1. The Board of Commissioners created under the Act of Congress,
entitled "An act to ascertain and settle private land claims in the
State of California," passed March 3, 1851, had jurisdiction of a
claim made under a grant of a lot by a Mexican governor within the
limits of the pueblo of San Francisco, and such claim was not
required to be presented in the name of the corporate authorities
of the city.
2. The eighth section of that act requires every person claiming
lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived from
the Spanish or Mexican government to present his claims to the
Board of Commissioners for examination. The fourteenth section
qualifies this general language and declares that the provisions of
the act shall not extend to lots held under grants from any
corporation or town to which lands have been granted for the
establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mexican government, nor
"to any city or town or village lot, which city, town, or village
existed on the 7th of July, 1846," and provides that the claims for
such lots shall be presented by the corporate authorities of the
town, or if the land upon which the town, city, or village is
situated was originally granted to an individual, shall be
presented in the name of such individual
Held 1st, that the second clause of this section does
not apply to all lots situated within the limits of a city, town,
or village, which existed on the 7th of July, 1846, but only to the
lots owned or claimed by such city, town, or village; 2d, that the
object of the section was to give to lotholders deriving title from
a common source -- from the authorities of a pueblo or town, or
from an individual who was originally the grantee of the land upon
which the pueblo or town is situated -- the benefit of the
examination by the board of the general title under which they
hold, and relieve the commissioners from the necessity of
considering a multitude of separate claims for
Page 76 U. S. 316
small tracts depending upon the validity of the same original
title. It intended that the corporate authorities should present
under one general claim not only the interest of the city, town, or
village which they represent, but also the separate interests of
individuals holding under conveyances from them.
3. The fourteenth section of the act has no application to lots
held adversely to the corporation or town by independent titles.
The confirmation of a claim, whether made to corporations or
individuals, cannot enure to the benefit of parties holding
adversely to them.
4. When the Board of Commissioners had jurisdiction of a claim,
its validity and title to recognition and confirmation were
subjects for that tribunal's determination, and its adjudication,
however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed on the ground
that it was made upon insufficient evidence.
5. The rule is as applicable to inferior and special tribunals
as it is to those of superior or general authority that where they
have once acquired jurisdiction, their subsequent proceedings
cannot be collaterally questioned for mere error or irregularity,
and the provision of the fifteenth section of the Act of March 3,
1851, declaring that the final decrees of the commissioners, or of
the district court, and patents following them in California land
cases shall be conclusive between the United States and the
claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of third
persons, does not change the operation of this general rule.
6. The decree of the district court upon the claim involved an
adjudication that the grant under which it was made was valid, and
the decree approving the survey settled the location and boundaries
of the land. Neither of these determinations can be collaterally
assailed for any matter which might have been corrected on appeal
had it been brought to the attention of the appellate court.
7. Whoever received deeds from the City of San Francisco, or
asserted title to parcels of land under the Van Ness Ordinance,
whilst the claim of the city to the land was pending for
confirmation before the tribunals of the United States necessarily
held whatever they took subject to the final determination of the
claim. Their title stood or fell with the claim.
8. The exception made in the final decree of confirmation to the
City of San Francisco from the tract confirmed of
"such parcels of land as have been, by grants from lawful
authority vested in private proprietorship, and have been finally
confirmed to parties claiming under said grants by the tribunals of
the United States, or shall hereafter be finally confirmed to
parties claiming thereunder by said tribunals in proceedings
pending therein for that purpose,"
is not limited to parcels of land claimed under perfect grants,
but includes all parcels claimed by private parties under grants
from the authorities of the former government, the claims to which
had been subjected, or might, in proceedings then pending, be
subjected to the examination of the tribunals of the United States,
and had been, or might be, confirmed by them.
Page 76 U. S. 317
9. The doctrine of relation is applied only to subserve the ends
of justice and to protect parties deriving their interests from the
claimant pending the proceedings for the confirmation of his title.
It gives effect to the confirmation of the title as of the day when
the proceedings to secure such confirmation were instituted, and
for that purpose only can the decree be treated as made at that
time. No different interpretation is to be given to the language of
the decree than would be given if the doctrine of relation had no
application.
The case was ejectment to recover the possession of certain real
property situated within the corporate limits of the City of San
Francisco, as defined by its charter of 1851, the plaintiffs
asserting title to the premises under a grant of the Mexican
government confirmed by the tribunals of the United States. The
case was commenced in a district court of the state and was tried
by the court without the intervention of a jury by stipulation of
the parties.
The court found as facts that the plaintiffs (who are the widow
and son of Jose Cornelio Bernal, deceased), in March, 1853,
presented a petition to the Board of Land Commissioners, created
under the Act of March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle private
land claims in California, [
Footnote 1] for the confirmation of a claim asserted by
them to the premises in controversy, in which petition they averred
that the premises were granted in 1834 by Figueroa, then Mexican
Governor of the Department of California, to said Jose Cornelio
Bernal, and that such proceedings were had that in 1854 the said
claim was adjudged valid and confirmed by the board, and in 1856,
on appeal, by the district court of the United States. The court
set forth in its findings the proceedings had before the board and
the district court on appeal, and what it declared to be the
evidence remaining of record with the clerk of the district court
with respect to the grant. That evidence stated that a grant was
made by Governor Figueroa to Bernal, as alleged above, but the
court found that according to that evidence, no such grant was ever
issued, differing in its finding in that respect from both
Page 76 U. S. 318
the Board of Land Commissioners and the District Court of the
United States.
From the decree confirming the claim of the district court, the
United States declined to prosecute an appeal to this Court, and
the decree thus became final.
In 1861, the tract confirmed was surveyed under the directions
of the Surveyor General of the United States, and the survey was
subjected to the revision and correction of the district court
under the Act of Congress of June 14, 1860. [
Footnote 2] When made to conform to the directions
of the court, the survey and the plat of it were approved, and its
decree of approval was, on appeal, affirmed by this Court.
[
Footnote 3] The approved
survey and plat embraced the premises in controversy.
The defendants were in possession of the premises at the
commencement of the action, and asserted that they possessed an
older and superior title to the premises under the ordinance of the
City of San Francisco, adopted in June, 1855, and the subsequent
legislation of the state and of the United States respecting the
same. Their claim arose in this wise. At the cession of California
to the United States and for many years previous thereto, San
Francisco was a Mexican pueblo, asserting a claim to lands
embracing its site and adjoining lands to the extent of four square
leagues. The City of San Francisco, as successor of the Mexican
pueblo, claimed these municipal lands and presented her claim to
the Board of Land Commissioners for confirmation. In December,
1854, the board confirmed the claim to a portion of the land
embracing the premises in controversy. The case was then appealed
by the city to the district court of the United States, and was
afterwards transferred to the circuit court of the United States
under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1864. [
Footnote 4] In May, 1865, the circuit court confirmed
the claim to four square leagues, subject to the following
deductions, namely:
"Such parcels of land as have been heretofore reserved or
dedicated to public uses by the
Page 76 U. S. 319
United States,
and also such parcels of land as have been by
grants from lawful authority vested in private proprietorship, and
have been finally confirmed to parties claiming under said grants
by the tribunals of the United States, or shall hereafter be
finally confirmed to parties claiming thereunder by said tribunals
in proceedings pending therein for that purpose, all of which said
excepted parcels of land are included within the area of four
square leagues, above mentioned (those described as confirmed), but
are excluded from the confirmation to the city. [
Footnote 5]"
The claim thus confirmed by the decree of the circuit court was
also confirmed, with some modifications, by the Act of Congress of
March 8, 1866. [
Footnote 6]
Whilst this claim was pending before the district court on
appeal from the board for confirmation,
viz., on the 20th
of June, 1855, the Common Council of the City of San Francisco
passed "an ordinance for the settlement and quieting of the land
titles in the City of San Francisco," which is known in that city
as the "Van Ness Ordinance," after the name of its supposed author.
By its second section, the city relinquished and granted all the
title and claim which she held to the lands within her corporate
limits, as defined by the charter of 1851, with certain exceptions,
to the parties in the actual possession thereof, by themselves or
tenants, on or before the 1st of January, 1855, provided said
possession was continued up to the time of the introduction of the
ordinance into the common council, or if interrupted by an intruder
or trespasser, had been or might be recovered by legal proceedings.
[
Footnote 7]
In March, 1858, the legislature of the state ratified and
confirmed the ordinance, and in July, 1864, Congress passed an act
by which all the right and title of the United States to the lands
were granted to the City of San Francisco, for the uses specified
in the ordinance. [
Footnote 8]
The party through whom the defendants claim was in the actual
possession of the premises in controversy at the time designated in
the ordinance,
Page 76 U. S. 320
and also on the passage of the confirmatory act of the
legislature, and therefore acquired whatever right or title the
city then possessed.
The district court found as conclusions of law that the
defendants were estopped by the final decree of confirmation, and
the approval survey, from questioning the plaintiffs' title to the
premises, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs for the possession
of the premises and $500 damages for their use and occupation. On
appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the
state, and the case was brought here under the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Act of June 14, 1860, gives to a survey and plat of land
claimed under a confirmed Mexican grant, when approved by the
district court, the effect and validity of a patent of the United
States. It so declares in express terms. [
Footnote 9] It is therefore upon the decree of
confirmation, and the approved survey and plat, that the Bernals
rely to recover in the present action.
To meet the case thus presented, the defendants contend 1st.,
that the Board of Land Commissioners had no jurisdiction to
consider the claim of the plaintiffs under the grant of Figueroa,
and as a consequence, that the action of the district court in
hearing the appeal from the board and in revising and approving the
survey of the claim, was without authority and void, and 2d., that
if the board had such jurisdiction, the defendants possess an older
and superior title to the premises under the ordinance of the City
of San Francisco adopted in June, 1855, and the subsequent
legislation of the state and of the United States respecting the
same.
The objection to the jurisdiction of the board arises from
Page 76 U. S. 321
the fact that the premises granted consist of a lot within the
limits of the pueblo or town of San Francisco as it existed at the
cession of California to the United States. At that date, San
Francisco, as such pueblo, possessed an equitable claim to lands
within the limits of four square leagues, to be assigned and
measured off from the northern portion of the peninsula upon which
the town is situated. They City of San Francisco succeeded to such
interest, and her authorities presented the claim to the Board of
Land Commissioners for confirmation, and the defendants insist that
the claim of the Bernals under the grant of Figueroa should have
been presented in the name of those authorities, and could in no
other way have been brought under the jurisdiction of the
board.
This position is founded upon the language of the 14th section
of the act of Congress, but is not, in our opinion, supported by
its meaning. A previous section of the act requires every person
claiming lands in California by virtue of any right or title
derived from the Spanish or Mexican government to present his claim
to the commissioners for examination. The 14th section qualifies
this general language and declares that the provisions of the act
shall not extend to lots held under grants from any corporation or
town to which lands have been granted for the establishment of a
town by the Spanish or Mexican government, nor "to any city or
town, or village lot, which city, town, or village existed on the
7th of July, 1846," and provides that the claims for such lots
shall be presented by the corporate authorities of the town, or if
the land upon which the town, city, or village is situated was
originally granted to an individual, shall be presented in the name
of such individual.
The second clause of this section does not apply to all lots
situated within the limits of a city, town, or village which
existed on the 7th of July, 1846, but only to the lots owned or
claimed by such city, town, or village.
The object of the section was to give to lotholders deriving
title from a common source -- from the authorities of a pueblo or
town, or from an individual who was originally the grantee of the
land upon which the pueblo or town is
Page 76 U. S. 322
situated -- the benefit of the examination by the board of the
general title under which they hold, and relieve the commissioners
from the necessity of considering a multitude of separate claims
for small tracts depending upon the validity of the same original
title. It intended that the corporate authorities should present
under one general claim not only the interest of the city, town, or
village which they represent, but also the separate interests of
individuals holding under conveyances from them. The confirmation
of the common title to these authorities would, of course, enure to
the benefit of parties holding under them.
The section has no application to lots held adversely to the
corporation or town by independent titles. The confirmation of a
claim, whether made to corporations or individuals, could not enure
to the benefit of parties holding adversely to them.
The claim of the Bernals, not being derived from the pueblo of
San Francisco or by any action of its authorities, but directly by
grant from the political chief of the department, was adverse to
the claim of the city. It was therefore properly presented to the
Board of Commissioners for examination, and jurisdiction over it
was rightfully taken by that tribunal.
The board having jurisdiction of the claim, its validity and
title to recognition and confirmation were subjects for that
tribunal's determination, and its adjudication, however erroneous,
cannot be collaterally assailed on the ground that it was made upon
insufficient evidence. The rule is as applicable to inferior and
special tribunals as it is to those of superior or general
authority that where they have once acquired jurisdiction, their
subsequent proceedings cannot be collaterally questioned for mere
error or irregularity. The provision of the fifteenth section of
the Act of March 3, 1851, declaring that the final decrees of the
commissioners or of the district court and patents following them
in these California land cases shall be conclusive between the
United States and the claimants only, and shall not affect the
interests of third persons, does not change the operation
Page 76 U. S. 323
of this general rule. Final decrees in other judicial
proceedings affecting the title to property are not conclusive
except between the parties; they bind only them and their privies;
they do not conclude the rights of third persons not before the
court, or in any manner affect their rights. Third parties, with
respect to the adjudications of the Board of Commissioners and of
the district court on appeal from the board, stand upon the same
footing as they do with respect to other adjudications in the
ordinary proceedings of courts of law.
The decree of the district court upon the claim necessarily
involved an adjudication that the grant under which it was made was
valid, and the decree approving the survey settled the location and
boundaries of the land. As neither of these determinations can be
collaterally assailed for any matter which might have been
corrected on appeal had it been brought to the attention of the
appellate court, the plaintiffs must recover unless the defendants
have a superior title to the premises.
Such title they claim to possess, as we have already mentioned,
under the ordinance of the City of San Francisco passed in June,
1855, and the subsequent legislation of the state and of the United
States.
Whilst the claim of the City of San Francisco to her municipal
lands was pending before the district court of the United States on
appeal from the Board of Commissioners, the ordinance of June 20,
1855, commonly known, from the name of its reputed author, as the
Van Ness Ordinance, was passed. By its second section, the city
relinquished and granted all the title and claim which she held to
the lands within her corporate limits, as defined by the charter of
1851, with certain exceptions, to the parties in the actual
possession thereof, by themselves or tenants, on or before the 1st
of January, 1855, provided such possession was continued up to the
time of the introduction of the ordinance into the common council,
or if interrupted by an intruder or trespasser, had been or might
be recovered by legal proceedings.
Page 76 U. S. 324
In March, 1858, the legislature of the state ratified and
confirmed the ordinance, and in July, 1864, Congress passed an act
by which all the right and title of the United States to the lands
were granted to the City of San Francisco for the uses specified in
the ordinance. [
Footnote 10]
The party through whom the defendants claim was in the actual
possession of the premises in controversy at the time designated in
the ordinance, and also on the passage of the confirmatory act of
the legislature, and therefore acquired whatever right or title the
city then possessed.
The claim of the city was confirmed in May, 1865, by the decree
of the circuit court of the United States, to which court the
hearing of the claim had been transferred, and subsequently, with
some modifications, by the Act of Congress of March 8, 1866.
[
Footnote 11]
The position of the defendants is that by the possession of the
party through whom they claim and the operation of the Van Ness
Ordinance, they acquired an older and superior title to that ceded
to Bernal by the grant of Figueroa. This position assumes that the
city possessed a title to the premises in controversy at the time
the ordinance was passed, whereas, though the city was then
asserting in the courts of the United States her claim to four
square leagues, the boundaries of the tract were not defined, nor
was it known what exceptions and reservations might be made from
the claim when it should be considered and finally determined.
Whoever received deeds from the city or asserted title to parcels
of land under the Van Ness Ordinance whilst the claim of the city
to the land was thus pending necessarily held whatever they took
subject to the final determination of the claim. Their title stood
or fell with the claim.
Now when the final decree upon the claim was made there were
excepted from the tract confirmed such parcels of land as had been,
by grants from lawful authority, vested in private
Page 76 U. S. 325
proprietorship, and had been finally confirmed to parties
claiming under said grants by the tribunals of the United States or
should thereafter be finally confirmed to parties claiming
thereunder by said tribunals in proceedings then pending therein
for that purpose. This exception is not limited to parcels of land
claimed under perfect grants, as contended by counsel, but includes
all parcels claimed by private parties under grants from the
authorities of the former government, the claims to which had been
subjected, or might, in proceedings then, pending, be subjected to
the examination of the tribunals of the United States and had been
or might be confirmed by them. The object of the exception was to
prevent any possible controversy between parties claiming under the
city, and parties holding under grants adjudged valid by the
tribunals of the United States and to protect the latter from being
harassed by further litigation respecting their titles. By the
language, "such parcels of land as have been by lawful authority
vested in private proprietorship" no more is meant than parcels of
land which have been granted by lawful authority to private
parties.
The exception excludes, therefore, from confirmation to the city
the land granted to Bernal, and the Van Ness Ordinance did not
operate to pass any right or interest in the demanded premises to
the party through whom the defendants claim.
As by the doctrine of relation the decree confirming the title
of the city took effect as of the day when her petition was
presented to the board in July, 1852, it is contended that the
exception is to be construed as referring only to grants which had
been confirmed previous to that date or which might subsequently be
confirmed in proceedings then pending. But the position is not
tenable. Such a construction is not required from any application
of the doctrine of relation. That doctrine in applied only to
subserve the ends of justice and to protect parties deriving their
interests from the claimant pending the proceedings for the
confirmation of his title. It gives effect to the confirmation of
the title
Page 76 U. S. 326
as of the day when the proceedings to secure such confirmation
were instituted, and for that purpose only can the decree be
treated as made at that time. No different interpretation is to be
given to the language of the decree than would be given if the
doctrine of relation had no application. [
Footnote 12]
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
9 Stat. at Large 631.
[
Footnote 2]
12 Stat. at Large 33.
[
Footnote 3]
Dehon v.
Bernal, 3 Wall. 774.
[
Footnote 4]
13 Stat. at Large 333.
[
Footnote 5]
70 U. S. 3
Wall. 686.
[
Footnote 6]
14 Stat. at Large 4.
[
Footnote 7]
15 Cal. 627.
[
Footnote 8]
13 Stat. at Large 333. Act to expedite the settlement of titles
to lands in the State of California, § 5.
[
Footnote 9]
12 Stat. at Large 34, § 5.
[
Footnote 10]
15 Cal. 627; Act to expedite the settlement of titles to lands
in the State of California, § 5; 13 Stat. at Large 333.
[
Footnote 11]
14 Stat. at Large 4; 13
id. 333, § 4;
Grisar
v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 377.
[
Footnote 12]
Jackson v. Bard, 4 Johnson 230;
Heath v. Ross,
12
ib. 140.
