1. Mandamus from a federal court to officers of a county in a
state, to levy a tax to pay interest on bonds issued by the county
on which a relator has obtained judgment, and has no means of
obtaining satisfaction but by the levy of a tax, cannot be in any
way controlled by an injunction from a state court to those
officers against a levy.
Riggs v. Johnson
County, 6 Wall. 166, affirmed.
2. It makes no difference whether the relator have been made a
defendant to the proceeding in the state court for an injunction or
not, nor whether the injunction have issued before or after his
suit in the federal court was begun.
In 1853, 1854, and 1858, the County Judge of Washington County,
Iowa, submitted to the voters of that county propositions to
subscribe certain sums, and issue bonds accordingly, to aid the
making of certain railroads, and a majority of the voters voted in
favor of the propositions. The vote required the levy by the county
officers of yearly taxes to pay the interest. The bonds were
issued, and several of them passed into the hands of one Durant. In
April, 1860, certain taxpayers of the county filed a bill against
the board of supervisors of the county; Durant, with other holders
of the bonds, afterwards appearing and opposing, to enjoin the
supervisors (the proper officers to lay taxes) from laying any
taxes to pay either principal or interest of these bonds; the
ground of the injunction being that the bonds were illegal and
void, and that the county officers had no authority to levy and
collect taxes to pay either the principal or interest of them. And
the board of supervisors were enjoined accordingly. The interest
being now unpaid, Durant sued the county in the Circuit Court of
the United States for Iowa to compel payment of it. The county set
up, by way of plea, the injunction in the state court against it,
and the plea being overruled, and the case being fully heard on a
case stated, judgment was given in the federal court against the
county. Execution having issued without satisfaction, an
alternative writ of mandamus to levy a tax was asked for
Page 76 U. S. 416
and obtained by Durant against the county. By way of showing
cause against a peremptory writ, the county here again pleaded the
injunction from the state court. The plaintiff demurred, assigning
as one cause among others that this Court, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment, had jurisdiction to enforce it, and that no
state court could prevent it. The demurrer being sustained, the
county brought the case here.
Page 76 U. S. 417
MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Since the decisions which have been made by this Court during
the last four years, there is almost nothing in the record now
before us remaining open for adjudication. Indeed, it is not now
contended that mandamus is not a proper remedy in cases like the
present, when a relator has obtained a judgment, which can be
satisfied only by the levy of a tax, and when the proper officers
of the municipality, against which the judgment has been obtained,
refuse, or neglect to levy it. That it is a legitimate remedy has
been ruled in very many cases. [
Footnote 1] In such a case, "the writ is" (to use the
language of the court in
Riggs v. Johnson County) "neither
a prerogative writ, nor a new suit. On the contrary, it is a
proceeding ancillary to the judgment which gives the jurisdiction,
and, when issued," it "becomes a substitute for the ordinary
process of execution, to enforce the payment of the same, as
provided in the contract." It is a step toward the execution of the
judgment, and necessary to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is insisted, however, that even if the circuit court may
award a mandamus to aid in the enforcement of its judgments, the
writ should not have been awarded in this case, because the
District Court of Washington County had enjoined the defendants
against levying and collecting any tax for the payment of the bonds
and coupons, for a portion of which the relator had obtained his
judgment. This injunction the defendants pleaded, and to the plea
the relator demurred.
Page 76 U. S. 418
That such an injunction was wholly inoperative to prevent the
circuit court of the United States from enforcing its judgment by
mandamus to the defendants to compel them to levy the tax which the
law authorized and required is no longer to be doubted. Its
invalidity to work such an effect has been placed beyond question
by the rulings of this Court in the cases already cited. In
Riggs v. Johnson County, where it appeared that an
injunction had been obtained in one of the state courts upon the
county commissioners enjoining them against levying any tax to pay
certain municipal bonds and coupons, a mandamus was nevertheless
sustained to compel the levy of a tax, at the suit of one who had
obtained judgment in the circuit court for some of the coupons.
That case is full authority for the doctrine that an injunction of
a state court cannot control or in any manner affect the action,
the process, or the proceeding of a circuit court, not because the
latter has any paramount jurisdiction over state courts, but
because the tribunals are independent of each other. It is true
that in
Riggs v. Johnson County it appeared the relator in
the information or suggestion for the mandamus was not a party to
the injunction suit, while the relator here was a party defendant.
That, however, can make no difference. The present relator, though
made a party with the other defendants, was not enjoined. The
decree upon the bill for an injunction was exclusively against the
board of supervisors of Washington, at the suit of others than the
relator. And had he been enjoined, it is not easy to see how that
fact could have limited the power of the circuit court. We have
already remarked that the true reason why the injunction was not a
bar to the mandamus is that the district court of the state and the
circuit court are independent courts, and that neither can
interfere with the process or proceedings of the other. It would
hardly be contended that a state court can enjoin a defendant
against paying a judgment which has been or may thereafter be
recovered in a circuit court of the United States. If it may,
federal jurisdiction is a myth. It is at the mercy of state
tribunals. Yet there is no substantial difference in principle
Page 76 U. S. 419
between the allowance of such an injunction, and that of one
against a proceeding in aid of an execution; a mandamus to levy an
authorized tax to pay a judgment. The district courts of Iowa are
independent of each other. Will the injunction of one district
court limit the power of another district court to enforce its
judgment? To this no one would hazard an affirmative answer.
Certainly the circuit court of the United States are as exempt from
state control by state courts as are the district courts of the
state from control by each other.
It is of course immaterial whether the injunction of the
District Court of Washington County was before or after the
judgment obtained by the relator in the circuit court of the United
States, or whether before or after the institution of the suit. It
is not a question which court first obtained possession of the
case. In the case of
The Mayor v. Lord, [
Footnote 2] the facts were that the
plaintiffs in error had been enjoined against levying a tax, before
suit was brought in the circuit court, yet it was held that the
injunction was no sufficient answer to the alternative mandamus
commanding them to levy a tax to pay the judgment afterwards
recovered.
The plaintiffs in error are thus met at every point of their
case by decisions of this Court heretofore made -- decisions which
justify the court below in sustaining the demurrer to their return
to the alternative writ and in awarding a peremptory mandamus.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
[
Footnote 1]
Board of Commissioners of Knox
County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376;
Von
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535;
Supervisors v. United States
ex Rel. State Bank, 4 Wall. 435;
Riggs v.
Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166;
Weber v.
Lee County, 6 Wall. 210;
The Mayor v. Lord,
supra, <|76 U.S. 409|>409.
[
Footnote 2]
Supra, <|76 U.S. 409|>409.
