that ground, as by the very terms of the
finding it appears that the assurances which it is supposed misled
the Cortes were given by our minister, and there is no evidence
whatever that in giving the assurances he acted in pursuance of any
instructions from the President or by virtue of any authority from
the United States. Negotiations are usually conducted under
instructions from the President, and the provision of the
Constitution is that
"he (the President) shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur."
Such an assurance as that supposed could not be given by any
minister of the United States, except upon the condition that it
should become a treaty stipulation, and as such be subject to the
approval of the President and be ratified by the Senate, as
required by the Constitution.
Even if the finding had any foundation in fact, it is clear that
the act of our minister in giving the assurances was wholly without
authority, and that the act was null and void, which must have been
known to the Spanish government and to the claimant.
Page 76 U. S. 723
VII. Examination will next be made of certain other complaints
made by the appellant, as exhibited in the eighth finding of the
court below. The substance of that finding is as follows:
(1) That the claimant, on the seventh of April, 1823, and before
the commissioners under the treaty rejected his claim as founded
upon the award, requested the United States to procure from the
Spanish government his original vouchers and evidences of
indebtedness; that the United States made the demand as requested,
but that the Spanish government positively refused to comply with
the request upon the ground that the award was a judicial decree
and was final and conclusive.
(2) That the Spanish government did subsequently assure the
United States that the vouchers and documents would be given up,
but that the same never were produced, and have ever since been,
and still are, withheld.
(3) That by reason of such refusal and neglect on the part of
Spain, the commissioners never considered or allowed his claim;
that they allowed the claims of other persons, existing prior to
the treaty, to an amount greater in the aggregate than the five
million dollars provided by the treaty, and that the commission,
after making those awards, expired.
Regarded in the most favorable light, the facts stated in the
finding do not show any ground of action against the United
States:
(1) Because it appears that the claimant never presented to the
commissioners his unliquidated claims as they were filed in the
State Department, or as they existed at the time the treaty was
signed.
(2) Because the finding does not show that he ever intended to
present his claims in that form to the commissioners, nor that he
was prevented from so doing by the neglect and refusal of that
government to produce his original vouchers and documents.
(3) That even if the finding did show that he intended to
present his claims in that form, and that he was injured by the
alleged neglect and refusal, still the admission would not benefit
the appellant, as the finding, with that admission superadded,
would not show any cause of action against the United States within
the acts of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the
Page 76 U. S. 724
Court of Claims, as it would not show a claim founded upon any
law of Congress or upon any regulation of an executive department,
nor any claim founded upon any contract, express or implied, with
the government of the United States.
VIII. Some consideration must also be given to certain general
propositions submitted by the appellant as tending to bring his
case within the scope of an implied contract.
1. He contends that the United States had no power to release
Spain from her obligations due to the ancestor of the appellant
without his assent except upon the condition of making him just
compensation for his claims.
Special examination of that topic or of its conditions and
qualifications is not necessary, as the case before the court comes
within the rule, as conceded by the appellant, as his ancestor did
submit his claims to the Department of State for that protection
which his government might think proper to grant, and the finding
of the court below is that the claimant, both before and after the
date of the treaty, did invoke the aid of the United States in
collecting his claims, both those arising on contracts and those
arising from personal injuries. [
Footnote 15]
2. Attempt is also made to maintain the proposition that the
power which the claimant gave to the United States to make
reclamations in his behalf became revocable by him after the six
months fixed by the treaty for the exchange of the ratifications
had expired, but the proposition is wholly inadmissible, as the
effect would be that whenever any such misunderstanding should
arise between the contracting parties, the negotiations might be
controlled by a single claimant having some pecuniary interest in
the treaty.
3. Next suggestion is that the act of the claimant in submitting
his claims to the Spanish commission operated as a full and
complete revocation of the power he previously granted to the
United States to adjust his claims, but the proposition is even
less defensible than the preceding one,
Page 76 U. S. 725
as it would enable one of the contracting parties, by making
terms with a citizen of the other party, to avoid the obligation of
fulfilling a treaty stipulation.
4. Remark upon the sixth finding of the court does not seem to
be necessary, as what has been said in response to the fifth
finding furnishes a full answer to every deduction made from it by
the claimant. This award was made long after the treaty was signed,
and the claim in that form never was included in the fifth
renunciation. In his memorial he requested that a new article might
be added to the treaty, making provision for the payment of his
claim as expressed in the award, or that the fifth renunciation
might be expunged, but the request was not granted, nor could it
have been in the alternative from without defeating, in all
probability, the whole arrangement.
Entitled as the claimant clearly was to prove his unliquidated
claims before the commissioners, it is much to be regretted that he
did not seasonably come to the conclusion to adopt that course and
avail himself of the plain right secured to him by the treaty. His
error in that behalf increased the equation to other claimants, and
now his only remedy is by an appeal to the equity of Congress.
Under the circumstances, one or two observations upon the
conclusions of law certified by the court below will be sufficient.
We do not concur in the first nor the second finding, except that
part of it where the court says that the decision of the
commissioners appointed by the United States dismissing the claim
was final and conclusive, and bars a recovery upon the merits in
that court. We concur also in the third conclusion of law, and
direct that the judgment be
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY had not taken his seat upon the Bench when
this judgment was given, and the case was argued February 28 and
March 1, 1870, before MR. JUSTICE STRONG had taken his seat.
[
Footnote 1]
8 Stat. at Large 258, 260.
[
Footnote 2]
A special tribunal or commission, invested with judicial powers,
under the laws of Spain.
[
Footnote 3]
12 Stat. at Large 765.
[
Footnote 4]
3 Wall. 7 [argument of counsel -- omitted].
[
Footnote 5]
12 Stat. at Large 765.
[
Footnote 6]
14 Stat. at Large 611.
[
Footnote 7]
8 Stat. at Large 264; 3 Executive Journal 177.
[
Footnote 8]
4 American State Papers 683.
[
Footnote 9]
3 Executive Journal 244.
[
Footnote 10]
Meade v. United States, 2 Nott & Huntingdon
256.
[
Footnote 11]
3 Stat. at Large 639.
[
Footnote 12]
Senate Document, Second Session, 18th Congress 248.
[
Footnote 13]
1 Senate Documents, Second Session, 18th Congress 250.
[
Footnote 14]
1 Rep.Com., First Session, 20th Congress, No. 58.
[
Footnote 15]
2 Rep.Com., 1st Session, 22d Congress, No. 316; 3 Senate
Documents, 1st Session, 19th Congress, p. 66;
De Bode v.
Queen, 3 House of Lords Cases 449.
