A question of fact, to-wit, of the location of survey in a
previously confirmed Mexican grant, prior to the examination and
decision of which, the court sets forth the difficulties which
attend any satisfactory determination of this class of California
cases.
This was a case of conflicting land claims in California, and
came here on appeal from a decree of the District Court for the
Northern District of California, locating, by survey, under the Act
of Congress of June 14, 1860, a previously confirmed Mexican grant.
The case, to understand which even imperfectly the reader must
refer to a map opposite, was essentially thus:
In 1833, Mexico granted to Gonzales the tract marked A, whose
southern boundary was the Creek or Arroyo de Butano. In
1838, the same government, Alvarado being then governor, made a
provisional concession to Ramona Sanchez for a league square,
describing the tract as "known by the name of "Butano," which
tract, in 1848, Governor Micheltorena granted to her, reciting his
deed to be the ratification of the provisional title given to her,
from the year 1838, to the tract of land granted her,
called
Buttano, bordering on the rancho of the heirs of the deceased
Simeon Castro, on the
Serrania (or ridge of
mountains) and
the sea." Sanchez had solicited the land in
1837, asking for a league in length and
half a league in
breadth. In 1842, between the dates last above named, the
government granted a tract also to the Simeon Castro just above
named. It is described as "bordering to the east on the Sierra, to
the west on the sea, on
the north on the rancho of Don Juan
Gonzales, and to the south on that of Don Ylaria Buelna."
Reference was made, on the grant of each tract, to the disenos or
maps annexed to the original petitions, but these maps, like most
of the disenos attached to Mexican espedientes, were very rough
sketches, and in the present case were of imperfect value, except,
perhaps, as indicating, to a greater or less degree, that the grant
to Sanchez was between two "arroyos," or streams, which might be
held to correspond with the streams known on better maps as the
Arroyo
image:a
Page 68 U. S. 583
or Creek Butano, and the Arroyo or Creek de los Frijoles.
Undoubtedly upon a tract of about half a league, marked No. 1,
between those two streams, and bordering on the sea, Sanchez had
settled and resided from 1837. Still, a reference to the map will
show that if Castro's north boundary was that called for by his
grant, to-wit, "the rancho of Don Juan Gonzales," then there was no
place for Sanchez upon the Butano Creek (from which stream her
tract obviously derived its name), in any such way as to border "on
the rancho of the heirs of the deceased Don Simeon Castro, on the
Serrania, and on the sea." The whole tract up to that creek
belonged to Castro, and it had in fact been confirmed, surveyed,
and patented to him, though neither Sanchez nor Rodrigues were
parties to any of the proceedings, and these were had prior to the
14th June, 1860, when Congress passed an act authorizing anybody to
call into court and to contest any survey afterwards to be made.
[
Footnote 1] The difficulty
therefore was to bring Castro's tract
up north, so as to
"border on the north on the rancho of Don Juan Gonzales," itself
bounded on the
south by the Butano Creek, and at the same
time give to Sanchez, or rather to Rodrigues, who had succeeded to
her rights, a league between the Butano and the tract of Castro.
The thing was plainly impossible. However, to give him a league
somewhere, and at the same time to leave Castro in enjoyment of all
that he claimed and up to the Butano, Rodrigues' tract was located
as indicated by the plot No. 2 -- that is to say, was made a long,
narrow tract, north of the Butano and east of Gonzales. This tract
was upon the Butano, in part; and it was "bordering on the rancho
of the heirs of the deceased Don Simeon Castro, on the Serrania,"
both in part. But the sea; where was
it? It touched the
tract nowhere, and the tract was not the one which Ramona Sanchez
had settled on and occupied, whose general locality is indicated by
the plot No. 1. [
Footnote 2]
This location, No. 2, was set aside. Rodrigues was next located on
the old tract of Sanchez again, it being now assumed that some
error had
Page 68 U. S. 584
taken place in giving Castro's north boundary, and that while
this boundary was really a creek, that creek was not the Butano,
but another one, to-wit, the Frijoles, south of it. It was among
the facts of the case that the land granted to Castro had been
originally two tracts, with different names, and that for the north
one a concession had issued to a certain Bernal, who surrendered
his rights to Castro, by whom a final grant for both under one name
was obtained. The original papers, moreover, gave some indications,
which, compared by modern surveys of the Pacific coast, tended to
show that the tract did not go
up to the Butano, and that
the northern boundary of one of the tracts was the Frijoles. But
everything was more or less obscure. The representatives of Castro
had excepted to this location of Rodrigues on No. 1, contending
that all up to the Butano was theirs, and that no one else should
be put upon it. Superadded to the difficulties just mentioned there
was another, to-wit, that admitting Rodrigues to be rightly located
between the Butano and the Frijoles, there was not enough land
between those two creeks, which were small and did not run far
back, to give him much more than half a league of land, whereas the
grant called for a whole one. What was to be done, in view of the
fact that the Butano and the Frijoles were natural boundaries,
having unquestionable owners on the north and south of them
respectively, and that on the east was the Sierra, or mountain
range, of no use to anyone, and of less than none, if she had to
take care of it, to a woman like Ramona Sanchez, who in her
petition represented herself as a "desamparada mujer," an
unprotected woman, who asked for the land, as
"un sitio valdio
aproposito pa contener en el su ganado y hacer algunos labores pa
subvenir a la mantencion de su familia;" "a vacant place,
adapted to keep my cattle and carry on some husbandry for
the
maintenance of my family?" From what quarter was the deficit
to come? A third survey was now made, and assuming that as the
tract was only "
bordering on the Serrania," the government
meant that it should not include any considerable part of it, as it
would do if the required half league was located east of the half
on the sea,
Page 68 U. S. 585
the surveyor turned the courses round, and forming an "elbow"
tract, made up the deficit by a survey upon the south part of No.
2, in the manner meant to be indicated by No. 3, and the
chain lines upon the map. The south part of No. 2 had,
however, been entered on by persons who meant to acquire it from
right of preemption.
The case was one of obvious difficulty, and Judge Hoffman, the
District Judge in California, having examined the whole case with
great patience, and with a careful comparison of landmarks, and
having stated at length the reasons of his conclusion, finally
located the easternmost portion
on the ridge, as indicated
by No. 4, his decree being thus:
"That said survey (the third) be and the same is hereby set
aside and rejected, and that a new survey of the tract
herein confirmed be made as follows,
viz.: bounding the
tract"
"on the east by the Sierra, on the west, by the sea, on the
south, by the Arroyo de los Frijoles, as far as the same is
delineated upon the diseno, and thence by the shortest distance to
the Sierra, and on the north by the Arroyo Butano, as far as the
same is delineated as a boundary upon the diseno, and thence
(crossing that stream) by such line or lines as will include the
area of one square league."
From this decree Rodrigues, representing Sanchez, and claiming
to have No. 2, or at least No. 3, took the appeal.
Page 68 U. S. 587
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
No class of cases that come before this Court are attended with
so many and such perplexing difficulties as these locations by
survey of confirmed Mexican grants in California. The number of
them which we are called upon to decide bears a very heavy
disproportion to the other business of the court, and this is
unfortunately increasing instead of diminishing. Some idea of the
difficulties which surround these cases may be obtained by
recurring to the loose and indefinite manner in which the Mexican
government made the grants which we are now required judicially to
locate. That government attached no value to the lands, and granted
it in what to us appears magnificent quantities. Leagues instead of
acres were their units of measurement, and when an application was
made to the government for a grant, which was always a gratuity,
the only question was whether the locality asked for was vacant and
was public property. When the grant was made, no surveyor sighted a
compass or stretched a chain. Indeed, these instruments were
probably not to be had in that region. A sketch, called a diseno,
which was rather a map than a plat of the land, was prepared by
the
Page 68 U. S. 588
applicant. It gave, in a rude and imperfect manner, the shape
and general outline of the land desired, with some of the more
prominent natural objects noted on it, and a reference to the
adjoining tracts owned by individuals, if there were any, or to
such other objects as were supposed to constitute the boundaries.
Their ideas of the relation of the points of the compass to the
objects on the map were very inaccurate; and as these sketches were
made by uneducated herdsmen of cattle, it is easy to imagine how
imperfect they were. Yet they are now often the most satisfactory,
and sometimes the only evidence by which to locate these
claims.
These difficulties have rather been increased than diminished by
the Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, entitled "An act to ascertain
and settle the private land claims in the state of California," and
the course of proceedings adopted under it by the Board of
Commissioners and the courts. Before this board every person having
a claim derived from the Mexican government appeared, and in his
own way and to the best of his ability established his right. The
primary object of the act was to ascertain and separate the public
domain from that which had become, under the Mexican government,
private property; and hence, in every case, the claimant was
plaintiff, or actor, and the United States was defendant. But no
other private claimant was made a party to the proceeding, and it
may well be supposed, and indeed we know it has often happened,
that two or three claims for the same land, or parts of the same,
were progressing,
pari passu, in the same court, and the
land has been confirmed to each claimant, and probably each has
received a patent for it. As if aware of the confusion which must
follow such proceedings, the act of 1851 provides expressly that
neither the final decree of the Board of Commissioners, or of the
District or Supreme Court, or any patent to be issued under that
act, shall be conclusive against anyone but the claimant and the
United States. In some instances the board, or the court, would
construe the grant and accompanying espediente, and define the
boundaries with particularity. In others, they merely confirmed the
grant, without any attempt
Page 68 U. S. 589
at location. And in still other cases, they would partially
define the boundaries, and refer to the espediente for that which
was left indefinite.
Then came the act of 1860, which attempted to settle these
difficulties in the making of the surveys under those decrees, by
permitting, or perhaps we should say compelling (for it is yet to
be determined whether everyone interested is not bound to come in
or be barred), all parties interested in the land covered by the
survey, to come in and contest it. Are they permitted to contest
the decree under which the survey is made? Or are they limited to
denying that the survey conforms to the decree? Or can they only
contest the matter where the decree has not definitely located the
grant? Many such questions as these will arise under this act, and
will require great care and reflection to arrive at sound, safe
conclusions. In this proceeding new parties come before the court,
and often demonstrate that grants have been confirmed, which
necessarily conflict, and, upon a question of the location of a
survey, we have all the contests renewed which should have been
settled in the question of title.
The case before us is an example, containing as many of the
perplexities to which we have alluded as can well exist in one
case. Its consideration requires an examination of three different
claims, which have each, independently of the other, been carried
through the Board of Commissioners and courts, and finally
confirmed.
The first of these, that of Gonzales, was the oldest in
reference to the date of the grant from Mexico, being made in 1833.
No party to the present record seeks to disturb its location, and
it is only to be considered here as bounding the present claim. It
is for three-fourths of a league, bounded by the sea on the west,
and the Butano Creek on the south. The next grant in order of time
is that to the present claimants, under Ramona Sanchez. She, in
1837, made application for a half league of land, and the governor
issued to her a provisional concession for a league in 1838. Of the
location of this we will speak hereafter. Next came Simeon Castro,
who, in 1842, obtained from the government a grant
Page 68 U. S. 590
of four square leagues, bordering to the east on the Sierra, to
the west on the sea, to the north on the rancho of Don Juan
Gonzales, and to the south on that of Don Ylaria Buelna.
In the provisional concession of Governor Alvarado, of 19th
September, 1838, to Ramona Sanchez, the land is said to be known by
the name of Butano, and reference is made to the espediente for its
description. This must mean the diseno accompanying her petition.
In the final grant to her in 1844, by Micheltorena, which is
expressed to be a ratification of the provisional title given her
in 1838, it is called the Butano ranch, and is described as
bordering on the ranch of the heirs of Simeon Castro, on the
Serrania, and on the sea. Now, an examination of the diseno in her
espediente, the place of her residence, and her long possession
under the grant, with other matters, leave no doubt that if her
grant was to bound on the sea she must come between Gonzales and
Castro; yet Castro's grant calls for the grant of Gonzales as his
northern boundary. This would leave no place for the location of
claimant's land, where it seems reasonably certain it was intended
to be. How are we to adjust these conflicting claims?
In the first place, we concur with the district court in
holding, that the language of the grant to Castro, which makes his
northern boundary the rancho of Gonzales, is a mistake, and that it
was only intended to extend north to the Arroyo Frijoles, instead
of the Arroyo Butano, which latter is the southern boundary of
Gonzales, and that between these two, and bounded by the sea on the
west, is the half league petitioned for by Sanchez, constituting
the valuable portion of the league granted her by the governor.
It would extend this opinion to an unreasonable length,
discussing mere facts and inferences, to go into all the reasons
which justify this conclusion. They are stated at length and with
much clearness in the opinion of Judge Hoffman of the district
court. Among them may be mentioned the fact that the land granted
to Castro originally constituted two independent ranches, for one
on which, the most northern,
Page 68 U. S. 591
a grant had been previously issued to one Bernal, but which was
surrendered by Castro when he took out a new grant including both
ranches. On the diseno accompanying his petition these two are laid
down, together with other natural objects, corresponding with a
survey of the coast since made, so as to show that the tract did
not extend so far north. The diseno attached to the original grant
to Bernal, the one that was surrendered, shows also that its
northern boundary was the Arroyo Frijoles. The diseno found with
the petition of Sanchez shows that her grant must have occupied the
space between the Arroyo Butano and Arroyo Frijoles. Now if the
Mexican governor really intended that Castro should join Gonzales
on the north, there was no place for the grant to Ramona Sanchez,
which, he says, is bounded by the sea on the west, and borders on
the lands of the heirs of Castro.
It is objected to this location of the grant that it places it
on land which has already been confirmed, surveyed, and patented to
the representatives of Castro. The answer to this is that we are
called on in this proceeding to determine where the grant to the
present claimant ought rightfully to be located, who was not a
party to any of the proceedings by which Castro's claim was
confirmed, surveyed, or patented, and is not therefore bound or
concluded by either the decree, survey, or patent, as expressly
enacted by the fifteenth section of the act of 1851. For Castro's
survey was made before the act of 1860, and there was no
opportunity for this claimant to contest its location. And lastly,
it may be added, that the holder of the Castro claim has made
himself a party to the present proceeding, and must be bound by its
result, and if the errors of his grant and survey are corrected, so
that the boundary of both claims shall be rightfully established,
no wrong can accrue either to him or claimant.
It has been strenuously urged that if the original half league
petitioned for by Sanchez has been correctly located, that the
remainder of the league granted her should be taken out of the
surplus of the Gonzales grant, instead of extending the grant
eastward to the Sierra for quantity. It is sufficient
Page 68 U. S. 592
to say that we see no reason for making the distorted survey
which this would require, and encroaching upon settlers who have
made preemptions, merely that claimant may get better land than he
does by extending his grant eastward to the mountains, as his grant
seems to demand.
On the whole case, without that full and satisfactory conviction
of the entire soundness of the decree below, which is desirable,
but which is perhaps unattainable in many of these cases, we see no
better course than to
Affirm the decree.
[
Footnote 1]
See ante, p. <|68 U.S. 104|>104,
United
States v. Sepulveda.
[
Footnote 2]
Shaded in the map.
