1. A statute authorizing the chancellor of the state to
discharge trustees named in a will (the purpose of the trust being
to hold real estate and to pay the rents to a person named for
life, and on his death to dispose of the fee to his children) and
to appoint new trustees in their place is valid, it appearing that
the act was passed with the knowledge and at the request of the
original trustees.
2. The trustees having been discharged pursuant to the statute,
it was competent for the legislature, by a supplemental act, to
grant power to the chancellor to appoint as such trustee, in the
place of those discharged, the devisee of the life estate and
authorize him to execute the trust. Such discharge and substitution
did not violate the obligation of a contract.
3. The first statute having authorized trustees to be appointed
by the chancellor to divide, as soon "as conveniently may be,"
certain real estate which they held in trust for A. for life,
remainder to his children, one moiety whereof -- the statute said
-- shall be held by them to those uses, and the remaining moiety
shall be subdivided by them into so many lots as they think most
likely to effect an advantageous sale, the proceeds to be invested
and the interest to be paid to tenant for life.
Held, the chancellor
having made an order that
the
eastern moiety of the
Page 73 U. S. 724
estate should be sold, and a third act of assembly having
authorized the trustee, under the order theretofore granted or any
subsequent order either to mortgage or sell the premises which "the
chancellor
has permitted or
may permit him to
sell," that the power to partition the estate was not exhausted by
the first partition into an eastern and western portion, and that
the chancellor might permit the substituted trustee to sell the
southern moiety instead of the eastern.
4. This would be so as an original question -- one however
already settled by this Court in the case on former judgment. In
addition, it would be to be taken to be so at all events, the
question arising in this case on a statute which has been construed
in that way by the highest court of the state which passed it.
The case was thus:
Mary Clarke, who died in 1802, devised certain land, now town
lots in New York City to the Right Rev. Benjamin Moore his wife
(the daughter of Mrs. Clarke), and a third person, Mrs. Maunsell,
in trust, to receive the rents, to pay the same to her grandson,
Thomas B. Clarke (a man, apparently, of improvident habits) during
life, and upon his death to convey it to his issue, then living, in
fee, and leaving none, then to Clement C. Moore in fee.
In May, 1811, Bishop Moore had become enfeebled in health. His
son, on his father's behalf, in that month addressed a
communication to the Diocesan Convention of the State of New York
requesting it to appoint an assistant bishop for that diocese,
wherein he stated
"that though the disease with which it had pleased Almighty God
to visit him was somewhat mitigated, yet that it was impossible, he
was assured, that he should ever be able to render or perform the
duties of the episcopal functions."
Thereupon the convention appointed an assistant. In July
following, the bishop was struck by paralysis, and grew weaker
until he died in February, 1816.
In 1814, the Legislature of New York, on the application or Mr.
Clarke -- who had at this time two children, a third afterwards
born not having as yet come into being -- passed an act in which --
reciting that the trustees had agreed by
Page 73 U. S. 725
writing to all such acts as the legislature should deem proper
to make for the benefit and relief of T. B. Clarke, and did desire
that some other persons might be appointed trustees -- it was
provided that the court of chancery, on his application, might
"appoint one or more trustees to execute and perform the several
trusts and duties" specified in the will in place of the
testamentary trustees,
"who are hereby discharged from the
trusts in the said will mentioned," and further that the new
trustees should "as soon as conveniently may be, partition and
divide the land
"
into two equal parts, one moiety whereof shall be held by
them to the uses and upon the trusts declared in and by the said
will, and the remaining moiety shall be subdivided by the said
trustees into so many lots as they may think most likely to effect
an advantageous sale thereof, and after having completed such
subdivision, the said trustees are hereby authorized and required,
within a convenient time thereafter, not to exceed six
months, except at the request of the said Clarke, to sell and
dispose of the said last subdivided moiety,"
the proceeds to be invested, the interest, excepting a certain
portion, to be paid to Mr. Clarke, and the principal reserved for
the trusts of the will.
In 1815, on the application of Mr. Clarke, a supplemental act
was passed authorizing HIM
"to execute and perform every act in relation to the real
estate, with like effect that trustees duly appointed under the
said act might have done, and that HE apply the whole of the
interest and income of the said property to the maintenance and
support of his family and the education of his children,"
and further providing that
"No sale of any part of the said estate shall be made by the
said Clarke until he shall have procured the assent of the
chancellor to such sale, who shall, at the time of giving such
assent, also direct the mode in which the proceeds of such sale
shall be vested in the said Clarke as trustee, and further that it
shall be the duty of the said Clarke annually to render an account
to the chancellor or to such person as he may appoint of the
principal of the proceeds of such sale only, the interest to be
applied by the said Clarke in such manner as he may think proper
for his use and
Page 73 U. S. 726
benefit and for the maintenance and education of his
children."
In July, 1815, an order was made by the chancellor on the
petition of Mr. Clarke authorizing him to sell and dispose of the
eastern moiety of the estate, "to be divided by the line
in the manner for that purpose mentioned in the said petition," the
sales to be made under the direction of a master and the proceeds
to be paid to the master and applied and invested according to the
directions of the order.
In 1816, a third act was passed authorizing Clarke,
"under the order heretofore granted by the chancellor or under
any subsequent order either to mortgage or to sell the premises
which the chancellor has permitted or hereafter may permit him to
sell, and to apply the money so raised, by mortgage or sale, to the
purposes required by the chancellor, under the acts"
theretofore passed.
In March, 1817, the chancellor, upon the petition of Mr. Clarke,
made an order that Mr. Clarke be authorized to sell the
southern moiety of the said estate
instead of the
eastern moiety, as permitted and directed by the orders
theretofore made, and further authorizing him to mortgage all or
any part or parts of the said southern moiety of the said estate if
in his judgment it would be more beneficial to mortgage than to
sell the same, and to convey and parts of the southern moiety in
satisfaction of any debts due from him upon a valuation to be
agreed on between him and his respective creditors, provided that
every sale and mortgage and conveyance in satisfaction that might
be made by the said Clarke should be approved by one of the masters
of the court, &c.
In October, 1818, Clarke executed a deed of twenty lots to one
McIntyre. The consideration recited in the deed is the indebtedness
of the grantor to the grantee "in a large sum of money," and $3,750
paid.
In this state of things, Clarke having died in 1826, leaving
children, Mrs. Williamson and others, these all now brought suit
against Suydam to recover two lots
in the western moiety of the
estate, as first divided, held by him under title from
McIntire.
Page 73 U. S. 727
The court below held the title of the defendant good. The
correctness of such view was now the matter here.
To understand the case better, it is necessary to state that
these statutes and what was done under them had been the subject,
previous to the present case, of consideration in the state courts
of New York, as also in this Court. The present case itself had
been here twice before.
Questions under the statutes first arose in the courts of New
York in
Sinclair v. Jackson, [
Footnote 1] in which case the court declined to express an
opinion respecting "the constitutionality of the laws, or the
efficacy of the proceedings under them." The next case was
Cochran v. Van Surlay, [
Footnote 2] where the Court of Errors, by a much divided
court, held, that the statutes were constitutional and that the
proceedings shown in that case had been take in conformity to the
statutes.
After this decision was made, proceedings under these statutes
came before the courts of the United States, and on certificate of
division were decided by this Court in
Williamson v.
Berry, [
Footnote 3]
Williamson v. Irish Presbyterian Congregation, [
Footnote 4] and
Williamson v.
Ball. [
Footnote 5]
This Court then decided various questions which arose respecting
the conformity of the proceedings to the requisitions of the
statutes. But the decision in
Clarke v. Van Surley having
been so far from unanimous, the majority of this Court thought that
the questions might be examined anew, and their view was different
from that of the majority in the state court. The
present
case, which, as already mentioned, had been here twice before, was
first decided by the circuit court, and in conformity to the
decisions of this Court just mentioned. Coming here again,
[
Footnote 6] the judgment was
reversed on the ground that
subsequently to the cases
already referred to in this Court, the courts of New York had, in
Towle v. Forney [
Footnote
7] and
Clarke v. Davenport, [
Footnote 8] reiterated the decision in
Cochran v.
Van Surley, and thus by repeated decision had
Page 73 U. S. 728
established in a way which, by its unanimity, had fixed what was
decided a law of property, which the federal courts must now
enforce, whatever might be their own opinion or decision.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The action was ejectment to recover the possession of two lots
of land situated in the City of New York and numbered sixty-four
and sixty-five, as delineated on a certain map made
Page 73 U. S. 729
by the city surveyor. Exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs to
the instructions of the circuit court in directing the jury to
return a verdict for the defendant. Judgment was accordingly
rendered for the defendant, and the plaintiffs sued out this writ
of error.
Detailed statement of the material facts of the case may be
found in the reported decisions of this Court when the case was
before the court on two former occasions. [
Footnote 9] Accurate report of the material facts
involved in the controversy is also given in the case of
Williamson v. Berry, [
Footnote 10] which was substantially overruled by the
decision of this Court when the case was last before the court
prior to the present hearing.
Prior to her death, the land in controversy belonged to Mary
Clarke, who died in 1802, having devised the same to three persons
in trust to receive the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and to
pay the same to Thomas B. Clarke during his natural life, and upon
his death in further trust to convey the same to his lawful issue
living at his death in fee, and if he should not leave any lawful
issue at the time of his death, then, in the further trust, to
convey the premises to Clement C. Moore and his heirs, or to such
person in fee as he might by will appoint in case of his death
prior to the devisee of the life estate.
Admitted facts are that Thomas B. Clarke died on the first day
of May, 1826, leaving three children -- Catharine, Isabella, and
Bayard -- who, with the husbands of the two daughters, were the
original plaintiffs. Two of the trustees died before the devisee of
the life estate, and the survivor died on the fourth day of
December, 1838. Title and right of the plaintiff to possession are
complete unless the defendant can establish a valid alienation of
the property. He deraigned his title from Thomas B. Clarke,
alleging that he was authorized by certain private acts of the
Legislature of the State of New York and by certain orders of the
chancellor
Page 73 U. S. 730
of that state to make the conveyance. Clarke conveyed to Peter
McIntire by deed of the twentieth of October, 1818, and McIntire
conveyed by deed of the thirtieth of January, 1830, to Elijah
Humphreys, and the plaintiff also introduced the deed from Philo T.
Ruggles, one of the masters in chancery of the state, of the
nineteenth February, 1845, to James H. Suydam, the defendant. By
the Act of the first of April, 1814, the court of chancery was
authorized, on the application of Thomas B. Clarke, to constitute
and appoint one or more trustees to execute and perform the several
trusts and duties specified in the will of Mary Clarke, in the
place of the testamentary trustees, and it also provided that the
trustees last named "are hereby discharged from the trusts in the
said will mentioned."
Provision was also therein made that the new trustees should, as
soon as conveniently might be, partition and divide the land into
two equal parts, one moiety whereof should be held by them to the
uses and upon the trusts declared in the will, and the other moiety
should be subdivided by the trustees, or the major part of them,
into so many lots as they or the major part of them might think
most likely to effect an advantageous sale thereof. Having
completed the subdivision as required, the provision was that the
trustees, or a majority of them, were authorized and required,
within a convenient time thereafter, not to exceed six months
except at the request of the petitioner, to sell and dispose of the
last subdivided moiety, and that they should invest the proceeds as
they or a majority of them should deem most for the interest of the
parties concerned, paying the interest or income, except a certain
portion of it, to the petitioner, and reserving the principal for
the trusts of the will.
On the application of said Thomas B. Clarke, a Supplemental Act
was passed March 24, 1815, authorizing and empowering the
petitioner to execute and perform every act, matter, and thing in
relation to the real estate mentioned in the preceding act in like
manner and with like effect that trustees duly appointed under it
might have done, and that
Page 73 U. S. 731
he might apply the whole of the interest and income of the
property to the maintenance and support of his family and the
education of his children, and further providing that no sale of
any part of the real estate should be made by him until he should
have procured the assent of the chancellor to such sale, who, at
the time of giving such assent, was also required to direct the
mode in which the proceeds of such sale, or so much thereof as he
should think proper, should be vested in the petitioner as trustee,
and that it should be the duty of the trustee annually to render an
account to the chancellor, or to such person as the chancellor
might appoint, of the principal of the proceeds of such sale,
leaving the interest to be applied by the trustee in such manner as
he might think proper for his use and benefit, and for the
maintenance and education of his children.
Pursuant to the authority therein conferred, the chancellor, on
the petition of said Thomas B. Clarke, made an order dated the
third day of July, 1815, authorizing him to sell and dispose of the
eastern moiety of the estate, "to be divided by the line, in the
manner for that purpose mentioned in the said petition," the sale
to be made under the direction of a master and the proceeds to be
paid to the master and applied and invested as directed in the
order. Subsequently a second Supplemental Act was passed, approved
March 29, 1816, which authorized the petitioner, under the order
heretofore granted by the chancellor or under any subsequent order,
either to mortgage or to sell the premises which the chancellor has
permitted or may hereafter permit him to sell as trustee under the
will, and to apply the money so raised by mortgage or sale to the
purposes required or to be required by the chancellor, under the
legislative acts to which reference is made. Application was
accordingly made to the chancellor May 30, 1816, for authority to
proceed under the second supplemental act, and an order was passed
on that day authorizing him to mortgage instead of selling the
lands embraced in the preceding order of the court, the moneys
thereby procured and the debts therewith extinguished to be
appropriated and adjusted in the
Page 73 U. S. 732
same manner and under the same checks as was provided in the
prior order.
Such power, however, proved to be unavailing, as the trustee, on
the eighth day of March, 1817, represented to the chancellor that
notwithstanding that authority, he could not effect any sales or
raise any money upon mortgage without a sacrifice of property
greater than he felt warranted to make; that the pressure of his
debts and the necessities of his family required some measures for
their relief. The measures of relief suggested were that the estate
should be divided by an eastern and western, instead of a northern
and southern, line, and that power should be granted to him to sell
or mortgage the southern, instead of the eastern moiety of the
estate, as directed in the prior order. Authority was accordingly
given to the trustee by an order made March 15, 1817, authorizing
him to sell and dispose of the southern moiety of the estate, the
same being divided by a line running east and west through the
center of Twenty-sixty Street &c., instead of the eastern
moiety of the estate, as permitted and directed by the orders
heretofore made in the premises. By virtue of that order, he might
convey and part of the southern moiety in payment and satisfaction
of his debts upon a valuation agreed on between him and his
respective creditors, but it was required that every sale,
mortgage, or conveyance he might make for that purpose should be
approved by a master of the court, and that a certificate of such
approval should be endorsed upon every sale or mortgage that should
be made by the trustee. Power was also conferred upon him in the
order to receive and take the moneys arising from the premises and
apply the same to the payment of his debts, and to invest the
surplus in such manner as he should deem proper to yield an income
for the maintenance and support of his family.
Clarke, October 20th, 1818, conveyed twenty lots to Peter
McIntire, including the two mentioned in the declaration.
Consideration, as recited in the deed, is that the grantor was
indebted to the grantee "in a large sum of money," and also of
three thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars, lawful
Page 73 U. S. 733
money. The proofs show that the defendant was in possession, and
the actual occupant of the premises at the commencement of the suit
on the thirteenth day of August, 1845, and that the two lots in
question are situated within the southern moiety, and were also
within the western moiety as the estate was first divided.
Objections were made by the plaintiff to the three orders of the
chancellor when offered in evidence by the defendant, but the court
overruled the several objections, and the plaintiff excepted to the
rulings. He also objected to the admissibility of the deed of
Charles W. McIntire, also to the endorsement thereon of the
approval of the master, and also to the admissibility of the
several other deeds introduced by the defendant, but the court
overruled the several objections and the plaintiff excepted to the
respective rulings, as more fully explained in the record.
Testimony was also introduced by the defendant proving that
there was formerly on file in the court of chancery certain papers
in which were the orders of the chancellor, but that they were
lost, and the witness testified that he knew nothing of their
genuineness, whereupon the defendant rested, and the court ruled
that he was entitled to a verdict, and the verdict and judgment
were rendered in his favor, and the plaintiff excepted and sued out
this writ of error.
1. Questions touching the validity of the before-mentioned acts
of the legislature of the state were first considered judicially in
the case of
Sinclair v. Jackson, [
Footnote 11] in the court for the correction of
errors, but the decision turned upon another point, and the court
cautiously avoided expressing any opinion as to their validity. The
next case was
Cochran v. Van Surlay, [
Footnote 12] decided originally in the supreme
court of the state. Statement of the court in that case was that
when the first act was passed, all the parties interested in the
trust estate who were capable of acting for themselves were before
the legislature and were applicants for the law. Besides
Page 73 U. S. 734
Clarke, the tenant for life, in his own right and the natural
guardian of his children, to whom the remainder was limited, there
was Clement C. Moore, the contingent remainderman in fee, and the
trustees named in the will, who had the whole legal estate and
represented the minors as fully as they could be represented in any
form.
Leading features of the acts are that they changed the trustees
appointed by the will and authorized a sale of a part of the estate
without the consent of the minors, who were entitled to the
remainder in fee after the termination of the life estate. Pursuant
to their request, the Act of April 1, 1814, discharged the trustees
named in the will from the execution of the trusts and authorized
the court of chancery to appoint one or more trustees in their
place. Subsequent Act passed March 24, 1815, authorized and
empowered Thomas B. Clarke to execute and perform every act,
matter, and thing in relation to the real estate in like manner and
with like effect that trustees duly appointed under the former act
might have done. Decision of the court was that the court of
chancery, without an act of the legislature, could have discharged
the trustees named in the will and might have appointed others in
their place, and that the act of the legislature was not an act
beyond their constitutional power, as the mere substitution of a
new trustee could neither defeat the trust nor divest the rights of
those beneficially interested in the property. Critical examination
of the power to sell, as conferred under the Act of April 1, 1814,
and as modified under the Act of March 24, 1815, and of the power
to mortgage or sell as conferred under the Act of March 29, 1816,
was made at the same time, and the unqualified conclusion reached
was that the several acts were valid and constitutional, although
they did not extend to other cases of a like character.
Objections were also taken that the orders of the chancellor
were not made in pursuance of the acts of the legislature, but
those objections were overruled as unsupported in fact or as
entirely unavailing, unless presented in some direct proceeding, as
by appeal or by application to the chancellor
Page 73 U. S. 735
for new orders and directions in the premises. Conclusions of
the court were:
(1) That the acts of the legislature authorizing the sale of the
property for the support and maintenance of the tenant for life and
of his family and the education of his children were fully
warranted by the state constitution, and that they did not in any
manner conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
(2) That the orders of the chancellor in carrying those
provisions into effect were regular and proper, and that the deeds
of conveyance were sufficient to convey the title to the estate to
the grantees.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, the plaintiff sued out a writ of
error and removed the cause into the court for the correction of
errors, where the questions were again fully argued, but the
judgment of the supreme court of the state was in all things
affirmed. [
Footnote 13]
Pending that litigation, certain suits were commenced in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New
York, and the justices of that court being opposed in opinion in
respect to the principal question involved in the controversy, they
were certified into this Court for decision, and the majority of
this Court adopted in substance and effect the views of the
minority of the court for the correction of errors. [
Footnote 14]
Same questions in respect to the same estate were subsequently
presented to the Superior Court of the City of New York, and the
court, adopting the state decisions, held that those acts of the
legislature were not inhibited by the state constitution nor by
that clause of the Constitution of the United States which declares
that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts. [
Footnote 15]
Judgment was for the plaintiff, and the defendant insisting that
the views of this Court, as expressed in the answers given on the
occasion when certain questions were certified here by the circuit
judges of that district, appealed to the Court of Appeals that the
questions might be reexamined.
Page 73 U. S. 736
Express decision of the Court of Appeals was that the judgment
of the Court of Errors in
Cochran v. Surlay was a final
determination of the court of last resort in the state not only
upon all the questions of law in the case, but upon the identical
title in controversy, and that they ought not to reexamine the
grounds of that decision. They also held that, as between judgments
of their own courts and those of the federal government, where
there is a conflict between them, they ought to follow their own
decisions except in cases arising under the Constitution and laws
of the Union. [
Footnote
16]
Present case was first decided in the circuit court in favor of
the plaintiff, but the defendant, being dissatisfied, removed cause
into this Court by writ of error, where it was affirmed because
there was no bill of exceptions. [
Footnote 17] By consent, a bill of exceptions was
subsequently allowed and the cause brought here on a second writ of
error. Parties were again fully heard, and the Court came to the
unanimous conclusion that the decision of the Court of Errors,
sanctioned by the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals,
established a rule of property in that state which it was the duty
of this Court to follow in questions of real property situated in
that state. [
Footnote
18]
Plaintiff admits, in view of the ruling of this Court in that
case, that it will regard the decision of the state courts as rules
of decision in respect to titles to real estate, that most of the
questions presented in this record are closed in favor of the
defendant. Where any principle of law establishing a rule of real
property is settled in the state court, the same rule will be
applied by this Court in the same or analogous cases. Conceding
that the rule established in that case was to that effect, still
the plaintiff contends that two questions arising in the record
remain open for discussion. One is a question touching the
construction of the second section of the act of April 1, 1814,
which authorized the trustees to partition and divide the estate
into two equal parts for the
Page 73 U. S. 737
purpose before mentioned, which, as he insists, was never before
a state court, and that the other is a question which belongs to
this Court to determine under the Constitution of the United
States.
Questions not determined in the state court because not raised
and presented for decision by the complaining party in the court
below, will not in general be examined in this Court, but it is not
necessary to place the decision in this case upon any such ground.
Authority to partition is conceded, but the argument is that when
the estate was divided into an eastern and western partition, the
power was exhausted. Assent of the chancellor was given in the
first order to the sale by the petitioner of the eastern moiety, to
be divided by the line in the manner for that purpose mentioned in
the petition. By the second order, the chancellor gave his assent
that the petitioner might mortgage instead of selling the estate
embraced in the former order. Third order bears date on the
fifteenth of March, 1817, and by it the chancellor gave his assent
that the petitioner might sell and dispose of the southern moiety
of the estate, the same being divided by a line running east and
west, instead of the eastern moiety as permitted and described by
the previous orders. Even regarded as an original question, there
can be no doubt of the power of the chancellor to make that order
under the Act of the twenty-ninth of March, 1816, as construed in
connection with the preceding acts to which it is supplemental.
Reference to the principal case [
Footnote 19] will show that the order in question was
directly under the consideration of the court, and it must be
regarded as a necessary intendment that the point now raised was
determined adversely to the views of the plaintiff. Same remarks
also apply to the case of
Towle v. Forney, where this
order as well as those of prior date were again before the court.
Judgment of the court was that the title of the plaintiff in that
case was valid, which affirmed the power of the chancellor to issue
the orders.
Page 73 U. S. 738
Appeal was taken by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, where
the judgment was affirmed. [
Footnote 20]
Careful examination was also given to that order by this Court
when the case was here on the last occasion before the present
hearing. Thorough examination of the whole case was made at that
time, and the court in conclusion said that there is no room for
doubt as to what the settled opinion of the state courts is in
reference to this title, and therefore that there could be no
hesitation as to the proper judgment to be rendered.
Second question presented by the plaintiff is that the discharge
of the trustees named in the will by the legislature of the state
was in contravention of that clause of the Constitution of the
United States which declares that no state shall pass any law
impairing the obligation of contracts.
Whenever the title of the estate conveyed has been put in issue,
the validity of that act of the legislature has been drawn in
question, and the decision in every case, except the one first made
in this Court, has sustained the validity of the act. None of the
adjudications in form dispose of the question, but the clear and
necessary intendment of each is to that effect, especially the last
decision of this Court, as it reverses the former views of the
court in respect to the whole merits of the controversy. All the
persons interested in the will who were capable of acting for
themselves were before the legislature when that act passed, and
the trustees named in the will were applicants for the law.
Trustees may undoubtedly be discharged by the chancellor, even
without an act of the legislature, and as the mere substitution of
a new trustee could neither defeat the trust nor divest the rights
of those interested, it is not possible to see how the proposition
of the plaintiff can be sustained.
The rights of the trustees were not invaded, as they asked to be
discharged, and the
cestuis que trust cannot complain, for
the reason that the substitution of a new trustee did not defeat or
impair the trust or divest their interest. But the
Page 73 U. S. 739
true answer to the proposition is that there is no matter of
contract involved in the substitution of new trustees, with the
assent of the chancellor, in the place of those named in a
testamentary devise unless the act be one which infringes some
vested right of the trustees. Nothing of the kind is pretended in
this case, and there is no foundation for the proposition.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
[
Footnote 1]
8 Cowen 579.
[
Footnote 2]
20 Wendell 365;
S.C., 15
id. 439.
[
Footnote 3]
49 U. S. 8 How.
495.
[
Footnote 4]
49 U. S. 8 How.
565.
[
Footnote 5]
49 U. S. 8 How.
566.
[
Footnote 6]
65 U. S. 24
How. 433.
[
Footnote 7]
14 N.Y. 426;
S.C., 4 Duer 164.
[
Footnote 8]
1 Boswell 96.
[
Footnote 9]
Suydam v.
Williamson, 24 How. 427;
Same v.
Same, 20 How. 427
[
Footnote 10]
49 U. S. 8 How.
495.
[
Footnote 11]
8 Cowen 579.
[
Footnote 12]
15 Wendell 439.
[
Footnote 13]
Cochran v. Surlay, 20 Wendell 371.
[
Footnote 14]
Williamson v.
Berry, 8 How. 495.
[
Footnote 15]
Towle v. Forney, 4 Duer 164.
[
Footnote 16]
Towle v. Forney, 14 N.Y. 428.
[
Footnote 17]
Suydam v.
Williamson, 20 How. 429.
[
Footnote 18]
Same v. Same,
24 How. 427.
[
Footnote 19]
Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wendell 447.
[
Footnote 20]
Towle v. Forney, 14 N.Y. 426.
