An appeal in a criminal case does not lie to the Supreme Court
from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.
An affirmative description of the powers of the Supreme Court of
the United States by an act of Congress must be understood as a
regulation under the Constitution prohibiting the exercise of other
powers than those described.
The words "matter in dispute" in the act of Congress respecting
appeals to the Supreme Court seem appropriated to civil cases where
the subject in contest is of a value beyond the sum mentioned in
the act. But in criminal cases, the question is the guilt or
innocence of the accused. And although he may be fined upwards of
$100, yet that is, in the eye of the law, a punishment for the
offense committed, and not the particular object of the suit.
Error to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, sitting
at Washington, upon a judgment in favor of the traverser on a
demurrer to an indictment for taking unlawful fees as a justice of
the peace for the County of Washington.
The indictment was as follows:
"United States, District of Columbia and County of Washington,
to-wit:"
"The jurors for the United States for the District of Columbia
and County of Washington aforesaid, upon their oath present that
Benjamin More, late of the County of Washington, aforesaid,
gentleman, on 10 December, 1802, then being one of the justices of
the peace of the United States for the County of Washington
aforesaid at the County of Washington aforesaid, by color of his
said office, unlawfully and unjustly did demand, extort, receive
and take of and from one Richard Spalding, constable, acting for
and on behalf, of one Joseph Hickman, the sum of twelve cents and a
half cent, lawful current money of the United States, for and as
his fee for executing and doing the duties of his said office,
to-wit, for rendering and giving judgment upon a warrant for a
small debt in a case between the said Joseph Hickman, plaintiff,
and one Joseph Dove, defendant, in contempt of the law, to the
great damage of them, the said Richard Spalding and Joseph Hickman,
and against the peace and government of the United States."
"JOHN T. MASON"
"United States Attorney, for the District of Columbia"
Page 7 U. S. 160
To this indictment there was a general demurrer and joinder, and
judgment in the court below for the traverser at July Term
1803.
Page 7 U. S. 172
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court as
follows:
This is an indictment against the defendant for taking fees
under color of his office, as a justice of the peace in the
District of Columbia.
A doubt has been suggested respecting the jurisdiction of this
Court in appeals on writs of error from the judgments of the
circuit court for that district in criminal cases, and this
question is to be decided before the Court can inquire into the
merits of the case.
In support of the jurisdiction of the Court, the Attorney
General has adverted to the words of the Constitution, from which
he seemed to argue that as criminal jurisdiction was exercised by
the courts of the United States, under the description of, "all
cases in law and equity arising under the laws of the United
States," and as the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, was
extended to all enumerated cases, other than those
Page 7 U. S. 173
which might be brought on originally, "with such exceptions, and
under such regulations, as the Congress shall make," that the
Supreme Court possessed appellate jurisdiction in criminal as well
as civil cases over the judgments of every court whose decisions it
would review unless there should be some exception or regulation
made by Congress which should circumscribe the jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution.
This argument would be unanswerable if the Supreme Court had
been created by law without describing its jurisdiction. The
Constitution would then have been the only standard by which its
powers could be tested, since there would be clearly no
congressional regulation or exception on the subject.
But as the jurisdiction of the Court has been described, it has
been regulated by Congress, and an affirmative description of its
powers must be understood as a regulation, under the Constitution,
prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described.
Thus the appellate jurisdiction of this Court from the judgments
of the circuit courts is described affirmatively. No restrictive
words are used. Yet it has never been supposed that a decision of a
circuit court could be reviewed unless the matter in dispute should
exceed the value of $2,000. There are no words in the act
restraining the Supreme Court from taking cognizance of causes
under that sum; their jurisdiction is only limited by the
legislative declaration that they may reexamine the decisions of
the circuit court where the matter in dispute exceeds the value of
$2,000.
This Court therefore will only review those judgments of the
Circuit Court of Columbia, a power to reexamine which is expressly
given by law.
On examining the act "concerning the District of Columbia," the
Court is of opinion that the appellate jurisdiction granted by that
act is confined to civil cases. The words, "matter in dispute,"
seem appropriated to civil cases, where the subject in contest
has
Page 7 U. S. 174
a value beyond the sum mentioned in the act. But in criminal
cases the question is the guilt or innocence of the accused. And
although he may be fined upwards of $100, yet that is, in the eye
of the law, a punishment for the offense committed, and not the
particular object of the suit.
The writ of error therefore is to be dismissed, this Court
having no jurisdiction of the case.