A state legislature may constitutionally pass a private act
authorizing a court to decree, on the petition of an administrator,
private sale of the real estate of an intestate to pay his debts,
even though the act should not require notice to heirs or to
anyone, and although the same general subject is regulated by
general statute much more full and provident in its nature.
In making the order of sale under such private act, the court is
presumed to have adjudged every question necessary to justify such
order or decree,
viz., the death of the owners; that the
petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was
insufficient to pay the debts of deceased; that the private acts of
assembly, as to the manner of sale, were within the constitutional
power of the legislature, and that all the previsions of the law as
to notices which are directory to the administrators have been
complied with.
A general statute of Illinois, passed at an early day, enacted
that, when any administrator whose intestate had died leaving real
estate, should discover that the personal estate was insufficient
to pay his debts, such administrator should make and deliver to the
circuit Court of the county, an account of the debts and personal
estate of such his intestate,
Page 69 U. S. 211
with a petition requesting aid of said court by its order of
sale of a part of the real property.
The act was full, minute, and stringent in its requirements of
notice to the heirs of the intestate, with "a copy of the account
and petition." It directed "due examination" by the court of all
objections made by anyone, and that sale of so much of the realty
as would pay the debts should, from time to time, be ordered, or
the whole, if requisite, only in case the court should find that
the personalty was insufficient to do so. But the act directed that
no sale not a public one, made in open hours of day, and upon full
public notice, and with a description, to "common certainty," of
the land, should be made at all.
With this
general statute in existence and force, the
Legislature of Illinois passed, in 1821, a private act, reciting
that Beck and O'Harra, administrators of Aron Crane, had, by
petition to it, set forth that the said Crane, late of Missouri,
had died intestate, not leaving sufficient personal estate to pay
his debts, but leaving real estate; and enacting that the said Beck
and O'Harra should have power to sell such part of his real estate
as they might at any time be ordered to do by the proper court, for
the payment of his debts; and that such sales "may be made at
private sale instead of public sale," notwithstanding the
above recited general act. It was provided, however, that before
any sale was completed, it should be reported to one of the judges
of the court allowing it, and be approved by him.
The administrators accordingly made a petition to the state
circuit court. Neither the petition, however, nor any other
proceeding except the record
of court, now appeared. This
record recited a petition setting forth that the personal estate
was not sufficient to pay debts, and praying an order to sell
certain parts of the real estate, for the purpose of paying them,
agreeably to the private act of legislature already referred to,
and concluding with an order that the administrators should sell an
item described.
But there was no mention whatever in the
record, that any notice had been given to heirs or to anybody, or
that the estate was in any way indebted.
Ten days after order made, the administrators sold the property,
and their sale was reported by them to one of the judges of the
court, which allowed it, and by him was approved. This was in A.D.
1823.
Ejectment for the land thus sold was now brought, A.D. 1857, in
the federal court for the Northern Circuit of Illinois, by
Florentine, who had purchased, in 1856, from the heirs of Crane,
against Barton, claiming under the vendee of the administrators.
Judgment was given for the defendant, which was the error
assigned.
Page 69 U. S. 215
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The land in dispute, in this case, was sold by order of a court
some forty years ago, to pay the debts of its deceased owner. The
heirs seem to have acquiesced in the regularity and justice of this
proceeding till the plaintiff in error, a few years ago, obtained
from them a release of their title, doubtless for the purpose of
this litigation.
By the law of Illinois, the lands of one deceased are liable for
the payment of his debts. The circuit court of the county in which
the administration is granted has jurisdiction
Page 69 U. S. 216
to order their sale for that purpose. The petition of the
administrator, setting forth that the personal property of the
deceased is insufficient to pay such debts, and praying the court
for an order of sale, brought the case fully within the
jurisdiction of the court. It became a case of judicial cognizance,
and the proceedings are judicial. The court has power over the
subject matter and the parties. It is true, in such proceedings,
there are no adversary parties, because the proceeding is in the
nature of a proceeding
in rem, in which the estate is
represented by the administrators, and, as in a proceeding
in
rem in admiralty, all the world are parties. In making the
order of sale, the court are presumed to have adjudged every
question necessary to justify such order or decree,
viz.,
the death of the owner; that the petitioners were his
administrators; that the personal estate was insufficient to pay
the debts of the deceased; that the private act of Assembly, as to
the manner of sale, was within the constitutional power of the
legislature; and that all the provisions of the law, as to notices
which are directory to the administrators, have been complied
with.
"The court having a right to decide every question which occurs
in a cause, whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its
judgment, until reversed, is binding on every other court."
The purchaser, under such a sale, is not bound to look further
back than the order of the court, or to inquire as to its mistakes.
The court is not bound to enter on record the evidence on which any
fact was decided. The proceedings on which the action of the court
is grounded, are usually kept on separate papers, which are often
mislaid or lost. A different doctrine would (especially after a
lapse of over thirty years) render titles under a judicial sale
worthless, and a "mere trap for the unwary." These propositions
will be found discussed at length and fully decided by us in
Grignon's Lessee v. Astor. [
Footnote 1] Any further argument in vindication of them
would be superfluous.
The question raised as to the constitutional power of the
Page 69 U. S. 217
Legislature of Illinois to pass the private acts modifying the
general course of proceedings in similar cases, was necessarily
decided by the circuit court of the state, under whose order and
supervision this sale was made. The state court is the proper
tribunal to construe and determine the validity of the enactments
of their own legislature.
But assuming the question to be open for our decision, we see no
reason to doubt the authority of the legislature to pass such acts
as are now complained of, without infringing the Constitution of
the state or of the United States. Such legislation is remedial,
not judicial. It infringes no contract; it is not
ex post
facto, nor even retrospective; it is not the usurpation of
judicial powers; it authorizes the administrators to sell at
private sale, and not at public auction, as by the general law, but
not till ordered by the proper court. Every question of a judicial
nature was left to the judgment of the court.
It must
order the sale, and approve it when made. There may have been many
reasons why it would be for the benefit of the estate and the
creditors that the land should be sold at private and not at public
sale. The legislature, by this private act, direct only the manner
of sale; the courts are to judge of its necessity. Statutes are to
be found in almost every state in the Union giving authority to
guardians to sell the real estate of their wards, and usually
requiring the supervision and approbation of a court. The power of
the legislature to grant such special authority to guardians has
been generally admitted. In a case in Illinois, [
Footnote 2] it is said by their supreme court
that, "to deny this power to the legislature in this view of its
action, would almost annihilate its powers." Yet there was an
assumption of power in that case far exceeding anything to be found
in the present.
Let the judgment of the circuit court be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
43 U. S. 2 How.
319.
[
Footnote 2]
Mason v. Wait, 4 Scammon 134.
