1. The court reproves the practice of making bills of exception
a sort of abstract or index to the history of the case, and so of
obscuring its merits.
2. Where a party claiming land as owner, under the laws of
Pennsylvania, brings ejectment in the name of the original
warrantee and recovers against a father and subsequently producing
a deed poll from the warrantee, made previously to the date of the
ejectment and deraigning title to himself, brings another ejectment
in his own name against a son, who on his father's death kept
possession of the same land, such two suits are an estoppel and
within the Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania of the 13th of April,
1807, which declares that
"where two verdicts shall, in any suit of ejectment between the
same parties, be given in succession for the plaintiff or
defendant, and judgment be rendered thereon, no new ejectment shall
be brought. "
Page 71 U. S. 225
3. But where a plaintiff deraigns title regularly from the
warrantee, and the defendant shows no title, the question of
estoppel is of no importance.
The State of Pennsylvania in 1792 granted a warrant to survey a
certain tract of land to William Barker. Barker, the warrantee,
conveyed his interests to Daniel Broadhead. Broadhead died, and
James Patterson bought his title from his heirs. But he had not, or
at least could not find or prove the existence of any "deed poll"
from Barker, conveying the warrant to Broadhead. However, using the
name of Barker, the warrantee, he brought ejectment in 1831 against
a certain Eli Evans and some other persons who were in possession
of the land. Evans and these others set up in defense that Barker
did not appear, and that his existence was uncertain, and that
Patterson, asserting himself as he did, to be owner of the land,
could not bring suit in Barker's name. But the court decided that
under the peculiar system of land law of Pennsylvania, he could,
and he had verdict and judgment accordingly. On error to the
supreme court of the state (
Ross v. Barker, 5 Watts 391),
that tribunal affirmed the judgment; holding to the doctrine
previously declared in
Campbell v. Galbraith, [
Footnote 1] that in Pennsylvania a
beneficial owner was entitled to use the name of a warrantee,
though such warrantee was ignorant both of the action and that
trust.
For some reason, however, Patterson did not get possession of
the land. Eli Evans, against whom the ejectment had been brought,
died, leaving a son, Elihu Evans, upon the land. Patterson, who had
in the meantime found a deed poll from Barker, the warrantee, to
Broadhead, brought, A.D. 1855, a suit against this Elihu Evans,
deraigning the title regularly from the warrantee to himself and
obtaining verdict and judgment. But still he did not get into
actual or permanent possession. Elihu Evans yet maintained
occupation.
Page 71 U. S. 226
Patterson, who was a citizen of Ohio, now brought a third
ejectment -- the suit below -- in his own name against the said
Elihu. This was in the Circuit Court of the Western District of
Pennsylvania. He put in evidence the records of the two judgments
just mentioned, proved his actual ownership at the time when the
first suit (that in the name of William Barker), was brought,
showed the identity of the land, now demanded with that recovered
in the former suits, and that Elihu Evans was a son of Eli Evans,
and in possession. He here rested; asserting that he had shown two
recoveries for the same land, and claiming the benefit of them
under a statute of Pennsylvania, passed 13 April, 1807, which
enacts that
"where two verdicts shall in any suit in ejectment between
the same parties be given in succession for the plaintiff
or defendant, and judgment be rendered thereon, no new ejectment
shall be brought."
The defendant contended that the first ejectment having been
instituted in the name of William Barker, the warrantee, after he
had conveyed all his right and title to the land in controversy to
Daniel Broadhead, as appeared from the evidence, there was no
privity, and therefore the first verdict and judgment should not be
counted against him, and prayed the court so to instruct the jury,
which the court after argument of counsel declined to do, and
charged the jury that if the evidence in the case was believed by
them, the plaintiff had two verdicts and judgments for the land in
controversy, which were conclusive in favor of his title, and he
was entitled to recover.
The case was now here on error, the record showing a long and
confused bill of exceptions, with recitals of all the deeds, and
minute descriptions of the land and of the tracts bounding it.
Page 71 U. S. 229
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The bill of exceptions (so called) in this case, is a sort of
abstract or index to the history of a case tried in the Western
District of Pennsylvania. Protesting against attempts at mystifying
the merits of a case by such records, we shall proceed to notice
the single error which it is supposed that the court has committed
in the charge to the jury.
Page 71 U. S. 230
The case cannot be made intelligible without a brief notice of
the very peculiar land law of Pennsylvania. The proprietors of the
province, in the beginning, allowed no one man to locate and survey
more than three hundred acres. To evade this rule in after times,
it was the custom for speculators in land to make application in
the names of third persons, and having obtained a warrant to take
from them what was called a "deed poll," or brief conveyance of
their inchoate equitable claim.
Pennsylvania, until of late years, had no courts of equity.
Hence, in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff might recover
without showing a legal title. If he had a prior inchoate or
equitable title, either as trustee or
cestui que trust, he
might recover. The courts treated the applicant, or warrantee, as
trustee for the party, who paid the purchase money, or paid even
the surveying fees; for the purchase money, under the location or
application system, was not paid at the time, and sometimes never.
When the state succeeded to the title of the proprietors, the
application system was abandoned, and warrants were granted on
payment of the purchase money for the number of acres for which his
warrant called. Hence, where the claimant of the warrant was unable
to show his deed poll, he might recover by showing that he paid the
purchase money; that the warrantee, whose name was used, was
therefore trustee for him. And an ejectment might also be
maintained in the name of the warrantee, although he had no
beneficial interest in the land, and had no knowledge of the
institution of the suit.
See Campbell v. Galbraith,
[
Footnote 2] and also
Ross
v. Barker, [
Footnote 3]
which was decided on the title now in question.
To come to the history of the present case. Daniel Broadhead was
the owner of the warrant in the name of William Barker. He had died
intestate. The defendant in error had bought up the titles of the
different heirs, and found Eli Evans, the father of the plaintiff
in error, and others in possession, claiming title as settlers. But
as the
deed poll from
Page 71 U. S. 231
Barker to Broadhead could not be found, the defendant in error
brought his first ejectment in the name of the warrantee, and
recovered. The objection was made that Patterson, the defendant in
error, could not maintain his suit in such form. But the supreme
court, in the cases above cited, determined that he could.
Afterwards, finding the same parties or their privies in
possession (A.D. 1855), he brought another ejectment in his own
name, and having found the lost deed poll to Broadhead, he was able
to deraign his title regularly from the original warrantee, and had
another verdict and judgment in his favor.
In the case now before us, Elihu Evans, the plaintiff in error,
had succeeded to the claim of his father, Eli Evans. On the trial,
the defendant in error had again deraigned his title from Barker,
the warrantee, and gave in evidence also his two former recoveries.
As he had already shown a title regularly deraigned from the
original warrantee, and the defendant Evans had shown no title at
all, the two former verdicts were unnecessary, but were conclusive,
according to the laws of Pennsylvania, between the same parties and
their privies.
The only objection made by Evans was to the conclusiveness of
the two verdicts, because the first suit was in the name of Barker,
and, as now appeared by the deed to Broadhead, that Barker had no
title. When the recovery was had in his name, it was argued that
such "verdict and judgment should not be counted." The record
showed that at the time the first ejectment was brought, Patterson
had bought up the title from Broadhead's heirs; that the suit was
carried on by him in the name of the warrantee for his own use. No
objection was made to the admission of the first verdict and
judgment, because the parties defendant were not the same, or for
want of privity between the defendant and the parties defendant in
the former action. But it was contended that the first verdict and
judgment "should not be counted against him" for want of privity
between the plaintiffs. There was satisfactory evidence that
Patterson
Page 71 U. S. 232
was the real party in interest, and conducted both suits, and
had recovered, in the first suit in the name of a trustee, and in
the second in his own name, as "
cestui que trust" of the
equitable estate -- as where one suit was in a real or fictitious
lease from John Doe, and the other in the name of Richard Roe. The
jury were instructed that if they believed the evidence that
Patterson was the real party in both suits, the two verdicts and
judgments were conclusive.
But the plaintiff below having deraigned title from the
warrantee, and the plaintiff in error having shown no title, the
question as to the estoppel was of no importance, as the court were
bound to instruct the jury, that without its aid, their verdict
should be the same.
The plaintiff in error having failed to show any error in
the record, the judgment is affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
1 Watts 78.
[
Footnote 2]
1 Watts 78.
[
Footnote 3]
5
id. 391.
