Under the fourteenth section of the Patent Act of 1836, enacting
that damages may be recovered by action on the case, to be brought
in the name of the person "interested," the original owner of the
patent, who has afterwards sold his right, may recover for an
infringement committed during the time that he was owner. The word
"interested," means interested in the patent at the time when the
infringement was committed.
The eleventh section of the Patent Act of 1836, relating to the
assignment of patents, thus enacts:
"Every patent shall be assignable in law either as to the whole
interest, or any undivided part thereof, by any instrument in
writing, which assignment, and also every grant and conveyance of
the exclusive right under any patent to make
Page 74 U. S. 516
and use, and to grant to others to make and use the thing
patented, within and throughout any specified part of portion of
the United States, shall be recorded,"
&c.
And the fourteenth section, which relates to damages in suits,
brought by the owners of patents for infringement, says:
"And such damages may be recovered by action on the case, in any
court of competent jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names
of the person or persons interested, whether as patentees,
assignees, or as grantees of the exclusive right within and
throughout a specified part of the United States."
This statute being in force, Moore a patentee, brought suit in
the court below against Marsh for infringement. Marsh pleaded that
after the date of the alleged infringement, he, Moore, the
patentee, had sold and assigned an undivided half of the patent for
the district where the infringement was alleged to have been
committed. To this plea Moore demurred. The court having sustained
the demurrer and judgment being given accordingly, the case was
brought here by the patentee on appeal.
The general question, therefore, was whether a sale and
assignment by a patentee of his patent right is, under the
fourteenth section above quoted, a bar to an action by him to
recover damages for an infringement committed before such sale and
transfer. In other words, whether the words of the statute "name of
the person interested" meant, as the plea assumed, "persons
interested in the patent at the time when the suit was brought," or
meant, as the declaration assumed, interested at the time when the
cause of action accrued.
The case was submitted on briefs.
Page 74 U. S. 518
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Viewed in the light of the admitted facts, the only question in
the case is whether the assignment by the plaintiff to a third
person of an undivided half of the right, title, and interest
secured to him by his letters patent, subsequent to the alleged
infringement but before the commencement of his suit, is a bar to
his claim to recover damages for such infringement.
Letters patent were granted to the plaintiff on the 18th of
April, 1848, for a certain new and useful improvement in grain
drills, in which it is alleged that he is the original and first
inventor of the improvement. Original patent was for the term of
fourteen years, but it was subsequently extended by the
Commissioner of Patents for the term of seven years from and after
the expiration of the original term. Alleged defects existed in the
original specification, and in consequence thereof the plaintiff,
on the 3d of February, 1863, surrendered the letters patent, and
the same were reissued to him in three new patents for separate and
distinct parts of the invention for the unexpired portion of the
original and extended terms of the patent.
Damages are claimed of the defendants for infringing the
reissued letters patent from the day of the reissue to the 24th of
February, 1865, as more fully set forth in the declaration.
Page 74 U. S. 519
Pleas to the declaration were subsequently filed by the
defendants, and the record shows that they gave due notice of
certain special defenses which they proposed to offer in evidence
under the general issue, in pursuance of the act of Congress in
such case made and provided. Before the day for the trial came,
however, the parties filed an agreement waiving a jury and
submitting the cause to the court, stipulating that the decision of
the court should have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.
Leave to amend was subsequently granted by the court to both
parties.
Purport of the amendment to the declaration was that the
plaintiff was the sole owner of the letters patent for the County
of Union in the State of Pennsylvania, from the date of the
reissued letters patent to the 24th of February, 1865, and that the
defendants had infringed the same throughout that period by making
and using the invention and vending the same to others to be used
without his license or consent.
Defendants filed another special plea in which they alleged that
the plaintiff, when he commenced his suit, was not the owner of the
exclusive right secured in the reissued letters patent within any
part of the United States, that in certain states and districts he
had parted with all his interest in the patent, and that on the
said 24th of February he assigned and transferred an undivided half
of all the residue of his right, title, and interest in the same,
and therefore that the plaintiff had no right to bring this action
in his own name against the defendants. Plaintiff demurred to the
plea and the defendants joined in demurrer. Parties were heard and
the court rendered judgment for the defendants and the plaintiff
sued out this writ of error.
Conceded fact is that the plaintiff was the exclusive owner of
the patent in the territorial district where the alleged
infringement was committed, throughout the entire period of the
infringement, as alleged in the declaration. Express allegation of
the declaration is to that effect, and, as the plea is in avoidance
and contains no denial of the matters alleged in the declaration,
they must be considered as admitted
Page 74 U. S. 520
unless the matters alleged in the special plea are a sufficient
answer to the action.
Briefly stated, the matter alleged in avoidance of the right of
the plaintiff to maintain the suit is that he, before he commenced
the suit but subsequent to the infringement, sold and assigned an
undivided half of his patent for the territorial district where the
infringement was committed to a third person.
Patentees have secured to them, by virtue of the letters patent
granted to them, the full and exclusive right and liberty, for a
prescribed term, "of making and using, and vending to others to be
used" their respective inventions or discoveries, and whenever
their rights as thus defined are invaded by others, they are
entitled to an action on the case to recover actual damages as
compensation for the injury. [
Footnote 1]
Such damages may be recovered by action on the case in any
circuit court of competent jurisdiction, to be brought in the name
or names of the person or persons interested, whether as patentees,
assignees, or as grantees of the exclusive right, as already
defined, within and throughout a specified part of the United
States. [
Footnote 2]
Assignees and grantees as well as the patentee may, under some
circumstances, maintain an action on the case for an infringement
in their own name, as appears by the express words of the act of
Congress. An assignee is one who holds, by a valid assignment in
writing, the whole interest of a patent or any undivided part of
such whole interest throughout the United States. [
Footnote 3]
Where the patentee has assigned his whole interest either before
or after the patent is issued, the action must be brought in the
name of the assignee, because he alone was interested in the patent
at the time the infringement took place; but where the assignment
is of an undivided part of the patent, the action should be brought
for every infringement committed subsequent to the assignment in
the joint names of
Page 74 U. S. 521
the patentee and assignee, as representing the entire interest.
[
Footnote 4]
Settled view at one time was that the grantee of a territorial
right for a particular district could not bring an action on the
patent in his own name, but the act of Congress having made him a
party interested in the patent, it is now equally well settled that
he may sue in his own name for invasion of the patent in that
territorial district, as no one else is injured by any such
infringement. [
Footnote 5]
Both assignees and grantees have an interest in the patent, but
the terms are not synonymous as used in the patent law. [
Footnote 6]
Grants as well as assignments must be in writing, and they must
convey the exclusive right under the patent to make and use and
vend to others to be used the thing patented within and throughout
some specified district or portion of the United States, and such
right must be exclusive of the patentee as well as of all others
except the grantee. Suits for infringement in such districts, if
committed subsequent to the grant, can only be brought in the name
of the grantee, as it is clear that no one can maintain such an
action until his rights have been invaded nor until he is
interested in the damages to be recovered.
Alleged infringement in this case was committed in the County of
Union in the State of Pennsylvania, and the admitted fact is that
the plaintiff, throughout the entire period of the infringement,
was the sole owner of the exclusive right to make and use and grant
to others to make and use the thing patented in that territorial
district by virtue of his original title as patentee, having never
assigned or granted any right, title, or interest, within that
county. [
Footnote 7]
Page 74 U. S. 522
Grant that these views are correct and it is clear that unless
the plaintiff can maintain the action, there can be no redress, as
it is too plain for argument that a subsequent assignee or grantee
can neither maintain an action in his own name or be joined with
the patentee in maintaining it for any infringement of the
exclusive right committed before he became interested in the
patent. Undoubtedly the assignee thereafter stands in the place of
the patentee both as to right under the patent and future
responsibility; but it is a great mistake to suppose that the
assignment of a patent carries with it a transfer of the right to
damages for an infringement committed before such assignment.
Comment upon the cases cited as supporting this proposition is
unnecessary, as it is clear to a demonstration that they give it no
countenance whatever. Such a proposition finds no support in any
decided case nor in the act of Congress upon the subject.
True meaning of the word interested, as employed in the last
clause of the fourteenth section of the Patent Act, when properly
understood and applied, is that the right of action is given to the
person or persons owning the exclusive right at the time the
infringement is committed. Subsequent sale and transfer of the
exclusive right are no bar to an action to recover damages for an
infringement committed before such sale and transfer.
The reason for the rule is that the assignee or grantee is not
interested in the damages for any infringement committed before the
sale and transfer of the patent. Correct interpretation of the
words "person or persons interested" is that the words mean the
person or persons interested in the patent at the time when the
infringement was committed, which is the cause of action for which
the damages may be recovered. [
Footnote 8]
Assignment was made in that case after suit was brought, but
before the final decree. Proof of the fact was offered, and a
motion filed to dismiss the case, but the court overruled
Page 74 U. S. 523
the motion because the assignees could have no interest in a
suit for an infringement committed before their right accrued.
[
Footnote 9]
Attempt is made to distinguish the case at bar from the rule
established in those cases, but, in the view of this Court, without
success.
Judgment reversed. New venire ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
5 Stat. at Large 123, § 14.
[
Footnote 2]
Ib.
[
Footnote 3]
Ib., 121, § 11.
[
Footnote 4]
Herbert v. Adams, 4 Mason 15; Curtis on Patents (3d ed)
§ 347;
Gayler v.
Wilder, 10 How. 477;
Whittemore v. Cutter,
1 Callison 430;
Woodworth v.
Wilson, 4 How. 712.
[
Footnote 5]
Tyler v. Tuel,
6 Cranch 324;
Gayler v.
Wilder, 10 How. 477; Curtis on Patents § 346.
[
Footnote 6]
Potter v. Holland, Law's Digest 157.
[
Footnote 7]
5 Stat. at Large 121, § 11.
[
Footnote 8]
Dean v. Mason,
20 How. 198.
[
Footnote 9]
Kilborn v. Rewee, 8 Gray 415; 1 Hilliard on T. 521;
Eades v. Harris, 1 Younge & Collier 230.