A maritime lien can only exist upon movable things engaged in
navigation, or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on
the high seas or navigable waters. It cannot arise upon anything
which is fixed and immovable. It does not, therefore, exist upon a
bridge.
This was a libel filed in the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, against that part of the Rock Island Railroad
Bridge which is situated in the Northern District of Illinois, for
alleged damages done by that part of the bridge to two steamboats,
the property of the libellant, employed in the navigation of the
Mississippi River. It alleged that, by law and the public treaties
of the United States, the Mississippi River is, for the distance of
two thousand miles, a public navigable stream and common highway,
free and open to all the citizens of the United States, who are
entitled to navigate the same by sailing and steam vessels, and
otherwise, without impediment or obstruction; that the Rock Island
Bridge obstructed the free navigation of the stream; and that by
collision with this obstruction the steam vessels
Page 73 U. S. 214
of the libellant had been injured, and that he had in
consequence been damaged to an extent exceeding seventy thousand
dollars.
In accordance with the prayer of the libel, process was issued
and the property attached. The Mississippi & Missouri Railroad
Company and others then intervened as claimants, and filed an
exception to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed against the
property in question in the manner "in which the same is sought to
be proceeded against by the libel." In other words, they objected
to the jurisdiction of the court to take a proceeding
in
rem against the property. The exception was sustained by the
district and circuit courts, and the libel dismissed. The
correctness of this ruling was the sole question presented for the
determination of this Court.
Page 73 U. S. 215
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court, as follows:
There is no doubt, as stated by the counsel for the appellant,
that the jurisdiction of the admiralty extends to all cases of tort
committed on the high seas, and in this country on navigable
waters. For the redress of these torts, the courts of admiralty may
proceed
in personam, and when the cause of the injury is
the subject of a maritime lien, may also proceed
in rem.
The latter proceeding is the remedy afforded for the enforcement of
liens of that character.
A maritime lien, unlike a lien at common law, may in many cases
exist without possession of the thing, upon which it is asserted,
either actual or constructive. It confers, however, upon its holder
such a right in the thing that he may subject it to condemnation
and sale to satisfy his claim or damages, and when the lien arises
from torts committed at sea, it travels with the thing wherever
that goes and into whosesoever hands it may pass. The only object
of the proceeding
in rem is to make this right, where it
exists, available -- to carry it into effect. It subserves no other
purpose.
The lien and the proceeding
in rem are therefore
correlative -- where one exists, the other can be taken, and not
otherwise. Such is the language of the Privy Council in the
decision of the case of
The Bold Buccleugh. [
Footnote 1] "A maritime lien," says that
court,
"is the foundation of the proceeding
in rem, a process
to make perfect a right inchoate from the moment the lien attaches,
and whilst it must be admitted that where such lien exists, a
proceeding
in rem may be had, it will be found to be
equally true that in all cases where a proceeding
in rem
is the proper course, there a maritime lien exists which gives a
privilege or claim upon the thing to be carried into effect by
legal process."
There is an expression in the case of
The Volant,
[
Footnote 2] attributed to Dr.
Lushington, which militates against this view. He is reported to
have said that the damage committed on
Page 73 U. S. 216
the high seas confers no lien upon the ship, and this is cited
by the counsel of the appellant to show that a maritime lien is not
the foundation of a proceeding
in rem. But the expression
is a mere dictum, and the Privy Council in the case cited allude to
it and observe that it is doubtful, from a contemporaneous report
of the same case, [
Footnote 3]
whether the learned judge made use of it, and add that if he did,
the expression is certainly inaccurate, and, not being necessary
for the decision of the case cannot be taken as authority.
A maritime lien can only exist upon movable things engaged in
navigation or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on the
high seas or navigable waters. It may arise with reference to
vessels, steamers, and rafts, and upon goods and merchandise
carried by them. But it cannot arise upon anything which is fixed
and immovable like a wharf, a bridge, or real estate of any kind.
Though bridges and wharves may aid commerce by facilitating
intercourse on land or the discharge of cargoes, they are not in
any sense the subjects of maritime lien.
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
7 Moore 284.
[
Footnote 2]
1 W. Robinson 388.
[
Footnote 3]
1 Notes of Cases 508.
