The United States cannot be sued in the Court of Claims upon
equitable considerations merely. Hence, the holder of a military
bounty land warrant can have no legal right through that court,
against the United States, for compensation on the allegation that
the government has wrongfully appropriated to other uses the lands
ceded for his benefit.
The State of Virginia, during the Revolutionary war, promised
bounty lands to her troops on Continental establishment, and at an
early day set apart for their benefit a tract of country within the
limits of the present State of Kentucky which it was supposed at
the time would be sufficient for the purpose. Recognizing, however,
that this reservation might prove insufficient to satisfy the
claims of these troops, Virginia, in ceding, March 1, 1784, to the
United States the territory beyond the Ohio River, reserved all the
lands lying between the Scioto and Little Miami Rivers to supply
any deficiency of lands in the Kentucky district. It was very
Page 76 U. S. 157
soon manifest that the apprehended deficiency existed, and the
second reservation therefore became operative. In order to
ascertain the limits of this reservation, it was necessary to find
the sources of these two rivers and to run the line between them.
The execution of this object was the occasion of much difficulty
and the cause of frequent legislation by Congress. Two lines were
run by different surveyors, one by Ludlow and the other by Roberts.
It is unnecessary here to trace the history of these lines or to
show which is scientifically correct. It is enough to say the
Congress, in 1818, [
Footnote 1]
established Ludlow's line as the true boundary and excluded entries
upon the west side of it.
In this state of things, Wallace, being the owner and holder of
unsatisfied military bounty land warrants, issued by the State of
Virginia for the services of her troops on the Continental
establishment in the war of the Revolution, located them, in 1838
and 1839, on lands which he asserted to be within the district
reserved by Virginia to satisfy warrants of this class, in her deed
of cession to the United States of March 1, 1784. The entries were,
however, made on the west side of Ludlow's line. That lime
therefore excluded the land on which Wallace located his entries,
though Roberts's line included them.
The lands on which the attempt was thus made to locate these
warrants had long before that time been disposed of to other
parties, and the government declined to recognize the validity of
Wallace's proceedings, and refused to issue patents to him. Wallace
accordingly filed a petition in the Court of Claims, a court which,
by the act constituting it, [
Footnote 2] has power to hear and determine claims against
the United States
founded upon any law of Congress or
regulation of an executive department or upon any contract with it,
express or implied. His claim was that as the government had
wrongfully appropriated the lands on which the warrants were laid,
and as he could not get the lands themselves, he should be paid the
amount of money received into the Treasury from their
Page 76 U. S. 158
sale, with interest, or in lieu thereof have land scrip issued
to him, the petitioner stating that he would be satisfied with this
"or with such other mode, if any there be, as will be
equitable
and just."
Wallace dying soon after, his executor and devisee, one Bonner,
took his place upon the record. He insisted in the Court of Claims
that there was no power in Congress to establish Ludlow's line as
the true boundary, since Virginia had not assented to this action
on its part and since it was demonstrable that this line did not
include all the lands between the two rivers.
The Court of Claims, however, took a different view of the
obligations of the government, and decided adversely to the claim
on its merits.
The case being now here for review.
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
If the position of the counsel of the United States that the
Court of Claims has no authority to hear a case of this character
be well taken, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the
merits of the controversy.
Page 76 U. S. 159
The claimant insists that there was no power to establish
Ludlow's line as the true boundary and exclude entries on the west
side of it, as Virginia did not assent to this action on the part
of Congress and as it is demonstrable that this line does not
include all the lands between the two rivers.
If this position be correct, this claim is based on the theory
that the United States has violated the trust contained in the deed
of cession of the Northwestern Territory, and is bound in good
conscience to furnish compensation to the Virginia beneficiaries
who suffer by this misconduct. This makes a case for the
interposition of a court of equity, and if it were a controversy
between two private suitors, it would have to be settled there, for
a court of law could not afford the proper mode and measure of
relief. But the Court of Claims has no equitable jurisdiction given
it, and was not created to inquire into rights in equity set up by
claimants against the United States. Congress did not think proper
to part with the consideration of such questions, but wisely
reserved to itself the power to dispose of them.
Immunity from suit is an incident of sovereignty, but the
government of the United States, in a spirit of great liberality,
waived that immunity in favor of those persons who had claims
against it which were founded upon any law of Congress or
regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract with
it, express or implied, and gave the Court of Claims the power to
hear and determine cases of this nature.
The inquiry then arises whether the present case, in view of
this limited jurisdiction, is one that the Court of Claims had a
right to consider. The answer to this question seems to us of easy
solution. It is not pretended that there was any regulation of a
department to justify the entries in dispute, and it is certain,
instead of having a law of Congress to rest upon, they were made in
violation of the whole course of legislation by Congress on the
subject. Congress has not only, in fixing the boundary line of the
reservation, excluded these entries, but has also limited the time
in which the
Page 76 U. S. 160
holders of warrants of the class in question should have the
right to locate them, and, in addition to this, has forbidden their
location on tracts of land for which patents had been previously
issued or which had been previously surveyed. [
Footnote 3]
As the land in question had been previously patented to
individuals, or granted for the use of schools, it follows that the
attempt on the part of the claimant to locate his warrants on them
was contrary to law, and that the claim which he now makes for
compensation, because of the failure of this proceeding, cannot be
said to be founded on a law of Congress. Nor can it be said to be
based on a contract in the sense of the law conferring jurisdiction
on the Court of Claims. That court was authorized to enforce legal
rights and obligations, but it could not proceed further and judge
of the equities between the citizen and his government. In the
absence of legislation by Congress, the holder of a Virginia
military bounty land warrant can have no legal right against the
United States for compensation on the allegation that the
government has wrongfully appropriated to other uses the lands
ceded for his benefit.
It is only a contract authorized by law that the Court of Claims
can consider, and as there is no law of Congress on this subject,
there is nothing on which that court could base a judgment against
the United States if, in the opinion of that tribunal, it had not
fulfilled its duties towards the beneficiaries under the Virginia
deed of cession. The liability of the government, if at all, arises
out of the breach of an accepted trust, and that liability cannot
be enforced at law. The claimant is in no better position because
the government is the trustee than he would be if a private person
occupied that relation, and it is very clear, if such were the
case, that a court of equity would alone have the power to deal
with him.
As the government has not thought fit to allow itself to
Page 76 U. S. 161
be sued in the Court of Claims on equitable considerations, it
follows that the remedy of the claimant, if any now exists, is with
Congress.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is
remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the petition for
want of jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 1]
3 Stat. at Large p. 424.
[
Footnote 2]
See 10 Stat. at Large 612.
[
Footnote 3]
See the following acts of Congress: March 23, 1804, 2
Stat. at Large 274; March 2, 1807,
ib., 425; April 2,
1818, 3
id. 423; March 1, 1823, 3
id. 772; July
7, 1838, 5
id. 262.
