1. Where land is sold for taxes, the inadequacy of the price
given is not a valid objection to the sale.
2. Where a tract of land sold for taxes consists of several
distinct parcels, the sale of the entire tract in one body does not
vitiate the proceeding if bids could not have been obtained upon an
offer of a part of the property.
3. Where a fact alleged in a bill in chancery is one within the
defendant's own knowledge, the general rule of equity pleading is
that the defendant must answer positively, and not merely to his
remembrance or belief.
Accordingly, when a bill alleged, that at the time that a very
large tract
Page 73 U. S. 269
of land -- sold for taxes -- was put up for public sale, a great
many persons were present with a view to purchase small tracts for
farming purposes, but that the defendant stated to them that the
complainant would redeem his land from the purchasers, and in that
way put down all competition, and bad the entire property struck
off to him for the amount of the taxes, and that this conduct was
pursued to enable him to buy without competition, for a trifling
amount, all the land of the complainant:
held that an
answer was evasive and insufficient, when answering that the
defendant "has no
recollection of making said statement,
nor does he believe that he stated that W. S. would redeem his
land," and that he "
believes the charge that he stated to
the bystanders attending that sale that he would do so, to be
untrue."
4. It is essential to the validity of tax sales, that they be
conducted in conformity with the requirements of the law, and with
entire fairness. Perfect freedom from all influences likely to
prevent competition in the sale should be strictly exacted.
5. When the objections to a tax deed consist in the want of
conformity to the requirements of the statute in the proceedings at
the sale or preliminary to it, or in the assessment of the tax, or
in any like particulars, they maybe urged at law in an action of
ejectment. Where, however, the sale is not open to objections of
this nature, but is impeached for fraud or unfair practices of
officer or purchaser, to the prejudice of the owner, a court of
equity is the proper tribunal to afford relief.
Slater filed a bill in that court to compel one Maxwell to
release whatever apparent right he, Maxwell, might have acquired to
a large tract of land (19,944 acres) in Virginia, under a sale of
the same, made in October, 1845, by the Sheriff of Ritchie County,
for taxes amounting to $30.03, accrued for 1841-1844, and the deeds
executed upon such sale.
The grounds of relief set forth and relied on were:
1. That the sale had been made at a grossly inadequate price,
the land having been worth $6,000, and the sale having been made to
the defendant for $30.03.
2. That although the land was composed of parts, capable of
being sold separately, and anyone of which would have more than
paid all the taxes claimed, the whole had been set up and sold.
3. That there were many persons at the sale, bystanders,
desirous of purchasing different parts, but that the defendant
Page 73 U. S. 270
stated to them that the owner would redeem them all, and having
thus prevented all competition, had the lands knocked down to
himself for the paltry sum named.
As to the facts, it appeared to be true that the land had been
sold at a price merely nominal, and wholly below its value, and
also that the sheriff had sold the whole; but that in selling he
had asked, "Who will pay the taxes and damages for the least
quantity of acres?" and that getting no bid for a less quantity of
acres, he had then sold the whole. The answer positively averred
that no bid could be got for a part. It appeared also that in 1840,
the complainant had sold 7,955 acres of the original tract, but
notwithstanding this sale, the entire tract was charged in his name
on the books of the commissioner of the revenue of the county, with
the taxes, and was returned delinquent for their nonpayment, and
was sold.
The main questions, accordingly, were had the defendant stated
to the bystanders that the plaintiff would redeem the land from the
tax sale with a view of preventing their bidding, and so of having
the land knocked down to himself at a very low price, and if so,
what was the effect in equity, upon the sale, of these statements
of his?
As respected the matter of fact. In reply to a positive charge
in the bill, that he had made statements of the sort above
mentioned, the defendant in his answer said, "that he has
no
recollection of making said statement, nor does he
believe that he stated that William Slater would redeem
his land," and that he "
believes the charge that he stated
to the bystanders attending said sale, that William Slater would
redeem his land from the purchaser, to be untrue."
The testimony from witnesses was thus:
One Zinn stated that
"he was present when the sheriff was crying the land, and that
Maxwell stepped up, and said he knew
the owners, and
it was not worth while for any person to buy it, that they
would pay the taxes."
Being asked, on cross-examination, by the defendant himself,
whether he was certain and positive that those words were used, he
answered
"I am." And being asked, whether
he, the
defendant, "might
Page 73 U. S. 271
not have alluded to some of the tracts lying in the Slater
connection?" his reply was: "The defendant might have alluded
to those tracts, or he might not.
They were crying the Slater
land at the time he stepped up and made the observations."
One J. R. Jones, also at the sale, testified that Mr. Maxwell,
S. T. Bukey, and Manly Zinn, were present; that Mr. Zinn "appeared
like as if he wanted some of the land; that Maxwell said that he
knew the men,
and that it was no use for them to bid, that
it would be redeemed" -- as the witness understood Mr. Maxwell to
mean -- "by
the owner of the land."
In reply to a question, whether any other person would have bid
on the Slater land, if the defendant had not made the
representations he did, in relation to its being redeemed, Jones
said: "It appeared to me that Mr. Bukey and Mr. Zinn were going to
bid;
they said they were going to bid on the Slater land."
Mr. Bukey was dead at the time when the evidence was taken.
Among the exhibits filed by the complainant was certificate from
the clerk of the Ritchie County Court, that the defendant was the
purchaser at $31.53 of 19,944 acres in Richie County, returned
delinquent and sold in the name of Slater, for taxes due in
October, 1845 (the taxes which had accrued in 1841-1844), amounting
to $30.03. And also a certificate, that 9,944 acres of land
(evidently the same 19,944 which were sold in 1845, or a part
thereof) were returned
delinquent in the name of Slater,
for taxes of 1846-1849, amounting to $23.78; that
twenty-five
acres thereof were sold in September, 1850, to satisfy the
said taxes; and were bought by
Maxwell for $24.96. And
then followed, under date of
30 August, 1852, a receipt
from
the defendant Maxwell to the plaintiff Slater, by the
hand of Slater's attorney, for $30, in redemption "for twenty-five
acres of land purchased by me in September, 1850, for taxes, and
sold as land belonging to said Slater, by the Sheriff of Ritchie
County."
There was a general replication to the answer.
The court below dismissed the bill.
Page 73 U. S. 273
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court, as follows:
The relief sought by the bill in this case is put upon three
grounds:
1st. That the sale was made at a grossly inadequate price;
2d. That the entire tract was sold in one body; and
3d. That competition at the sale was prevented by the fraudulent
declaration of the defendant, made to effect that purpose, that the
complainant would redeem the land from the purchasers.
The inadequacy of the price given at the sale of land for unpaid
taxes thereon, does not constitute a valid objection to the sale.
The taxes levied upon property generally bear a very slight
proportion to its value, and of necessity the
Page 73 U. S. 274
whole property must be sold, if a sum equivalent to the amount
of the taxes is not bid for a portion of the premises.
The sale of the entire tract in one body would have vitiated the
proceeding, if bids could have been obtained upon an offer of a
part of the property. In this case, the answer avers and the proof
shows that the sheriff offered to sell a part of each tract without
receiving a bid, and it was only then that the entire tract was put
up and struck off to the defendant.
The case must therefore turn upon the last ground, the alleged
fraudulent declaration of the defendant at the sale to prevent
competition.
The allegation of the bill is, that at the time the land was
offered for sale a great many persons were present with a view to
purchase small tracts for farming purposes, but the defendant
stated to them that the complainant would redeem his land from the
purchasers, and in that way put down all competition, and had the
entire property struck off to him for the amount of the taxes, and
that this conduct was pursued to enable him to buy without
competition, for a trifling amount, all the land of the
complainant.
The answer of the defendant to the allegation is evasive and
unsatisfactory. It is that he has no recollection of making the
statement averred, nor does he believe he did, and that he believes
the charge to be untrue. The charge is of conduct which would not
readily be forgotten. It is hardly conceivable that a person could
acquire so large a domain as 19,944 acres for so trifling a sum as
thirty dollars without a distinct recollection of the attendant
circumstances. If the property was acquired by unfair means the
fact was one within the defendant's own knowledge, and in such
cases the general rule of equity pleading is that the defendant
must answer positively and not merely to his remembrance or belief.
The distinction which is generally made between recent and remote
acts or declarations of the defendant would hardly seem applicable
to a case like the present. It is not necessary, however, to
attempt to draw any nice distinctions in this particular, for the
answer was not
Page 73 U. S. 275
excepted to, and by the general replication the complainant has
waived all objections to its sufficiency. [
Footnote 1] The difference, however, between a positive
answer and an answer in the form of the present one, upon belief,
is important to be considered with reference to the testimony
required to overcome its denials. A clear and positive denial of an
allegation of the bill can only be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses to the fact alleged, or by one witness and corroborative
circumstances. But if a fact alleged be denied upon belief merely,
or be denied equivocally or evasively, it may be sustained by the
testimony of a single witness. [
Footnote 2]
Turning now to the testimony presented by the record, we find
that the allegation of the bill is sufficiently established. One
witness states that he was present at the sale of the land, and
that the defendant "stepped up and said he knew the owners, and it
was not worth while for any person to buy it; that they would pay
the taxes." Another witness states, that certain parties were
present at the sale, and that the defendant said "he knew the men,
and it was no use for them to bid, that it (the land) would be
redeemed." Some attempt was made to impeach the credibility of one
of these witnesses, but if failed. On the other hand, there are
some circumstances which tend to establish the truth of their
statements. There were several persons present, some of whom were
desirous of bidding at the sale -- at least they so stated at the
time. It is difficult to explain the fact that none of them made a
bid on the property, but allowed the immense tract to be sold at a
price less than two cents an acre, except upon the idea that they
believed that a bid by them would be of no avail, because a
redemption from the sale would be made by the owner.
Again, a portion of the property, amounting to 9,944 acres, was
returned delinquent for the taxes of 1846, 1847, 1848, and 1849, in
the name of the complainant. Twenty-five of these acres were sold
in September, 1850, for these taxes,
Page 73 U. S. 276
and were bid in by the defendant. In August, 1852, the
complainant redeemed the property thus sold, and the receipt given
by the defendant for the money paid on the redemption describes the
land
as purchased by him in September, 1850, for taxes, and
sold as belonging to the complainant. This transaction is
inexplicable except upon the hypothesis that the action of the
defendant in bidding in the property in 1845 was taken for the
benefit of the complainant, or that the sale then made was so far
subject to objection for unfairness that he desired its concealment
until, from lapse of time, it should become impossible to impeach
it successfully.
Such being the case, there is no doubt that relief should be
granted the complainant. It is essential to the validity of tax
sales not merely that they should be conducted in conformity with
the requirements of the law, but that they should be conducted with
entire fairness. Perfect freedom from all influences likely to
prevent competition in the sale should be in all such cases
strictly exacted. The owner is seldom present, and is generally
ignorant of the proceeding until too late to prevent it. The tax
usually bears a very slight proportion to the value of the
property, and thus a great temptation is presented to parties to
exclude competition at the sale, and to prevent the owner from
redeeming when the sale is made. The proceeding therefore should be
closely scrutinized, and whenever it has been characterized by
fraud or unfairness should be set aside, or the purchaser be
required to hold the title in trust for the owner.
When the objections to a tax deed consist in the want of
conformity to the requirements of the statute in the proceedings at
the sale or preliminary to it, or in the assessment of the tax, or
in any like particulars, they may be urged at law in an action of
ejectment, whether the deed be the ground upon which the recovery
of the premises is sought by the purchaser, or be relied upon to
defeat a recovery by the owner. In some instances equity will
interpose in cases of this kind, as where the deed is by statute
made evidence of title in the purchaser, or the preliminary
proceedings are regular upon their face, and extrinsic evidence is
required
Page 73 U. S. 277
to show their invalidity. Where, however, the sale is not open
to objections of this nature, but is impeached for fraud or unfair
practices of officer or purchaser, to the prejudice of the owner, a
court of equity is the proper tribunal to afford relief. Thus in
Dudley v. Little, [
Footnote 3] equity relieved against a tax sale and deed,
where there had been a combination among several persons that one
of them should but in the land to prevent competition. [
Footnote 4]
It follows from the views expressed, that the complainant is
entitled to a release from the defendant of all the right and
interest acquired by him under the tax deeds in the property owned
by the complainant at the time of the sale. The decree of the court
below will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded with
directions to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion.
Decree accordingly.
[
Footnote 1]
Story's Equity Pleadings § 877.
[
Footnote 2]
Knickerbacker v. Harris, 1 Paige 211; 3 Greenleaf's
Evidence § 289.
[
Footnote 3]
2 Hammond 504.
[
Footnote 4]
See also Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Mumford 419;
Rowland
v. Doty, Harringtor's Chancery 3;
Bacon v. Conn, 1
Smedes & Marshall's do. 348.
