A proceeding in the district or circuit court of the United
States under the Act of March 3, 1851, [
Footnote 1] for the ascertainment and settlement of
private land claims in the state of California, is in the nature of
a proceeding in equity. A decree of the circuit court in one of
these cases transferred to it is therefore subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States under the amendatory Judicial
Act of March 3, 1803. [
Footnote
2]
The fourth section of an Act of Congress of July 1, 1864,
[
Footnote 3] "To expedite the
settlement of titles to lands in the state of California," provides
as follows:
"That whenever the district judge of any one of the District
Court of the United States for California is interested in any land
the claim to which, under the said Act of March 3, 1851, is pending
before him on appeal from the Board of Commissioners created by
said act, the said district court shall order the case to be
transferred to the Circuit Court of the United States for
California, which court shall thereupon take jurisdiction and
determine the same. The said district courts may also order a
transfer, to the said circuit court, of any other cases arising
under said act pending before them affecting the title to lands
within the corporate limits of any city or town, and in such cases
both the district and circuit judges may sit."
An appeal pending in the District Court for the Northern
District of California from a decree of the Board of Commissioners
-- the United States being a party on one side and the City of San
Francisco party on the other -- was transferred from the district
court to the circuit under the above section. It was there heard
and decided in favor of the city, and the United States,
represented by the attorney-general, considering itself aggrieved
by the decree, applied in due form to the circuit court for an
appeal to this Court. The application, after full consideration,
was denied, on the ground that upon a true construction of the
section above quoted, no appeal had been provided for.
Page 70 U. S. 674
The section itself, it will be seen, provides for no appeal.
On a petition by the United States for a mandamus to the judges
of the circuit court to allow one, the question accordingly was
whether under the Constitution and different statutes of the United
States, any appeal lay.
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question raised by the present application is a nice one in
practice, and is not without its difficulties.
The section itself does not provide for an appeal, and unless
the case is governed by some general law, or established practice
of the court derived from acts of Congress, the right of appeal
cannot be maintained.
By the 22d section of the Judiciary Act, in connection with the
act of March 3, 1803, all judgments and decrees in civil actions,
and in suits in equity in a circuit court, brought there by
original process or removed there from courts of the several states
or removed there by appeal from a district court, may be reexamined
and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court. It is said that the
present case was not brought into the circuit by an appeal from the
district court, and hence is not within the provision. The case, as
we have seen, comes into the circuit under the 4th section of the
act of 1864 not by appeal, but by an order of the district court
transferring it to the circuit.
This 4th section was taken from, or part of it, at least, is but
a transcript of the 11th section of an Act of Congress passed May
8, 1792. The act provided that in all suits and actions in any
district court of the United States in which it shall appear that
the judge is in any way interested or has been counsel for either
party, it shall be his duty to cause the fact to be entered in the
minutes of his Court and order an authenticated copy thereof, with
all the proceedings in the suit, to the next circuit court, which
court shall thereupon take cognizance of the case, and hear and
determine
Page 70 U. S. 675
the same. And a similar provision will be found in the Act of
March 2, 1809, [
Footnote 4] in
case of the disability of the district judge to perform the duties
of his office during such disability. The cases are transferred by
the clerk on the order of the circuit judge. And a like provision
is found in the Act of March 3, 1821, [
Footnote 5] in case of the relationship of the judge to
either of the parties to the suit.
Now these acts, as will be seen from their date, have been in
force from an early period, and it has never been doubted but that
the judgments and decrees rendered in the circuit court were
subject to be reexamined, reversed, or affirmed by the Supreme
Court, as in any other case under the 22d section of the Judiciary
Act. A case was before us at the present term that had been
transferred to the circuit under the act of 1792.
The law providing for the transfer of the case from the district
court to the circuit, was regarded as enlarging the cases provided
for in the 22d section, and virtually incorporated therein a
removal by transfer, when thus authorized, to the circuit, in
addition to the cases of removal by appeal as provided for in that
section.
It will be observed that this 4th section of the act of 1864
provides for a compulsory transfer only in the case of an interest
of the judge in the land in controversy. But suppose he has been
counsel in the cause, or disabled by sickness, or by reason of
relationship to either of the parties, this 4th section does not
provide for the disability. The cases were, however, already
provided for by the acts of 1792, 1809, and 1821, and they are
peremptory that on application of the counsel of either party, the
case shall be transferred to the circuit court. The construction,
therefore, contended for would present the singular inconsistency
of a denial of an appeal in case of the interest of the judge in
the subject matter of the controversy, but its allowance in case of
a transfer, when he had been counsel in the cause, or general
disability to discharge his duties, or in case of relationship to
either of the parties.
Page 70 U. S. 676
The remaining clause of this section makes it optional with the
judge to transfer other causes arising under the act of 1851,
affecting the title to lands within the corporate limits of a city
or town, and then both judges may sit.
But whether the transfer is optional or compulsory cannot vary
its legal effect. If made at all, it must be by the authority of
the 4th section -- by the authority of law -- the same as in the
case of interest of counsel, or general disability of the judge, or
from relationship, and falls within the practice applicable to
these cases.
This clause is subject to an additional objection, for, as the
transfer is optional and may be granted or not, if the decree of
judgment of the circuit court is not matter of appeal, or writ of
error, whether any appeal be permitted or not in the case, is
within the power of the district judge. If he retains the case and
determines it, an appeal, it is admitted, lies; if he transfers the
case, and the decree or judgment is in the circuit, it must be
denied. We think Congress could hardly have intended this result.
It places the right of an appeal not on the judgment of the circuit
judge who rendered it, but in the discretion of the judge of the
district court.
It is urged that the proceedings under the act of 1851,
concerning California land titles, are special, and are not to be
regarded as cases either in law or equity. The law is general, and
concerns the title to the whole of the real property of the state.
Many of the provisions of this law are taken from the act of May
26, 1824, which provided for the trial of claims under imperfect
Spanish and French grants within the state of Missouri before the
district judge of that district. These were grants under the
protection of the treaty of San Ildefonzo. The proceedings were
informal, like those under the act of 1851. The claims were to be
determined according to the law of nations, the stipulations of the
treaty, the several acts of Congress in relation thereto, the laws
and ordinances of the government from which the titles were
derived. The proceedings were regarded as in the nature of a
proceeding in equity, though the analogy
Page 70 U. S. 677
was not very close, the decision on the claim being in the form
of a decree.
The proceedings under the act of 1851, we think, should be
regarded in the same light -- in the nature of a proceeding in
equity. The form of the decision has always been in conformity
thereto. An appeal is the appropriate mode of bringing the case up
to the appellate court for review, and such has been the uniform
practice under the act.
Upon the whole, our conclusion is that an appeal lies in behalf
of the United States.
[
Footnote 1]
9 Stat. at Large 631.
[
Footnote 2]
2
id. 244.
[
Footnote 3]
13
id. 333.
[
Footnote 4]
1 Stat. at Large 534.
[
Footnote 5]
3
id. 643.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, with whom concurred GRIER and MILLER, JJ.,
dissenting:
Unable to concur in the opinion of a majority of the Court which
has just been read, I will proceed to give the grounds of my
dissent.
The Supreme Court, by the Constitution, takes its appellate
jurisdiction over cases "with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make." And the designation, by
acts of Congress, of the cases to which this jurisdiction shall
extend has uniformly been held to be a legislative declaration that
all other cases are excepted from it. Thus in
Wiscart v.
Dauchy, [
Footnote 2/1] which
was decided as early as 1796, the Court said that if Congress had
not provided any rule to regulate its proceedings on appeal, it
could not exercise an appellate jurisdiction, and if a rule were
provided, the Court could not depart from it. And in
Clarke v.
Bazadone, [
Footnote 2/2] it
was decided that a writ of error did not lie from this Court to the
General Court for the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, because
Congress had not by its legislation authorized such writ. It was
urged on the argument that the judicial power under the
Constitution extended to all cases arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States and to controversies in which the
United States were a party, and that the Supreme Court had
appellate jurisdiction in all these cases, with such exceptions
Page 70 U. S. 678
and under such regulations as Congress might make; that Congress
had made no exception in that case, which was one arising under the
laws of the United States, and no regulation was necessary to give
the Court the appellate power; that it derived that from the
Constitution itself. But the Court adhered to its previous ruling,
although observing at the same time that from the manifest errors
on the face of the record, it felt every disposition to support the
writ.
In
Durousseau v. United States, [
Footnote 2/3] the subject was again considered, and the
Court held that though its appellate powers were given by the
Constitution, they were limited and regulated by the judicial act
and such other acts as had been passed on the subject. "When the
first legislature of the Union," said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in
delivering the opinion of the Court,
"proceeded to carry the third article of the Constitution into
effect, they must be understood as intending to execute the power
they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. They have not, indeed, made these exceptions
in express terms. They have not declared that the appellate power
of the Court shall not extend to certain cases, but they have
described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and its affirmative
description has been understood to imply a negative on the exercise
of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it."
And, in illustration of this principle, reference is made to the
provision of the law which allows a writ of error to a judgment of
the circuit court where the matter in controversy exceeds the value
of two thousand dollars. "There is no express declaration," said
the Chief Justice,
"that it will not lie where the matter in controversy shall be
of less value. But the Court considers this affirmative description
as manifesting the intent of the legislature to except from its
appellate jurisdiction all cases decided in the circuits where the
matter in controversy is of less value, and implies negative words.
"
Page 70 U. S. 679
It follows, therefore, that the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court exists only in those cases in which it is expressly granted.
In conformity with this principle, it has been held that such
jurisdiction does not extend to final judgments in criminal cases,
it not having been conferred by Congress. A question arising in a
criminal case can only be brought before this Court for decision
upon a certificate of a division of opinion between the judges of
the circuit court. [
Footnote 2/4]
So under the Judiciary Act of 1789, jurisdiction to review a
judgment or decree of the circuit court, rendered in an action
brought before it from the district court on writ of error, was
denied, as the act only mentioned judgments and decrees brought
before the circuit court on appeal from the district court.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The Act of July 1, 1864, under which the circuit court acquired
jurisdiction over this case, makes no provision for an appeal from
the decree of the court or for any reexamination of the decree by
the Supreme Court. If an appeal exists, it must be found in the
Amendatory Judicial Act of March 3, 1803, or in the Act of March 3,
1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State of
California.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 only provides for a review upon a
writ of error of the final judgments and decrees of the
circuit court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value
of two thousand dollars. It is the act of 1803 which extends the
appellate power of the court to a review of final judgments and
decrees brought up on appeal when the matter in dispute is of the
like amount or value, and it limits the review to judgments and
decrees rendered in "cases of equity, of admiralty, and maritime
jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize." Subsequent acts of
Congress have reduced the required amount or value of the matter in
dispute in some cases -- as in suits for the protection of
copyrights and patents -- but in none of them is there any change
in the character of the case in which the judgment or decree of
the
Page 70 U. S. 680
circuit court can be reviewed on appeal. Where a review of the
action of the circuit court upon any other matter is intended, it
is authorized by special provision in the act creating the
proceeding.
The question, then, upon the act of 1803 is whether its terms
embrace a proceeding taken for the ascertainment and settlement of
a claim to land derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments.
Such a proceeding is not a suit in admiralty, or course; nor is it
a suit in equity as those terms are there used. By those terms is
meant a regular proceeding in a court of justice for relief on
equitable grounds, in contradistinction to an action at law for the
enforcement of legal rights -- a proceeding which can only be
sustained when plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had
at law. The act mentions the pleadings by which the suit is to be
conducted; it requires a transcript of the bill, answer, and
deposition to be transmitted to the Supreme Court on appeal,
clearly indicating the nature of the proceeding to which it refers.
The proceeding for the confirmation of a California land claim is
of a very different character, is governed by different principles,
and supported by different evidence. It is a proceeding taken under
a statute conferring a peculiar and limited jurisdiction, created
for the purpose of enabling the government to separate private
lands from the public domain and to discharge its political
obligations under the treaty of cession. It is in the nature of an
inquisition of the government, invoked by the petition of the
claimant and governed by the stipulations of the treaty, the law of
nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the former government,
the principles of equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court,
so far as they are applicable. Though the principles of equity are
to constitute one ground of the decision, the proceeding has
nothing in it whatever which will justify its designation as a suit
in equity as those terms are used in the act of 1803.
The heads of the different departments are often required by
acts or resolutions of Congress to settle claims for losses and
liabilities incurred on behalf of the government, or in
Page 70 U. S. 681
the attempted performance of contracts on the principles of
equity. Thus, in the case of De Groot, who asserted claims for
furnishing materials for the Washington aqueduct, the resolution of
Congress directed the Secretary of War to settle the claims "on the
principles of justice and equity." [
Footnote 2/6] Yet no one would pretend that the
proceeding before the secretary was a suit in equity as these terms
are understood in a legal sense. Nor is an application for a patent
or a proceeding for the assessment of damages where private
property is taken for public purposes a suit of that nature. Nor
would such special proceeding lose its distinctive and special
character if by an act of Congress it was made subject to review on
appeal by the district court of the United States. These cases
belong to that class of controversies which are properly the
subjects of administrative regulation, and do not become converted
into suits in equity because judicial agency is brought in to aid
the administrative proceeding. They may be submitted to the entire
disposition of a board of commissioners without the violation of
any principle, just as the California land cases are submitted in
the first instance to such board for investigation.
The Act of March 3, 1851, does not provide for any consideration
by the circuit court of cases of this character. The jurisdiction
over these cases is by that act vested, in the first instance, in a
board of commissioners, and afterwards, on appeal from the decision
of the board, in the district court. From the decrees of the
district court an appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court. The
language of the act is, "that the district court . . . shall, on
application of the party against whom judgment is rendered, grant
an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States."
The Act of July 1, 1864, authorizes a transfer from the district
court to the circuit court of cases of this kind where the district
judge is interested in the land, the claim to which is pending
before him, and also where the case affects the title to lands
within the corporate limits of any
Page 70 U. S. 682
city or town; but it does not confer any right of appeal from
the action of the circuit court in these cases after they are
transferred. It is contended, however, by counsel, that the right
of appeal goes with the transfer of the case.
The argument is that there is no rule for the decision of the
case after it is transferred unless the provisions of the act of
1851 on this point are considered as governing, and that it is not
to be presumed that Congress intended that the right of appeal from
the decision should depend upon the contingency of the district
judge having an interest in the claim, or the fact that some of the
lands involved are situated within the limits of a corporate
city.
The answer to the first head of the argument is found in the
fact that the rules prescribed by the act of 1851 would govern
independent of their statutory enactment. Whether a title alleged
to have been acquired under the former government was in fact thus
acquired and entitled to recognition after a change of sovereignty
by the new government would necessarily depend upon the laws,
customs, and usages of the former government, the laws of nations,
the stipulations of the treaty by which a change of jurisdiction
was effected, and the considerations which should govern a just
nation in treating of the property of its newly acquired subjects,
as explained by the highest tribunal of the country.
And as to the second head of the argument, it may be suggested
that it would be a reasonable position to assume that Congress, in
passing the act in question, understood the meaning of the language
it used, and recognized the difference between the district and
circuit courts of the United States, and when it omitted to provide
any appeal from the decree of the circuit court, it intended that
none should exist. There is no repugnancy between the acts of 1851
and 1864. Reading them together, it would seem to be clear that
Congress intended that when a case was decided by the district
court, an appeal should lie; but when decided by the circuit court,
its decision should be final. There is nothing singular in a
provision of this kind, and if there
Page 70 U. S. 683
were, it is sufficient that such was the will of the
legislature. In matters of survey, which oftentimes determine the
value of the whole claim, the decision of the circuit court is
admitted to be final, made so in express terms by the act. Is there
any more reason for doubting the disposition of Congress to trust
to that court the final settlement of the title than there is to
trust the final settlement of the boundaries of the land when the
title is confirmed?
But it is not necessary to rest this matter upon reasons of this
nature. The absence of a provision allowing an appeal was not an
oversight on the part of Congress. It is evident from the general
language of the act and the object sought to be accomplished by it
that it was the intention of the legislature to give finality to
the action of the circuit court.
The act was designed, as its name purports, to expedite the
settlement of titles to land in the state. Great delays and
embarrassments were found to exist in determining the location and
boundaries of tracts confirmed after the question of title had been
adjudicated. The hearing by the district court of exceptions to
surveys returned by the surveyor general, interposed by parties
possessing or asserting adverse interests, the taking of
depositions, the discussion of counsel, and the modifications or
new surveys sometimes ordered, necessarily occupied the time
usually taken by an ordinary suit at law. Then followed the right
of appeal to the Supreme Court from the action of the district
court, not merely by the original contestants to the proceeding,
but by third parties intervening, whether adjoining proprietors,
purchasers under the original grantee, or persons claiming by
preemption, settlement, or other right under the United States. To
obviate the delays and expense necessarily attending proceedings of
this character, particularly as occasioned by the appeal to the
Supreme Court, and to relieve that tribunal, burdened by a crowded
docket, the act limited its jurisdiction to cases in which appeals
were then pending, and vested jurisdiction in the circuit court
over cases in which appeals might be subsequently taken.
Page 70 U. S. 684
When from the decree of the district court approving or
correcting the survey no appeal had been taken, "no appeal," says
the act,
"to that court shall be allowed, but an appeal may be taken,
within twelve months after this act shall take effect, to the
Circuit Court of the United States for California, and said court
shall proceed to fully determine the matter."
Following these provisions is the section which directs that
when the district judge is interested in any land, the claim to
which, under the act of March 3, 1851, is pending before him on
appeal from the board of commissioners, the case shall be
transferred to the circuit court, "which shall thereupon take
jurisdiction and determine the same." The act then proceeds as
follows:
"The said district courts may also order a transfer to the said
circuit court of any other cases arising under said act, pending
before them, affecting the title to lands within the corporate
limits of any city or town, and in such cases both the district and
circuit judges may sit."
The answer to the last objection will be more obvious if
reference is made to the circumstances under which the act of 1864
was passed, as given in the opinion of the circuit court. These
circumstances are not referred to for the purpose of controlling
the construction of the language of the act, but in answer to
suppositions as to the intention of Congress.
At the passage of the act, there were only two cases pending in
the district courts of California with reference to which the
authority conferred by the clause in question could be exercised --
the case of the City of San Francisco, and the case of the City of
Sonoma, both against the United States. The first case had then
been pending in the district court for over eight years. In the
meantime, the city had extended in all directions, and interests of
vast magnitude had grown up which demanded that the title to the
land upon which the city rested should be in some way speedily and
finally settled. The land commissioners had adjudged that the claim
of the city was valid within certain described
Page 70 U. S. 685
limits. The United States, through their highest legal officer,
had assented to this adjudication, and the principal question on
appeal before the district court was as to the additional quantity
claimed over the quantity confirmed.
The case of the City of Sonoma had been likewise pending in the
district court on appeal for over eight years. In this case, the
United States had, through the attorney-general, signified their
assent to a confirmation of the decree of the board, and the
principal question on appeal here was also as to the additional
quantity claimed by the city.
It was under these circumstances that the law was passed
authorizing a transfer of these cases to the circuit court. If an
appeal from its action had been intended, no beneficial object
would have been accomplished by the transfer, for the same delay
would follow an appeal from the circuit court as would follow an
appeal from the district court. Nor can any reason, in that view,
be assigned for allowing both the district and circuit judges, if
they desired, to sit in the hearing of these cases.
The acts of 1792, 1809, and 1821, which authorize a transfer of
causes from the district court to the circuit court where the
district judge is interested, or has been counsel in the case, or
is disabled from performing the duties of his office, or is related
to either of the parties, have no bearing upon the question under
consideration. They do not confer any right of appeal from the
action of the circuit court after the cases are transferred, or any
right to have such action reviewed on writ of error. Such right,
when it exists, depends upon the acts of 1789 and 1803 -- that is,
upon the nature of the case and the amount or value of the matter
in controversy -- and the latter act, which is the only one
relating to appeals, does not cover, as I have endeavored to show,
a decree in a proceeding for the settlement of a California land
claim, where the right or title is alleged to have been derived
from the Spanish or Mexican governments.
[
Footnote 2/1]
3 Dall. 327 [argument of counsel -- omitted].
[
Footnote 2/2]
5 U. S. 1 Cranch
212.
[
Footnote 2/3]
10 U. S. 6 Cranch
307.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Forsyth v. United
States, 9 How. 571.
[
Footnote 2/5]
United States v.
Goodwin, 7 Cranch 108.
[
Footnote 2/6]
12 Stat. at Large 874.
NOTE
For a short time it seemed possible that the present case might
assume an interest beyond that of the point of law involved. The
decree of the circuit
Page 70 U. S. 686
court from which an appeal was prayed, and which was made May
18, 1865, was one settling the title to a large part of the City of
San Francisco -- how considerable will be seen from the decree
itself, of which the following is the material portion:
"The land of which confirmation is made is a tract situated
within the County of San Francisco, and embracing so much of the
extreme upper portion of the peninsula above ordinary high water
mark (as the same existed at the date of the conquest of the
country, namely, the 7th of July, A.D. 1846), on which the City of
San Francisco is situated, as will contain an area of four square
leagues -- said tract being bounded on the north and east by the
Bay of San Francisco; on the west by the Pacific Ocean; and on the
south by a due east and west line, drawn so as to include the area
aforesaid, subject to the following deductions, namely: such
parcels of land as have been heretofore reserved or dedicated to
public uses by the United States, and also such parcels of land as
have been by grants from lawful authority vested in private
proprietorship and have been finally confirmed to parties claiming
under said grants by the tribunals of the United States or shall
hereafter be finally confirmed to parties claiming thereunder by
said tribunals, in proceedings now pending therein for that
purpose, all of which said excepted parcels of land are included
within the area of four square leagues above mentioned, but are
excluded from the confirmation to the city. This confirmation is in
trust for the benefit of the lot-holders under grants from the
Pueblo, Town, or City of San Francisco or other competent
authority, and as to any residue, in trust for the use and benefit
of the inhabitants of the city."
However, immediately after the expression of the views of the
majority of the judges as given in the preceding case, Congress
passed the following act:
"
An act to quiet the title to certain lands within the
corporate limits of the City of San Francisco"
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled that all
the right and title of the United States to the land situated
within the corporate limits of the City of San Francisco, in the
State of California, confirmed to the City of San Francisco by the
decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern
District of California, entered on the 18th day of May, 1865, be
and the same are hereby relinquished and granted to the said City
of San Francisco and its successors, and the claim of the said city
to said land is hereby confirmed, subject, however, to the
reservations and exceptions designated in said decree, and upon the
following trusts, namely that all the said land not heretofore
granted to said city shall be disposed of and conveyed by said city
to parties in the
bona fide actual possession thereof, by
themselves or tenants, on the passage of this act in such
quantities and upon such terms and conditions as the Legislature of
the State of California may prescribe, except such parcels thereof
as may be reserved and set apart by ordinance of said city for
public uses.
Provided, however, that the relinquishment
and grant by this act shall not interfere with or prejudice any
valid adverse right or claim, if such exist, to said land or any
part thereof, whether derived from Spain, Mexico, or the United
States, or preclude a judicial examination and adjustment
thereof."
"Approved, March 8, 1866."