1. The established rule, that where a matter has been once heard
and determined in one court (as of law), it cannot be raised anew
and reheard in another (as of equity), is not confined to cases
where the matter is made patent in the pleadings themselves. Where
the form of issue in the trial, relied on as estoppel, is so vague
(as it may be in an action of ejectment), that it does not show
precisely what questions were before
Page 69 U. S. 36
the jury and were necessarily determined by it, parol proof may
be given to show them.
2. The reasons which rendered inconclusive one trial in
ejectment have force when the action is brought in the fictitious
form practiced in England and known partially among ourselves, but
they apply imperfectly, and have little weight, when the action is
brought in the form now usual in the United States, and where
parties sue and are sued in their own names, and the position and
limits of the land claimed are described. They have no force at all
in Missouri, where the modern form is prescribed, and where, by
statute, one judgment is it bar.
3. A state statute, enacting that a judgment in ejectment --
provided the action be brought in a form which gives precision to
the parties and land claimed -- shall be a bar to any other action
between the same parties on the same subject matter, is a rule of
property as well as of practice, and being conclusive on title in
the courts of the state, is conclusive also in those of the
Union.
Miles brought ejectment against Caldwell in the Circuit Court of
Missouri; the action being brought, not in the fictitious form,
still sometimes used in the United States, but in the form now more
frequent with us, in which the parties actually suing appear in
their proper names, as Thomas Miles against William Caldwell, and
where the land claimed is described as by metes or bounds, or by
both, the action being entitled, in Missouri, "trespass in
ejectment." Both parties in the present suit claimed under one Ely,
who, in 1837, and prior to that time, was owner of the land,
Caldwell claiming under a mortgage made by Ely to Gallagher in that
year and a subsequent release by Ely, [
Footnote 1] Miles under a mortgage of 1838 by Ely to
Carswell and McClellan and a foreclosure and sale founded on it.
The defendant, Caldwell, in that ejectment, contended that his own
title, under the mortgage to Gallagher, was good, and that the
title of Miles, under the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan, was
bad as having been made in fraud of creditors. Miles, the
Page 69 U. S. 37
plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the mortgage to
Gallagher had been satisfied, and that his own mortgage was not
fraudulent, but given for a valid debt. Both these points -- that
is to say, the point whether Gallagher's mortgage had or had not
been paid and whether that of Carswell and McClellan was fraudulent
or was good -- were submitted to the jury, who, on instructions
from the court, passed upon them, finding a verdict for the
plaintiff, Miles. Indeed, as to the question of fraud, there was an
express agreement, now before this Court, that the mortgage to
Carswell and McClellan was, in the action of ejectment, impeached
for fraud, and the record of that suit also established the fact
that the question whether the mortgage to Gallagher had been paid
off in full was submitted to them. But neither of these points were
points
put in issue by the pleadings themselves, nor
indeed was it practicable so to put them in issue in the action --
that of ejectment.
In this state of the facts, Caldwell, wishing, as he
represented, to have his title "quieted," filed his bill on the
equity side of the court, where the judgment at law had been
obtained, to enjoin execution on the judgment and to prevent Miles'
taking possession of the land.
The grounds of the complainant's application were these:
1. That his title was good and valid, founded on the senior
mortgage, and, being the true legal title, should prevail.
2. That the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan was fraudulent
because made for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors,
and that a court of equity should decree it to be void and prevent
its being used to the injury of complainant.
3. That he had made valuable improvements, in good faith, on the
land, supposing it to be his own, for which he was entitled to
compensation before it was taken from him.
It is necessary here to say that in Missouri, one of the Revised
Statutes enacts that in ejectment, as in other actions authorized
by it, a judgment, except one of nonsuit, "shall be a bar to any
other action between the same parties, or those claiming under
them, as to the same subject matter."
Page 69 U. S. 38
The court below granted the injunction, and an appeal came
here.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. The complainant's first proposition -- that his title is
good, founded on the prior mortgage, and, being the true legal
title, should prevail -- contains no element as it is stated, or in
the facts which go to make up his title, that calls into action the
powers of a court of chancery. If under the proceedings which took
place in regard to the mortgage of Gallagher, [
Footnote 2] the complainant acquired the legal
title to the real estate in question, a court of law would notice
that title, and is as much bound to respect it as a court of
equity. If he did not really obtain the legal title, but having the
possession, was entitled to be treated as a mortgagee in
possession, a court of law is bound to protect him in that
possession against any title not paramount to the mortgage under
which he held.
Page 69 U. S. 39
We cannot perceive that there is any circumstance connected with
the title of complainant which brings his case within the
jurisdiction of a court of equity. Although it is true that in the
practice of the English courts, and in those states of the Union
where the fictitious action of ejectment is still in use, chancery
will interfere where there have been repeated verdicts in favor of
the same title to prevent further litigation, it is not true that
chancery will interpose in favor of the unsuccessful party in the
first trial upon the sole ground that he has the legal title, and
therefore ought to have succeeded in the action at law. It would be
a novelty that a court of chancery, which in proper cases quiets a
title which has been
established by several verdicts and
judgments at law, should reverse its course of action to quiet a
title strictly legal, with no impediment to its assertion in a
court of law, where it had been
defeated in the only
action in which it had been thus set up.
2. The second proposition, in respect of which complainant asks
relief -- that the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan is
fraudulent, made to hinder creditors &c. -- is one of the
common grounds of equity jurisdiction. To relieve against fraud,
and to set aside and cancel fraudulent conveyances, are among the
ordinary duties of courts of chancery. Courts of law, however, have
concurrent jurisdiction of questions of fraud, when properly
raised; and although they cannot cancel or set aside fraudulent
instruments of writing, yet when they are produced in evidence by a
party claiming any right under them, their fraudulent character
may, under proper circumstances, be shown, and their validity in
the particular case contested.
It is a general rule, growing out of the concurrent jurisdiction
of the courts of law and chancery over this subject, as well as a
variety of others, founded also upon the principle that it is the
interest of the public, that there should be some end to
litigation, that when a matter has once been heard and determined
in one court, it shall not be subject to reexamination in another
court between the same parties. The defendant in this suit invokes
the benefit of this rule as
Page 69 U. S. 40
regards the question of fraud in the mortgage from Ely to
Carswell and McClellan, and also as to the fact charged by him that
the Gallagher mortgage had been fully satisfied, and was no longer
of any force, alleging that both questions were submitted to the
jury and decided against complainant in the action of ejectment,
the judgment in which is now sought to be enjoined. Of the fact of
such submission and finding there can, in this case, be no doubt.
Under the instructions of the court, which are in proof in this
record, if the jury found either of these issues in favor of
Caldwell, the plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict. The
plaintiff, however, did get a verdict. It thus appears conclusively
that the jury found that there was no fraud in the second mortgage
and that the first had been satisfied.
The complainant, however, seeks to evade the force of the
general principle on the ground that the verdict and judgment in
actions of ejectment have not that conclusive effect between the
parties which they have in other actions, either in courts of law
or equity. It must be conceded that such is the general doctrine on
the subject as applicable to cases tried under the common law form
of the action of ejectment.
One reason why the verdict cannot be made conclusive in those
cases is obviously due to the fictitious character of the action.
If a question is tried and determined between John Doe, plaintiff,
and A. B., who comes in and is substituted defendant in place of
Richard Roe, the casual ejector, it is plain that A. B. cannot
plead the verdict and judgment in bar of another suit brought by
John Den against Richard Fen, though the demise may be laid from
the same lessor, for there is no privity between John Doe and John
Den. Hence, technically, an estoppel could not be successfully
pleaded so long as a new fictitious plaintiff could be used. It was
this difficulty of enforcing at law the estoppel of former verdicts
and judgments in ejectment that induced courts of equity (which,
unrestrained by the technicality, could look past the nominal
parties to the real ones) to interfere after a sufficient number of
trials had taken place to determine fairly the validity of the
title, and by injunction
Page 69 U. S. 41
directed to the unsuccessful litigant compel him to cease from
harassing his opponent by useless litigation.
There was perhaps another reason why the English common law
refused to concede to the action of ejectment, which is a personal
action, that conclusive effect which it gave to all other actions,
namely, the peculiar respect, almost sanctity, which the feudal
system attached to the tenure by which real estate was held. So
peculiarly sacred was the title to land with our ancestors, that
they were not willing that the claim to it should, like all other
claims, be settled forever by one trial in an ordinary personal
action, but permitted the unsuccessful party to have other
opportunity of establishing his title. They, however, did concede
to those solemn actions, the writ of right and the writ of assize,
the same force as estoppels, which they did to personal actions in
other cases.
The first of the above reasons, for the inconclusiveness of the
action of ejectment, does not exist in the case before us. That is
not the old fictitious action, but is a suit by Thomas Miles
against William Caldwell, in which the former complains of the
latter "in a plea of trespass and ejectment," and sues for the
possession of the land and for damages for its detention. If
Caldwell should sue Miles to regain possession after the latter had
obtained it under his judgment, there exists no technical reason to
prevent Miles from pleading the former judgment, and alleging that
it involved the same subject matter as that for which the second
suit was brought.
How far the peculiar sanctity attaching to titles to real estate
is still a reason, if it were ever one, for taking judgments in
ejectment out of the general rule of conclusiveness, we will
consider hereafter. At present we proceed to inquire into a
qualification of the rule which is alleged to apply in all cases
where the action relied on as an estoppel was in tort -- namely
that nothing will be held as concluded by the verdict which was not
put directly in issue by the pleadings. If this principle is a
sound one, the plea in this case being the general issue of not
guilty, no parol proof can
Page 69 U. S. 42
be received to show what questions of fact were submitted to the
jury under that issue. The case of
Standish v. Parker,
[
Footnote 3] would seem to
countenance this doctrine. But after a careful examination of the
authorities, we do not think that the rule is sustained, nor do we
believe it to be founded on sound principle. No reason is perceived
why parol proof should be admitted to show what facts were proved
or were put in issue under the general issue in assumpsit that
would not be equally applicable to the same issue in trespass. Yet
it is quite clear from numerous authorities that the facts put in
issue in assumpsit may be shown in another action by parol.
[
Footnote 4] The case of
Outram v. Moorewood is a leading case on the subject. It
is there decided that the action of trespass is conclusive on all
questions put expressly in issue by the pleadings. But there is
nothing in the opinion touching the introduction of parol proof,
for the pleas in that case rendered it unnecessary, the facts in
dispute having been set forth in a special plea. In
Kitchen v.
Campbell, [
Footnote 5] the
former action was trover for the conversion of goods, and the same
plaintiff having afterwards sued in assumpsit for their value, his
defeat in the former suit was held to be a bar to his recovery in
the second action. Although it is not stated in the case what was
the plea in the action of trover, there is no reason to suppose
that it was other than not guilty; nor does it seem that any
importance was attached to the form of the plea. In
Burt v.
Sternburgh, [
Footnote 6]
--an action of trespass
quare clausum fregit -- the
plaintiff was allowed to introduce the record of a former recovery
between the same parties in an action of trespass, and then to
prove by parol that the
locus in quo was the same, and
that the title relied on by defendant in the action then on trial,
was the same title which had been set up and defeated in the first
action. In
Doty v. Brown, [
Footnote 7] the action was replevin for oats, hay &c.
The case
Page 69 U. S. 43
turned on the validity of a bill of sale, which was alleged to
be fraudulent and void as to creditors. The defendant relied on a
judgment of a justice of the peace in a former suit, between the
same parties, for the conversion of a part of the goods covered by
the same bill of sale. The justice was allowed to testify that he
had rendered his judgment in favor of defendant on the ground that
the bill of sale was fraudulent as to creditors, and this was held
conclusive in the Court of Appeals of New York.
We are of opinion that the prevailing doctrine of the courts at
present is that whenever the form of the issue in the trial relied
on as an estoppel is so vague that it does not determine what
questions of fact were submitted to the jury under it, it is
competent to prove by parol testimony what question or questions of
fact were before the jury and were necessarily passed on by them.
In the case under consideration, the record leaves no doubt on that
subject.
Reverting now to the question of policy, grounded on the
supposed sanctity of land titles as affecting the conclusiveness of
judgments in trespass or ejectment, we remark that it is the
settled doctrine of this Court in reference to all questions
affecting the title to real estate to permit the different states
of the Union to settle them each for itself, and when the point
involved is one which becomes a rule of property, we follow the
decisions of the state courts, whether founded on the statutes of
the states or their views of general policy.
As regards the particular question before us, there is a great
difference in the different states in the value attached to real
estate, and to the title by which it is held, as compared with
other species of property. But no doubt is entertained that in all
of them, the feeling is far removed from that which formerly
prevailed in England or which prevails there even now. While some
of our older states still uphold many of the safeguards of the
common law, with its complicated system of conveyancing, operating
as a strong drag upon the facility and frequency of transfers of
real property, our Western people traffic in land as they do in
horses
Page 69 U. S. 44
or merchandise, and sell a quarter-section of land as readily
and as easily as they do a mule or a wagon. The laws of the people
correspond with their habits. Deeds of conveyance are, by statute,
rendered exceedingly simple and effectual, the main safeguard being
a well digested system of registration. In consonance with this
general facility of traffic, it is their policy to prevent those
endless litigations concerning titles to lands, which in other
countries are transmitted from one generation to another. The rapid
settlement of a new country requires that a title once fairly
determined shall not be again disturbed as between the same
parties.
The Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1855, [
Footnote 8] concerning the action of ejectment,
say:
"A judgment, except of nonsuit, in an action authorized by this
act shall be a bar to any other action between the same parties or
those claiming under them as to the same subject matter."
We hold this enactment to be binding on the federal courts as
well as those of the state. It is a rule of property. It concerns
the stability of titles to land, and it would be highly improper to
adopt in the federal courts a rule tending to increase litigation
and unsettle those titles which is in conflict with the one
prescribed by the lawmaking power of the state. It is a matter
which involves something more than a mere rule of practice. It is a
question whether a matter which is conclusive of the title to land
in the state courts shall have the same effect in the federal
courts. It is our opinion that it should.
3. As regards the claim for improvements made in good faith by
complainant, the matter is not alluded to by his counsel in this
Court at all. It is barely mentioned by the counsel for appellant,
and no importance seems to have been attached to it either here or
in the court below. Such a right must depend wholly upon the
statutes of Missouri, and none is cited to us. We are unwilling to
enter upon an investigation of the law and the facts both under
such circumstances. Besides, without deciding the point, we may
Page 69 U. S. 45
remark that upon an examination of the statute of Missouri on
that subject, and looking to the policy which dictated it, it does
not seem probable that it was intended to give this kind of relief
to an unsuccessful defendant in ejectment, while he was still
contesting the title of the plaintiff. As to this point, we incline
to rule that the bill shall be dismissed without prejudice.
GRIER, J., expressed his concurrence, adding as another reason
why the bill should have been dismissed that even if the mortgage
given to Carswell and McClellan had been fraudulent -- which his
Honor, after examining the testimony, said it was not -- the
complainant, who was not a creditor, had no equity to found his
bill.
Decree reversed with costs; case remanded to the court below
with directions that there the bill be dismissed with costs, the
dismissal, however, to be without prejudice to any remedy of the
complainant for compensation for improvements on the land made in
good faith.
[
Footnote 1]
The mortgage to
Gallagher was never foreclosed. The
mortgagee had obtained a judgment against Ely on a note which the
mortgage was given to secure, and under an execution issued on that
judgment the land was sold, and by several mesne conveyances the
complainant became invested with such title or claim as that sale
could confer. Having some doubts of the validity under the laws of
Missouri of this title, Caldwell procured from Ely, the mortgagor,
the release above mentioned.
[
Footnote 2]
See supra, p. 36,
note
[
Footnote 3]
2 Pickering 20.
[
Footnote 4]
Washington Steam Packing Co.
v. Sickles, 24 How. 333.
[
Footnote 5]
3 Wilson 304.
[
Footnote 6]
4 Cowen 559.
[
Footnote 7]
4 Comstock 71.
[
Footnote 8]
Page 695, ch. 58, ยง 33.