1. Where a seizure of property on land is made under the Acts of
July 13, 1861, or of August 6, 1861, or July 17, 1862, passed in
suppression of the rebellion, the claimants are entitled to trial
by jury, though the suit be in form a libel of information, and the
suit can be removed into this Court by writ of error alone.
Union Insurance Company v.
United States, 6 Wall. 765, and
Armstrong's
Foundry, 6 Wall. 769, affirmed.
2. This Court will, however, assume jurisdiction on appeal for
the purpose of reversing a decree rendered by an inferior court not
having jurisdiction to proceed in the way in which it has
proceeded, and of vacating any unwarranted proceedings of it which
stand in the way of a new trial there in a case where, in the
judgment of this Court, a new trial ought to be granted. And it
will in such cases either reverse the judgment or decree and direct
the proceedings to be dismissed or remand the cause with directions
to allow the pleadings to be amended and to grant a new trial
according to law. And if the subject in controversy be a fund
lately in the registry o� the court, but which has been
distributed, so that a new trial would be useless unless the fund
was restored to the registry where it was before the decree of
distribution was executed,
Page 75 U. S. 508
it will direct that a writ of restitution issue to the proper
parties to restore the fund to the registry.
Three Acts of Congress, one of July 13, 1861, another of August
6, 1861, and a third of July 17, 1862, passed during the late
rebellion, authorized the seizure and confiscation in the district
or circuit courts of property used for insurrectionary purposes,
and to a certain extent prescribed the mode of proceeding.
Under one of these acts it was decided, in the
Union
Insurance Company v. United States and in
Armstrong's
Foundry, [
Footnote 1] that
while proceedings for the condemnation of property or land might be
shaped in the form and modes analogous to those used in admiralty,
yet that issues of fact must, on the demand of either party, be
tried by jury, and that while, where a proceeding under that act to
enforce the forfeiture of real estate had been carried on in
conformity with the practice of courts of admiralty, this Court
would take jurisdiction of the decree on appeal, yet that it would
do so only for the purpose of reversing the decree and directing a
new trial, with proceedings conformed in respect to trial by jury
and exceptions to evidence to the course of proceeding by
information on the common law side of the court in cases of seizure
upon lands.
The three acts above mentioned being in force and in an action
purporting to be in conformity to them, the United States filed an
information
in rem against certain cotton (Morris
claimant) alleged to have been seized on land and forfeited to the
United States under the statutes above referred to. The information
was tried in the district court as a suit in admiralty. The
claimant prayed for a jury, but his prayer was denied. A decree of
forfeiture having passed against the cotton, the case was brought
by the claimant before this Court from the district court by
appeal, and not by writ of error.
Page 75 U. S. 509
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD gave the details of the case, and delivered
the opinion of the Court.
Forfeiture of the property seized in this case is claimed in the
libel of information, as amended, upon several distinct grounds, of
which the following are the most material:
Page 75 U. S. 510
1. Because the owner purchased the cotton of an inhabitant of a
state or district in insurrection, as lawfully declared by the
President in his proclamation to that effect and in violation of
the provision which prohibited "all commercial intercourse between
such states or districts" so long as such hostilities should
continue. [
Footnote 2]
2. Because the property was owned by a person who knowingly used
or employed, or consented to the use or employment of the same, in
aiding, abetting, or promoting said insurrection and resistance to
the laws. [
Footnote 3]
3. Because the owner of the property, being engaged in armed
rebellion against the United States or in aiding or abetting such
rebellion at the time when the President issued his proclamation
upon the subject, did not within sixty days thereafter cease to
aid, countenance, and abet such rebellion and return to his
allegiance. [
Footnote 4]
Process of monition issued, and the marshal, on the eleventh of
May, 1866, seized one hundred and fifty-four bales of cotton, as
appears by his return. Appearance was entered by the claimant on
the ninth of June following as the agent of the bank, and he
alleges in behalf of the bank that none of the material allegations
of the libel of information are true. On the contrary, he alleges
that the cotton was purchased by the bank, and was held by their
agent as their property until the same was attached by a creditor
of the bank, and that the bank had ample authority to transport the
funds with which the cotton was purchased into that district, and
he utterly denies that the purchase was made in violation of any
act of Congress, or of any commercial regulations of the United
States. Many other defenses are set up in the answer, but in the
view taken of the case, it is not important to enter further into
those details.
Testimony was taken in the case, and on the twentieth of
December, 1866, a decree was entered in the district court that the
cotton seized be forfeited to the United States for the value
thereof, estimated at $25,069.70, together with
Page 75 U. S. 511
costs, against the stipulators and claimants. Dissatisfied with
the decree, the claimants appealed to this Court.
By the findings of the court, it appears:
(1) That the cotton was grown on a plantation in the State of
Alabama, and that it was purchased by the agent of the Bank of
Louisiana during the period when both of those states were in
rebellion against the United States.
(2) That the agent of the bank, in going from Louisiana to
Alabama, passed through our military lines, and that he purchased
the cotton in the latter state for the bank, and with the funds
which he transported through our military lines.
(3) That neither the agent nor the bank had any license or
permit from the President to trade or hold any commercial
intercourse in that state or district, and that his acts in trading
for and making the purchase of the cotton were contrary to the act
of Congress prohibiting all such trade and commercial
intercourse.
None of these matters, however, can be reexamined in this Court,
as the district court had no jurisdiction of the cause in admiralty
to render any decree upon the merits. Where the seizure is made on
navigable waters, within the ninth section of the Judiciary Act,
the case belongs to the instance side of the district court; but
where the seizure was made on land, the suit, though in the form of
a libel of information, is an action at common law, and the
claimants are entitled to trial by jury. [
Footnote 5]
Seizures, when made on waters which are navigable from the sea
by vessels of ten or more tons burden, are exclusively cognizable
in the district courts, subject to appeal, as provided by law; but
all seizures on land or on waters not navigable, and all suits
instituted to recover penalties and forfeitures incurred, except
for seizures on navigable waters, must be prosecuted as other
common law suits, and can only be removed into this Court by writ
of error. [
Footnote 6]
Want of jurisdiction in the court below, however, does not
prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction on appeal
Page 75 U. S. 512
for the purpose of reversing the decree rendered by that court
and of vacating any unwarranted proceedings of that court which
necessarily stand in the way of a new trial there in a case where,
in the judgment of this Court, a new trial ought to be granted.
Where the court below has no jurisdiction of the case in any form
of proceeding, the course of this Court is to direct the cause to
be dismissed if the judgment or decree was for the defendant or
claimant, but if the judgment or decree was for the plaintiff or
libellant, the Court here will reverse the judgment or decree and
remand the cause with directions to the court below to dismiss the
proceeding.
Unless the practice were as explained, great injustice would be
done in all cases where the judgment or decree was in favor of the
party who instituted the suit, as he would obtain the full benefit
of a judgment or decree rendered by a court in his favor which had
no jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy. Hence this
Court will in all such cases reverse the judgment or decree and
direct the proceedings to be dismissed, or remand the cause with
directions to allow the pleadings to be amended, and to grant a new
trial according to law. But the fund in this case having been
distributed, a new trial would be useless unless the fund is
restored to the registry of the court, where it was deposited
before the decree of distribution was executed. Although the
district court has no jurisdiction in such a case, still this Court
has full jurisdiction on appeal to reverse the action of that court
and to dismiss the proceedings, or, in a case where a new trial is
required, to remand the cause, and give directions to that effect,
and also to direct that a writ of restitution issue to the proper
parties, to cause the fund to be restored to the registry of the
court, from which it was erroneously withdrawn.
Decree reversed and the cause remanded with directions to
allow the pleadings to be amended, and to grant a new trial, and
issue a writ of restitution in conformity to the opinion of the
Court.
[
Footnote 1]
6 Wall.
73 U. S. 759 and
73 U. S. 766.
[
Footnote 2]
12 Stat. at Large 257.
[
Footnote 3]
Ib., 319.
[
Footnote 4]
Ib., 591.
[
Footnote 5]
Confiscation
Cases, 7 Wall. 462;
Armstrong's
Foundry, 6 Wall. 769.
[
Footnote 6]
Insurance Co. v. United
States, 6 Wall. 765;
United
States v. Hart, 6 Wall. 772.
