1. A contract for the transportation of passengers by a
steamship on the ocean is a maritime contract, and there is no
distinction in principle between it and a contract for the like
transportation of merchandise. The same liability attaches upon its
execution both to the owner and the steamship.
2. The distinguishing and characteristic feature of a suit in
admiralty, is that the vessel or thing proceeded against itself is
seized and impleaded as the defendant and is judged and sentenced
accordingly. By the common law process, property is reached only
through a personal defendant, and then only to the extent of his
title.
3. A statute of California which authorizes actions
in
rem against vessels for causes of action cognizance in the
admiralty to that extent attempts to invest her courts with
admiralty jurisdiction.
4. The judicial power of the United States is in some cases
unavoidably exclusive of all state authority, and in all others it
may be made so at the election of Congress.
5. The provision of the ninth section of the Judiciary Act which
vests in the district courts of the United States exclusive
cognizance of civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
is constitutional.
6. The clause of the ninth section saving to suitors "the right
of a common
Page 71 U. S. 412
law remedy where the common law is competent to give it" does
not save a proceeding
in rem, as used in the admiralty
courts. Such a proceeding is not a remedy afforded by the common
law.
A statute of California, passed in 1851, and amended in 1860,
provides that all steamers, vessels, and boats, shall be
liable:
1st. For services rendered on board at the request of or on
contract with their respective owners, masters, agents, or
consignees.
2d. For supplies furnished for their use at the request of their
respective owners, masters, agents, or consignees.
3d. For materials furnished in their construction, repair, or
equipment.
4th. For their wharfage and anchorage within the state.
5th. For nonperformance or malperformance of any contract for
the transportation of persons or property made by their respective
owners, masters, agents, or consignees.
6th. For injuries committed by them to persons or property.
And that the "said several causes of action shall constitute
liens upon all steamers, vessels, and boats, and have priority in
their order, herein enumerated," with preference over all other
demands.
The statute also provides that actions for demands arising upon
any of the grounds above specified may be brought directly against
such steamers, vessels, or boats; that the complaint shall
designate the steamer, vessel, or boat by name; that the summons
may be served on the master, mate, or anyone having charge of the
same; that the same may be attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered; and that if the
attachment be not discharged and a judgment be recovered by the
plaintiff, the steamer, vessel, or boat may be sold by the sheriff
and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.
With this statute in force, the steamship
Moses Taylor,
a vessel of over one thousand tons burden, was owned in 1863 by
Roberts, of the City of New York, and was employed by him in
navigating the Pacific Ocean and in carrying
Page 71 U. S. 413
passengers and freight between Panama and San Francisco. In
October of that year, one Hammons entered into a contract with
Roberts, as owner of this steamship, by which, in consideration of
$100, Roberts agreed to transport him from New York to San
Francisco as a steerage passenger with reasonable dispatch and to
furnish him with proper and necessary food, water, and berths or
other conveniences for lodging on the voyage. For alleged breach of
this contract Hammons brought this action, a proceeding against the
vessel, in a court of a justice of the peace within the City of San
Francisco, such courts at that time having, by statute of
California, jurisdiction of these cases where the amount claimed
did not exceed $200, which it did not here. The breach alleged was
that the plaintiff was detained at the Isthmus of Panama eight
days, and that the provisions furnished him on the vessel were
unwholesome, and that he was crowded into an unhealthy cabin,
without sufficient room or air for either health or comfort in
consequence of the large number of steerage passengers, more than
the vessel was allowed by law to have or could properly carry, to
his damage &c.
The agent of the vessel filed an answer in which he denied the
allegations of the complaint and asserted that the court had no
jurisdiction, because the cause of action as against the said
vessel was one of which the courts of admiralty had exclusive
jurisdiction, for that the vessel was used exclusively in
navigating the high seas and that the said cause of action, if any,
arose on the high seas.
The justice decided that he had jurisdiction and gave judgment
for the $200 claimed. The case was then taken to the county court,
where the objection to the jurisdiction was again made and again
overruled. The court found as fact that Hammons had been carried on
the steamer
Illinois from New York to Aspinwall, thence,
after the delay alleged, on railway across the Isthmus to Panama,
and from there on the
Moses Taylor to San Francisco, and
in substance that the other facts alleged were as stated in the
complaint. Whereupon final judgment was entered in accordance
Page 71 U. S. 414
with the decision, and from that judgment the defendant, owner
of the vessel, brought this writ of error.
Page 71 U. S. 424
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises upon certain provisions of a statute of
California regulating proceedings in civil cases in the courts of
that state. [
Footnote 1] The
sixth chapter of the statute relates to actions against steamers,
vessels, and boats, and provides that they shall be liable 1st, for
services rendered on board of them, at the request of, or on
contract with, their respective owners, agents, masters, or
consignees; 2d, for supplies furnished for their use upon the like
request; 3d, for materials furnished in their construction, repair,
or equipment; 4th, for their wharfage and anchorage within the
state; 5th,
Page 71 U. S. 425
for nonperformance or malperformance of any contract for the
transportation of persons or property made by their respective
owners, agents, masters, or consignees; 6th, for injuries committed
by them to persons or property, and declares that these several
causes of action shall constitute liens upon the steamers, vessels,
and boats for one year after the causes of action shall have
accrued, and have priority in the order enumerated and preference
over all other demands. The statute also provides that actions for
demands arising upon any of these grounds may be brought directly
against the steamers, vessels, or boats by name; that process may
be served on the master, mate, or any person having charge of the
same; that they may be attached as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment which may be recovered; and that if the attachment be
not discharged and a judgment be recovered by the plaintiff, they
may be sold, with their tackle, apparel, and furniture or such
interest therein as may be necessary and the proceeds applied to
the payment of the judgment.
These provisions, with the exception of the clause designating
the order of priority in the liens and their preference over other
demands, were enacted in 1851; that clause was inserted by an
amendment in 1860.
In 1863, the steamship
Moses Taylor, a vessel of over
one thousand tons burden, was owned by Marshall O. Roberts, of the
City of New York, and was employed by him in navigating the Pacific
Ocean and in carrying passengers and freight between Panama and San
Francisco. In October of that year, the plaintiff in the court
below, the defendant in error in this Court, entered into a
contract with Roberts, as owner of this steamship, by which, in
consideration of one hundred dollars, Roberts agreed to transport
him from New York to San Francisco as a steerage passenger, with
reasonable dispatch, and to furnish him with proper and necessary
food, water, and berths, or other conveniences for lodging, on the
voyage. The contract, as set forth in the complaint, does not in
terms provide for transportation on any portion of the voyage by
the
Moses Taylor, but the case
Page 71 U. S. 426
was tried upon the supposition that such was the fact, and we
shall therefore treat the contract as if it specified a
transportation by that steamer on the Pacific for the distance
between Panama and San Francisco. For alleged breach of this
contract the present action was brought under the statute mentioned
in a court of a justice of the peace held within the City of San
Francisco. Courts held by justices of the peace were at that time
by another statute invested with jurisdiction of these cases where
the amount claimed did not exceed two hundred dollars except where
the action was brought to recover seamen's wages for a voyage
performed in whole or in part without the waters of the state.
[
Footnote 2]
The agent for the
Moses Taylor appeared to the action
and denied the jurisdiction of the court, insisting that the cause
of action was one over which the courts of admiralty had exclusive
jurisdiction, and also traversed the several matters alleged as
breaches of the contract.
The justice of the peace overruled the objection to his
jurisdiction and gave judgment for the amount claimed. On appeal to
the county court, the action was tried
de novo upon the
same pleadings, but in all respects as if originally commenced in
that court. The want of jurisdiction there and the exclusive
cognizance of such causes of action by the courts of admiralty were
again urged and were again overruled, and a similar judgment to
that of the justice of the peace was rendered. The amount of the
judgment was too small to enable the owner of the steamer to take
the case by appeal to the supreme court of the state. That court
has no appellate jurisdiction in cases where the demand in dispute,
exclusive of interest, is under three hundred dollars unless it
involve the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, or
municipal fine. [
Footnote 3]
The decision of the county court was the decision of the highest
court in the state which had jurisdiction of the matter in
controversy. From that court, therefore, the case is brought here
by writ of error.
Page 71 U. S. 427
The case presented is clearly one within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts. The contract for the
transportation of the plaintiff was a maritime contract. As stated
in the complaint, it related exclusively to a service to be
performed on the high seas and pertained solely to the business of
commerce and navigation. There is no distinction in principle
between a contract of this character and a contract for the
transportation of merchandise. The same liability attaches upon
their execution both to the owner and the ship. The passage -money
in the one case is equivalent to the freight money in the other. A
breach of either contract is the appropriate subject of admiralty
jurisdiction.
The action against the steamer by name, authorized by the
statute of California, is a proceeding in the nature and with the
incidents of a suit in admiralty. The distinguishing and
characteristic feature of such suit is that the vessel or thing
proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the defendant,
and is judged and sentenced accordingly. It is this dominion of the
suit in admiralty over the vessel or thing itself which gives to
the title made under its decrees validity against all the world. By
the common law process, whether of mesne attachment or execution,
property is reached only through a personal defendant, and then
only to the extent of his title. Under a sale, therefore, upon a
judgment in a common law proceeding, the title acquired can never
be better than that possessed by the personal defendant. It is his
title, and not the property itself, which is sold.
The statute of California, to the extent in which it authorizes
actions
in rem against vessels for causes of action
cognizable in the admiralty, invests her courts with admiralty
jurisdiction, and so the Supreme Court of that state has decided in
several cases. In
Averill v. The Steamer Harford,
[
Footnote 4] the court thus
held, and added that
"the proceedings in such actions must be governed by the
principles and forms
Page 71 U. S. 428
of admiralty courts except where otherwise controlled or
directed by the act."
This jurisdiction of the courts of California was asserted and
is maintained upon the assumed ground that the cognizance by the
federal courts "of civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" is not exclusive, as declared by the ninth section of
the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The question presented for our determination is therefore
whether such cognizance by the federal courts is exclusive, and
this depends either upon the constitutional grant of judicial power
or the validity of the provision of the ninth section of the act of
Congress.
The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United
States
"shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or
which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or
more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between
citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state
claiming lands under grants of different states; and between a
state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or
subjects. [
Footnote 5]"
How far this judicial power is exclusive or may by the
legislation of Congress be made exclusive in the courts of the
United States has been much discussed, though there has been no
direct adjudication upon the point. In the opinion delivered in the
case of
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, [
Footnote 6] Mr. Justice Story comments upon the
fact that there are two classes of cases enumerated in the clause
cited between which a distinction is drawn; that the first class
includes cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States, cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, and cases of admiralty and maritime
Page 71 U. S. 429
jurisdiction; and that, with reference to this class, the
expression is that the judicial power shall extend to all cases,
but that in the subsequent part of the clause which embraces all
the other cases of national cognizance and forms the second class,
the word "all" is dropped. And the learned justice appears to have
thought the variation in the language the result of some
determinate reason, and suggests that with respect to the first
class it may have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution imperatively to extend the judicial power either in an
original or appellate form to all cases, and with respect to the
latter class to leave it to Congress to qualify the jurisdiction in
such manner as public policy might dictate. Many cogent reasons and
various considerations of public policy are stated in support of
this suggestion. The vital importance of all the cases enumerated
in the first class to the national sovereignty is mentioned as a
reason which may have warranted the distinction, and which would
seem to require that they should be vested exclusively in the
national courts -- a consideration which does not apply, at least
with equal force, to cases of the second class. Without, however,
placing implicit reliance upon the distinction stated, the learned
justice observes in conclusion that it is manifest that the
judicial power of the United States is in some cases unavoidably
exclusive of all state authority, and that in all others it may be
made so at the election of Congress. We agree fully with this
conclusion. The legislation of Congress has proceeded upon this
supposition. The Judiciary Act of 1789, in its distribution of
jurisdiction to the several federal courts, recognizes and is
framed upon the theory that in all cases to which the judicial
power of the United States extends, Congress may rightfully vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. It declares that in
some cases, from their commencement, such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive; in other cases it determines at what stage of procedure
such jurisdiction shall attach and how long and how far concurrent
jurisdiction of the state courts shall be permitted. Thus, cases in
which the United States are parties, civil
Page 71 U. S. 430
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and cases against
consuls and vice-consuls, except for certain offenses, are placed
from their commencement exclusively under the cognizance of the
federal courts.
On the other hand, some cases in which an alien or a citizen of
another state is made a party may be brought either in a federal or
a state court, at the option of the plaintiff, and if brought in
the state court may be prosecuted until the appearance of the
defendant, and then, at his option, may be suffered to remain there
or may be transferred to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
Other cases, not included under these heads but involving
questions under the Constitution, laws, treaties, or authority of
the United States, are only drawn within the control of the federal
courts upon appeal or writ of error after final judgment.
By subsequent legislation of Congress, and particularly by the
legislation of the last four years, many of the cases which by the
Judiciary Act could only come under the cognizance of the federal
courts after final judgment in the state courts may be withdrawn
from the concurrent jurisdiction of the latter courts at earlier
stages upon the application of the defendant.
The constitutionality of these provisions cannot be seriously
questioned, and is of frequent recognition by both state and
federal courts.
The cognizance of civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction vested in the district courts by the ninth section of
the Judiciary Act, may be supported upon like considerations. It
has been made exclusive by Congress, and that is sufficient, even
if we should admit that in the absence of its legislation the state
courts might have taken cognizance of these causes. But there are
many weighty reasons why it was so declared. "The admiralty
jurisdiction," says Mr. Justice Story
"naturally connects itself on the one hand with our diplomatic
relations and the duties to foreign nations and their subjects, and
on the other hand with the great interests of navigation and
commerce, foreign and domestic.
Page 71 U. S. 431
There is, then, a peculiar wisdom in giving to the national
government a jurisdiction of this sort which cannot be yielded
except for the general good and which multiplies the securities for
the public peace abroad and gives to commerce and navigation the
most encouraging support at home. [
Footnote 7]"
The case before us is not within the saving clause of the ninth
section. That clause only saves to suitors "the right of a common
law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." It is
not a remedy in the common law courts which is saved, but a common
law remedy. A proceeding
in rem, as used in the admiralty
courts, is not a remedy afforded by the common law; it is a
proceeding under the civil law. When used in the common law courts,
it is given by statute.
It follows from the views expressed that the judgment of the
county court must be reversed and the cause remanded, with
directions to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
And it is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Laws of California of 1851, p. 51.
[
Footnote 2]
Laws of California of 1853, p. 287, and of 1856, p. 133.
[
Footnote 3]
Constitution of the state, Art. VI, sec. 4, as amended in
1862.
[
Footnote 4]
2 Cal. 308.
[
Footnote 5]
Article II, § 2.
[
Footnote 6]
14 U. S. 1
Wheat. 334.
[
Footnote 7]
Commentaries § 1672.
