1. The jurisdiction of the circuit court in a case between
citizens of he same state, under the internal revenue laws of July
1, 1862, and March 3, 1863, removed thereto from a state court
under the Act of March 2, 1833 (the Force Bill), and before the
passage of the Internal Revenue Act of June 30, 1864, is saved by
the sixty-eighth section of the Internal Revenue Act of July 13,
1866, if the justice of said circuit court is of opinion that the
case would be removable from the state court to the circuit court
under the sixty-seventh section of the said Act of July 13,
1866.
2. Where a case, removed from a state court to a circuit court
under the act of 1833, above mentioned, would be clearly removable
under the provisions of the act of 1866, directing such circuit
court to remand removed cases unless the circuit judge should be of
opinion that the same, if pending in the state court, would be
removable under a provision which the last-named act made, the fact
that the case was in the circuit court when the new act passed, and
that it never was remanded, is a fact from which it may be inferred
as a conclusion of law that it was the opinion of the circuit judge
that the case was one that ought to be retained.
3. Where an article (as illuminating gas) which, under the
internal revenue acts, is taxable when made and "sold," but is not
taxable when made by the party "for his own use," is made by
trustees appointed by the party using it under obligatory and fixed
arrangements with such party's creditors, at an establishment of
which the party using the article has apparently the ultimate
ownership, but which, till certain debts due by him and contracted
in order to build and enlarge the establishment are paid is held
and managed exclusively by the trustees under an arrangement that
the party using may have the article at a certain price and that
all clear profits shall be set aside as a sinking fund for the
payment of the principal due the creditors, such article, when
furnished to the debtor at a price fixed, is "sold" and taxable,
though apparently the sale is chiefly for the purpose of providing,
in the manner agreed on, a sinking fund to pay the debts of the
party using it.
4. The trustees of the Philadelphia Gas Works, by the law and
ordinances creating and constituting them, and by reason of the
several loans created for the support and management of the said
gas works, hold such
a relation to the private consumer, the loanholder, and the City
of Philadelphia, that all illuminating gas manufactured by the said
trustees and
Page 72 U. S. 721
furnished by them to the city to be used in her public lamps is
liable to, and chargeable with, the internal revenue duty imposed
by the Act of July 1, 1862, and the supplement thereto of March 3,
1863.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 limits the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, so far as determined by citizenship, to "suits between a
citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of
another state."
An act of 1833, [
Footnote 1]
"to provide further for the collection of
duties on
imports," extended the jurisdiction to cases arising under
"
the revenue laws of the United States" where other
provision had not been made. And it authorized any person injured
in person or property on account of any act done "under any law of
the United States for the protection of
the revenue or the
collection of duties on imports" to maintain suit in the circuit
court. It also allowed any person sued in a state court on account
of any act done "under the
revenue laws of the United
States" to remove the cause by a mode which the act itself set
forth into the circuit court of the United States.
With the passage of the internal revenue laws made necessary by
the late rebellion, it was doubted by some persons whether this act
of 1833 extended to cases under the new enactments. And the
internal revenue act of 1864, [
Footnote 2] by its fiftieth section extended in general
words "the provisions" of the act of 1833 to cases arising under
the
internal revenue acts.
By an internal revenue act of 1866, [
Footnote 3] however (§ 67), Congress made provision for
removing cases from state courts to the circuit court, authorizing
such removal in a way which it particularized,
"in any case, civil or criminal, where suit or prosecution shall
be commenced in any court of any state against any officer of the
United States, . . . or against any person acting under or by
authority of any such
Page 72 U. S. 722
officer, on account of any act done under color of his
office,"
&c.
And by the sixty-eighth section, immediately following, it
"repealed" the fiftieth section of the act of 1864, with, however,
this proviso:
"
Provided that any case which may have been removed
from the courts of any state
under said fiftieth section
to the courts of the United States shall be remanded to the state
court from which it was so removed, with all the records relating
to such cases, unless the justice of the circuit court of the
United States in which such suit or prosecution is pending shall be
of opinion that said case would be removable from the court of the
state to the circuit court under and by virtue of the provisions of
this act."
With the act of 1833 in force, but before the passage of any of
the others, the City of Philadelphia, in October, 1863, sued in a
state court the collector of
internal revenue of the
collection district to which the city belongs for a return of
certain internal revenue taxes paid under protest, the city
corporation (constructively) and the collector being citizens of
the same state.
The collector assuming that the case was one arising "under the
revenue laws of the United States" and that it was therefore within
the act of 1833, removed it by the mode prescribed in that act of
1833 into the circuit court. This was in November, 1863. And the
circuit court having been apparently of the same opinion as to the
extent of operation of the act of 1833, tried the case twice, the
first trial beginning in December, 1863 -- therefore, before the
internal revenue act of 1864, having its fiftieth section, was
passed. A new trial was had in October, 1864, and final judgment
then given.
The suit thus brought in the state court and removed was to
recover internal revenue taxes accrued under the internal revenue
acts of 1862 and 1863, demanded by the collector and paid under
protest by the "Trustees of the Philadelphia Gas
Page 72 U. S. 723
Works," for gas used by the city for its public lamps. Supposing
jurisdiction to have existed in the circuit court, the question was
whether this gas had been "made and sold" by the trustees to the
city, or whether it had been made by the city through its
appointees, the trustees, for itself. If the former, it was taxable
under the provisions of the revenue acts, which taxed all gas "made
and sold;" if the latter, it came within an exception which
exempted articles made by any person "not for sale, but for his or
their
own use," and was not taxable.
The history of "the Philadelphia Gas Works," where the gas was
made, and their relation to the City of Philadelphia, was this:
They originated in a city ordinance passed in 1835, and which
seems to have contemplated the temporary establishment of a
quasi-corporation which might yet be, or be ultimately, a
department of the city government. The works were to be and were
constructed by means of money subscribed by private individuals,
for which they received certificates of
stock entitling
them to the profits arising from the manufacture and sale of gas.
The ordinance provided that the works should be under the exclusive
management of trustees elected by the
councils of the
city; also that the public lamps should be supplied at half
the price paid by private consumers. It provided, above all, that
the city corporation should have a right to take possession on
certain conditions. The original capital was limited to $100,000.
The works, with the increase of the city, not being found large
enough and needing to be extended, subsequent ordinances were
passed authorizing loans and providing that the money should be
borrowed by the
city on the requisition of the trustees
and that obligations of the
city should be issued to the
loanholders. A sinking fund, as security for the loanholders, was
created out of the proceeds of sale of gas before any profits were
distributable to the stockholders. The interest on the certificates
of loan was declared payable at the office of the gas works. In
1841, under the original ordinance of 1835, reserving to the city
the right to take
Page 72 U. S. 724
possession, the city did take possession in their own right, and
the stock was converted into a "gas loan" in which the city was the
debtor, and whose interest was in fact paid at the city treasury.
But the works were continued under the superintendence of the
existing trustees; that only change in the relation of the trustees
being that they thenceforth were trustees for the city and
loanholders, instead of for the stockholders. Several ordinances
were subsequently passed authorizing further loans. They stipulated
that for the further security of the loanholders, the works should
be controlled and managed by a board of trustees, elected and
constituted as theretofore, who should have the whole control of
the works, and of all the funds belonging to them, and that the
trustees should pay no part of the funds, nor any of the profits of
the works, into the city treasury, but should apply the same in
payment of the interest and principal of the loans, a stipulation
whose primary design was declared by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania -- on a controversy between some of the holders of the
gas loans and the city corporation, which last wished to take into
its own control the property, held by the trustees under the
various city ordinances, out of their hands, and to elect other
trustees, in addition to the number provided by the original
ordinance of 1835 [
Footnote 4]
-- to have been
"to keep the pledge entirely out of the hands of the borrowers
(the city), and prevent the funds from being intermingled with
other property of the city, and thus exposed to the hazards of
expenditure for other objects than those to which it was
exclusively designated."
The gas used by the city for its public lamps was manufactured
at these works, and under different ordinances, specifically
providing for the price payable for gas supplied to the public
lamps, a process of payment was regularly gone through with at
stated intervals, though practically the matter was, in a good
degree, a provision by the city
Page 72 U. S. 725
for the support of works whose income paid the interest on, and
provided a sinking fund for final redemption of its own "gas loans"
held by various creditors.
The court below was of opinion that the gas was "made and sold,"
and that it was taxable.
Page 72 U. S. 727
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs sued the defendant as the collector of internal
revenue in the Second Collection District in the State of
Pennsylvania in an action of assumpsit for money had and received,
to recover back the sum of twenty-six thousand eight hundred and
seventy-five dollars and fifty-seven cents, which they had
previously paid to him under protest and which he, as such
collector, had demanded of them as for internal revenue duties.
Record shows that the duties were assessed for the last four months
of the year 1862 and for the first six months of the succeeding
year upon illuminating gas manufactured and furnished by the
trustees of the Philadelphia Gas Works, and which was consumed
under the direction of the proper authorities of the city in her
public lamps during that period. Assessment of the duties in
question was made under the seventy-fifth section of the Act of the
first of July, 1862, which provides in effect that upon
illuminating gas, made wholly or in part of coal or of any other
material and produced and sold or manufactured or made and sold or
removed for consumption or for delivery to others than agents of
the manufacturers or producers, there shall be levied and collected
a duty of five cents per one thousand cubic feet. Section
thirty-three of the Act of the third of March, 1863, enacts that
those provisions shall also be applied to the producers of the
several articles mentioned in that section as subject to duty as
well as the manufacturers. [
Footnote 5]
Suit was commenced in this case in the state court, but on
motion of the defendant the same was removed, on the twenty-fifty
day of November, 1863, into the circuit court of the United States
for that district, where the verdict and
Page 72 U. S. 728
judgment were for the defendant. Exceptions were duly taken by
the plaintiffs, and they sued out the present writ of error.
Defendant objects to the jurisdiction of the court, and insists
that the writ of error should be dismissed and as that objection
presents a preliminary question it will first be examined.
1. Jurisdiction of the circuit court was extended by the second
section of the Act of the second of March, 1833, to all cases in
law or equity arising under the revenue laws where other provisions
had not been previously made by law. Section three of that act also
provided that any officer of the United States or other person who
should be sued in any state court for or on account of any act done
under the revenue laws or under color thereof or for or on account
of any right, authority, or title, set up or claimed by such
officer or other person under such law, might, in the manner
therein prescribed, remove the cause into the circuit court, and
that the cause so removed should be proceeded in as one originally
commenced in that court. [
Footnote
6]
Those provisions were extended to cases arising under the laws
for the collection of internal duties by the fifth section of the
Act of the thirtieth of June, 1864, and the same section enacted in
effect that all persons duly authorized to assess, receive, or
collect such duties or taxes under such laws should be entitled to
all the exemptions, immunities, benefits, rights, and privileges
therein enumerated or conferred. [
Footnote 7]
Undoubtedly the original act was passed for the protection of
officers of the revenue and persons acting under them charged by
law with the collection of import duties, and the first proviso in
the sixty-seventh section of the act of the thirtieth of July,
1866, expressly enacts that the original act shall not be so
construed as to apply to cases "arising under any of the internal
revenue acts, nor to any case in which the validity or
interpretation of those acts shall be in issue." [
Footnote 8]
Effect of that provision is to limit the scope of the original
act, without repealing it, to cases arising under the acts of
Page 72 U. S. 729
Congress providing for the collection of import duties, and to
confine its operation to the purposes for which it was originally
passed, but the proviso does not touch the provision as reenacted
in the subsequent act, entitled An act to provide ways and means
for the support of the government, and for other purposes. Had
legislation stopped there, the subsequent provision would have
remained in full force, but the sixty-eighth section of the act,
which in its sixty-seventh section limits and restrains the
original provision in the Act of the second of March, 1833, repeals
the fiftieth section of the Act of the thirtieth of June, 1864,
altogether, subject to the proviso contained in the same repealing
section. [
Footnote 9]
Substance of the last-named proviso is that any case removed
from the court of a state into the circuit court under former
regulations upon the subject shall be remanded unless the justice
of the circuit court shall be of opinion that the same, if pending
in the state court, would be removable under the new provision
contained in the sixty-seventh section of the same act, which in
its sixty-eighth section repeals the fiftieth section of the prior
law. [
Footnote 10]
2. Section sixty-seven, in the body of the section preceding the
proviso limiting and restraining the operations of the original act
to cases arising under the laws for the levy and collection of
import duties, makes provision for the removal of any case, civil
or criminal, commenced against any officer appointed or acting
under the law to provide internal revenue, or against any person
acting under such an officer, on account of any act done in virtue
of his office &c., and prescribes the mode of proceeding to
effect such a removal of the case. [
Footnote 11]
Present case is one which was removed into the circuit court
under the original act, now limited and restrained in its operation
to cases arising under the laws for the collection of import
duties, but it is undeniably one which, if pending in the state
court, would be removable under the new provision, and inasmuch as
it was pending in the circuit
Page 72 U. S. 730
court when the last-named proviso was passed, and has never been
remanded by the justice of the circuit court, it must be understood
as a conclusion of law that it was his opinion that it ought to be
retained in the circuit court. Want of jurisdiction, therefore, is
not shown, although the parties, plaintiffs and defendant, are
citizens of the same state.
3. Cases arising under the internal revenue laws, as now
modified, if commenced in a state court, against an officer
appointed or acting under those laws, or against persons acting
under such an officer, may be removed on petition of the defendant
into the circuit court for the district, and the jurisdiction of
the circuit court over such controversies, when all the prescribed
conditions for the removal concur in the case, is clear beyond
doubt, irrespective of the citizenship of the parties.
Although the point was not made in this case, it seems proper to
remark that the jurisdiction of the circuit court has often been
denied in this class of cases, because the party aggrieved may
appeal to the commissioner for redress and because he may also
pursue his remedy by petitioner to Congress or present it in the
Court of Claims. Suffice it to say, without entering much into the
argument, that such a theory finds no substantial support in any
act of Congress upon the subject or in any decided case. On the
contrary, the several acts of Congress for the assessment and
collection of internal duties contain many provisions wholly
inconsistent with any such theory and which, when considered
together, afford an entirely satisfactory basis for the opposite
conclusion.
Collectors are appointed by the President, and they were made
responsible by the fifth section of the Act of the first of May,
1862, both to the United States and individuals, as the case might
be, for all moneys collected by their deputies, and for every
omission of duty. [
Footnote
12]
Collections were required by the twenty-third section of the act
to be completed within six months, and collectors
Page 72 U. S. 731
were required to render their final account and pay the sums
collected into the Treasury within that period. Argument is that
inasmuch as collectors were required by that act to pay all moneys
collected into the Treasury, they cannot be held liable to refund
day portion of such collections; but the same requirement is made
of the commissioner, and yet he is authorized to remit, refund, and
pay back all duties erroneously or illegally assessed or collected
and to pay all judgments or sums of money recovered in any court
against any collector or deputy collector for any duties or
licenses paid under protest. [
Footnote 13]
4. Necessary implication from those provisions is that actions
may be maintained against collectors of the internal revenue to
recover back duties illegally or erroneously assessed. Authority is
also conferred upon the commissioner, by the forty-fourth section
of the Act of the thirtieth of June, 1864, not only to pay back all
duties erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, but also all
duties that appear to be excessive in amount,
and to repay
to collectors or deputy collectors the full amount of such sums of
money as shall or may be recovered against them in any court for
any internal duties or licenses collected by them, with costs and
expenses of suit. [
Footnote
14]
Same section also confers authority upon the commissioner to
repay to assessors, assistant assessors, collectors, deputy
collectors, and inspectors,
all damages and costs
recovered in any suit against them by reason of any act done in the
performance of their official duties. Evidently those clauses of
the section contemplate different grievances and different remedies
for their redress as known at common law and in the practice of the
courts. [
Footnote 15]
5. Appropriate remedy to recover back money paid under protest
on account of duties or taxes erroneously or illegally assessed is
an action of assumpsit for money had and received. Where the party
voluntarily pays the money, he is without remedy, but if he pays it
by compulsion of law, or
Page 72 U. S. 732
under protest, or with notice that he intends to bring suit to
test the validity of the claim, he may recover it back, if the
assessment was erroneous or illegal, in an action of assumpsit for
money had and received. [
Footnote 16]
When a party, knowing his rights, voluntarily pays duties or
taxes illegally or erroneously assessed, the law will not afford
him redress for the injury; but when the duties or taxes are
illegally demanded, and he pays the same under protest or gives
notice to the collector that he intends to bring a suit against him
to test the validity of the claim, the collector may be compelled
to refund the amount illegally exacted. [
Footnote 17]
Decisions to the same effect were made in the parent country at
a very early period, and like decisions are to be found in the
judicial reports of all, or nearly all, of the several states. But
the third section of the Act of the third of March, 1865, requires
collectors to pay daily into the Treasury the gross amount of all
duties, taxes, and revenue received or collected in virtue of the
internal revenue acts, without any abatement or deduction on
account of salary, compensation, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or
claims of any description whatever. [
Footnote 18]
Defendant contends that this provision has the same legal effect
in respect to suits against the collectors of the internal revenue
as the second section of the Act of the third of March, 1839, had
in respect to suits against collectors of customs. [
Footnote 19]
6. None of the internal revenue acts, however, contemplates that
collectors shall reimburse themselves for the amount of any
judgment recovered against them an account of duties illegally or
erroneously assessed and paid under protest. Direction in those
acts is without exception that all such judgments shall be paid by
the commissioner, including, by the latter acts, costs and expenses
of suit.
Page 72 U. S. 733
Clear implication of the several provisions is that a judgment
against the collector in such a case is in the nature of a recovery
against the United States, and that the amount recovered is
regarded as a proper charge against the revenue collected from that
source. Evidently, therefore, it is not material in this inquiry
whether the collectors of the internal revenue are required to
account daily or monthly, or whether they are required to pay into
the Treasury the gross or only the net amount of collections, so
long as this provision authorizing the commissioner to pay such
judgments, costs, and expenses of suit, remains in full force.
Direct repeal is not pretended, and it is equally clear that the
enactment requiring collectors to pay the gross amounts collected
into the Treasury is in no respect repugnant to the provision
directing the commissioner to pay all judgments recovered against
such collectors for duties illegally or erroneously assessed and
paid under protest. Inconsistent provisions are repealed, but all
others remain in full force. [
Footnote 20] Section nineteen of the Act of the
thirteenth of July, 1866, does not apply in this case, as it was
not passed until long after this suit was commenced. [
Footnote 21]
Strong support to the conclusion that the circuit courts have
jurisdiction in cases like the present is derived from the several
provisions authorizing the removal of such cases from the state
courts into the circuit courts for trial. Parties compelled to pay
an illegal assessment ought to have a convenient remedy to redress
the injury, and inasmuch as it is enacted by Congress that no suit
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
taxes shall be maintained in any court, it is believed that there
is no more appropriate or effectual remedy known to the common law
than the action of assumpsit for money had and received, as in this
case. [
Footnote 22]
7. All the gas consumed in the public lamps of the corporation
plaintiffs is manufactured at the Philadelphia Gas
Page 72 U. S. 734
Works, and payment therefor is made by the corporation to the
trustees of the works, as shown by the only witness examined in the
case. Origin of the gas works is shown in the Ordinance of the
twenty-first of March, 1835, and it appears that the works were
construed and put in operation by means of money subscribed by
private individuals, for which they received certificates of stock,
signed by the mayor of the city and countersigned by the treasurer,
entitling the holder to the proper share of the profits arising
from the manufacture and sale of gas. Original subscriptions
amounted to one hundred thousand dollars, and the provision was
that the works should be under the exclusive control and management
of twelve trustees, to be elected by the councils of the city.
Purpose was to supply the city and the citizens with gas, but the
stipulation was that the public lamps of the city should be
supplied at one-half the price paid by private consumers. Five
hundred dollars is annually paid by the trustees to the city as
rent of the lot for the location and use of the gas works. New
subscriptions and loans were subsequently authorized to increase
the capital stock for the extension of the works.
Moneys arising from the manufacture and sale of the gas were
required by the original ordinance to be paid into the city
treasury, but that part of the ordinance was afterwards repealed,
which gave the entire control to the trustees. Whenever the
municipality deemed it expedient, they might take possession of the
gas works and convert the stock into a loan, redeemable in twenty
years. They did take possession of the works, and loan
certificates, on the third day of June, 1841, were issued to the
stockholders, but the stipulation that the works should be
controlled and managed by the trustees elected, as before, was
renewed in the subsequent ordinance passed in the same month. Clear
profits were required, under this last arrangement, to be set apart
as a sinking fund to be invested in the loans to the association,
and the trustees were charged with the duty of carrying the
regulation into effect. Throughout, from the organization of the
association to the commencement of the suit,
Page 72 U. S. 735
the works have been controlled and managed by the trustees, and
the interest of the association, which constructed the works and
put them in operation, has never been divested or become vested in
the corporation.
Plaintiffs authorized the mayor of the city, on the sixteenth
day of February, 1856, to contract with the trustees for the
lighting, extinguishing, cleansing, and repairs of the public lamps
of the city for the term of three years at a stipulated sum for
each lamp, and made a sufficient appropriation to carry the
contract into effect, and the evidence showed that the works were,
throughout the period for which the duties were assessed, in the
exclusive possession of the trustees. Testimony also showed that
the city paid monthly for the gas consumed in her public lamps
throughout that entire period. They sometimes paid a fixed sum for
each lamp and sometimes one-half the rate paid by private
consumers.
Prayers for instruction were presented by both parties, but the
presiding justice rejected them all and instructed the jury that
the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover and that their verdict
should be for the defendant.
8. Buried as the original transaction is in subsequent
ordinances and amendments thereto, still it is believed that there
is no great difficulty in ascertaining the true state of the case
so far as it respects the present controversy. Trustees elected by
the councils of the city superintended the construction of the
works, but the subscribers to the capital stock furnished the money
employed in the enterprise, and became and are the legal owners of
the works. When loans were subsequently made to enable the
association to supply gas to a larger portion of the citizens, the
capital stock and the number of shares were increased, but the
control and management remained unchanged. Debts contracted by
loans or otherwise became liens upon the works, and in some
instances the faith of the city as surety or guarantor was pledged
for the payment of the interest and ultimate payment of the
principal. Such liens did not change the ownership of the capital
stock of the association, nor did
Page 72 U. S. 736
the mere entry by the city for the purpose of laying the
foundation to issue the loan certificates, as the possession was
only temporary, and the control and management were, by new
stipulation, continued in the trustees constituted and appointed in
case of any vacancy, as provided in the original ordinance. Rent
was paid as before to the city for the lot leased for the location
of the works and for the use of the association, and the
authorities continued as before to pay monthly or otherwise at
stipulated prices for the gas consumed in the public lamps.
Taking the facts as they appear in this record, it is clear that
the property of the association never became vested in the city,
and it is equally clear that it remained vested in the association,
subject to the liens created as security for the loans and as
indemnity to the city for her liabilities incurred as surety or
guarantor. Supreme court of the state regarded the city as the
borrower in the matter of the last loan, and they held that the
object of the stipulation that the works should continued to be
controlled and managed by a board of trustees, elected as before,
was to keep the pledge out of the hands of the borrower and prevent
the fund from being mingled with the funds of the city. Ruling of
the court that the works were held by the city in pledge only, and
not in full property, is all which the present case requires this
Court to decide. They also held that the effect of taking
possession and the issuing of the certificates of loans was that
the trustees ceased to be trustees for the stockholders and became
the trustees of the city and the loanholders. [
Footnote 23]
Suppose that to be so, still they held that the control and
management of the works continued in the trustees and that they
were to be elected, as under the original ordinance. Rights of the
stockholders could not be divested without their consent, and the
mere acceptance of certificates of loan in the place of
certificates of shares in the capital stock, without more, would
not operate to convey to the
Page 72 U. S. 737
city their interests in the gas works. Conclusion is that the
duties were properly assessed, and that there is no error in the
record.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
[
Footnote 1]
4 Stat. at Large 632.
[
Footnote 2]
13
id. 241.
[
Footnote 3]
14
id. 172.
[
Footnote 4]
Western Saving Fund Society v. City of Philadelphia, 31
Pa.St. 178.
[
Footnote 5]
12 Stat. at Large 462-729.
[
Footnote 6]
4 Stat. at Large § 32.
[
Footnote 7]
13
id. 241.
[
Footnote 8]
14
id. 172, § 67.
[
Footnote 9]
14 Stat. at Large 172, § 68.
[
Footnote 10]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 11]
Id., 171, § 67.
[
Footnote 12]
12 Stat. at Large 434.
[
Footnote 13]
12 Stat. at Large 725, 729.
[
Footnote 14]
13
id. 239.
[
Footnote 15]
See also 14
id. 111.
[
Footnote 16]
Elliott v.
Swartwout, 10 Pet. 150.
[
Footnote 17]
Bend v.
Hoyt, 13 Pet. 267.
[
Footnote 18]
13 Stat. at Large 487.
[
Footnote 19]
5 Stat. at Large 348;
Cary v.
Curtis, 3 How. 236;
Curtis v.
Fiedler, 2 Black 461.
[
Footnote 20]
13 Stat. at Large 486, § 16.
[
Footnote 21]
14
id. 152.
[
Footnote 22]
Act March 2, 1867, § 10.
[
Footnote 23]
Saving Fund Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 7 Casey
187.
