Although when statute abolishing its fictitious forms places the
action of ejectment on the same footing with other actions as to
the conclusiveness of the judgment, the court will give effect to
the same; yet where a plaintiff in ejectment is defeated in one
suit, where he claimed through a power of attorney rightly ruled
out on the trial as void, he will not be held to be concluded in a
subsequent action where he claims under a new deed made by the
executors themselves. Having acquired a new and distinct title, he
has the same right to assert it without prejudice from the former
suit as a stranger would have had it passed to him.
The statute of Illinois regulating the action of ejectment
abolishes all fictions. Its twenty-ninth section provides that
"Every judgment in the action of ejectment rendered upon a
verdict shall be conclusive as to the title established in such
action upon the party against whom the same is rendered and against
all persons claiming from, through, or under such party by title
accruing after the commencement of such action, subject to the
exceptions hereinafter named,"
exceptions not material to be noticed. With this statute in
force, the plaintiff in error brought an action of ejectment
against the defendant in error in the court below, and upon the
trial produced a chain of title, consisting of a patent
Page 71 U. S. 400
from the United States to Whitney, a deed from Whitney to Vose,
the will of Vose, and a deed
from his executors to the
plaintiff.
This deed was dated March 18, 1861.
The validity of these several links was not denied. They made
the chain of title complete, and
prima facie entitled the
plaintiff to recover the premises in controversy.
The defendant thereupon gave in evidence the record of a
judgment relating to the same premises -- rendered in a former
action of ejectment -- wherein the plaintiff in error was the
plaintiff, and James R. Gordon was defendant. The judgment was in
favor of the latter.
This suit was begun on the 12th June,
1858, and ended June 5, 1859.
The defendant also proved that he was in possession as the
tenant of Gordon; that in the former action set forth in the record
in question, the plaintiff, Barrows, gave in evidence the same
patent from the United States to Whitney, the same deed from
Whitney to Vose, a power of attorney from the executors of Vose to
S. A. Kingsley, authorizing him to sell and convey the premises, a
deed from the executors
by Kingsley as their attorney in
fact, to Scroggs, and a deed from Scroggs to the plaintiff.
This power of attorney from the executors and the deed executed
by Kingsley were ruled out as void.
The defendant proved further that the deed from the executors of
Vose to the plaintiff was given upon the same consideration as the
former deed by their attorneys in fact to Scroggs.
The evidence being closed, the plaintiff asked the court to
charge the jury that the record and evidence relating to the former
trial constituted no bar to his right to recover in this action.
This the court refused to do, and thereupon charged that the record
in connection with the evidence did constitute a bar. The jury
found accordingly for the defendant.
To the admission of each of the several parts of this evidence,
to the refusal of the court to charge as asked, and to the charge
given, the defendant excepted.
The correctness of these instructions was the question now
before this Court.
Page 71 U. S. 402
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question of error in the instructions given by the court is
the hinge of the controversy between the parties. The statute of
Illinois regulating the action of ejectment abolishes all fictions.
The twenty-ninth section provides that
"Every judgment in the action of ejectment rendered upon a
verdict shall be conclusive as to the title established in such
action upon the party against whom the same is rendered and against
all persons claiming from, through, or under such party, by title
accruing after the commencement
Page 71 U. S. 403
of such action, subject to the exceptions hereinafter
named."
It is not claimed that the exceptions referred to affect this
case.
Where a judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, the title upon
which he recovered is thereby established and the construction and
effect of the statute are obvious. He must recover in all cases, if
at all, upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the
weakness of his adversary's. It is not incumbent upon the defendant
to show any title. Where a plaintiff shows no title and is
therefore defeated, it is not easy to perceive how any title can be
said to have been established in the action, or how, under the
statute, the result can affect his right to bring a new action for
the same premises. We are not advised of any authoritative
interpretation of the statute in this aspect by the courts of
Illinois. If one were shown, we should follow it. But in the view
which we take of this case it may be conceded that the judgment has
the same effect upon the parties and those in privity with them as
a judgment in a common law action. As a general proposition, such a
judgment is a bar to any future litigation between the parties and
all claiming under them touching the subject involved in the
controversy. It is conclusive of their rights, and shuts the door
to further inquiry. This is an elementary principle of all
civilized jurisprudence. It has been and will be applied in this
Court upon all proper occasions. It is a principle of repose, and
fruitful of good. When the legislature of any state has seen fit to
divest the action of ejectment of its ancient characteristics and
to place it upon the same footing with other actions, we have not
failed to give full effect to the legislative intent by maintaining
the conclusiveness of the judgment, as in other cases.
But in our judgment this principle has no application to the
case before us.
The suit between Barrows and Gordon was commenced on the 12th of
June, 1858, and terminated on the 5th of June, 1859.
Page 71 U. S. 404
The deed from the executors of Vose to Barrows bears date on the
18th of March, 1861. Upon the trial of the case of
Barrows v.
Gordon, the power of attorney from the executors and the deed
executed by Kingsley were properly ruled out as void. They were not
in the case. Barrows had no title to the premises in controversy,
and judgment was given against him. This may be admitted to be
conclusive as to his want of title at that time, and whether the
decision of the court as to the power of attorney and the deed made
under it was erroneous or not, it would have been a bar to another
action attempted to be maintained upon the same state of facts. But
this did not deprive Barrows of the right to acquire a new and
distinct title, and, having done so, he had the same right to
assert it without prejudice from the former suit which would have
accompanied the title into the hands of a stranger. At the
termination of that suit, the executors had not passed the title to
anyone. They did not transfer it for more than a year
afterwards.
How, then, can it be said to have been involved in or in any
wise affected by the prior litigation? The plaintiff could no more
be barred than any other person who might have subsequently
acquired the title. In refusing to instruct and in instructing as
appears by the record, the court committed an error.
The judgment is therefore reversed with costs and the cause
will be remanded to the court below with directions to proceed
inconformity with this opinion.