1. The Mexican colonization law of August 18, 1824, though
general to the Republic of Mexico, was, so far as it affected lands
within the limits of Texas after the independence of that country,
a local law of the new state, as much so as if it had originated in
her legislation. The interpretation, therefore, placed on it by the
highest court of the state must be accepted as the true
interpretation, so far as it applies to titles to lands in that
state, whatever may be the opinion of this Court of its original
soundness. If in courts of other states carved out of territory
since acquired from Mexico a different interpretation has been
adopted, the courts of the United States will follow the different
ruling, so far as it affects titles in those states.
2. The interpretation within the jurisdiction of a state of a
local law becomes a part of that law, as much so as if incorporated
in the body of
Page 71 U. S. 197
it by the legislature. If different interpretations are given in
different states to a similar law, that law in effect becomes, by
the interpretations, so far as it is a rule for action by this
Court, a different law in one state from what it is in the
other.
By the Mexican colonization law of August 18, 1824, and the
legislation of Coahuila and Texas authorized by it, the governor of
the state just mentioned had power to grant lands for colonization,
but it was declared that the territory comprised within twenty
leagues of the boundaries of a foreign nation or within ten leagues
of the seacoast could not be colonized without the previous
approval of the supreme executive power.
In this state of the law, one Miguel Arceniga, a resident of
Bexar, made his petition for concession of eleven leagues of land.
The petition was dated March 31, 1831, and the concession of the
Governor granting the quantity asked for was made on the 6th of
April of the same year, accompanied with a direction to the proper
local officers to give possession of the land to the grantee and to
issue to him the proper title. Neither document designated the
land. A petition to the alcalde for survey, possession, and title
of the eleven leagues in the vicinity of the "Red River of the
Nachitoches" was followed by the appropriate action of the officer
for that purpose, and on the 22d of September, 1835, by the issue
to the grantee of a formal certificate of possession and title of
the land thus situated. This was before the annexation of Texas to
the United States, and the land thus granted laid within twenty
leagues of what was then the northern boundary between Texas and
the United States. Texas having become part of the Union, one
Christy, claiming under the grantee, brought trespass to try title
for these eleven leagues, now situated in Harrison County,
Texas.
The court ruled that the grant being issued without the previous
assent or approval of the supreme executive power of Mexico was
illegal and void, and excluded it from the jury. Thereupon, the
jury found for the defendant. The
Page 71 U. S. 198
alleged error in this ruling was the only question before this
Court.
Page 71 U. S. 201
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action to try the title to a tract of land situated
in the County of Harrison, in the State of Texas.
The plaintiff relied for recovery upon title derived under a
grant from the Governor of Coahuila and Texas, made whilst Texas
was a province of Mexico. The defendant rested his defense upon the
invalidity of the grant in question, and this invalidity was
asserted upon the admitted fact that the land it embraces was
situated, at the time the grant was made, within the twenty
frontier leagues bordering on the United States, and the absence of
any evidence tending to show the assent to the grant, or its
approval by the national executive of the republic. The court held
the grant, without such assent or approval, to be illegal and void,
and excluded it from the jury. The ruling in this respect
constitutes the only error assigned, which is properly before us
for consideration.
The irregularities in the record mentioned by counsel we cannot
notice, as they do not constitute the ground of any alleged
error.
The absence of the signature of the judge of the court to
Page 71 U. S. 202
the bill of exceptions is not made the subject of objection by
the parties, and we hence infer that its omission was a mere
clerical error.
The doctrine, that prior possession is sufficient evidence of
title to maintain the action against a mere intruder and
trespasser, we do not find at all controverted or doubted by the
court below.
The only question presented by the bill of exceptions, and this
arises upon the ruling mentioned, relates to the validity of the
grant produced. The petition to the Governor upon which the grant
was made, solicited, by way of sale, eleven leagues from the vacant
lands of the department. This bore date in March, 1831. The decree
of concession, which followed in April of the same year, gave the
quantity as solicited, and directed the proper local officers to
give possession of the land to the grantee, and issue to him the
appropriate title. Neither the petition nor the concession
designated the land, and in September, 1835, the grantee applied to
the alcalde of the district to place him in possession, and to
issue to him the title of the eleven leagues in the immediate
vicinity of the "Red River of the Nachitoches." By order of this
officer the land was surveyed, and on the 22d of the same month
formal evidence of title was given to the grantee. The land thus
ceded lay within twenty leagues of what then constituted the
boundary between the province of Texas and the United States.
The power of the Governor of Coahuila and Texas to make the
grant was derived from the Mexican colonization law of August 18,
1824, and the legislation of the state, which that law authorized.
The object of that law was to induce the settlement of the vacant
lands of the Republic. To this end, the several states were
empowered, under certain restrictions, to provide for the
colonization of the lands within their limits. Their legislation
was, of course, subject to the provisions of the fourth article of
the law mentioned, which declares that
"Those territories comprised within twenty leagues of the
boundaries of any foreign nation, or within ten leagues of the
seacoast, cannot be colonized without
Page 71 U. S. 203
the previous approval of the supreme general executive power.
[
Footnote 1]"
This law of 1824, though general to the Republic of Mexico, was,
so far as it affected lands within the limits of Texas after the
independence of that country, a local law of the new state -- as
much so as if it had originated in her legislation. It had at the
time no operation in any portion of what then constituted the
United States. The interpretation, therefore, placed upon it by the
highest court of that state must, according to the established
principles of this Court, be accepted as the true interpretation so
far as it applies to titles to lands in that state, whatever may be
our opinion of its original soundness. Nor does it matter that in
the courts of other states, carved out of territory since acquired
from Mexico, a different interpretation may have been adopted. If
such be the case, the courts of the United States will, in
conformity with the same principles, follow the different ruling so
far as it affects titles in those states. The interpretation within
the jurisdiction of one state becomes a part of the law of that
state, as much so as if incorporated into the body of it by the
legislature. If, therefore, different interpretations are given in
different states to a similar local law, that law in effect becomes
by the interpretations, so far as it is a rule for our action, a
different law in one state from what it is in the other. "That the
statute laws of the states," says Mr. Justice Johnson in delivering
the opinion of this Court in
Shelby v. Guy, [
Footnote 2]
"must furnish the rule of decision of this Court, as far as they
comport with the Constitution of the United States, in all cases
arising within the respective states is a position that no one
doubts. Nor is it questionable that a fixed and received
construction of their respective statute laws, in their own courts,
makes, in fact, a part of the statute law of the country, however
we may doubt the propriety of that construction. It is obvious that
this admission may at times involve us in seeming inconsistencies
--
Page 71 U. S. 204
as where states have adopted the same statutes, and their courts
differ in the construction. Yet that course is necessarily
indicated by the duty imposed upon us, to administer, as between
certain individuals, the laws of the respective states, according
to the best lights we possess of what those laws are."
In construing the fourth article cited from the colonization law
of Mexico, the Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly held that it
operated as a prohibition of any grant of land within the littoral
or coast leagues mentioned, without the previous assent of the
federal executive of Mexico; that such assent was essential to the
validity of a grant within those limits, and that such assent was
not to be inferred from the existence of the grant, but must be
affirmatively established. A series of decisions to this purport,
from an early history of the state down to the present time, is
found in the reports of her courts. These decisions have become a
rule of property in that state, any departure from which would
disturb titles to extensive and densely settled districts of
country. [
Footnote 3] We
receive them, therefore, to quote the language of this Court in
League v. Egery, "as having a binding force almost
equivalent to positive law." [
Footnote 4]
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
See translation of the General Colonization Law of
August 18, 1824, in appendix to Halleck's Report, Executive
Documents, Senate, of 1849.
[
Footnote 2]
24 U. S. 11
Wheat. 367.
[
Footnote 3]
Goode v. McQueen's Heirs, 3 Tex. 241;
Edwards v.
Davis, ibid., 321;
Smith v. Power, 23
id.
32.
[
Footnote 4]
65 U. S. 24
How. 266.
