1. The Act of Congress of July 27, 1831, relinquishes to the
State of Missouri the lots, commons &c., reserved for the use
of schools by the act of June 12, 1812, and nothing else.
2. The act of 1812 excluded from the reservation which it made
all lots rightfully claimed by private persons, and the report of
the Board of Commissioners under the Act of July 9, 1832, in favor
of such a claim and its confirmation by Congress, is evidence that
it was rightful.
3. The fact that such a claim was barred by the limitation of
the act of 1824 did not prove that it was not a rightful claim, nor
prevent Congress from removing that bar and allowing the claim to
be proved and confirmed.
4. Such subsequent confirmation shows that the claim was a
rightful one when the act of 1812 was passed, and that the lot
claimed was not included in the reservation for schools.
Page 76 U. S. 283
Error to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the controversy being
one of those, quite numerous in this Court, growing out of the
various acts of Congress intended to settle the land titles
originating in the lands of Louisiana prior to its purchase by our
government from France. The case was thus:
The President and Directors of the St. Louis Public Schools
brought suit in the St. Louis Land Court of Missouri against Walker
and another to recover certain lands situate in the City of St.
Louis.
The title of the plaintiffs, who represented the common schools
of St. Louis, rested on two acts of Congress. The first of these
was the Act of June 13, 1812, [
Footnote 1] the first section of which, after confirming
the common field lots and commons to certain towns and villages, of
which St. Louis is one, directs the deputy surveyor of the
territory to survey and mark the outboundary lines of said several
towns so as to include the out-lots, common field lots, and commons
thereto respectively belonging.
The second section, under which the plaintiffs' claim arose,
enacted that:
"All town or village lots, out-lots, or common field lots
included in such surveys
which are not rightfully owned or
claimed by any private individuals or held as commons
belonging to such towns or villages, or that the President of the
United States may not think proper to reserve for military
purposes, shall be and the same are hereby reserved for the support
of schools in the respective towns or villages aforesaid provided
that the whole quantity of land contained in the lots reserved for
the support of schools in anyone town or village shall not exceed
one-twentieth part of the whole lands included in the general
survey of such town or village."
The other Act was that of July 27, 1831. [
Footnote 2] The second section of this act,
referring to the section just cited from the act of 1812,
declares:
"That the United States do hereby relinquish all their
right,
Page 76 U. S. 284
title, and interest in and to the town and village lots,
out-lots, and common field lots in the state of Missouri, reserved
for the support of schools in the respective towns and villages
aforesaid by the second section of the above-recited act of
Congress, and that the same shall be sold or disposed of or
regulated for the said purposes in such manner as may be directed
by the legislature of the state."
It was conceded that, by the survey made under the first section
of the act of 1812, the lot in controversy was found to be within
the outboundary of the Town of St. Louis and its common field lots,
commons &c. It was also admitted that by appropriate
legislation of the state, the plaintiffs have become invested with
such right as the state could give by virtue of the last-recited
act of Congress.
The surveyor general at St. Louis, on demand of the plaintiffs,
on the 3d June, 1861, had
caused this lot to be surveyed and
certified to them as a lot embraced within and covered by the
reservation for school purposes, and on this survey and
certificate and the acts aforesaid they rested their title.
Such was the plaintiffs' case.
The defendant, who had been in possession by himself and those
under whom he claimed from 1844 till the beginning of this suit in
1864, now asserted that this land was, at the time the act of 1812
was passed, rightfully claimed by Joseph Brazeau, a "private
individual," and was therefore not relinquished to the state by the
act of 1831.
In support of this assertion he showed that, long before the act
of 1812, Brazeau had filed with a board of commissioners, organized
under the act of 1805 to report on such cases, his claim and the
evidences of it furnished him by the colonial authorities. Though
this first board of commissioners reported against the claim
because he had not proved the inhabitancy and cultivation prior to
1803, which the act of 1805 required, yet Congress, which had never
made the reports of these commissioners final, but in all the
numerous acts regulating the various commissions appointed for this
purpose had reserved to itself the power to confirm
Page 76 U. S. 285
or reject their reports, did by the third section of the act of
1812 provide for a further hearing on this question of inhabitancy
and cultivation. It also in every act on the subject reserved from
sale the lands for which claims had been filed with the recorder of
land titles, whether confirmed or not. [
Footnote 3]
Several changes were made in the tribunals authorized to act on
these claims, and for a time there was none with such
authority.
An act of 1824 [
Footnote 4]
directed that individual claims should be presented before a court
of the United States within two years, and that unless so
presented, they should be barred. The time was extended by
subsequent act to May 26, 1829. Brazeau did not present his claim
under these directions.
Finally, however, by an act of 1832, [
Footnote 5] another commission was organized. The
recorder of land titles, in whose office all the old undetermined
cases like Brazeau's still remained on file, and two other
commissioners were directed by this act of 1832 to examine all
those unconfirmed claims in his office and classify and report them
to Congress. They were to report what claims would have been
confirmed under Spanish laws and usages and what were in their
opinion destitute of merit under that rule. And while no new claim
was to be admitted, they might raise new testimony in addition to
that already on file in such cases. This commission passed
favorably on Brazeau's claim, the necessary proof of occupancy and
cultivation having been made, and reported it to Congress, and that
body confirmed the claim by act of July 4, 1836. [
Footnote 6]
The St. Louis Land Court gave judgment for the defendant, and
the Supreme Court having affirmed, the case was now here for
review.
Page 76 U. S. 286
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is not to be denied that if the lot in question was one of
the class which, by the act of 1812, was reserved for the support
of schools, the title was vested in the state by the act of 1831
and by the state in the plaintiffs.
On the other hand, if the lot in question was not of the class
reserved for support of schools by the act of 1812, then nothing in
the act of 1831 has any effect upon it, and whoever may be the true
owner, neither the state or school directors acquired any interest
by the act of 1831.
Nothing can be plainer than that the act of 1831 was intended to
relinquish the title which remained in the United States to the
same lots and lands which had been reserved
Page 76 U. S. 287
for the support of schools by the act of 1812, and it
relinquished title to nothing else. The one act is the exact
complement of the other. The one
reserved a class of lots,
fields, and commons for the support of schools, the other
relinquished to the state the title of the lands and lots
so reserved for the same purpose. We are compelled, then, to look
to the act of 1812 to ascertain precisely what was reserved.
This presents no
patent ambiguity, for "all town or
village lots, out-lots, or common field lots" included in such
surveys are so reserved, with the exception of three classes. These
are:
1st. Such as are rightfully owned or claimed by any private
individuals.
2d. Or held as commons belonging to such towns or villages.
3d. Or that the President may think proper to reserve for
military purposes.
If the lot in question was covered by either of these
exceptions, then it was not reserved by the act of 1812 and was not
relinquished to the state by the act of 1831.
The inquiry is still further narrowed in the present case by the
fact that it is only claimed to be excluded from the class
reserved, because it was rightfully claimed by a private
individual.
It will be seen by reference to the statement of the defendants'
title that at the time the act of 1812 made an exception of lots
rightfully claimed by private individuals, Joseph Brazeau was
asserting a claim before the proper tribunal for this land; that
his claim was never abandoned; and that, finally, a competent
tribunal, authorized by Congress, decided his claim to be a
rightful one, and that Congress, by statute, confirmed this
decision.
Unless it is shown in some other way that Brazeau's claim was
not a rightful one, we think the plaintiffs have no title, for it
is too clear for argument that no land was relinquished to the
state by the act of 1831 which was not reserved for schools by the
act of 1812, and is equally clear that no land rightfully claimed
by a private individual was so reserved.
Page 76 U. S. 288
Two propositions are urged with zeal and ability as
counteracting the effect of Brazeau's claim on the rights of
plaintiffs.
1. It is said that, by virtue of the act of Congress of 1824
[
Footnote 7] and other
amendatory acts, his claim was barred.
The act of 1824 directed that all such individual claims should
be presented before a court of the United States, and that unless
presented to the court within two years, they should be barred, and
though the time was subsequently extended, Brazeau did not present
his claim within it.
It may be conceded that between this time and the passage of the
act of 1832 organizing another board, Brazeau had no claim which he
could lawfully assert to this land, and it is said that while his
claim was in this condition, the act of 1831 vested the title in
the state for the use of schools.
But as the act of 1831 only relinquished the title to lots
reserved by that of 1812, and as that reserved none rightfully
claimed by private individuals, we must inquire whether the fact
that Brazeau had failed to assert his claim within the time limited
by Congress proved that his claim was not rightful. For as a board
of commissioners has said that it was rightful, and as Congress has
also said it was, this proposition can only be refuted by holding
that his failure to assert it for a time, and the declaration of
Congress that he could not be heard to assert it afterwards, proved
that it was not rightful.
We do not think it had this effect. If it be treated as a
statute of limitation, it is not the doctrine on which such
statutes are founded that lapse of time proves the wrongfulness of
the claim. They are made for the repose of society and the
protection of those who may in that time have lost their means of
defense. It is a mere declaration of the lawmaking power to the
plaintiff that, having voluntarily slept so long upon his rights,
he shall not now be permitted to assert them to the injury of
individuals and the disturbance of society.
Page 76 U. S. 289
In the class of cases before us, the act was nothing more than
the declaration of the sovereign power, who at the same time held
the fee of the land, that if you establish your equitable claim to
the land within a certain time, I will confer the title; if you do
not, I will not afterwards hear you assert it. But it was competent
for the sovereign, after this forfeiture had occurred by laches, to
release it, to consent to hear the claimant and to give him another
chance to prove the rightfulness of his claim. And this is what
Congress did by the act of 1832.
It is a little remarkable that Congress did not require in this
act that these parties who had been barred by the former acts
should now appear and renew their claim, but it directed the
recorder of land titles, in whose office all the old cases like
Brazeau's still remained on file, and two other commissioners, to
examine all those unconfirmed claims and classify and report them
to Congress. They were to report what claims would have been
confirmed under Spanish laws and usages and what were, in their
opinion, destitute of merit under that rule. And while no new claim
was to be admitted, they might receive new testimony in addition to
that already on file in such cases.
It is very clear that Congress, by this act, intended to remove
the restriction on the right to assert these claims imposed by the
act of 1824 so far as it concerned those that had been filed in due
time with the recorder. We can entertain no doubt of their right to
do this, and we do not see that they lost this right by a
gratuitous relinquishment of the interest of the United States in
lots not rightfully claimed by any private individual. They still
had, as we think, the right to ascertain whether these old claims,
long known and on the public files, were rightful claims or
not.
2. It is said that the survey made for plaintiffs of this lot by
the surveyor general, and his certificate that the lot was of those
reserved for public schools by the act of 1812, is conclusive and
cannot be disputed.
We do not know of any statute or of any rule of law which should
give it this effect. The survey is made
ex parte by
Page 76 U. S. 290
an officer who has no control of the evidences of claims filed
with the recorder of land titles.
Being an officer of the government, it is possible that this
certificate of a survey, which he is authorized to make, may bind
the United States, but we cannot see how it can determine
conclusively the rights of private persons, which are not
considered by him, and still less the rightfulness of a claim
submitted by Congress to other tribunals for investigation and
reserved to itself for final approval or rejection.
The case of
Kissell v. Public Schools is very much
relied on to establish the conclusiveness of this certificate. That
was a contest between the public schools and a person claiming
under the preemption laws. The court, in discussing the effect of a
certificate of survey in favor of the schools precisely like the
one in the present case said that as to the public schools, they
were bound by it, and so was the government. "The parties
interested," said the court, "have agreed that this land was a
school lot, and here the matter must rest unless some third person
can show a better title." The court held in that case that Kissell
did not show a better title by a common entry and purchase as
preemptor, because the land, being within the limits of the town of
St. Louis, was reserved from sale. The clear implication here is
that when there is a better title, the certificate of survey is not
conclusive against that title.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
2 Stat. at Large 748.
[
Footnote 2]
4
id. 435.
[
Footnote 3]
See act of 1805, § 5, 2 Stat. at Large 327; act of
1806, § 5,
ib., 392; act of 1807, § 8,
ib., 442;
act of 1811, §§ 6 and 10,
ib. 664-5.
[
Footnote 4]
May 26, 4 Stat. at Large 52.
[
Footnote 5]
July 9,
ib., 565.
[
Footnote 6]
5
id. 127.
[
Footnote 7]
4 Stat. at Large 52.
