A bidder at a marshal's sale made on foreclosure of a mortgage
in a federal court below may, by his bid, though no party to the
suit originally, so far be made a party to the proceedings in that
court as to be entitled to an appeal here. Whether or not, this
Court will not dismiss an appeal by such person on mere motion of
the other side, the decision involving the merits of the case, and
such an examination of the whole record as can only be made on full
hearing.
A decree foreclosing a mortgage and ordering a sale of the road
had been obtained in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Wisconsin in a suit by one
Bishop and
others against
The Milwaukee & Chicago Railroad
Company, and the road being offered for sale by the marshal,
under the decree, Blossom, the appellant in
this case,
made a bid for the property. The sale was suspended at this point
and never actually proceeded further. Blossom then went into the
district court and by petition prayed to have the sale completed
and confirmed. His application was, however, refused. From this
order of refusal he took an appeal -- the present suit. A motion
was now made to dismiss this appeal, the grounds of the motion
being these:
1. That the appellant was not a party to the suit in the
district court, and was therefore not entitled to prosecute an
appeal.
2. That his right had accrued in the mere
process of
executing the final decree, and that accordingly no appeal lay.
3. That the refusal of the district court to confirm or complete
the sale was a matter within its discretion, and therefore not the
subject of review here.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. Is the appellant so far a party to the original suit that he
can appeal?
It is certainly true that he cannot appeal from the original
decree of foreclosure, nor from any other order or decree of the
court made prior to his bid. It however seems to be well settled
that after a decree adjudicating certain rights
Page 68 U. S. 656
between the parties to a suit, other persons having no previous
interest in the litigation may become connected with the case, in
the course of the subsequent proceedings, in such a manner as to
subject them to the jurisdiction of the court and render them
liable to its orders, and that they may in like manner acquire
rights in regard to the subject matter of the litigation which the
court is bound to protect. Sureties, signing appeal bonds, stay
bonds, delivery bonds, and receipters under writs of attachment,
become
quasi-parties to the proceedings, and subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court so that summary
judgments may be rendered on their bonds or recognizances. So in
the case of a creditor's bill or other suit by which a fund is to
be distributed to parties, some of whom are not before the court;
these are at liberty to come before the master after the decree and
establish their claims to share in the distribution.
A purchaser or bidder at a master's sale in chancery subjects
himself
quoad hoc to the jurisdiction of the court, and
can be compelled to perform his agreement specifically. It would
seem that he must acquire a corresponding right to appear and
claim, at the hands of the court, such relief as the rules of
equity proceedings entitle him to.
In
Delaplaine v. Lawrence, [
Footnote 1] Chancellor Walworth says that
"In sales made by masters under decrees and orders of this
Court, the purchasers who have bid off the property and paid their
deposits in good faith are considered as having inchoate rights
which entitle them to a hearing upon the question whether the sales
shall be set aside. And if the court errs by setting aside the sale
improperly, they have the right to carry the question by appeal to
a higher tribunal."
This principle, to which we see no objection, seems to decide
the point before us in regard to parties to the suit.
2. The next ground assumed is that the right of appellant having
accrued in the mere process of executing the final decree of the
court, no appeal lies in such case.
Page 68 U. S. 657
Although this Court has frequently decided that where the act
complained of was a mere ministerial duty necessarily growing out
of the decree which was being carried into effect, no appeal would
lie, it has never decided that in
no case arising after a
decree, which is final only in the sense which would allow it to be
appealed, will an appeal be allowed from an order of the court,
however it might affect important interests or decide matters not
before the court when the first decree was rendered. Such a
doctrine would place a very large proportion of the most important
matters adjudged by courts of chancery beyond the reach of an
appeal. On the contrary, this Court has repeatedly considered
appeals from the decrees of the circuit courts upon matters arising
after the case had been here, and the courts below had entered
decrees in accordance with the directions of this Court. At the
present term, in the case of
A. R. Orchard v. John Hughes,
the Court refused to dismiss an appeal from an order confirming a
sale under a decree of foreclosure and directed that the case
should be heard with the appeal from the principal decree in the
suit which ordered the sale. [
Footnote 2]
3. It is said that the act of the court in refusing to confirm
or complete the sale was entirely within its discretion, and
therefore cannot be reviewed here.
The case of
Delaplaine v. Lawrence, just cited, seems
to imply a different doctrine. However this may appear on
investigation, we think that its decision involves the merits of
the case before us, and requires such an examination of the whole
record as can only be made fairly on a full hearing. We are not
disposed to deprive the appellant of this by dismissing his appeal
on motion.
Motion overruled.
[
Footnote 1]
10 Paige 602;
see also Calvert on Parties to Suits in
Equity; side pages 51, 58; note page 61.
[
Footnote 2]
This was a motion, and was heard before the present reporter was
appointed to office. These facts account for there being no report
of the matter in this volume.
