Courts of equity, acting on their own inherent doctrine of
discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, refuse
to interfere in attempts to establish a stale trust except
where,
1. The trust is
clearly established.
2. The facts have been fraudulently and successfully concealed
by the trustee from the knowledge of the
cestui que
trust.
And in cases for relief, the
cestui que trust should
set forth in his bill specifically what were the impediments to an
earlier prosecution of his claim; how he came to be so long
ignorant of his rights and the means used by the respondent to
fraudulently keep him in ignorance, and how and when he first came
to a knowledge of his rights.
Badger died in 1818, leaving a widow and ten children, one of
whom only was of age at that time; the others being
Page 69 U. S. 88
minors, of different ages. One of them came of age in 1824;
another in 1828; a third in 1831; a fourth in 1834; a fifth in
1835; a sixth in 1837. The eldest son, Daniel Badger, took
administration on the estate in 1819, an uncle being joined with
him; and soon after filed an inventory of the estate, its debts,
and liabilities. In 1820, having settled on administration account,
the administrators obtained leave from the court to sell certain
portions of the real estate. None of these proceedings were the
subject of question.
In 1827, they filed a further account, which had endorsed upon
it what purported to be the written approval of the widow and
heirs, the latter acting by their guardians. By this account, they
claimed credit for several thousand dollars, alleged to have been
advanced for the estate, and in 1830 got leave from court to sell
as much real estate as would pay this balance. Public sale of the
real estate was accordingly made; when it was bought by a friend of
Daniel Badger, the administrator, and soon afterwards conveyed to
him. The widow died in 1855, aged 74.
In 1858,
James Badger, a son and heir, whose age did
not appear, further than from the fact of the father's death in
1819 -- and one of the persons
who by his guardian, now dead,
had approved of the account of 1827 -- filed a bill against
his brother Daniel -- administrator, as aforesaid -- in the Circuit
Court for the Massachusetts District, charging that the account of
1827 was false and fraudulent; that the real estate had been sold
beneath its value, and bought in for his said brother, the
administrator; that before this purchase he had silenced the
objections of some of the heirs who opposed the sale by purchasing
their shares, and had forged, or fraudulently procured the
signature of the widow, his mother, and in this way had obtained
license from the court to sell. The bill alleged, that "the
fraudulent acts and doings of the said Daniel were unknown to the
complainant and his coheirs, until within five years last past,"
and prayed an account &c.
The answer of Daniel Badger, the defendant, denied the
allegations of the bill generally; and, on the last point,
denied
Page 69 U. S. 89
"that the complainant, or any of the said heirs-at-law of said
intestate, did not have personal knowledge of all acts and doings
of said Daniel (the administrator) in reference to the sale and
purchase of these estates until within five years."
There was much testimony from different members of the family;
the charges of the bill being more or less supported by the
evidence of heirs who had sold out what rights they had to James
Badger, the complainant below. Some of the witnesses testified that
Daniel, the defendant, who bore his father's name exactly, had
often declared that, being the oldest son and bearing the paternal
name, he was entitled to
all the property. One of the
witnesses was a daughter, born in 1807.
The court below dismissed the bill as being stale. On appeal,
the question was, whether this was rightly done?
Page 69 U. S. 92
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The numerous cases in the books as to dismissing a chancery bill
because of staleness, would seem to be contradictory if the dicta
of the chancellors are not modified by applying them to the
peculiar facts of the case under consideration. Thus, Lord Erskine,
in an important case once before him, says: " No length of time can
prevent the unkennelling of a fraud." And Lord Northington, in
Alden v. Gregory, [
Footnote 1] with virtuous indignation against fraud,
exclaims:
"The next question is, in effect, whether delay will purge a
fraud? Never -- while I sit here! Every delay adds to its injustice
and multiplies its oppression."
In our own Court, Mr. Justice Story has said: [
Footnote 2]
"It is certainly true that length of time is no bar to a trust
clearly established, and in a cash where fraud is imputed and
proved, length of time ought not, on principles of eternal justice,
to be admitted to repel relief. On the other hand, it would seem
that the length of time during which the fraud has been
successfully concealed and practiced is rather an aggravation of
the offense, and calls more loudly upon a court of equity to give
ample and decisive relief."
Now these principles are, no doubt, correct, but the
qualifications with which they are stated should be carefully
noted:
1st. The trust must be "clearly established."
2d. The facts must have been fraudulently and successfully
Page 69 U. S. 93
concealed by the trustee from the knowledge of the
cestui
que trust.
The case of
Michoud v. Girod, cited by the appellant's
counsel, is an example of the class in which the concealment of the
fraud was the aggravation of the offense. The facts of the case
were "clearly established" by records and other written documents,
and the court were not called on to found their decree on the frail
memory or active imaginations of ancient witnesses, who may not be
able, after a great lapse of time, to distinguish between their
faith and their knowledge, between things seen or heard by
themselves, and those received from family or neighborhood gossip,
or upon that most unsafe of all testimony, conversations and
confessions -- remembered or imagined -- partially stated or wholly
misrepresented. The fraudulent concealment was also clearly
established. The heirs, who lived in Europe, were deceived by the
false representations of the executor, and kept in total ignorance
of the situation and value of the estate, having no other
information on the subject than that communicated to them by him.
The delay was not the consequence of any laches in the heirs, but
was caused by the successful fraud of the executor, and was but an
aggravation of the offense.
But the case before us has none of the peculiar characteristics
of those to which we have referred. For more than twenty-five
years, the widow and heirs have acquiesced in this sale, and it is
more than thirty since the administration account was settled,
which is alleged to have been fraudulent. The guardian of the
complainant, who approved the account, is dead; the widow died in
1855. Two of the heirs were of full age in 1831, and the others
afterwards. This bill was filed in 1858. The bill does not state
the age of complainant. But at the time of filing his bill, he must
have been over forty years of age.
The whole transaction was public, and well known to the widow
and the heirs, and their guardians. The purchase of the estate by
the administrator could have been avoided at once, if any party
interested disapproved of it. There was not and could not be any
concealment of the facts of the
Page 69 U. S. 94
case. The complainant claims as assignee of his elder brothers
and sisters, and uses them as witnesses to prove the alleged fraud
after a silence of over thirty years. They attempt to prove the
signature of their mother to the documents on file in the court to
be forged, and this after the death of the mother, who lived for
twenty-eight years after the transaction without complaint or
allegation either that her signature was fraudulently obtained or
forged. A daughter, who was twenty-three years of age when this
sale was made, and had full knowledge of the whole transaction,
after near thirty years' silence, now comes forward to prove that
her concurrence and assent was obtained by fraud; and now, after
the death of the guardian and the mother, who could have explained
the whole transaction, the aid of a court of chancery is demanded
to destroy a title obtained by judicial sale, after the parties
complaining, with full knowledge of their rights, have slept upon
them for over a quarter of a century.
Now, the principles upon which courts of equity act in such
cases, are established by cases and authorities too numerous for
reference. The following abstract, quoted in the words used in
various decisions, will suffice for the purposes of this
decision:
"Courts of equity, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, consider
themselves bound by the statutes of limitation which govern courts
of law in like cases, and this rather in obedience to the statutes
than by analogy."
"In many other cases they act upon the analogy of the like
limitation at law. But there is a defense peculiar to courts of
equity founded on lapse of time and the staleness of the claim,
where no statute of limitation governs the case. In such cases,
courts of equity act upon their own inherent doctrine of
discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, refuse
to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting the
claim, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights.
Long acquiescence and laches by parties out of possession are
productive of much hardship and injustice to others, and cannot be
excused but by showing some actual hindrance
Page 69 U. S. 95
or impediment, caused by the fraud or concealment of the parties
in possession, which will appeal to the conscience of the
chancellor."
"The party who makes such appeal should set forth in his bill
specifically what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of
his claim; how he came to be so long ignorant of his rights, and
the means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in
ignorance; and how and when he first came to a knowledge of the
matters alleged in his bill; otherwise the chancellor may justly
refuse to consider his case, on his own showing, without inquiring
whether there is a demurrer or formal plea of the statute of
limitations contained in the answer."
The bill, in this case, is entirely defective in all these
respects. It is true there is a general allegation, that the
"fraudulent acts were unknown to complainant till within five years
past," while the statement of his case shows clearly that he must
have known, or could have known, if he had chosen to inquire at any
time in the last thirty years of his life, every fact alleged in
his bill. That his mother was entitled to dower in the land if the
sale was set aside, was no impediment to his pursuit of his rights,
while her death may have removed the only witness who was able to
prove that his complaint of fraud was unfounded, and that it was by
the consent and desire of the family that the property was kept in
the family name by the only one who was able to advance the money
to pay the debts of the deceased -- a fact fairly to be presumed
from her silence and acquiescence for twenty-four years.
The court below very properly dismissed this bill, and refused
to examine into accounts settled by the courts with the knowledge
of all parties concerned, and commencing forty years and ending
thirty years ago, and to grope after the truth of facts involved in
the mists and obscurity consequent on such a lapse of time.
If a further reason were required for affirming this decree, it
might be found in the statute of Massachusetts, declaring that
actions for land sold by executors, administrators, or guardians,
cannot be maintained by any heir or person
Page 69 U. S. 96
claiming under the deceased or intestate, unless the same be
commenced within five years next after the sale. But we prefer to
affirm the decree for the reasons given, without passing any
opinion on the effect of this statute.
Decree affirmed with costs.
[
Footnote 1]
2 Eden 285.
[
Footnote 2]
Prevost v.
Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481.
