A statute of a state releasing "whatever interest" in certain
real estate may "rightfully" belong to it is not a law impairing
the obligation of a contract in a case where an agent of the state,
having by contract with it acquired an interest in half the lot,
undertakes to sell and conveys the whole of it. In such case -- and
on an assumption that the agent does own one half -- the statute
will be held to apply to the remaining half alone.
Solomon Brindley, a free colored man, was the owner, in
Page 74 U. S. 488
1808, of a small house and lot of trifling value on Upper
Street, in the City of Lexington, and was now dead. It did not
appear when he died, or that he ever transferred the title to the
property, but at a very early day, William T. Barry occupied it,
and this occupancy was continued after his death by his legal
representatives until 1843, when it was sold, as Barry's property,
on an execution in favor of the old Bank of Kentucky (then mainly
owned by and under the control of the state), and purchased for
Martha Ann Corbin, and Martha Ann Corbin, her daughter, two of the
defendants in error, who occupied and claimed it until November,
1855.
At this date, T. B. Monroe Jr., an attorney-at-law, was employed
by the auditor of public accounts, in conformity with a statute of
Kentucky, [
Footnote 1] by a
written contract, to sue for and recover the property, as having
escheated on the death of Brindley, it being agreed that Monroe was
to have for his compensation a moiety of the property recovered.
Monroe, in the execution of his employment, prosecuted a suit in
the name of one Baxter, the agent appointed to take charge of
escheated estates in Fayette County, where the property was
situated, and procured a judgment of eviction, and afterwards
undertook to sell the property to Mulligan, the plaintiff in error,
and to deliver possession to him. The record did not show that
Baxter was a party to this sale or had sanctioned it. At this point
of time the legislature stepped in, and on the 4th of April, 1861,
passed a statute enacting
"That
whatever interest in a small house and lot on
Upper Street, in the city of Lexington, which was conveyed, in the
year 1808, by Thomas Bodley to Solomon Brindley, may
rightfully
belong to the state by escheat, or otherwise, since the death
of the said Brindley, without any known legal heirs, be, and the
same is hereby,
released to and vested in Martha Ann
Corbin for her life, and her daughter, Martha Ann, absolutely after
her said mother's death. The said property having been
Page 74 U. S. 489
bought, in the year 1843, as the property of William T. Barry,
claiming and possessed of it, after said Brindley's death, and
conveyed, in 1844, to the said mother and daughter, and who have
occupied it as theirs ever since said sale and conveyance."
Mulligan, having filed a petition against the Corbins to recover
possession of the property, insisted that this act of 1861 was
inhibited by the Constitution of the United States, because it
impaired the obligation of the contract which the auditor made with
Monroe. The Court of Appeals directed the petition to be dismissed,
and Mulligan brought the case by writ of error here.
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The only question that arises in this case, which it is
competent for this Court to decide, is whether the act of the
Legislature of Kentucky, passed on the 4th day of April, 1861, is
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, because it
impairs the obligation of a contract.
If the legislature had the power to release to the defendants in
error the right of the state to the property in controversy, both
common justice and the good name of the commonwealth demanded the
exercise of that power, under the circumstances of this case. It
appears that the affairs of the old Bank of Kentucky were
substantially under the control of the state when the house and lot
were seized as the property of Barry, and sold. The purchasers at
that sale had a right to conclude that the state would never
interfere to their prejudice, and no other party could, if Brindley
died without heirs. The legislature, after the facts were known,
would have been guilty of a great wrong, if they had refused to
pass an act to give validity, as far as it
Page 74 U. S. 490
had power to do so, to a sale of which the state derived the
benefit.
The general power of the legislature to grant to individuals the
lands belonging to the state is not denied, but it is claimed there
was a restraint in this instance, on account of the previous
contract, concerning the property, between the auditor and
Monroe.
It is charitable to suppose that the auditor would never have
employed Monroe to dispossess the Corbins, had he known the manner
in which they acquired possession, and that his proceedings were
prompted by a commendable zeal for the true interests of the
state.
But after all, did the contract with Monroe have the effect
claimed for it by the plaintiff in error? It certainly did not vest
in him the title to the property. If, as is admitted, the auditor
had the authority to contract with an attorney-at-law to give him
one-half the escheated estate, as compensation for its recovery,
still, this contract did not confer on him a license to sell the
property after it was recovered, or to make any disposition of it
that would bind the government.
The legislature had entrusted the management of escheated
property with bonded officers, and confided to them the exclusive
power of selling, under the written directions of the auditor.
[
Footnote 2] In no other mode
could the legal title of the state be divested, and it nowhere
appears that Baxter, in whose name the suit against the Corbins was
prosecuted, and who was the agent for escheated estates in Fayette
County, where the property is situated, was a party to the sale to
Mulligan, or that he ever sanctioned it. Viewing the transaction in
the aspect most favorable to Mulligan, it is apparent that his
rights, under this contract, are those which belonged to Monroe,
and that he has no other or better rights than Monroe had. The
case, then, resolves into this question: what were the rights of
Monroe, and how are they affected by the act of the legislature?
The answer to this question is very plain, and relieves the
proceeding of any difficulty.
When the escheat was perfected, the legal title to the entire
property was vested in the state; but as the state, through its
auditor, had bargained with Monroe to concede a moiety to him for
his services, it follows that the state was under obligations to
convey, in some proper form, this moiety to him. This left the
state the undisputed owner of one-half the property, with such
power of disposition as the legislature, in its wisdom, should see
proper to give it. The act in question does not attempt to
interfere with any privilege which belonged to Monroe, and we have
no right to presume it was passed with any such intention. It does
not profess to grant to the Corbins any particular estate, but
simply releases to them whatever interest the state had to the
property they occupied, and as the state undoubtedly had an
interest in it to the extent of one moiety, how can it be said that
the obligation of the contract between the auditor and Monroe was
impaired by this statute?
The statute operated rightfully on the moiety owned by the
state, and there is no authority for saying the legislature meant
to do anything more.
It is not our province to decide any other point in this case,
and as the act of the Legislature of Kentucky does not, either in
terms or by necessary implication, impair the obligation of the
auditor's contract with Monroe, it follows that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals must be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
1 Stanton's Statutes of Kentucky, chap. 34, p. 459.
[
Footnote 2]
1 Stanton's Statutes of Kentucky, chap. 34, p. 459.
