1. The Act of Congress of August 16, 1856, confirming claims in
favor of Ambrose Lanfear, confirmed to him whatever he was entitled
to by virtue of the original grant referred to in it, conceding
that to have been valid. It neither enlarged nor diminished what
the grant gave. It extinguished all claim on the part of the United
States to the land covered by the surveys, but as regards adverse
claimants, it determined nothing, and concluded no one.
Page 71 U. S. 205
2. The twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act does not
warrant the review of an adjudication upon a mere question of
boundary; the fact that the land to which the boundary relates is
held by a title derived from an act of Congress does not change the
result. If the title be admitted as recognized by the act, its
location upon the land is a subject wholly within the cognizance of
the state tribunals, and it is not within the power of this Court
to reverse their action. In such cases, its authority is limited to
errors relating to the title.
Lanfear brought suit against Hunley in a state district court of
Louisiana to recover the possession of certain land occupied and
claimed by Hunley as his own. The plaintiff relied on a title
derived from a Spanish grant in early times to Paul Toups and
subsequently confirmed, as he alleged, by acts of Congress in 1807,
1814, 1820, and with greater particularity by an Act of August 18,
1856, to the children of Toups and to a certain Daspit St. Amand
through whom he claimed. Toups' petition was made in 1795, and was
for
"A grant of land on the place called 'Les Coteaux de France,' at
a distance of about eleven leagues from the capital and about three
and a half leagues from the river on the other bank, reaching to a
bayou named Crocodile, which runs parallel with the river, and the
said land to be taken from the crossing of said bayou as far as the
large swamp on the other side of Bayou des Cannes -- the whole
forming a strip of land about sixteen or eighteen arpents wide and
about two leagues and a half long -- bounded on one side by
floating prairies and on the other by lakes and marshes."
The land was granted as prayed for. But there having been, as
the plaintiff alleged, several bayous in that neighborhood named in
former times Bayou Crocodile, though with one exception no longer
now so named, the question as to the line to which the land
extended -- a question of boundary alone -- became a disputed
one.
The first act of Congress, that of 1807, relied on as confirming
the claim as set up by Lanfear, the plaintiff, was a
Page 71 U. S. 206
general act authorizing commissioners to pass on claims to lands
granted prior to 1803, limiting such grant to 2,000 acres, and
leaving locations to be determined. Nor was there anything of a
particular kind in the act of 1814 or that of 1820. In 1854, Hawke,
a deputy surveyor of the United States, made a survey of the land
granted to Toups and confirmed to his children, and so surveyed it
as to cover the lands of the defendant, now in dispute, and on the
18th August, 1856, Congress, referring specifically to the survey
as made by Hawke, declared the same "confirmed" in favor of
Lanfear. The act contained these provisos:
"
Provided that such confirmation shall only be
construed into a relinquishment of title on the part of the United
States, and shall not affect the rights of any third persons
claiming title, either under adverse title or as preemptor;
and
provided further that any person or persons who are now settled on
said lands or any portion of the lands embraced in the said surveys
shall be entitled to have and maintain an action to test the
validity of said surveys, and the extent of the said claims of
the children of Paul Toups and of Daspit St. Amand, numbers 74 and
529, and to have the same determined judicially, in the same manner
as though the land on which they are settled had been surveyed as
public land, and they had been permitted to enter the same by way
of preemption, it being the true intent and meaning of this act
that no person who would be now entitled to a right of preemption
to any part of said land if the same were the property of the
United States shall be deprived of the same unless it is judicially
decided that the surveys were made in conformity with the legal
rights of said Ambrose Lanfear under the said confirmation."
The state court in which the suit was brought decided against
the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana having confirmed
that judgment, the case came here for reexamination under the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, which provides that a
final judgment in the highest court of a state where is drawn in
question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority
exercised under the United States, and the decision is against that
validity, or
Page 71 U. S. 207
where is drawn in question the construction of any statute of
the United States and the decision is against the right specially
set up or claimed by either party under such statute may be
reexamined in this Court, enacting further however that no other
error shall be assigned or regarded as ground of reversal than such
as immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity
or construction.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are met at the threshold of the investigation by the
proposition, on the part of the defendant in error, that this Court
has no jurisdiction of the controversy between the parties, and
that the case must be dismissed.
The defendant in error holds the lands in controversy by the
right of preemption under the laws of the United States, and it is
admitted that his title is valid and must prevail unless his
adversary has proved a better one. The plaintiff in error insists
that such a title is shown in the record -- by a grant from the
government of Spain to Paul Toups, in 1796, confirmed by the Acts
of Congress of the 3d of March, 1807, of the 12th of April, 1814,
of the 11th of May, 1820, and especially by the Act of the 18th of
August, 1856.
None of these acts, except the one last mentioned, attempted
Page 71 U. S. 208
to fix definitely the locality and boundaries of the grant. That
act refers to surveys made by Hawke in 1854 and confirms them. The
plaintiff in error claims according to these surveys. They include
the land in controversy. But the confirmation by this act was
accompanied by important conditions.
[The learned judge here read the provisos as given,
supra, p. <|71 U.S. 206|>206, in the statement of
the case.]
These provisos expressly save the rights, whatever they may be,
of the defendant in error.
The act, considered in its entirety, confirmed to the plaintiff
whatever he was entitled to by virtue of the original grant,
conceding that to have been valid. It neither enlarges nor
diminishes what the grant gave him. It extinguishes all claim on
the part of the United States to the land covered by the surveys,
but as regards all adverse claimants, it determines nothing, and
concludes no one. It gives to the settlers upon the land, in
express terms, the right to institute and maintain the litigation
necessary to enable them to test the validity of the surveys. It
leaves adverse claimants otherwise where they were before Congress
legislated upon the subject and in all respects as if this act had
not been passed.
The defendant in error does not deny that a grant was made as
alleged by the plaintiff in error, nor that it was confirmed by
Congress, but he denies that its boundaries were properly defined
by the surveys of Hawke, and he asserts, that if properly located
it will not include the land in dispute. The plaintiff in error
insists that these surveys conformed to the grant, and that they
are made conclusive by the act of 1856.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana gave to this act the same
construction which we have given, and proceeded to settle the
rights of the parties according to the evidence.
The controversy in that court turned wholly upon the question of
the locality of the eastern boundary of the grant. The plaintiff
contended that it was a line eighty arpens from the west bank of
the Mississippi River. The defendant alleged
Page 71 U. S. 209
that it was the Bayou Crocodile. If the plaintiff's claim
prevailed, the tract would include the land in controversy; if the
defendant's, the opposite result would follow. The court, after an
elaborate examination of the subject, sustained the theory of the
defendant, and gave judgment accordingly.
Has this Court jurisdiction to examine the grounds of this
decision?
The case is brought here under the twenty-fifth section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. Our authority is derived from and limited by
that section. This Court has repeatedly held, that it does not
warrant the review of an adjudication upon a mere question of
boundary. The fact that the land to which the boundary relates is
held by a title derived from an act of Congress does not change the
result. If the title be admitted as recognized by the act, its
location upon the land is a subject wholly within the cognizance of
the state tribunals, and it is not within the power of this Court
to revise their action. In such cases, our authority is limited to
errors relating to the title. If any such are committed, it is our
duty to correct them. If there are none, we have no more authority
to interpose than in any other case of alleged maladministration of
justice by a state court. A party cannot, by setting up an
unfounded claim of title, compel us, after deciding the claim
against him, to take to ourselves a jurisdiction which, but for
such claim, we could not have exercised. Such a result would make
the jurisdiction depend, not upon the nature and merits of the
case, but upon what the party may choose to allege. In this way, in
every case where the title is derived from the United States, and a
question of boundary is involved, this Court might be constrained
to do what it has uniformly held to be beyond the sphere of its
power.
In the case before us, the Supreme Court of Louisiana construed
correctly the several acts of Congress relating to the subject of
the controversy. No greater or different effect would have been
given to them here if the case had been brought before us by appeal
from a circuit court of the
Page 71 U. S. 210
United States. Full effect was given to the title. The error, if
any were committed, was in locating it upon the land, and fixing
its boundaries. In the performance of this function by that court,
no treaty, act of Congress, or authority exercised under the United
States, was drawn in question. We cannot, therefore, review the
conclusions at which the court arrived.
* The section
referred to in express terms forbids it.
The decision having been correct upon the only question
before us for consideration, the judgment below is
affirmed.
*
McDonough v.
Millandon, 3 How. 707;
Doe v.
Esclava, 9 How. 448.
