1. Paredes, president of Mexico from 15 December, 1845, until 29
July, 1846, exercised extraordinary powers, but it is not certain
that such of his acts as violated the law were ever ratified.
Semble that such ratification was necessary to make his
acts valid as against the government.
2. Conceding the power of the acting president of the republic
to make a grant of land in California, the several documents
attesting any supposed grant are to be examined with care, since it
thus becomes a question of construction whether it was or was not
intended to be a grant.
3. A party asserting that he had discovered and denounced a
valuable mine in California presented a memorial to the
Junta
de Mineria asking a loan of money and materials to work it and
also requesting the Junta to recommend that the government grant
him as a colonist two square leagues on his mining possession. The
Junta communicated the memorial to the Minister of Justice, with
their approval of the loan &c., but declined to give any
opinion upon the propriety of granting the land. The minister of
justice, in the name of the president, concurred with the junta,
and with respect to the land ordered the proper measures to be
taken by the Minister of Relations, "with the understanding that
the government accedes to the petition." The Minister of Relations
made out and gave to the applicant a dispatch addressed to the
Governor of California reciting the previous
Page 67 U. S. 18
proceedings and declaring that he did so in order that the
Governor might put the applicant in possession of the two square
leagues "in conformity with the laws and decrees on the subject of
colonization." The dispatch was never delivered to the governor.
Held that this was not a grant for two leagues of land,
nor intended to be so.
4. The legal effect of the dispatch of the Minister of Relations
was merely to authorize a regular application to the governor by
petition under the laws of 1824 and 1828, to be followed by such
steps as those laws require and a grant of land if the governor
should ascertain that it was proper to make one.
5. To say that these proceedings at the City of Mexico were in
themselves an absolute grant, either legal or equitable, of the
land claimed under them is a manifest error which this Court cannot
be expected to sanction.
6. The case of
United States v.
Castillero, 23 How. 468, reviewed and shown to be
entirely different from this in its facts and in the legal
principles applicable to it.
7. If the mine was on private property, the governor was wholly
without power to make a grant of land there, for his jurisdiction
under the colonization laws extends only so far as to make grants
of public lands.
8. Nor would it benefit the claimant if it were now shown that
it was public land because his own representations prove that he
fully believed it to be private property.
9. A mining right or privilege under the Mexican ordinances
relating to that subject is a title to land within the meaning of
the Act of 1851, and therefore the Board of Land Commissioners had
jurisdiction to investigate a claim to such right.
10. The ordinances made and established by the King of Spain at
Madrid in 1783 prescribe the mode of acquiring titles to mines, and
were in force throughout the Republic of Mexico at the date of the
American conquest of California.
11. A strict compliance with the terms and conditions of those
ordinances is required by the ordinances themselves, and is shown
to be necessary on general principles by all the writers on the
subject.
12. Registry is the basis of title to a mine, and no mine can be
lawfully worked until it is registered, nor can any title thereto
be acquired either by the discoverer or by any other person without
a registry.
13. Registry consists of an entry in a book kept by the proper
public authority.
Page 67 U. S. 19
14. Claimant of a mining right filed with his petition an
espediente of his title certified by an Alcalde to be a true copy
to the letter from the original in his office. It was afterwards
proved that the expediente and the certificate were in the
handwriting of a party interested, who had copied them from papers
furnished by another party also interested, and that the Alcalde
had signed the certificate without seeing any original.
Held that this document is entirely unworthy of
credit.
15. Claimant produced another espediente certified by a Mexican
Alcalde who could not write nor read writing. This expediente
differed in some particulars from that which the claimant filed
with his petition. The Alcalde, though a witness, was not asked to
verify, the document. It was in the handwriting of another witness
who swore to that fact, but did not testify from what he had copied
it.
Held that such a document, so proved, is entitled to
very little consideration.
16. Another espediente was produced at a subsequent period which
the claimant alleged to be the original from the archives, though
it differed materially from the two others previously alleged to be
copies. A witness testified that he found it among the records in
January, 1851, but it bore no official marks, it was never seen
among the archives previous to that time, the claimant's counsel
had made affidavit in December, 1850, that the original expediente
was in Mexico and could not be produced, nor a copy of it
furnished, though it had been diligently sought for.
Held
that this document was not sufficiently proved, and that the
testimony of Mexican officers and assisting witnesses who swore to
its execution by them at or about the time of its date did not
establish it as an official paper.
17. A fourth and still different expediente was introduced by
claimant near the close of the case. It was certified (all but the
act of possession) by an alcalde who admitted on his oath that the
papers had been sent to him from the mine, and he had signed the
certificates without knowing what they were. The Mexican officer
and his assisting witnesses were then called to prove that the act
of possession in this expediente was a duplicate original. Upon
these and other circumstances, it was
held that this
expediente could not be regarded as a genuine document, and that
its production at that late stage of the case, added to its glaring
inconsistency with the evidence previously given, had the effect
not only to impair all confidence in the first expediente, but to
discredit all the witnesses who had sworn to the papers of which it
was composed.
Page 67 U. S. 20
18. Title to a mine is vested by the adjudication or decree of
the proper tribunal in a case duly presented for decision, and by
the registry of the adjudication, together with the proceedings on
which it is founded.
19. The mere fact of discovery, without such adjudication and
registry, gives no title to the discoverer, though it is also true
that without proof of discovery there can be no adjudication in his
favor.
20. To complete the adjudication and carry it into effect, the
boundaries must be fixed, else the title or claim, like other
indefinite interests in lands, will be void for uncertainty, and
this rule applies to mines situate on public as well as to those on
private lands.
21. An alcalde had no jurisdiction under the mining laws and
could make no title to a mine. The tribunal empowered to exercise
this jurisdiction was the mining deputation of the territory or the
nearest one thereto.
22. The fact that no mining deputation nor no courts of first
instance were established in California would show that a law
giving jurisdiction over mines to an alcalde might have been a
convenience to the people, but it does not show that such a law
existed.
23. It may be safely inferred from the character and history of
Mexico that its supreme government reserved to itself the power
over its mines and purposely withheld all jurisdiction of that
nature from the local authorities of its distant and frontier
territories.
24. If the alcalde had jurisdiction, it would be necessary for
the claimant to show that such jurisdiction was exercised in
accordance with the requirements of the mining ordinances.
25. Some of the provisions of those ordinances are doubtless
directory, and others conditions subsequent, but some of them are
clearly conditions precedent.
26. Those provisions which appertain to the registry of the mine
and the action of the tribunal thereon and in respect to the
judicial possession of it are conditions precedent, and a
discoverer cannot support a title without showing a substantial
compliance. Want of registry and omission to mark boundaries on the
ground are fatal defects in a mining title.
27. A discoverer who neglects to have his title adjudicated and
registered agreeably to the ordinance or to have his pertenencias
measured and marked does not by such negligence forfeit his title,
but simply fails to acquire any title which could be the subject of
forfeiture.
Page 67 U. S. 21
28. Claimant went to Mexico six months after the alleged date of
his mining title. He petitioned the junta for aid and asked a land
grant, as mentioned in note 3. He asserted that he had discovered
and denounced a mine, but produced no title papers, and falsely
stated that the mine was in the Mission of Santa Clara, suppressing
the fact that it was on a private rancho five leagues distant from
that mission. He requested the junta to recommend the approval of
the possession of the mine which had been given him by the local
authorities of California. The junta agreed to furnish the
assistance, and recommended the approval or confirmation. The
president
approved of the agreement made by the junta in
order to commence
working the mine (as one of his
ministers said) or (according to another) for the
exploration of the mine, but made no decree concerning the
title.
Held that these proceedings were not a confirmation
or approval of any title which the claimant might previously have
obtained from an alcalde in California, and therefore the documents
produced to show that he had such a title must stand or fall by
their own contents and the evidence which supports there on their
original merits.
29. The Court discusses numerous acts of the original claimant
and of parties interested in the mine, and especially those
disclosed in a correspondence between them, and holds these acts to
be evidence that the claimant and his aliences knew full well the
invalidity of the title which he and they were setting up.
30. The assurance given by the Mexican government when the
treaty of peace was under negotiation that no title for land in
California had been made of later date than 13 May, 1846, her
assent to the tenth article which contained a similar declaration,
and her acceptance of the subsequent explanations contained in a
protocol which promised the protection of the American government
only to such titles as were made before that time prove that Mexico
herself did know and must have known that the pretensions of the
claimants under a title of later date were unfounded.
These were cross-appeals severally taken by the United States
and by the claimants from a decree of the District Court for the
Northern District of California in a claim of Andres Castillero for
land under the Act of March 3, 1851.
Before the commencement of the proceeding, the claim had been
divided, and most of the shares in it were held by other persons,
who, with Castillero, occupied the lands under the
Page 67 U. S. 22
name of the New Almaden Mining Company. But the petition to the
Board of Land Commissioners was presented by the attorneys of the
company in the name of Castillero alone, for his benefit, and the
benefit of those holding under him.
The petition set forth that Castillero discovered a mine of
cinnabar in 1845; that having formed a company to work it, he, on
the 22d of November, and 3d of December, 1845, denounced it, and on
the 30th of December received juridical possession in due form from
the magistrate of that jurisdiction; that the record of his mining
possession was afterwards submitted to the Junta de Fomento y
Administracion de Mineria, who declared it to be legal and
recommended to the Executive not only that it be confirmed but that
two square leagues be granted him on the surface of his mining
possession; that the grant of two square leagues was made on the
20th of May, 1846, and an order or patent of title issued to him on
the 23d, with which he started to take possession, but was
prevented by the war; that as soon as possible he got a survey
made; that by virtue of these facts he acquired a perfect title,
under which he and his grantees have held possession ever since
1845, expending immense sums of money upon it. The petition
concludes with a prayer that the land commissioner will confirm to
him "the two square leagues of land, as embraced in his mining
possession and grant as aforesaid."
Along with the petition, the claimants filed copies of the title
documents under which they claimed the mine and lands. The mining
title consisted of the following papers united together in the form
of an expediente.
"
Senor alcalde of first nomination:"
"Andres Castillero, captain of permanent cavalry and at present
resident in this department, before your notorious justification
makes representation:"
"That having discovered a vein of silver, with a ley of gold, on
the rancho pertaining to Jose Reyes Berreyesa, retired sergeant of
the Presidio Company of San Francisco, and wishing to work it in
company, I request that, in conformity with the ordinance on
mining, you will be pleased to fix up notices in public places of
the jurisdiction in order to make sure of my right when the
time
Page 67 U. S. 23
of the juridical possession may arrive, according to the laws on
the matter."
"I pray you to provide in conformity, in which I will receive
favor and justice, admitting this on common paper, there being none
of the corresponding stamp."
"Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe, November twenty-second, eighteen
hundred and forty-five."
"ANDRES CASTILLERO"
"This is a copy of the original to which I refer, signing it
with two assisting witnesses, in the Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe,
on the 13th of January, 1846."
"PEDRO CHABOLLA"
"Assisting witnesses:"
"Sansevain"
"Jose Sunol"
"
Senor alcalde of first nomination:"
"I, Andres Castillero, permanent captain of cavalry, before your
well known justification, appear and say that on opening the mine
which I previously denounced in this Court, I have taken out,
besides silver with a ley of gold, liquid quicksilver, in the
presence of several bystanders, whom I may summon on the proper
occasion."
"And considering it necessary for the security of my right so to
do, I have to request of you that uniting this representation to
the denouncement, it may be placed on file, it not going on stamped
paper, because there is none."
"I pray you to take measures to this effect, in which I will
receive favor and grace,"
"Santa Clara, December 3, 1845."
"ANDRES CASTILLERO"
"This is a copy of the original to which I refer, signing it
with the witnesses of my assistance, in the Pueblo of San Jose
Guadalupe, on the 13th of January, 1846."
"PEDRO CHABOLLA"
"Assisting witnesses:"
"Sansevain"
"Jose Sunol"
"There being no deputation on mining in the Department of
California, and this being the only time since the settlement of
Upper California, that a mine has been worked in conformity with
the laws -- and there being no
Juez de Letras
[Professional Judge] in the Second
Page 67 U. S. 24
District, I, the alcalde of first Nomination, citizen Antonio
Maria Pico, accompanied by two assisting witnesses, have resolved
to act in virtue of my office for want of a notary public, there
being none, for the purpose of giving juridical possession of the
mine known by the name of Santa Clara, in this jurisdiction,
situated on the Rancho of the retired sergeant Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, for the time having expired, which is designated in the
ordinance of mining, for citizen Don Andres Castillero to show his
right and also for others to allege a better right, between the
time of denouncement and this date, and the mine being found with
abundance of metals discovered, the shaft made according to the
rules of art, and the working of the mine producing a large
quantity of liquid quicksilver, as shown by the specimens which
this court has, and as the laws now in force so strongly
recommended the protection of an article so necessary for the
amalgamation of gold and silver in the Republic, I have granted
three thousand varas of land in all directions, subject to what the
general ordinance of mines may direct, it being worked in company,
to which I certify, the witnesses signing with me, this act of
possession being attached to the rest of the expediente, deposited
in the Archives under my charge. This not going on stamped paper,
because there is none, as prescribed by law."
"Jazgado of San Jose Guadalupe, December 30, 1845."
"ANTONIO MARIA PICO"
"Assisting witnesses:"
"Antonio Sunol"
"Jose Noriega"
"I have received of Don Andres Castillero the sum of twenty-five
dollars, on account of the fees for the possession of the
quicksilver, mine, which is in this jurisdiction, under my charge,
named Santa Clara."
"Court House of San Jose Guadalupe, December 30, 1845."
"$25 ANTONIO MARIA PICO"
"Writing of partnership executed by Don Andres Castillero,
captain of permanent cavalry, with the commanding general, Den Jose
Castro, and the Senores Secundino Robles and Teodoro Robles, and a
voluntary grant which the partners make perpetually to the Rev.
Father Fria, Jose Maria del Refugio Suarez del Real, of a mine of
silver, gold, and quicksilver, in the Rancho of Don Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, in the jurisdiction of the Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe.
"
Page 67 U. S. 25
"
Art. 1. Don Andres Castillero, conforming in all
respects to the ordinance of mining, forms a regular perpetual
partnership with the said persons in this form: the half of the
mine, which is that of which he can dispose, will be divided in
three parts in this manner: four shares to Don Jose Castro; four
shares to Senores Secundino and Teodoro Robles; and the other four
shares to the Rev. Father Jose Ma. R. S. del Real, as a perpetual
donation."
"
Art. 2. Neither of the partners can sell or alienate
any of his shares, so that he who may do so shall lose his right,
which shall revert to the other partners."
"
Art. 3. The expenses shall be borne in proportion to
the shares, a formal account being kept by an accountant, who will
be paid from the common fund."
"
Art. 4. That prescribed by the ordinance of mining
being complied with in everything, whatever difference may arise
will be decided by the partners themselves."
"
Art. 5. Don Andres Castillero will direct the labors,
expenses, and works, and in his absence the Rev. Father Friar Jose
Maria R. S. del Real."
"
Art. 6. Of the products, no larger quantities will be
taken out than are necessary for the arrangement of the negotiation
until the works may be regulated, and whatever the quantity may be,
it must be with the consent of all the partners until the
negotiation may be arranged."
"
Art. 7. These agreements will be authenticated by the
prefect of the second district, Don Manuel Castro, the original
document being deposited in the archives of the district
[partido], a copy certified by his honor being left with
the persons interested."
"Mission of Santa Clara, November 2, one thousand eight hundred
and forty-five."
"ANDRES CASTILLERO"
"For the comd'g general, Don Jose Castro"
"ANDRES CASTILLERO"
"JOSE MARIA DEL R. S. DEL REAL"
"For the Senores Secundino Robles and Teodoro Robles."
"FRANCISCO ARCE"
"It is a copy of the original, to which I refer."
"Santa Clara, December 8, 1845."
"MANUEL CASTRO"
"Antonio M. Pico"
Page 67 U. S. 26
To this expediente was appended the following certificate by
James W. Weekes, who was then acting as alcalde of San Jose.
"COURT OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE"
"
San Jose Guadalupe, Upper California"
"I certify in due form that the foregoing is a faithful copy
made to the letter from its original, the 'expediente' of the mine
of Santa Clara or New Almaden, which exists in the archives under
my charge, to which I refer. And in testimony thereof, I have
signed it this twentieth day of January, one thousand eight hundred
and forty-eight."
"JAMES WEEKES,
Alcalde"
Weekes, being called by the United States as a witness,
testified that the body of the papers, as well as the certificates,
were written by James Alexander Forbes, then one of the
complainants, and that he (Weekes) had signed the certificate
without seeing any original, but merely because Forbes requested
him to do so and in the belief that such a request would not be
made unless it was right. J. A. Forbes swore that he made the copy
not from official papers, but from papers furnished him by
Alexander Forbes, another claimant. J. A. Forbes, being British
vice-consul, added to the certificate of Weekes the following
certificate of his own.
"BRITISH VICE CONSULATE FOR CALIFORNIA"
"San Francisco"
"I hereby certify that the signature to the above certificate is
the true and proper handwriting of the person it represents, and
that it is worthy of all faith and credit."
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto placed my hand and official
seal this twenty-first day of January, one thousand eight hundred
and forty-eight."
"JAS. ALEXANDER FORBES"
"Vice Consul"
"SEAL OF H. B. M. VICE CONSULATE"
After the document was made and so certified, it was returned to
Alexander Forbes, who took it to Tepic, in Mexico, and there
procured for it the following additional certificates:
Page 67 U. S. 27
"JESUS VEJAR, NOTARY PUBLIC."
"I certify and assure that the last preceding signature of the
Senor Vice Consul, Don James Alexander Forbes, is his own, which
said Senor is accustomed to use, I having become acquainted with it
when I knew him during his stay in this city, on the way to Upper
California, by various acts which he executed in the house of
Messrs. Barron, Forbes & Co."
"And at the request of the same persons I affix my notarial mark
and signature to this testimony, in Tepic, on the fifteenth of
March, one thousand eight hundred and fifty."
"JESUS VEJAR"
"We, the Constitutional First alcalde and notary public, who
sign, certify and assure, that the preceding mark and signature are
those which the Notary, Jesus Vejar, is accustomed to use in all
the acts which pass before him. We thus prove it, in Tepic, on the
fifteenth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and fifty."
"EUSEBIO FERNANDEZ"
"CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES"
"I, George W. P. Bissell, Consul of the United States of North
America for this district, hereby certify that the signatures
attached to the foregoing document are in the true handwriting of
the subscribers, who legally hold the situations therein
represented, and are worthy of all faith and credit."
"In testimony whereof, I hereunto set my hand and seal of office
this 1st day of December, in the year 1850, in the city of
Tepic."
"[L.S.]"
"G. W. P. BISSELL"
"
United States Consul"
"Filed in office September 20, 1850"
"GEORGE FISHER"
It was a copy of this espediente and of the certificates
appended to it that was filed with claimants' petition. The papers
as made out by James Alexander Forbes was not produced by them
until August 18, 1856, after the appeal to the district court, when
it was brought in upon a formal notice from the United States and
an order of the Court. Upon its being compared with the espediente,
afterwards alleged by the claimants
Page 67 U. S. 28
to be the original record, it was found not to correspond with
it, but differed in many and very essential respects.
On the 6th of November, 1856, the claimants introduced another
espediente, certified as a copy from the record, by Pedro Chaboya.
The certificate is dated 13th of August, 1846. Chaboya was second
alcalde that year. Juan Fernandez recognized it as being in the
handwriting of Salvio Pacheco, who being sworn, testified that he
had written it, certificate and all, except Chaboya's signature,
but gave no account of any original from which he had copied it. He
added his belief that the signature was the handwriting of Chaboya.
Chaboya himself was not interrogated on the subject. This document
also differed from that previously produced.
In was on the 30th of January, 1858, that the claimants put into
the case the espediente which they asserted was the original record
made up by the alcalde at the time when the proceeding was closed
by the delivery of possession to Castillero. It was brought into
Court from the recorder's office of Santa Clara County, by Mr.
Houghton, the deputy recorder. On the back of it was the official
mark -- "Filed 25 February, 1853, at 12 o'clock A.M. J. M. Murphy,
recorder, by S. O. Houghton, deputy." It appeared also that there
was on the paper a note in pencil by Mr. Richardson to the effect
that it was filed 21st of January, 1851. Richardson was then
recorder. He was not a witness, but Houghton made a deposition in
which he gave the following account of the filing by him:
"The first recollection I have of the document is a few days
before the date of this filing on the back of it, which is 'Filed
February 25, A.D. 1853, at 12 o'clock, A. M., J. M. Murphy,
Recorder, By S. O. Houghton, Deputy.'"
"I think it was sometime in the month of February, I think so
from the time this filing is dated. Mr. James A. Forbes came to the
office and desired to see the record of this paper, describing the
paper to me. I examined the record and told him that it was not
recorded there. He then looked for it himself and insisted that it
was recorded there; he did not find it. He was looking for the
record of the paper, not for the paper itself. Some days after
that, I
Page 67 U. S. 29
found the paper in the office. There was a safe in the office,
in the top of which were some papers; there was also a desk with
pigeon-holes containing papers, I found it in one or the other of
them. I do not recollect which."
"
Q. When you found the paper, how did you recognize
it?"
"
A. By the description given of it by Mr. Forbes."
"
Q. If you had ever seen such a paper before in the
office, would you not have remembered it?"
"
A. I think that I should."
"
Q. Were you not surprised when you saw the paper?"
"
A. I was surprised that such a paper should be there
without its being known."
"
Q. Did Mr. James A. Forbes appear to be making a
thorough search, and about how long was he in searching for the
record of that paper of which you have before spoken?"
"
A. I think he and I together searched more than one
day, he represented the paper to me to be of great importance, and
I made a very thorough search for the record of it."
"
Q. Did you always keep your safe locked during
business hours, and did you always keep a strict guard upon those
pigeon-holes, or was it possible to insert a paper into the top of
that safe, or into those pigeon-holes, without your observing when
it was done?"
"
A. The safe and the pigeon-holes were generally open
during business hours when I was in the office; the books of record
were kept in the safe, and the safe was kept open for the purpose
of getting access to the books when persons came to examine them.
There was no particular guard kept upon anything in the office. I
never suffered any person there unless I was there. It is possible
that anything might be inserted into the top of that safe or those
pigeon-holes without my knowing it."
"
Q. After you found the paper, what did you do with
it?"
"
A. I kept it there until Mr. Forbes came, and filed it
at his request."
Captain Halleck, superintendent-general of the mine and
principal agent of the company, testified that he found the
document in the office of the Mayor of San Jose, in January, 1851;
that he took it thence and carried it to the Recorder's
Page 67 U. S. 30
office, where he left it; Mr. Belden, the Mayor, being with him
when he found it, and when it was delivered to the Recorder. He
confidently believed this to be same paper which he had so found at
that time. The following is part of his cross-examination:
"
Q. In September, October, November, and December of
the year 1850, where were the papers of denouncement and juridical
possession of the mine of New Almaden, being the same paper
produced by Mr. Houghton?"
"
A. I do not know."
"
Q. Were they not, to the best of your knowledge and
belief, in Mexico?"
"
A. I have no knowledge of their being in Mexico, or of
where they were. My belief is that they were in San Jose."
"
Q. Have you a pretty good memory?"
"
A. I have a pretty good memory of occurrences and of
persons, but not a very good memory for names or dates."
"
Q. During the time of which I have just inquired, did
you not verily believe that they were in Mexico?"
"
A. I did not. I had no reason to believe that they
were in Mexico, and my reasons for believing they were in San Jose
are that I found them there in 1851, as I have stated."
"
Q. It is now seven years since the period of which I
have questioned you. The human memory is treacherous. I therefore
desire you to reflect well upon the answer you have just given. Do
you answer in the same manner?"
"
A. I have no charge to make in my answer except to
say, as I have before said, that I cannot say positively that the
paper produced by Mr. Houghton is the same found in Mr. Belden's
office. I believe it to be the same, as I have before stated."
"
Q. You regard the paper which you found in the office
of Belden as
the original denouncement and juridical possession
of the mine of New Almaden, do you not?"
"
A. I do."
"
Q. In
reference to that paper, you then
repeat the answer you have given above, do you?"
"
A. I do."
"
Q. Did you not, in the month of December, 1850,
declare on
Page 67 U. S. 31
oath in a court of justice that the original denouncement and
juridical possession of the mine was at that time in Mexico?"
"
A. I may have done so. I had copies or a copy of that
original denouncement and possession, and may have supposed then
that the original, which is usually delivered to the parties, was
in Mexico. I understood and always have understood it to be the
practice of Mexican alcaldes to make two originals of their
judicial acts, one of which is made of record in their office and
the other delivered to the parties interested.
I probably then
supposed, as I have since, that a duplicate original had been given
to Castillero and taken to Mexico. I remember to have written
to Mexico to have such original sent to California to be used in
the litigation then pending."
The United States then produced the record of an ejectment
brought by Maria Bernal de Berreyesa, widow of Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, against James Alexander Forbes and Robert Walkinshaw,
for the land on which the mine is situate. This record showed that
on the 13th of September, 1850, the counsel of the plaintiffs moved
for an order of the court on the defendants to produce in court and
file the papers upon which they claimed the mine, "and all papers
connected with the said New Almaden Mine, or the land upon which
the same is situated, upon which the defendants intend to found
their claim to said land or said mine." This motion "was granted by
the court, and the said papers
or copies thereof were
ordered to be produced according to said motion." Mr. Halleck was
of counsel with the New Almaden Company, and as one of the
attorneys for the defendants, in that action brought by Berreyesa,
he put in an answer verified by his own affidavit, to show why the
order of the court could not be complied with. The answer and
affidavit were as follows:
"
State of California, County of Santa Clara:"
"JAMES A. FORBES, ROBERT WALKINSHAW,"
"
ads."
"MARIA BERNAL DE BERREYESA
et als."
"The defendants in this cause in answer to the order of court
made on the 13th day of September A.D. 1850, requiring the
defendants
Page 67 U. S. 32
to produce in court certain papers upon which they intended to
rely as a defense in this cause, answer and say:"
"That they have exercised all due diligence to procure and
produce the said papers in court, by writing immediately on the
receipt of the above mentioned order, to the parties in Mexico, who
hold them, but to this date the defendants have not received them,
this delay having been caused, as defendants verily believe, by the
failure of the mail steamers running from Panama to San Francisco
to touch, as heretofore has been their custom, at the port of San
Blais in Mexico, from which place the defendants have expected, and
still expect, to receive said papers."
"The defendants therefore ask your honorable court such further
time as may be necessary to procure said papers and comply with the
said order of court."
"And the defendants further aver that the said papers and other
documents which they have sent for in Mexico, and which they are
daily expecting to receive, are absolutely necessary to them in the
above entitled cause, and that they cannot proceed with the trial
of this cause without said papers and documents."
"And the defendants specify, among others, the following papers
and documents as absolutely necessary to them before they can
proceed with the trial of this cause,
viz.: (1)
the
original denouncement of the Mine of New Almaden and the Judicial
possession given of the same in the year 1845; (2) the
confirmation of said denouncement and possession by the supreme
government of Mexico in the year 1846, and prior to the late
declaration of war by the United States against the Republic of
Mexico; (3) the original grant of land including said mining
possession, made by the supreme government of Mexico (prior to the
declaration of war as aforesaid) to the owners of said mine; (4)
the original documents showing the ownership of said mine and land
in the parties from whom the defendants derive title, the
defendants verily believing that the land referred to in said
documents is the same land as that upon which the pretended
trespass is alleged in plaintiff's complaint to have been
committed, and that these documents are absolutely necessary for
their defense."
"The defendants therefore pray a continuance of the above
entitled cause to the April Term of this Honorable Court."
"State of California, County of Santa Clara."
"Henry W. Halleck, one of the attorneys in the above
entitled
Page 67 U. S. 33
suit, states on oath that he believes the facts mentioned in the
foregoing answer and petition are true, that all due diligence has
been exercised to produce in court the aforementioned papers, that
further time is necessary to defendants in order to enable them to
produce said papers, and that defendants cannot go to trial in this
cause till said papers are procured."
"H. W. HALLECK"
"Sworn to and subscribed before me."
"JOHN H. WATSON,
Judge"
"Filed December 23, 1850"
"H. C. MELOVE,
Clerk"
The New Almaden Company had several judicial controversies
concerning their title to the mine. No record evidence of their
title was produced in any of them, nor does it appear that any body
having the custody of the alcalde's archives ever discovered among
them any papers relating to Castillero's title. H. C. Melone, who
was secretary of the alcalde's court before the establishment of
the state government and was clerk of the county court afterwards,
testified as follows:
"
Q. During the pendency of the suit of Walkinshaw
against Forbes, and of the proceedings of Horace Hawes in
denouncements, was there offered in evidence or exhibited to you,
any document purporting to be a record of the original denouncement
of the New Almaden mine, and of possession of said mine, given by
any alcalde in the year 1845."
"
A. There was none that I know of. I should have
remembered it if I had seen it."
"
Q. Look at the paper now shown you, which is the same
which was yesterday in your presence produced by G. M. Yoell,
Deputy Recorder of the County of Santa Clara, then under
examination, and which the said Yoell testified was a paper now on
file among the records in the office, of the recorder of said
county, which paper is endorsed, 'Posesion de la mina de Sta.
Clara, Ano de 1845,' and say whether this paper was offered in
evidence in either the aforesaid suit of Walkinshaw against Forbes
or the denouncement by Horace Hawes of which you have spoken, or
was exhibited
Page 67 U. S. 34
to you or seen by you at any time during the said proceedings,
or either of them."
"
A. I think not. I do not remember to have ever seen
this paper until a short time since. It was shown me in the
Recorder's office of Santa Clara County."
"
Q. What opportunities have you ever had for making
yourself familiar with the records and papers, books and documents,
contained in the office of the First alcalde of the Pueblo of San
Jose, and of obtaining a clear knowledge of what papers were there
recorded, filed or kept."
"
A. I was clerk for Judge May, both as alcalde and
Judge of the First Instance, and had the custody of all the books
and papers in the office, and did the recording. After the
resignation of Judge May, which took place some time in November,
1849, and the appointment of J. C. Conroy as First Alcalde and
Judge Richardson as Judge of the First Instance, I continued to do
most of the recording, and had access to the papers and books, and
had the custody, in a manner, of said papers and books, until
sometime in April, 1850, when the state government went into
operation. At that time I took all the records, of every
description, and the books and papers belonging to all the suits in
the Court of the First Instance, and carried them to my office as
county clerk, and delivered such of those as I thought properly
belonged to the county recorder's office, to John T. Richardson the
then county recorder."
"
Q. During all this time of which you have just spoken,
and all your connection with the records of which you have just
spoken, did you ever see among them, or in any of the offices of
which you have spoken, or anywhere else, the paper described in the
38th question as 'Posesion de la mina,' &c.?"
"
A. I do not recollect of ever having seen it until a
short time ago in the Recorder's office."
Pedro Chaboya was second alcalde for the year 1846, and there is
an inventory in the office of the papers handed over to him by the
first alcalde. This inventory is dated 2d of January, 1846, and
contains among other things, this:
Acta de posesion de Mina de
Santa Clara a Don Andres Castillero. There is also another
inventory dated November 10, 1846, when Burton, the first
person
Page 67 U. S. 35
who was appointed alcalde of San Jose, under American authority,
received the archives from his Mexican predecessor. In this no
mention whatever is made of the act of possession or of any other
paper comprised in the claimants' espediente.
Antonio Maria Pico, the alcalde, whose name is to the act of
possession, and Antonio Sunol and Jose Noriega, by whom it was
signed as assisting witnesses, testify to the making of that paper,
but neither of them refer to the petitions of Castillero. The
evidence gives no account of them earlier than the time of their
discovery by Captain Halleck, in January, 1851.
The alcalde and his two assistants swore that the Act of
Possession was written out by a man named Gutierrez, a schoolmaster
in the neighborhood, who brought it to them to be signed at the
house of Sunol. After the signatures were affixed to it, Guttierez
took it away. Juan Fernandez was the alcalde's secretary at the
time, and he says that it was brought by Guttierez to him, and that
Gutierrez paid him three dollars and a half for writing it,
although not having written it, he was entitled to nothing. The
secretary does not seem to have done any official act to make the
paper a record, and on the subject of the identity of the paper
brought him by Gutierrez with the document produced in the cause,
the following passage occurs in his deposition:
"
Q. How do you know that the document you have
testified about, is the same document that Gutierrez brought
you?"
"
A. Because I know it."
"
Q. Was the document which Gutierrez brought you all
signed?"
"
A. I did not examine it well."
"
Q. Did you not read it?"
"
A. I did not."
"
Q. How can you know it to be the same document if you
did not read it?"
"
A. I do not know. I have seen it tumbling about with
other papers in the court; I always saw it in the desk tumbling
about."
"
Q. Did you read it when you saw it tumbled about
amongst the other papers?"
"
A. The superscription was what I always read. "
Page 67 U. S. 36
"
Q. What was the superscription which you always
read?"
"
A. Possession of the mine of Santa Clara, I think it
says. I did not pay much attention to it."
"
Q. Did you read no more than the superscription?"
"
A. If I read any more, I do not remember it."
"
Q. Then how do you know that this document, of which
you have testified, is the same?"
"
A. I imagine it is the same."
"
Q. Who wrote the superscription; did you write
it?"
"
A. I do not know who wrote it. I did not."
Pico Sunol and Noriega testify that on some day, not long after
the time when possession of the mine was delivered, they signed the
Act of Possession at the house of Jose Sunol, who lived in San
Jose. Their testimony, as to time, was not from recollection of it,
but they spoke with confidence and directness to the fact that the
paper was made at or near its date, and within a few days of the
time when the act was done which it was intended to record. The
document, alleged to be the original, had a
blank in it
for the day of the month -- "December, ___ 1845." It was the copy
made by Forbes, and certified by Weekes, that supplied the day, and
referred it to the 30th.
The "writing of partnership" was not in the espediente found by
Captain Halleck, but was attached to the one made by Forbes in
1848. In the former espediente there was a paper which was wanting
in the latter, namely, the following petition of Jose Castro:
"
Senor alcalde of 1st Nomination of the Pueblo of San Jose
de Guadalupe:"
"I, Jose Castro, Lieutenant-Colonel of Cavalry in the Mexican
Army, a native of this Department, before your notorious
justification (notoria justificacion) appear and say: that
representing at present the person and rights of Captain D. Andres
Castillero, and other individuals who compose the company (I being
one of the shareholders) in the quicksilver mine which the said
Senor Castilleros denounced on the third day of December one
thousand eight hundred and forty-five, and of which possession was
given us on the
Page 67 U. S. 37
thirtieth of the same month and year, in strict conformance with
the laws of mining, title sixth, article first, which grants to
discoverers of new mines, three pertenencias contiguous or
disconnected, of the dimensions designated by law, and as accords
with its rights, the company claims now, as a matter of course (da
hoy pordeducidas) before you, the three pertenencias in
continuation of the first, it being proper that this petition
should be attached to the expediente of the denouncement, so that
it may remain among the archives and appear through all time."
"Not going on paper with proper seal, because there is none, I
pray that I may receive favor and justice."
"JOSE CASTRO"
"
Santa Clara, June 27, 1846"
Jose Castro testified very positively that this petition was
made at the time of its date, signed by him, and sent to the
alcalde.
The petition was in the handwriting of Benito Diaz, and he
declared on his oath, as a witness, that it was written some months
after its date, and after the American conquest of the country, but
the reputation of Diaz for truth and veracity was such as to make
him unworthy of credit in the opinion of the court below, and that
opinion, based upon the personal knowledge of the judges, was
placed on record.
On the 17th day of July, 1860, the fourth espediente was brought
into the case, accompanied by clear proof from the claimants'
witnesses that it had been found among the papers of Robert
Walkinshaw, deceased, who in his lifetime had been a member of the
New Almaden Company, and for a while one of its principal agents.
This espediente had the following caption and summary of
contents.
"
YEAR 1845"
"
Expediente of the denouncement, possession, and partnership
of the Quicksilver Mine called Santa Clara, Jurisdiction of San
Jose Guadalupe, in Upper California."
"November 22d, 1845 -- Don Andres Castillero makes the
denouncement of the aforesaid, in the Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe,
for want of deputation of Mining and of Judge
de letras.
"
Page 67 U. S. 38
"December 3, 1845 -- Writing which the said Castillero
presented, testifying to having taken out quicksilver and other
metals, asking that it be annexed to the espediente."
"December 30th, 1845 -- An act of possession, which with the
assisting witnesses the alcalde of the Pueblo of San Jose gave to
Don Andres Castillero, of the mine of Santa Clara, because of the
time of the notices being completed."
"December 30th, 1845 -- Receipt for the fees of the possession,
signed by the Judge of San Jose."
"December 8th, 1845 -- Writing of partnership for the works of
the mine, authorized by the Prefect of the 2d District."
The writing of partnership, mentioned in the summary, was not
connected with the espediente when produced to the court. It was
composed of the other papers there described. Following each of the
two petitions was a certificate with the name to it of Pedro
Chabollo, declaring that the respective papers were copies from the
original, and the certificates are countersigned by Jose Sunol and
Pedro Sainsevain, as assisting witnesses. All the papers comprised
in this espediente and the certificates thereto (everything except
the signatures) are in the handwriting of Gutierres. Chabollo gave
the following account of the manner in which his name was
signed:
"
Q. What day, month, and year was it that you signed
the two documents in 'Exhibit J. Y. No. 1, W. H. C.,' purporting to
be copies of two representations by Andres Castillero to the
alcalde of the Pueblo of San Jose, dated respectively the 22d
November and 3d December, 1845?"
"
A. I don't remember the day, but it must appear on the
papers. I think it was on the 13th February, 1846."
"
Q. What is it that fixes that date in your mind?"
"
A. Because I have been shown the papers here."
"
Q. What else makes you remember that date?"
"
A. Nothing else; if I had not seen them perhaps I
should not have remembered them, it was so long ago."
"
Q. Who showed you the papers?"
"
A. I was shown them the other day on my examination. I
was not shown them before. "
Page 67 U. S. 39
"
Q. Are you not mistaken; were they not shown to you in
Mr. Barron's office by somebody?"
"
A. No, sir; I was shown them here; also the signatures
of Sainsevain, Noriega, Sunol, and my own."
"
Q. Who asked you to sign your name on that paper?"
"
A. A person name Gutierrez, or a name very like
that."
"
Q. What had Gutierrez to do with it; what is the
reason he asked you?"
"
A. They were papers relating to the mine. I was in
authority at that time. I was asked to sign them, and I signed. I
don't know what Gutierrez had to do with them. I only remember that
he brought them and I signed with the other witnesses"
"
Q. Where did he get them from?"
"
A. I don't know, but he probably got them from the
mine."
"
Q. Who had them at the mine, perhaps?"
"
A. I can't say."
"
Q. How did you know the papers were correct when you
signed them?"
"
A. I supposed they were correct, as they were brought
by those people. I did not examine them at all; it was not for me
to do that."
"
Q. What do the papers purport to be, in your opinion,
and according to your present recollection?"
"
A. They are papers."
"
Q. Look at these papers and read them; say what they
are?"
"
A. I can't read writing well; I can only read it with
great difficulty."
"
Q. Don't you know how to write?"
"
A. It is with difficulty I can paint my signature. I
never learned to write."
"
Q. When did you learn to paint out your signature; who
taught you?"
"
A. I learned alone, I had no teaching. I had a liking
for writing and learned by own efforts alone."
"
Q. What compensation have you received, or are you to
receive, for giving your testimony in this case?"
"
A. I don't know what I am to receive; I have only
received my expenses. I have never been offered any payment for my
testimony. "
Page 67 U. S. 40
"
Q. As you were only second alcalde, what had you to do
with the keeping of the documents, or the certifying to
copies?"
"
A. It was my duty as Judge to keep the records. The
first alcalde was sick, and I acted for him. Dolores Pacheco was
first alcalde."
"
Q. How do you happen to remember now that he was sick
at that time? It was a very long time ago."
"
A. Because we were named Judges together, and I
remember that when he took sick I had to notify the Prefect, who
required that I should act during his sickness."
"
Q. Who was the Prefect?"
"
A. Manuel Castro. I got an order from him to act as
first alcalde during the sickness of the incumbent, otherwise I
should not have done so."
Jose Sunol, one of the assisting witnesses, was dead. Pedro
Sainsevain, the surviving one, deposed that his name was placed to
the documents by himself, at the time of the date, but he did not
say whether the certificate was true or false, and appears to have
signed it without thinking it his duty to inquire for the original.
Two witnesses, Messrs. Sloan and Marks, testified to declarations
of Sainsevain that the certificates were made in 1848, and not in
1846.
There was no certificate to the Act of Possession, as found in
this expediente. The claimants alleged it to be a duplicate
original, and to prove it such called Pico, Noriego and Sunol,
whose testimony accorded with the allegation. Neither of these
witnesses had spoken in their former depositions of more than one
original being made.
This Act of Possession, was dated 30th of December, 1845, there
being no blank as in the other original.
All these expedientes were alike in some points, but no two of
them corresponded in all respects. Some of the points of difference
were important and remarkable. But they are sufficiently set out in
the opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD.
A considerable portion of this voluminous record is occupied by
evidence of the statements and declarations of Castillero himself.
Besides his own declarations made to Colonel Fremont,
Page 67 U. S. 41
letters written by him to General Vallejo and governor Pio Pico;
letters of Pico addressed to persons in Mexico; a letter from
Manuel Castro to Pico; dispatches from Mr. Larkin, United States
Consul at Monterey, to Mr. Buchanan, then Secretary of state;
articles from Mexican newspapers; letters from Mr. Larkin to Mr.
Judd, Prime Minister of the King of Hawaii, and a newspaper
entitled the
"Polynesian," printed in the Sandwich Islands
-- were given in evidence by the claimants, furnishing the ground
of much remark in the court below, and some little here; but
inasmuch as they do not appear to have been noticed by this Court,
it is not considered necessary to insert them in the report.
There was much parol testimony concerning the condition of the
mine, the alleged discovery of it by Castillero, the work done at
it, the possession given to him by the alcalde, and the subsequent
occupation of it by him and his alienees.
It is situate about fifty-five miles southeast from San
Francisco, in a valley called "La Canada de los Capitancillos."
This valley is bounded by the Sierra Azul on the south, and the
Puebla hills on the north. It is watered by several streams, which
rise in the mountains and find their outlet at the northwestern end
of the valley, running thence towards the Pacific. On the north
side the land is nearly level or slightly inclining to the
southwest, but nearer to the mountain, on the south side there
runs, on a parallel with the mountain, a range of hills, called
lomas bajos -- low hills. These hills were regarded by
some of the witnesses as part of the Sierra, and by others they
were considered as being entirely distinct. It is in them that the
quicksilver was found, and from an old opening in a peak, near the
eastern end of the range, came the ore which Castillero used in his
experiments.
For many years -- probably long before the advent of the
Spaniards into that country -- the Indians knew that the cinnabar,
of which the
lomas bajos were in a measure composed, was
neither common earth nor common rock, for it was ruby red, and
nearly two and a half times as heavy as sand stone. In fact it was
a
bisulphide of mercury, some of it almost as pure
Page 67 U. S. 42
as the vermilion of the shops. The Indians used it to paint
their faces and bodies. Afterwards a quantity was dug out and
carried to Santa Clara to paint the Mission Church. In 1824 and
1835, attempts were made to work it as a silver mine. Late in the
autumn of 1845, Castillero came to California on business, which
took him to Sutter's fort. He left that place on the 12th of
November, and went to Santa Clara. Some of the ore being shown to
him, he pronounced it silver with a ley of gold. The last of
November, or first of December, at Santa Clara, he detected the
presence of quicksilver in it, as shown by the following testimony
of Jacob P. Leese.
"About the latter part of November, or first of December, 1845,
I went into the mission of Santa Clara to dine with Padre Real of
the mission; Mr. Castillero was there. Our general conversation
through dinner was about this mine, and of experiments which
Castillero had been trying, to find out what the mineral was. He
made a remark, and said he thought he knew what it was; if it was
what he supposed it was, he had made his fortune. We were anxious
to know what it was. He got up from the table and ordered the
servant to pulverize a portion of this ore; after it was
pulverized, he ordered the servant to bring in a hollow tile full
of lighted coals; he took some of the powdered ore and threw it on
the coals; after it got perfectly hot, he took a tumbler of water
and sprinkled it on the coals with his fingers; he then emptied the
tumbler and put it over the coals upside down; then took the
tumbler off and went to the light to look at it; then made the
remark that it was what he supposed it was, 'quicksilver.' He
showed all who were there the tumbler, and we found that it was
frosted with minute globules of the metal, which Castillero
collected with his finger and said it was quicksilver. He then said
tomorrow he would test it thoroughly and find out what it was
worth, he considered it very rich on account of the weight of the
ore, and if it proved as rich as the quicksilver mines in Spain,
that the Mexican government had offered to anyone for the discovery
of such a mine in the Republic of Mexico one hundred thousand
dollars."
In one of the espedientes, the first representation of
Castillero is dated at Santa Clara, in the other at San Jose. There
was no
Page 67 U. S. 43
extrinsic evidence to show at which of these places it was
written, or when it was written, or that it was delivered to the
alcalde by Castillero, or sent to him, or that Castillero was seen
to sign it, or known to have it in his hands. It is in the
handwriting of Juan Castenada, whose deposition was not taken. The
testimony is equally silent on the subject of the supplementary
petition, which, however, is dated in all the copies at Santa
Clara, and is also in the handwriting of Castenada. Several
witnesses declared their belief that the name of Castillero, as
signed to both petitions, was in his handwriting. It was admitted
in this Court that the writing of partnership, dated 2d of
November, 1845, must have been misdated, and could not have been
made until after the experiment testified to by Leese, which was
the last of November or first of December.
Upon these papers and the accompanying parol evidence, the
claimants contended that Castillero was the discoverer of the mine,
since they show that he was the first to find metal in it. The
United States, on the other hand, maintained that the discovery of
a mine consisted in ascertaining its situation, the extent and
direction of the vein, the true character of its product, and
whatever else might be necessary to give a correct idea of its
value; that Castillero had learned none of these things; that when
he made his original petition, he was utterly ignorant even of the
metal, believing the cinnabar to be silver with an alloy of gold;
that when he put in his supplemental petition he mistook it for
such a combination as nature never made -- gold, silver, and liquid
quicksilver -- and this blunder he persisted in to the last; that
the mine was never actually discovered, or its real contents known
as a discoverer should know them, until Alexander Forbes explored
it in January, 1848.
After the date of Castillero's second petition, he employed a
man named Chard to reduce some of the ore. He took a gun barrel,
charged it with pieces of ore the size of a bean, stopped the
touch-hole with clay, put the muzzle in a vessel of water and built
a fire around the other end. The heat drove off the mercury in the
form of vapor, which passing out at the muzzle, was condensed in
the water, and precipitated itself to the bottom
Page 67 U. S. 44
in the form of liquid metal. Several gun barrels -- as many as
three or four -- were used in this way at once, and the work was
kept up for a month or six weeks.
While this was going on, the alcalde, Pico, Sunol, Noriega,
Fernandez, Gutierrez, Padre Real, and some other persons, came to
the mine where Chard was at work with his gun barrels, and the
thing was done which the claimants assert was the delivery of
juridical possession, Pico was examined three times in this case,
and once in the adverse case of Berreyesa, and his several
depositions, relating to the delivery of possession, are not
without serious contradictions; some of which are adverted to in
the opinion of the Court. All the witnesses concur in saying that
there was no survey or marking of the pertenencias, nor was there
any professor present or other person skilled in mining or
competent to inspect it and declare its character. Chard could not
recollect that Castillero was present; the other witnesses
testified that he was there.
Sometime after this transaction, Chard built a furnace near the
creek and packed down the ore to be reduced there, but some defect
in the construction of the furnace made it a total failure. Some
old try pots were then procured, and by turning them bottom upwards
over a heap of ore, providing a mode of conducting the vapor to the
water, and setting fire to three or four cords of wood over each
one, he obtained a quantity of quicksilver, which was not weighed,
but it could not have been less altogether than two thousand
pounds. This continued until August, when Chard and the Indians who
were helping him suddenly quit work and left the place. Nothing
whatever was done at or about the mine until April or May of the
next year, when Walkinshaw and Alden came there. Alden testifies
that he took charge of it as agent for the claimants, but he does
not mention what specific thing was done by him. In November,
Alexander Forbes, of the firm of Barron, Forbes & Co., came up
from Tepic with workmen, money, and other appliances for business.
The mine was thoroughly examined, and in January, 1848, the
operations which have yielded so large a result were fairly
commenced.
Page 67 U. S. 45
Castillero left California in March, and arrived in the City of
Mexico in May, where he memorialized the Junta de Mineria, or Board
for the Encouragement of Mining, as will be seen by the documents
hereafter to be mentioned. He never returned to California. In the
winter of 1846-1847, he sold certain shares of the mine to Barron,
Forbes & Co., of Tepic, as well as to other persons, and
contracted for the habilitation of it. The bargaining on the part
of Barron, Forbes & Co. was done by Mr. Negrete, to whom
Castillero showed the writing of partnership as his mining title,
and that paper alone was recited in all the acts of sale made by
him and his alienees and socios down to the year 1852.
Immediately after Castillero's arrival at the City of Mexico, he
commenced the proceedings which were given in evidence by the
claimants as proof that the mining title was confirmed by the
supreme government, and that a grant at the same time had been made
to him of two square leagues as a colonist. The six following
papers constituted that part of the title.
"Stamp third -- Four reales. -- For the years eighteen hundred
and forty-six and eighteen hundred and forty-seven."
"I, Andres Castillero, resident and miner in the Department of
Upper California, before your Excellency and your Honor, as I best
may proceed, say that, having discovered in the mission of Santa
Clara a mine of quicksilver, of
leyes as rich, certainly,
as were ever seen before not only in the Republic, but perhaps in
all the world, as proved by the assays made by the order of the
Junta Facultativa of the College of Mining, which, mixing together
of all the specimens I brought, from the best to the worst, have
given a result of thirty-five and a half percent, while there have
been specimens of the best kind which must produce much greater
leyes, I see myself in a condition to satisfy my desires
in favor of the progress of my country, of benefiting exclusively
Mexicans by the flattering and well founded hopes which such a
discovery offers. In virtue of this,
I have denounced and taken
possession not only of said mine named Santa Clara, but also of an
extent of three thousand varas in all directions from said point. I
have formed a company to work it. I have constructed the pit,
and complied
with all the conditions prescribed
Page 67 U. S. 46
by the ordinance, the mine yielding ore, with the
notable circumstance that the specimens which I brought and which
have been assayed have been taken out of the mouth. It would have
been very easy for me to have given the necessary extension to the
negotiation by accepting the repeated and advantageous offers which
have been made to me by several foreign houses in California, but
the undertaking does not require that kind of assistance, which
would result in advantage to foreigners, when it may be entirely
national, and I have not, for that reason, hesitated to apply to
your Excellency and your Honors to obtain the small and only
resources which I need. These are reduced to a small advance of
five thousand dollars in money, in consideration of the excessive
scarcity of coin in that department, and the quick remittance to it
of retorts, cylinders, and other small distilling apparatus, and
also iron flasks for bottling up the quicksilver."
"I would have proposed a contract of partnership to the junta,
an
avio, or some other agreement, if there had been time
to be able to furnish the proofs and details which would be
required for said contracts; but being compromised by the supreme
government to leave this capital within a few days, I find it
necessary to restrict myself to that which appears to present no
difficulty, and which may open a way to our future agreement."
"I am well persuaded that the junta will accede to my request,
so far as may be within its power, and that it will send up to the
supreme government with a recommendation that which may require the
decision of the latter."
"My propositions, then, are the following:"
"
First -- the junta, in the act of approving the
agreement, will give me a draft for five thousand dollars on some
mercantile house in Mazatlan."
"
Second -- on my part, I bind myself to place in said
port, within six months after leaving it, fifty quintals of
quicksilver, at the rate of one hundred dollars each, which I will
send from the first taken out, with absolute preference over every
other engagement."
"
Third -- the junta will order that there be placed at
my disposition before leaving the capital the eight iron retorts
which it has in its office and all the quicksilver flasks which can
be found in the
negociacion of Tasco, which are fit for
use, and lastly, it will deliver
Page 67 U. S. 47
to Senor Don Tomas Ramon del Moral, my attorney, the sums to pay
for the retorts, cylinders, and other kinds of small apparatus,
which may be ordered to be made for the negociacion, to the amount
of one thousand dollars."
"
Fourth -- I will receive the retorts of the junta at
cost price, and the flasks which I may select at two dollars a
piece, agreeably with their valuation."
"
Fifth -- the ascertained value of said retorts and
flasks, and that of the sums which may be delivered to Senor Moral,
I will return in the term of one year from this agreement, and also
the premium on the draft on Mazatlan, in quicksilver, placed in
said port at the price of one hundred dollars the quintal; but if
the junta should wish to take one or more 'acciones' in the mine,
it shall be left as a part payment of the sum corresponding to one
or more barras."
"
Sixth -- while the company is being formed, during the
period of one year, counted from the date on which this agreement
shall be approved and the five thousand dollars spoken of in the
first proposition being paid, I will give the preference to the
junta in the sale of quicksilver placed in Mazatlan, at the rate of
one hundred dollars the quintal."
"
Seventh -- the junta shall represent to the supreme
government the necessity of approving the possession which has been
given me of the mine by the local authorities of California, in the
same terms as those in which I now hold it."
"
Eighth -- it shall also represent the advantage of
their being granted to me, as a colonist, two square leagues upon
the land of my mining possession, with the object of being able to
use the wood for my business."
"
Ninth -- for the compliance of this contract I pledge
the mine itself and all its appurtenances."
"The subscriber subjects this request to the deliberation of the
junta, which, if accepted, may be made into a formal contract, and
made legal in the most proper manner."
"God and Liberty. Mexico, May 12, 1846."
"ANDRES CASTILLERO"
"Copy. Mexico, April 23, 1850."
"O. MONASTERIO"
Page 67 U. S. 48
"
Junta for the Encouragement and Administration of
Mining"
"MOST EXCELLENT SIR -- Professor Don Tomas Ramon del Moral
having presented to this junta some specimens of cinnabar from the
Mission of Santa Clara, in Lower California, which Don Andres
Castillero sent him, together with the annexed copies, with the
object of inciting the supreme government, that it may be pleased
to aid so important an enterprise, said specimens were immediately
sent to his Excellency, the Director of the College, that the
proper assays might be made. His Excellency, in an official
communication of the twenty-ninth of last month, received
yesterday, says that which follows: Senor Don Tomas del Moral,
president of the Junta Facultativa of the National College of
Mining, in an official communication of the twenty-fourth ult.,
says to me as follows:"
"Most Excellent Sir -- The Junta Facultativa having examined the
documents which your Excellency referred to on the twenty-first of
the present month, relative to a deposit of cinnabar discovered in
California by Senor Don Andres Castillero, and another of coal on
the Bay of San Francisco, has the honor to inform your Excellency
that the specimens sent by said Senor Castillero were deposited,
some in the Mineralogical Cabinet and others assayed by the
Professor of Chemistry, Don Manuel Herrera. The assay gave a
ley of thirty-five and a half percent, a mean of the
different specimens having been taken to make the assay, for there
are some so rich that they are pure cinnabar. The junta believes
that Senor Castillero has, by such an important discovery, made
himself deserving of the efficacious protection of the supreme
government and of the Junta for the Encouragement of Mining, and is
persuaded that your Excellency will interpose all your influence to
the end that this individual may receive a proof that the supreme
government knows how to distinguish and reward those citizens who
contribute to the prosperity of the country."
"And with this motive I repeat to your Excellency the
considerations of my esteem and respect. And I have the honor to
transmit it to your Excellencies, as the result of your dispatch on
the matter. "
Page 67 U. S. 49
"The junta, on enclosing the foregoing communication to your
Excellency, has the honor to inform you that it has already asked
Senor Castillero what kind of aid or protection he needs for the
encouragement of his brilliant enterprise, congratulating the
supreme government on a discovery, which, if it meets from the
beginning with all the protection it deserves, may change
completely the aspect of our mining, freeing it from the necessity
in which it has been until now of foreign quicksilver. With this
motive, the junta takes advantage of the opportunity to inform your
Excellency that as on the twenty-fourth of this month, the bounty
terminates which the law granted of five dollars premium on each
hundred-weight of quicksilver extracted from the mines of the
nation, the miners of Guadalcazar have proved that they have taken
out one thousand five hundred and seventy-five quintals from
December, eighteen hundred and forty-four to the end of March last,
which result exceeds the calculation, which, until now, had been
made, that the product of this mineral was one hundred quintals per
month. The junta, on this occasion, reiterates to your Excellency
the assurances of its distinguished consideration and esteem."
"God and Liberty. Mexico, May 5, 1846."
"VINCENTE SEGURA,
president"
"
Junta for the Encouragement and Administration of
Mining."
"MOST EXCELLENT SIR -- As this junta had the honor to inform
your Excellency on the 5th instant, in No. 573, Senor Don Andres
Castillero has directed to it a petition, the original of which it
has the pleasure to transmit herewith, regarding the assistance
which he needs for the new discovery of the quicksilver mine in the
mission of Santa Clara in the Department of Californias. The junta
has no hesitation in recommending said petition to your Excellency,
for being persuaded of the great importance of the enterprise, it
considers it entitled to all the protection of the supreme
government and also the particular circumstances of that department
and the just desire which his Excellency the president has shown to
preserve the integrity of the national territory render it
worthy
Page 67 U. S. 50
of the greatest consideration. The junta is consequently of
opinion that there should be immediately furnished to Senor
Castillero the sum of five thousand dollars in the terms he
proposes; that it should be authorized to furnish him with the iron
retorts and flasks belonging to it, and the other thousand dollars,
which can be employed in the construction of retorts, cylinders,
and other small apparatus of distillation for said mine; although
the law authorizing the junta to make loans for the encouragement
of deposits of quicksilver exacts a premium of five percent per
annum on the capital loaned, it cannot be doubted that the proposal
of Senor Castillero to pay the five thousand dollars with fifty
quintals of quicksilver placed in Mazatlan, at the disposition of
the junta, at the rate of one hundred dollars each, and in the term
of six months, offers greater advantages to the fund than the said
interest. The urgency shown by Senor Castillero to undertake his
journey to that department, and that which his so doing may
contribute under present circumstances towards the preservation of
the national territory, is, in the opinion of the junta, a
sufficient motive to leave until a more opportune occasion the
formation of a contract of partnership, or of 'avio' for the
encouragement of said mine. It remains, then, to show to your
Excellency that although the possession given to Senor Castillero
by the local authorities of California has not been in conformity
with the ordinance, inasmuch as there have been granted him
'pertenencias' to the extent of three thousand varas, which are
equivalent to fifteen 'pertenencias,' agreeably to the second
article of the eighth title, yet it is necessary to consider that
he has in his favor the qualification of being discoverer
of an
absolutely new hill, in which there was no mine open, and to
such there is granted in the first article of the sixth title
three 'pertenencias,' either continuous or interrupted; and if
he shall have discovered other veins, one ('pertenencia') in each
of them. He has also in his favor the circumstance that he
works it in company with others, to whom there is granted that
without prejudice to the right which they may have by the title of
discoverers, when they are such, they may denounce four new
pertenencias, even though they are contiguous and in the same
direction; but that which is most worthy of consideration is that
Californias being a frontier department, and frequently threatened
by the emigrants from the United States of the north, and by the
new colonists of Oregon, it seems proper to grant to the first
mine
Page 67 U. S. 51
discovered in a department so extensive a greater number of
'pertenencias,' which view is corroborated by the reason found at
the end of the eighth title, Article 1st, which says:"
"Considering that the limits established in the mines of these
kingdoms, to which those of New Spain have until now been made to
conform, and are very contracted in proportion to the multitude,
abundance, and richness of the metallic veins which the goodness of
the Creator has been pleased to grant to those regions, I order and
command that in mines which may hereafter be discovered in a new
vein or without neighbors, these measurements be observed. 2d.
Along the thread, direction, or course of the vein, be it of gold,
silver, or any other metal, I grant to every miner, without
distinction of the discoverers (who have their reward already
assigned to them) two hundred Castilian varas, called 'varas de
medir,' measured on a level."
Lastly, in the first article, eleventh title, there are
expressed these terms:
"And because the capital of a single individual may not be
sufficient for great undertakings, while that of all the partners
may be, I will and command that such companies be encouraged,
promoted, and protected by all convenient measures, my viceroy
granting to those who may form such, every favor, aid, and
exemption which can be granted them according to the judgment and
discretion of the royal tribunal of mines, and without detriment to
the public and my royal Treasury."
In reference to the ownership of two square leagues which Senor
Castillero solicits as a colonist upon the surface of his mining
property for the purpose of supplying himself with the firewood
necessary for the reduction of ores (beneficio), the junta not
having the necessary information on the matter of which the supreme
government has abundance, his Excellency the president will decide
as he may think proper. In this view, the junta, in sending up to
your Excellency the petition of Senor Castillero, has no hesitation
in recommending it very efficaciously on account of the vital
importance of the undertaking and its incredible influence upon the
general good and prosperity of the Republic.
"The junta has the honor on this occasion to repeat to your
Excellency the assurances of its distinguished esteem and
consideration."
"God and Liberty. Mexico, May 14, 1846."
"VINCENTE SEGURA,
president"
Page 67 U. S. 52
"
Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction"
"MOST EXCELLENT SIR -- Having reported to his Excellency, the
president
ad interim of the Republic, your Excellency's
note of the 14th inst., with which you were pleased to transmit,
with a recommendation, the petition of Senor Don Andres Castillero
for the encouragement of the quicksilver mine which he has
discovered in the mission of Santa Clara in Upper California, his
Excellency has been pleased to approve in all its parts the
agreement made with that individual in order to commence the
working of said mine, and on this day the corresponding
communication is made to the Minister of Exterior Relations and
government to issue the proper orders respecting that which is
contained in the 8th proposition for the grant of lands in that
department."
"I repeat to your Excellency the assurance of my esteem."
"God and Liberty. Mexico, 20 May, 1846."
"BECERRA"
"To His Excellency, D. Vicente Segura, president of the Junta
for the Encouragement of Mining."
"
Ministry of Justice and Public
Instruction"
"I this day say to His Excellency, Don Vicente Segura, president
of the Junta for the Encouragement of Mining, what follows:"
"MOST EXCELLENT SIR -- Having reported to His Excellency, the
president
ad interim, your Excellency's note of the
fourteenth inst., with which you were pleased to transmit, with a
recommendation, the petition of Senor Don Andres Castillero for the
encouragement of the quicksilver mine which he has discovered in
the Mission of Santa Clara in Upper California, his Excellency has
been pleased to approve in all its parts the agreement made with
that individual, in order to commence the working of said mine, and
on this day the corresponding communication has been made to the
Minister of Exterior Relations and government to issue the proper
orders respecting that which is contained in the eighth proposition
for the grant of lands in that Department."
"And I have the honor to transcribe it to your Excellency, to
the end that, with respect to the petition of Senor Castillero, to
which his Excellency, the president
ad interim, has
thought proper to accede, that there be granted to him as a
colonist two square leagues
Page 67 U. S. 53
upon the land of his mining possession, your Excellency will be
pleased to issue the orders corresponding."
"I repeat to your Excellency the assurances of my consideration
and esteem."
"God and Liberty. Mexico, May 20, 1846."
"BECERRA"
"To His Excellency, the Minister of Exterior Relations."
"
Ministry of Exterior Relations, government and
Police"
"MOST EXCELLENT SIR -- His Excellency the Illustrious Minister
of Justice, in an official communication of the 20th instant, says
to me that which I copy:"
" Excellent Sir -- I today say to his Excellency Don Vicent
Segura, president of the Junta for the Encouragement of Mining,
that which follows:"
" 'Most Excellent Sir: -- Having reported to his Excellency the
president
ad interim the note of your Excellency of the
14th instant, with which you were pleased to transmit, with a
recommendation, the petition of Senor Don Andres Castillero for the
encouragement of the quicksilver mine which he has discovered in
the mission of Santa Clara in Upper California, his Excellency has
been pleased to approve, in all its parts, the agreement made with
that person to commence the exploration of that mine, and on this
date the corresponding communication is made to the Ministry of
Exterior Relations and government, that it may issue the proper
orders relative to what is contained in the eighth proposition,
with respect to the granting of lands in that Department.'"
" And I have the honor to enclose it to your Excellency to the
end that, with respect to the petition of Senor Castillero, to
which his Excellency the president
ad interim has thought
proper to accede, that as a colonist there be granted to him two
square leagues upon the land of his mining possession, your
Excellency will be pleased to issue the orders corresponding."
" I repeat to your Excellency &c."
" Wherefore I transcribe it to your Excellency in order that, in
conformity with what is prescribed by the laws and disposition upon
colonization, you may put Senor Castillero in possession of the two
square leagues which are mentioned."
" God and liberty. Mexico, May 23, 1846."
"CASTILLO LANZAS"
" His Excellency the governor of the Department of Californias
"
Page 67 U. S. 54
To the dispatch of Castillo Lanzas, the Minister of Relations,
when it was filed by the claimants, the following certificate of
Jesus Vejar was appended:
"I, Jesus Vejar, a notary public, hereby certify and attest that
the foregoing authentic instrument, signed by his Excellency, the
Minister of Foreign Relations, government and Police, Castillo
Lanzas, has been respected under that signature, and obeyed by the
Mexican authorities that governed in Upper California in the year
eighteen hundred and forty-six, according to insertions which the
said authorities made of the said instrument in acts which they
passed upon the subject of which they treat, and which I certify to
have seen, and for this reason that signature in the said
instrument should be esteemed as authentic and signed in the
handwriting of his Excellency, the Minister, and as, also, by
proceedings that have passed under my observation, Senor Don Andres
Castillero recognized it."
"And at the instance of the Messrs. Barron, Forbes & Co., I
have placed hereon my signet, and sign it in Tepic, on this 1st day
of March, 1850."
"JESUS VEJAR"
"We, the undersigned, First Constitutional alcalde and notary
public, hereby certify and attest that the foregoing signet and
signature which Don Jesus Vejar, a Notary, generally uses in all
the acts is that performed by him."
"This we certify in Tepic, this 1st day of March, 1850."
"LORETO CORONA"
"EUSEBIO FERNANDEZ"
To authenticate the documents further, the claimants brought to
San Francisco and there examined Castillo y Lanzas, who in 1846 was
Prime Minister of Mexico, and had charge of the Department of
Exterior and Interior Relations; Manuel Couto, Secretary of the
Fonda de Mineria and Member of the junta de Fomento; Jose Maria de
Besoco, Member of the junta; Blas Balcarcel, Member of the junta,
and Director of the Mining College; Antonio del Castillo, Professor
of Mineralogy and Secretary of the junta; Jose Maria Yrrisarri,
Keeper of the Archives in the Ministry of Justice; Mariano Mariano,
clerk in the Ministry of Justice, and A. Q. de Velasco, clerk in
the Ministry of
Page 67 U. S. 55
Relations. These witnesses testified that the documents produced
were genuine; that they knew them to be true copies of such as were
registered in the books of the several departments, and that they
corresponded perfectly with the borradors existing in other cases.
Some of them swore to their personal knowledge of the fact that the
documents were issued and the records of them made up at the times
when they respectively bore date. By some of them was proved
Castillero's exhibition of quicksilver ores to the junta and the
College of Mining, the assays of it, and the results. Their
testimony also showed that a report to the Congress was made and
printed in the fall of 1846, in which Castillero's discovery of
quicksilver in California was referred to at some length.
Francisco Martinez Negrete, a merchant residing at Guadalajara,
was called to explain the circumstances attending the sale of
barras and other transactions of Castillero with Barron, Forbes
& Co.
The claimants introduced divers letters, addressed by their
counsel, to the president of the United States, the Secretary of
state, and the Attorney General, together with some of the replies
by those officers, in which were discussed,
inter alia,
the regularity and propriety of taking depositions in Mexico.
In the year 1857, and while this cause was pending in the
district court, process was issued requiring Mr. Davidson, a banker
of San Francisco, to produce a package of letters which had been
deposited with him by Henry Laurencel and James Alexander Forbes,
subject to their joint order. He did so; the package was opened;
the letters were read, and became a part of this case. The
handwriting of the several parties, by whom they purport to be
written, was proved by several witnesses. The letters were as
follow:
"Tepic, May 11, 1846"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I wrote to you at great length on the 15th
ultimo by the Rev. Mr. Macanamara, who intends visiting California,
and who proceeded to Mazatlan in order to procure a passage; but he
is still there, and there is every probability that he will go by
the vessel which takes this. I need not repeat what I have already
said, but it
Page 67 U. S. 56
may not be amiss, in case my letter not reaching you, to state
that its object was to request of you to procure as correct
information as you could respecting the quicksilver mine or mines
lately said to be discovered in California, one of which you
mention as being worked by Mr. Castillero. If quicksilver mines of
value are discovered, it would be of immense interest for Mexico,
as owing to the scarcity and high price of this article, the poorer
silver mines of Mexico cannot be worked. I therefore beg to request
your kind attention to this letter."
"I am, my dear sir, your most obedient servant,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"Addressed: James A. Forbes, Esq."
"British Vice Consul, California"
"Endorsed: Alex. Forbes, May 11, 1846, relative to quicksilver
mine. No. 1."
"September 2, 1846"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I am much obliged to you for your offer to
procure for me more information respecting the quicksilver mines,
and I hope they may turn out to be of value. Anything certain which
you may give me about them will be very interesting, as our mining
establishments in this country must greatly be benefited by the
abundance of quicksilver, and which is now scarce and dear here. I
understand Castanedo is still in Mexico. Does not one of these
mines belong to him, or has he disposed of it?"
"I am, my dear sir, yours very truly,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"J. A. Forbes, Esq."
"I received your power of attorney to James Murray, Esq., and
forwarded it by last packet."
"Endorsed: Alex. Forbes, September 2, 1846, relative to
quicksilver mine. No. 2."
"(In pencil) -- A. Forbes, private, 1st and 2d Sept., 1846."
"Tepic, January 7, 1847"
"JAMES A. FORBES, Esq., California,"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I had the pleasure to receive your very obliging
letter of the 29th of October last, which chiefly relates to the
mine of quicksilver about which I wrote you at so much length by
Mr. Macnamara. I had previous to the receipt of your letter been in
treaty
Page 67 U. S. 57
with D. Andres Castillero respecting this mine, and on the
arrival of Mr. Macnamara with the powers from the other
proprietors, the treaty was much facilitated, and I am now happy to
inform you that I have contracted for the 'Habilitation' of the
mine, and have also purchased a part of Mr. Castillero's 'Barras,'
all of which will be made known to you by Mr. Walkinshaw, who goes
to California as my attorney and agent for the examination and
working of the mines. Mr. Walkinshaw will wait upon you as soon
after his arrival as possible, and will show you all the documents,
and ask your advice and assistance in carrying out my views."
"It is needless for me to say more, than that I count on you as
a friend who will lend your best assistance to bring this
negotiation to a good account, and as you inform me that you are
the proprietor of two 'Barras,' it will be for your interest and
that of all others concerned, that every means may be used to make
the most of it."
"I have sent up a small sum of money to make a beginning, and if
Mr. Walkinshaw is of opinion that the business ought to be carried
on to a large extent, the necessary apparatus will be ordered, and
ample funds sent to carry on the business properly."
"I have for the present only sent one hundred and fourteen iron
bottles, but I can get a large quantity in this country when they
may be required."
"Mr. Walkinshaw will inform you that everything is left open
respecting the interest which he and others may take in this
enterprise, and I trust you will also leave to me the regulation of
the affair which must depend on after prospects. For the present, I
wish no one to run any risk or to incur any expense but myself,
which, however, you must be aware will be very considerable; but if
the mine turns out well, there will be sufficient for all."
"I, in conclusion, beg leave to recommend most strongly my
friend Mr. Walkinshaw to your best attentions and assistance, and I
am sure you will find him most worthy of your confidence."
"I am, my dear sir, yours, most sincerely,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"James A. Forbes, Esq., California."
"Endorsed: Alex. Forbes, relative to mine of quicksilver, Jan'y
7, 1847. No. 5."
"Monterey, Oct. 1, 1847"
"MY DEAR SIR -- You will no doubt be surprised to hear of my
being in Monterey, and I am so myself. I, however, resolved to
Page 67 U. S. 58
take a trip to this country, which I have so long wished to
visit, and arrived last afternoon in the
William, where I
have been kindly received by the authorities, and no difficulty of
any kind thrown in my way."
"I have sent to Mr. Alden to come over here, if he can, and take
some people to the mine which I have brought with me, and it is
very probable I shall accompany him, when I shall have the pleasure
to see you."
"Mr. Walkinshaw has come with me, but without his family. He has
been very ill all the voyage, and is now on shore in a very weak
state, but I hope he will soon recover. I have a thousand things to
say to you, but must wait till I have the pleasure of seeing
you."
"Please inform the good Padre Real of my arrival, and tell him I
don't write him, as I am a bad scribe at Castillano, but that I
shall soon be at his domicile."
"Believe me to be, my dear sir, yours, very sincerely,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"James A. Forbes, Esq."
"We have had thirty-two days' passage."
"The American Army, under Gen. Scott, was within six leagues of
the City of Mexico. 10,000 men -- and a battle was daily expected.
The Mexican say they have 32,000."
"Endorsed: Alex Forbes, on his arrival at Monterey, Oct. 1st,
1847. No. 3."
"(In pencil) -- Alex. Forbes, Monterey."
"Mina, 19th Nov., 1847"
"JAMES A. FORBES, Esq.,"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I wrote you the other day, which did not find
you at home. I am still here preparing the apparatus for making a
better trial of the ores, but as Mr. Wallis, the artizan, is
unwell, we go on but slowly. I am also very anxious to have the
mine cleared out and put in a proper working state before I leave
it, and for this purpose we have been sinking a 'Plan' at the
'Respaldo Alto' in order to run a 'Testero' across the vein, and to
discover the value and abundance of the ores in its whole width. In
doing this, we have most unexpectedly found that in this 'plan'
there are no cinnabar whatever, although over it, in the upper part
of the vein, there are ores. This puzzles us greatly, but we hope
that in cutting
Page 67 U. S. 59
across we will fall in again with ores towards the 'Respaldo
Bajo.' Can this mine be a 'Manto?' I must verify that, and so must
you and the Padre with your own eyes. I see very good ores in the
upper part of the mine in all directions, but why does it get into
Borra lower down? The Plan is about five varas lower down than when
you and the Padre wrought, and on the other side of the vein. The
people will go on cutting across, and when they again get into
'Metal' I will send you a man on purpose. I am confident we shall
find them, but there will always be about two varas or more of the
vein next the 'Respaldo Alto' without ores; at least I think so,
and hope nothing worse may be the case. We still see good ores on
the upper part of the vein near the 'Respaldo Bajo,' where you and
the Padre took out your ores."
"I have been somewhat alarmed about this Borra, but I hope there
will ultimately be no cause for this; yet I have thought it right
to inform you and the Padre, and have no doubt but that my express
carrier will in a few days carry better news."
"I am, my dear sir, yours very truly,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"Endorsed:"
"B."
"ALEX. FORBES, Mine of Almaden, Nov. 19, 1847"
"Addressed: Sr. D. DIEGO A. FORBES,"
"Ausente, Al Sr. PADRE REAL, Santa Clara"
"Mine, 24 November, 1847"
"For Mr. J. A. FORBES and the PADRE REAL, Santa Clara."
"We have at last found the vein or 'cinta' of ores which we were
looking for, so that I have now the pleasure to inform you and the
good Padre of our luck, as I promised I should do; but I fear this
mine will be reduced to this
cinta, and the great body of
it will be
tepetate muerto; but perhaps the
cinta
may be wider below than it is above. To see whether this is so or
not has been the object of our labors
since discovering the
proper direction of the vein of the whole mine, which
discovery makes everything more plain. This direction was before
entirely mistaken, of which and other things we will have
a great deal to talk about when we meet. When Mr. Walkinshaw
arrives and takes a look at the mine, I think we shall take a turn
to the Mission. I expect him to be at Bernal's Rancho this
afternoon."
"I may say now, that it is impossible we can go off the main
vein
Page 67 U. S. 60
of the mine, as it is entirely different from the walls
(respaldos) they being of a hard rock, of quite different
character, whereas the vein is quite soft and easily distinguished.
All we have to do is to look for the
cintas which have got
ores, which in my opinion will be reduced to one not very
wide."
"A. FORBES"
"New Almaden, January 19, 1848"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I am very much obliged to you for your very
prompt attention to the business in hand, and return the espediente
immediately."
"I am much surprised at the result of your assay, and shall try
what I have."
"It will, of course, be better to say nothing about it,
particularly as I have already written to Monterey that there is no
mine, nor does there appear to be any quantity of this kind of
stuff. I hope soon to see the alcalde."
"My dear sir, yours truly,"
"A. FORBES"
"New Almaden, 1st February, 1848"
"JAMES A. FORBES, Esq."
"MY DEAR SIR -- I received an express last evening giving me all
the news from Mexico, and informing me of the
Natalia
being about to sail for the Mexican coast and by which I have taken
the opportunity to forward letters to Mexico."
"I have had the imprudence to open your dispatch. They told me
that it contained newspapers, and as I knew General Miller's hand,
and it being a public letter, and that perhaps it might contain
letters for me which I could not get if sent on, in time to allow
me to write (if so required) by the
Natalia; for all these
reasons. I broke open the packet. But although I know you will not
be offended at what I have done, yet I would rather not have done
so, as I think nothing whatever can justify one in opening directed
letters to others without their previous sanction."
"You will find by the
Alcanal of Guada and the
Iris what is going on in Mexico, and what my friends in
Monterey write is to the same purpose. The present party, Pena y
Pena, Herrera, Otero, Bustamente & Co., are by far the most
respectable party in the Republic, and there is a better chance for
their doing something better either for peace or war than ever that
most infamous rascal Santa Anna and his party, would have done. Now
that they have
Page 67 U. S. 61
got rid of that blackguard, there are better prospects than
before, but the present party want energy, and the third party, the
Puros, (Democrats,) will most probably upset them, when greater
confusion than ever will ensue."
"You will find that the American president is getting more
courage in prosecuting the war than before, and has recalled Mr.
Trist, desiring the Mexicans to send to Washington if they wanted
peace. I have, as you know, always thought that on their getting
possession of a great part of Mexico, and their volunteers
covering themselves with glory, the war would become
popular, and they would
go ahead and possess themselves of
the whole of the Mexican Republic -- particularly when they have
got over the fears of European interference."
"You may now take my opinion a little farther and set down
Mexico as already, virtually, a part and portion of the Union,
alias the U.S."
"It is said that Gen. Yanes goes to Tepic with 4,000 men; he is
a superior kind of a man, and a most intimate friend of ours, so
that our interests there will be protected in as far as depends
upon him."
"As Ascona's letter gives a very good summary of the news, I
send it for your perusal."
"This being a rainy day, and being desirous to communicate what
I know in the shape of news, I inflict upon you this long
epistle."
"I am, my dear sir, yours, very truly,"
"ALEX FORBES"
"Please explain all this news to my good friend the Padre."
"You will see by Gen. Miller's list what a crash there has been
in England. None of our friends are in this black list. Liverpool
and Glasgow seem to suffer most."
"I am, my dear sir, yours &c.,"
"A. F."
"Addressed: James A. Forbes, Esq. &c., Santa Clara."
"Endorsed: Alex. Forbes, New Almaden, 1st Feb., 1848. No.
7,"
"Tepic, April 11, 1849"
"DEAR SIR -- We beg leave to refer you to Mr. Alex. Forbes'
letter of the 9th inst., respecting the arrangement of the affairs
of the mine of New Almaden, and beg to recommend that negotiation
to your best care and management until we can forward the
necessary
Page 67 U. S. 62
instructions for your government. You may now rely on this mine
being worked to the utmost of its capabilities of production and
sale of quicksilver on the arrival of the apparatus, and we hope to
make up for the delay which circumstances have hitherto prevented
this important concern from being productive. We shall soon have
the pleasure of sending you a list of the company of which the
'habilitadores' are composed. The house of Jecker, Torre & Co.,
of Mexico and Mazatlan, and our own are chiefly interested, and as
Don Ysidoro de la Torre has gone to Europe, he will concert with
Mr. Barron everything which can tend to the successful development
of this enterprise."
"We are, dear sir, your most obedient servants,"
"BARRON, FORBES & Co."
"Jas. Alex. Forbes, Esq., San Francisco."
"Endorsed: Barron, Forbes & Co., C., relative to
habilitacion of New Almaden. April 11, 1849."
"Tepic, May, 20, 1849"
"SIR -- From certain circumstances which you have communicated
to us, it may be necessary to purchase some lands in the vicinity
of the mine and hacienda of New Almaden, in California. We hereby
empower you to make such purchases as may be necessary to the
secure possession of this mine and hacienda or to effect such other
arrangement as you may deem necessary for that purpose -- the price
of such purchase not to exceed five thousand dollars, without
consulting with us upon the subject."
"We are, sir, your most obedient servants,"
"BARRON, FORBES & Co."
"James A. Forbes, Esq."
"Addressed: James A. Forbes, Esq., California."
"Endorsed: Barron, Forbes & Co., authorizing the purchases
of land. J."
"
[Very Private]"
"Memorandum of the Documents which Don Andres Castillero will
have to procure in Mexico:"
"1st. The full approbation and ratification by the supreme
government of all the acts of the alcalde of the District of
San
Page 67 U. S. 63
Jose, in Upper California -- in the possession given by the said
officer of the quicksilver mine situated in his jurisdiction, to
Don Andres Castillero in December, 1845."
"2d. An absolute and unconditional title of two leagues of land
to Don Andres Castillero, specifying the following boundaries: on
the north by the lands of the Rancho of San Vicente and Los
Capitancillos, on the east, south and west by vacant lands or
vacant highlands."
"3d. The dates of these documents will have to be arranged by
Don Andres. The testimony of them taken in due form, and besides
certified to by the American Minister in Mexico and transmitted to
California as soon as possible."
"Tepic, May 27th, 1849."
"Endorsed: Copy of memorandum left with Alex. Forbes for
Castillero, in Tepic, May 27, 1849. I."
"San Francisco, October 28, 1849"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I have been detained at this place until the
present moment, occupied in completing the arrangements explained
to B., F. & Co., under the date of yesterday, having raised the
sum of $27,180 67 1/4 from Probst, S. & Co., and Webster
alone."
"I must again call your attention to the importance of my
suggestions relative to the perfecting the title of the mine of New
Almaden, and without entering now into the particulars already
explained to yourself and to Mr. Alexander Forbes verbally, I
desire only to impress upon your mind the vast importance of
securing from the supreme government of Mexico the documents
comprised in the memorandum left with Mr. Alexander Forbes when I
was in Tepic, for Castillero. By my other letters by this
conveyance you will be informed of all the particulars of the
transactions that have occurred recently in the affairs of the
mine, and you will see the risk in which this valuable property is
placed by the delay that has occurred in the acquisition of the
documents referred to."
"I remain, my dear sir, yours, sincerely,"
"JAMES ALEX. FORBES"
"William Forbes, Esq., Tepic."
"Endorsed: Copy letter to William Forbes (private) from San
Francisco, October 28, 1849. III."
"[Private] Santa Clara, October 30, 1849"
"MY DEAR SIR -- By my letters to yourself and to B., F. &
Co.,
Page 67 U. S. 64
from the 22d to this day, you will be informed of the great
danger in which the mine of New Almaden has been thrown, and the
disagreeable and vexatious proceedings caused me by Mr. Walkinshaw
and his associates in their denunciation of the mine for
abandonment. You will, however, have the satisfaction of knowing
also that I am to be reinstated in the possession of that property,
both mine and hacienda, in two or three days hence by judicial
process."
"Although I feel much gratified at my successful defense of the
case, yet I am extremely apprehensive of further difficulties in
the event that those parties should succeed in purchasing the part
of the land of the Berreyesas that they have offered to purchase
(which embraces the mine and hacienda) for twenty-five thousand
dollars -- just five times the amount you all authorized me to pay
for the same identical tract!"
"Figure to yourself the position of the affair of the mine if I
do not strike boldly at our opponents by purchasing the land at a
higher price than they have offered to pay for it, and by thus
frustrating their plans, secure the mine and hacienda from further
risk."
"You will now readily perceive the great importance of my advice
to you to purchase a part both of the lands of Cook and of the
Berreyesas. You were of the opinion that this measure would not be
necessary, in view of the supposed facility of getting the title to
the mine perfected in Mexico."
"It is now more than five months since it was decided that
Castillero should procure the necessary documents in that city, and
that they should be sent to me as soon as possible. On the one
hand, I depend upon the precarious and illegal possession of the
mine, granted by the alcalde of this district to Castillero, who
was, in reality, the judge of the quantity of land given by the
alcalde; and on the other side I am attacked by the purchasers of
the same land, declared by Castillero himself to comprise the mine.
In the absence of the all-important document of the ratification of
the possession so given, I am compelled to purchase the part of the
land of the Berreyesas which Walkinshaw and his party have offered
to purchase, and you must not be surprised if I shall go far beyond
the price that they have offered, because it is the only mode of
securing the title to the mine and hacienda, for if Castillero
should fail in getting the desired documents from Mexico, it is the
sole mode of safety of this property."
"I shall endeavor to procrastinate as far as possible this
purchase,
Page 67 U. S. 65
and moreover to frustrate all the plans of Walkinsaw and his
associates for accomplishing their purchase, and I do entreat you
to use every effort to send me the document of the ratification of
possession of the mine and the grant of land thereon at the very
earliest opportunity, properly authenticated and certified, as
explained by me when I was in Tepic. In one of my pre-cited letters
I requested you to send me a certified power of attorney from B.,
F. & Co. to you authorizing you, as the representative of the
Compania de Abio, to appoint other attorneys in fact under
you."
"The object of this is to be able to refute the allegations of
the lawyer of Walkinshaw that you had no power to authorize me to
take charge of the mine."
"I remain, my dear sir, yours, truly,"
"JAS. ALEX. FORBES"
"Alexander Forbes, Esq."
"Endorsed: Copy of a letter to Alexander Forbes (private),
October 28, 1849. II."
"Tepic, 30th November, 1849"
"JAMES A. FORBES, ESQ., Santa Clara"
"DEAR SIR -- We had the pleasure to write you on the 13th inst.
by the steamer
Oregon, the chief object of which was to
enclose a notarial copy of the grant of land by the Mexican
government to Castillero, and which we hope has come safe to
hand."
"We have perused with much interest and attention the whole of
your letters and documents received by the steamers, the
California and
Panama, and we beg you will excuse
us from minutely entering into a reply to those valuable and
important papers. Suffice it to say that we not only approve of
your proceedings, but have to give you our most sincere thanks for
the most energetic and able conduct in the whole affair, and we
have to request that you will not hesitate continuing to take such
steps as may seem to you fit for securing the mine from all
attempts made by evil-minded persons to impede its being freely
worked for its legitimate owners."
"We are glad to find that you had not been obliged to purchase
Berreyesa's land. This is certainly a most important point, and we
trust that the document sent will be of great consequence in that
respect, but you will of course take care that no risk is run,
Page 67 U. S. 66
and you will do in this affair as your best judgment will direct
you, keeping in view that at all hazard and at whatever cost the
property of the mine must be secured. Castillero we expect will
soon be here from Lower California, and if anything can be done in
Mexico, he is the fittest person to procure what may be wanted. It
is incredible that Mr. Walkinshaw should lend himself to such
proceedings when he considered the very large capital invested in
this enterprise and when he well knows that by the mining laws, no
'denuncio' could possibly be heard under the circumstances in which
this mine has been occupied. We trust, however, that these vile
machinations will by your active proceedings be put an end to."
"We hope you will by the time this reaches you have got up at
least a part of the apparatus, and that some of it will be soon at
work. The price of quicksilver here still keeps up, and the supply
as yet not abundant. Everybody writes of the very high price it
bears in California, and we have no doubt you will in a short time
be able to supply the demand and to send us the surplus to San
Blas. Trusting to the continuance of your best exertions in behalf
of all concerned in the mine of New Almaden,"
"We are, dear sir, your most ob't servants,"
"BARRON, FORBES & CO."
"Endorsed: Barron, Forbes & Co., 30th Nov., 1849. No.
16."
"Tepic, 30th November, 1849"
"JAMES A. FORBES, ESQ., Santa Clara"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I have received your most valuable letters by
the two last steamers, 'California' and 'Panama,' the latest dates
being up to the 13th of the present month, and which gives the
agreeable notice of Walkinshaw's most villainous proceedings having
been upset. I hope you will forgive me for not entering minutely
into all the proceedings. But I can assure you that we all feel the
obligation we owe to you for the very able and decisive measures
you have adopted in the whole of this affair, and I recommend you
to proceed without fear of disapproval or waiting for instructions,
in taking such measures as shall preserve this valuable
'negociacion' from any risk from those unprincipled claimants who
have lately given you so much trouble, or from any other
proceedings which may take place; being sure that such proceedings
will be sanctioned by the company. We are quite of opinion
Page 67 U. S. 67
with you, that we should not be lulled into security from the
belief that other proceedings will not be resorted to, and that
principle will be acted upon, and every support from this will be
given to what you may point out as necessary."
"As you will not, I hope, have now to employ the large sum you
expected to do in the purchase of the Berreyesa's lands, you will
have a large amount of funds for the object of the mines. All the
drafts and orders for the value of gold have been honored."
"We are glad to learn that Mr. Probst has been so active in
assisting you, and it gives me in particular much pleasure to find
such a good understanding between you. I most earnestly hope the
same friendship will take place between you and Dr. Tobin."
"Notwithstanding the many difficulties you must have in
transporting the cargo of the Vicar of Bray, yet I hope a part of
the apparatus will soon be got up to supply the demand of the
placeres as well as to send us some here. It is of much importance
to realize as much as possible of the large capital which now lies
in the mine, laid out by the habilitadores, and to secure to the
owners of barras something
certain against an evil day
which may some time or other overtake us."
"In new countries nothing is very certain, and I, for one (and
in which I am sure you will agree with me) am most desirous to be
in possession and to see others in possession of at least a part of
the riches of this mine, which has cost me and others so much
thought and so much labor. This I, as an individual, and for the
good of all, beg leave to impress strongly upon your
attention."
"I am, my dear sir, yours, very sincerely,"
"ALEXANDER FORBES"
"James. A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara."
"Endorsed: No. 8"
"[
Very private] Tepic, December 1, 1849"
"MY DEAR SIR -- The document sent up to you by the last steamer
for the grant of the lands to D. Andres Castillero, was, by
mistake, not the one meant to be sent. I find now that the proper
one was registered by me in Monterey, and the original deposited
there."
"The one sent you was directed at the foot to the Governor of
California, and the one deposited at Monterey was directed to D.
Andres Castillero. The difference is that by one the delivery by
the
Page 67 U. S. 68
governor was perhaps necessary to make the grant valid, whereas
the other being addressed directly to D. Andres did not require
that formality, nor was any other proceeding necessary, thus making
it a better document than the greater part of the other titles for
lands in California. I fear you may have made use of the notarial
copy sent -- if not, you will of course apply for the copy of the
one at Monterey. I however, have hopes that your well known
cleverness will have enabled you to find out this mistake, which
would show itself, if you had applied for the document from
Monterey. And at all events you may be enabled to withdraw the one
sent and substitute the other; either, however, I take to be as
good as the usual California titles, few of which have been
officially delivered or sanctioned by the local authorities."
"Another difficulty however occurs. A document was made out in
the City of Mexico when I purchased the Bars from Castillero, for
the purpose of securing his consent and approval of the contract of
Habilitacion; in this document is also inserted the grant of the
two sitios, being an exact copy of what has been sent you, and
directed to the governor. All this will show you how that matter
stands. And as I think this document may be of use to you, I send a
copy of the whole, leaving you to your own good judgment, to make
such use of this document, and of what I communicate, as you shall
think proper."
"I shall send the document alluded to in a separate cover to
Probst, Smith & Co."
"I am, my dear sir, yours very truly,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"There is an approval of the Habilitacion in all the documents
of the sale of the other Bars."
"Endorsed: No. 9"
"[
Private] Tepic, Jan'y 7, 1850"
"JAMES A. FORBES, Esq., Santa Clara."
"MY DEAR SIR -- I have received by Acapulco and Mexico, along
with your other correspondence, your private letter to me, of the
25th and 28th of November, and beg to refer you to the letters of
B., F. & Co. on the business of the mine."
"I am very sorry indeed to see that there is likely to be a
difference between you and Dr. Tobin. This is a circumstance which
may lead to very bad consequences, and it is strange that Dr.
Tobin
Page 67 U. S. 69
should throw obstacles in the way when he sees you surrounded
with so many already, and which can only tend to lessen his own
profits."
"It is clearly to be understood that no verbal agreement was
made here with anyone, nor any promises given which is not
consistent with the contract as it is written. His brother never
was engaged; on the contrary, he told me that his brother went to
see what could be done in California, and if nothing offered he
would send him back to take our portraits. This might have been
said as a joke, but shows that no employment at the mine was
intended for him."
"No maintenance for himself (Dr. T) or family was ever intended.
He looked out here for a cook and took up one for that purpose. His
new contract is much more advantageous than his former one with me,
as he has his percentage on the whole two-thirds without
limitation. I have read over this second contract with care, and it
appears to me quite clear in respect to his charge at the
hacienda."
" ART. 2. The aforesaid James Tobin agrees to direct the
operations of the extraction of the quicksilver to the best of his
abilities, and is to have the said operations under his exclusive
management."
"This does not show that he shall have the general management of
the hacienda."
"One of the causes for altering the contract, and for canceling
the limitation of his profits was to make the contract less onerous
as to the supply of ores, people and necessaries, which you will
perceive by the 4th article. You are only bound to supply
'as
amply as circumstances will allow,' whereas, by the original
contract with me, it was obligatory on us to supply all those which
he might require."
"This, in the present state of things, is, I consider, of much
consequence."
"This is my opinion of what Mr. Tobin has a
right to
demand, but I am sure you will not stand on mere points of right or
risk the interests of negotiation for trifling pretensions which
may be put forth. Much must be sacrificed in principles to
conciliate a troublesome person, and I still most earnestly hope
that your prudence will enable you to keep up cordiality between
you. I shall write my opinion to Dr. Tobin, and give him my
strongest advice to lay aside all vexatious pretensions, and enjoin
him to proceed in good will and amity, which can only tend to his
own interests and those concerned in the mine. I hope he will
listen to my advice."
"The amount of capital is getting to be enormous, and the
company are beginning to get astonished. If, however, you can
once
Page 67 U. S. 70
get under way all will be well, if you could only get a couple
of cylinders up in any temporary way. They would supply the
placeres."
"Whenever you have more than is wanted for that, you will, of
course, send it down here, more or less, by the steamer."
"Strange as it appears to me, a Mexican merchant, 'Lizardo,'
sends up one hundred and thirty-six flasks by this steamer, and
between two and three hundred go by next conveyance. It is shipped
by B., F. & Co., as agents! We have not one bottle here, but
there are some still of the California quicksilver in Sonora."
"I am glad you have taken young Mr. Thom in your house; please
remember me to him, as also to Mrs. Forbes and your family."
"I am, my dear sir &c., yours truly,"
"A. FORBES."
"James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara."
"Webster will go up with a pacatillo by this steamer if he can
get his things on board. If you can do anything for him you will
oblige me."
"A. F."
"By the tenor of your letter, I have hopes that you will have
got rid of the villainous proceedings of Walkinshaw and his
party."
"I hope the document which now goes up (the Habilitacion
&c.) will be useful. Castillero is somewhere in Lower
California. We have not heard from him, but he must be somewhere
about La Poz."
"Mr. Spence of Monterey writes me of date of the 22d Nov. that
he had advanced to Mr. Walkinshaw about $2,000, and informs me that
although he had written him several times, he had received no
answer, and that neither principal nor interest had been paid. I
have advised Mr. Spence to inquire of you respecting this
transaction."
"I hope Mr. Probst, with your assistance, if necessary, will
push the claim of the Mazatlan debt against Walkinshaw."
"I have a letter from Alden, in which he speaks of Walkinshaw in
strong terms. I hope you will keep poor Alden in your service; he
speaks of his former service not being properly paid for, and of
his accounts not being settled."
"Endorsed: No. 10. "
Page 67 U. S. 71
"Santa Clara, 29th Jan'y, 1850"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I have rec'd the copy of the contract of
Habilitacion and as you request me to address myself to B., F.
& Co., on the affairs of the mine, I have now written to them
upon this particular subject to which I request your earnest
attention, not as regards the habilitacion, but another document
which you know of."
"I am, my dear sir, yours faithfully,"
"JAS. ALEX. FORBES"
"[
Very Private] Tepic, February 3, 1850."
"James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara."
"MY DEAR SIR -- I had the pleasure to write you of date the 7th
January, which went by last month's steamer, to which I refer. I
have since received your letters by Reyes dated the 27th and 31st
of December, and 8th of January. I shall not go minutely into the
whole valuable information you give me, nor into the statements so
very interesting to myself and those concerned in the mine of New
Almaden. By those communications I have every reason to believe
that by your indefatigable and energetic proceedings you will be
enabled to defeat all the vile attempts which have been made to rob
the legitimate owners of their property."
"The conduct of Dr. Tobin is inexplicable, but I think I can
perceive that you are somewhat of opinion that he may be heard and
protected by the Company, but I will at once put you right upon
that point, and assure you such will not be the case. All here are
most indignant at his conduct. You must and will be supported, and
all I wish and hope for on your part is that you act in a manner
towards him which may enable you if possible to avoid a rupture and
contentions which may lead to bad results. You say that Dr. Tobin
comes down in the next steamer; if so, he will be here in a few
days. This I shall not be sorry for, for the matter would then be
soon settled. He would most assuredly not be asked to return, nor
even permitted. He has no right to desert his post, and I hope you
have not given him leave of absence. I have no doubt but that you
could, with Gay, Alden, and the other person you mention, do well
enough for a time, and easily put up a part of the apparatus and
work it until a proper scientific person can be procured and sent
up to you."
"It so happens that almost the whole of the 'accionistas'
and
Page 67 U. S. 72
'aviadores' of the mine will be here in a few days. Mr. Barron
is now here, and is attorney for those absent. La Torre comes here
to visit Mr. B. Castillero has returned and is also here, so am I
and William Forbes. This leaves out only the four California bars,
and I think I may venture to act for you, if necessary, as you
verbally told me I might. This will give us power to deal with Dr.
Tobin if he comes this way, and to regulate any other matters which
may be thought necessary. For my own part, I have no power, as you
know, the management being in the hands of others, and therefore I
beg you will take all I say as purely
private and
confidential, without attaching any authority to my
suggestions. But of course, as I am a proprietor, and in the
confidence of the managers and other proprietors, my opinions and
advice may be worth attending to and be of some use to yourself as
well as to them. I shall continue to write to you as long as I
remain here, and will be most happy at all times to hear from
you."
"I wrote by last packet to Dr. Tobin as a friend, and attempted
to conciliate him in a mild way; perhaps he makes too much of this
letter, and I think it better to send you a copy to enable you to
see exactly what I have said to him. His leaguing himself with Mr.
Walkinshaw is too bad. Reyes has told me of all that has passed,
which is almost incredible. I am glad to find that you are
peaceably to get rid of Mr. W. Mr. Tobin has sent a plan of his
proposed establishment; this you must on no account allow to be put
in execution. You are aware that it would never do to go about
large magnificent works at once, particularly as you know the whole
must be at the cost of the 'aviadores' and left for the proprietors
at the end of the contract. You are acting for the aviadores, and
it is your duty to restrict the works within reasonable bounds, and
to only erect temporary and absolutely necessary works until some
funds shall be realized from the mine. However desirous that it may
be that the works should be set up by Dr. Tobin, yet if he will not
go on in good faith, or if he attempts to injure the company, or
refuses to obey your just commands, and resists your authority, or
stops or impedes the works, and thereby breaking his contract, I
think he may be discharged by
you, always taking care that
you have a very clear case, and nothing left in doubt to cause
litigation. But this is only my private opinion. I have no
authority to empower you to do so, but it would no doubt be
approved by the company, none of whom look favorably on the
Page 67 U. S. 73
Doctor's proceedings. The most effectual and safe way, however,
would be his coming here
without leave. He has not written
by last opportunity, nor will he be written to by this
steamer."
"I have every reason to believe that the documents you mention
will be
found in the City of Mexico, and as Mr. Castillero
will return there they will no doubt be procured, but we are at
some loss to know what is exactly wanted, and I beg you will, by
next steamer, give a sketch of the documents you allude to,
particularly a description of the limits of the grant. I think you
must not have received the information sent you of the existence of
the grant of the two sitios
directly to Castillero, and
registered in Monterey, nor am I sure if this will mend the matter.
In a few days, however, we will again hear from you and act
accordingly."
"One last resort I will mention to you, and it is with great
repugnance that I do so, which is that if the Berreyesas were
unreasonable and intractable, or insist on the extension of their
lands to our hacienda, the company would be justified in promoting
the invalidation of their own title to their Rancho."
"If they make it over to anyone else, and particularly to our
enemies, certainly this course must be pursued. If no opposition or
disclosures are made, and if the American government turn out to be
liberal in conceding the Ranchos to the present holders, the
Berreyesas and others may be left in possession; but if active
measures were taken by an adverse party, many of the titles would
be worthless, and I have reason to think from what came to our
knowledge when I was in California, the title of the Berreyesas is
not of the best. This I throw out for your consideration, and I
should think these people would do themselves no good in opposing
you."
"We think at present that it may be the best place to get an
authenticated copy of the approval of the Mexican government of the
grant of three thousand varas given by the Alcade on giving
possession of the mine. As a doubt may have started as to whether
the alcalde, acting as the 'Juez de Mineria,' had a right to make
this grant, yet if approved by the government of Mexico before the
possession of the country by the Americans, there could be no doubt
on the subject. This takes in our hacienda, and unless opposed by
the Berreyesas would, I should think, settle the question."
"Castillero says such approval was given, and that on his
arrival
Page 67 U. S. 74
in Mexico he will procure a judicial copy of it. This is the
plan we shall adopt if we hear nothing from you to alter this
resolution."
"Since writing the foregoing, I have looked over your private
letter to Wm. Forbes, dated 18 October, and find you state the
limits or boundaries as follows:"
" The boundaries must be expressed as joining on the north and
northwest by lands of the ranchos de San Vicente and de los
Capitancillos, and on the east, south and west by Serainia or
'tierras baldias.'"
"Castillero is not certain of accomplishing this latter plan,
and thinks the first -- that is, the 3,000 varas, the best."
"There goes up by the steamer another bill against Mr.
Walkinshaw, and in favor of B., F. & Co., for $1,000, so that
Probst, Smith & Co., have in our favor and against him:"
By A. Forbes, accepted . . . . . . . . . $ 1,758
B., F. & Co., about. . . . . . . . . . . 10,000
B., F. & Co., bill . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000
-------
In all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12,758
"I am, my dear, sir yours, very truly,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara"
"I send you five Atlas newspapers."
"Endorsed: Private, A. F. 3d February, 1850. Answered 26th
February. No. 11."
"
[Private] New Almaden, February 26, 1850"
"ALEXANDER FORBES, ESQ.,"
"MY DEAR SIR -- Your favor of the 3d instant came duly to hand,
and in answer to that part of it relating to the documents sent up
to me in November, serving as titles to this property, I will again
address you
'por seperado.'"
"I really did have more faith in the tact and ability of
Castillero to perceive the important objects set forth in my
memorandum of what was to be done nine months ago, in Mexico, by
that eccentric individual, and that with the powerful influence
that he was to have exercised by the efficient aid that was to be
lent to him, he would meet with no obstacle to the attainment of
the important documents explained in that memorandum. But
Castillero has deceived himself, for he thought that boundaries
were not necessary, as I shall
Page 67 U. S. 75
presently show you. He succeeded in obtaining the grant of two
sitios to himself on the mining possession in Santa Clara while
that very act of possession declares that the mine is situated on
the lands of one Jose R. Berreyesa, five leagues distant from Santa
Clara, and you will at once perceive that such a discrepancy would
not fail to attract the attention of the U.S. Land Commissioners
and to put the case of the mine in great risk in the judicial
ordeal to which its title will be subjected."
"Without troubling you with what I have so many times written
and explained to you verbally on the importance of the acquisition
of the
document, I will only say now what it
must
be, and it is this:"
"1st. A full and complete ratification of all the acts of the
alcalde of this jurisdiction in the possession of the mine."
"2d. A full and unconditional grant to Castillero of two sitios
of land covering that mining possession, expressing the boundaries
stated by me in the memorandum I left with you in Tepic. Both of
these documents to be of the proper date, and placed in the proper
governmental custody in Mexico, and"
"3d. The necessary certified copies of them duly authenticated
by the American Minister in that capital, taken and sent to me at
the earliest possible moment."
"You will receive my advice of the 19th inst., regarding my
views of not supplying W., with any quicksilver."
"Yours sincerely,"
"JAS. ALEX. FORBES"
"Endorsed: Letter to A. F. Private, IV. February 26, 1850."
"Tepic, March 2, 1850"
"DEAR SIR -- We duly received your letters up to the 29th of
January, per steamer
Panama, which have had our best
attention, and as our friend, Don Ysidoro de la Torre of Mazatlan
has been appointed, and has consented to proceed by this steamer to
California, with full powers to act in behalf of all concerned, it
is needless to enter into any particulars respecting the various
matters contained in your letters, as you will be enabled
personally to communicate your views to him and to arrange
everything in the best manner possible. Mr. De la Torre came to
Tepic to meet Mr. Barron and the others concerned in this
negotiation, and it was deemed necessary that some of the partners
of the 'habilitacion'
Page 67 U. S. 76
should proceed to New Almaden in order to consult personally
with you, and to arrange respecting the future operations of this
enterprise, and Mr. De la Torre has been prevailed upon, at much
inconvenience to himself, to undertake the present charge."
"We are sure no one could be named more agreeable to you than
Mr. De la Torre, and have no doubt but that his presence will be
most useful in sanctioning and arranging a plan of future
operations, and of assisting in adjusting any difficulties which
now exist, particularly as he has the full authority of the
association to act as to him shall appear necessary. Mr. De la
Torre takes up with him Dr. Tobin, in the hopes that he will resume
his labors and act in conformity with his duty."
"Mr. Barron and Don Andres Castillero are about to proceed to
the City of Mexico, and will attend to what you have
recommended."
"Soliciting your kind attentions to our friend, Mr. De la Torre,
we are, dear sir, your most obedient servants,"
"BARRON, FORBES & CO."
"James A. Forbes, Esq., New Almaden"
"Endorsed: No. 12"
"Tepic, March 11, 1850"
"MY DEAR SIR -- The
Oregon's letters have just come up,
and I give this a chance of reaching San Blas before the arrival of
the Panama steamer. Mr. Barron and Castillero have gone off to
Mexico, and I write them today
respecting the document you know
of, which if possible will be procured. The news of your
having got up four cylinders gives us all much joy, and I gave the
good news to my friends. M. La Torre don't expect this -- unless he
knows by the steamer which touched at Mazatlan. You will perhaps
see him and Dr. Tobin before this reaches you, who both go by this
conveyance.
Let us have Quicksilver and all will be
well."
"I am most happy to hear you have found an abundant mine or
Limestone, this is of much importance. Your official letter about
the vessel will be forwarded to the Foreign Office."
"In great haste, yours truly."
"A. FORBES"
"Endorsed: Alex. Forbes, March 11th, No. 14."
"Tepic, April 7, 1850"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I wrote to you by the California, dated the 23d
February, and since then have received by the 'Oregon' yours of
Page 67 U. S. 77
the 19th of that month. I was very happy to hear that you had
got up some of the cylinders, and trust that you are at this time
distilling quicksilver. I hope Dr. Tobin will now attend without
any difficulty to the superintendence of the apparatus, and am sure
that you will on your part do everything in your power to promote
harmony and forward the interests of all concerned. You will, I
know, find great relief and pleasure by the arrival of your friend
La Torre. He will during his stay take much responsibility off your
shoulders, and from his decision and conciliatory disposition
assist in smoothing many of the difficulties which surround you.
Mr. Barron and Castillero have arrived in Mexico, and have every
prospect of finding the documents you are aware of, and which will,
of course, be forwarded as soon as possible."
"I am, my dear sir, yours, very truly,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"James A. Forbes, Esq., New Almaden."
"I forward a letter received from Mr. Murray, of the foreign
office."
"Addressed: James A. Forbes, Esq., New Almaden"
"Endorsed: Alex. Forbes, April 7, 1950"
"
[Private] Tepic, June 6, 1850"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the
28th of April by the steamer, but of course not in time to reply by
the one from Panama, which arrived the day after that from San
Francisco."
"I remark what you say of Dr. Tobin and the cylinders, which has
caused me some uneasiness, and I wait with anxiety to know how
those he is putting up himself will succeed, which we expect to do
by the steamer which ought to arrive at San Blas on the 10th
instant."
"I find that it has been deemed necessary to appoint an American
citizen as manager of the mine, and am most happy to know that this
meets with your approbation. This approval on your part I am quite
sure will be estimated as it deserves, and shows to those
interested in this enterprise that you do not hesitate to sacrifice
your own private interests for the general benefit of the concern.
For my own part, I feel most grateful and highly obliged, and the
members of the house of Barron, Forbes & Co. express strongly
the same feeling. "
Page 67 U. S. 78
"We are all convinced that whoever may be in the management of
the New Almaden will receive the assistance of your knowledge and
experience, and the company and proprietors cannot fail to be
sensible of your services. It gives me great pleasure to hear from
yourself as well as from M. La Torre that the closest friendship
had existed between you, and that both were animated by the same
desire of making the mine productive. I had the pleasure to know
Mr. Halleck at Monterey, and I think a better selection could not
have been made. I think he is a gentleman with whom you will be
much satisfied as manager of the mine, and who I have no doubt will
be glad to avail himself of your experience in whatever may be new
to him."
"I am very happy to hear that Mr. Walkinshaw has been settled
with, and that all annoyance from that or any other quarter has
ceased."
"I shall avoid saying anything respecting the Berreyesa affair
till the letters by the steamer come to hand, which will no doubt
confirm the arrangement between them and Mr. La Torre."
"I am, my dear sir, yours truly,"
"A FORBES"
"Endorsed: No. 15"
"Tepic, January 10, 1851"
"J. A. FORBES, ESQ., Santa Clara"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I was duly favored with your obliging letters of
the 12th and 29th of Nov., in which you mention, that I had stated
some disappointment by your not writing, and allude to some other
matters I have no recollection of. I have always reckoned upon you
as a friend, and am well convinced that you have every disposition
to promote the interests of the mining negotiation as much as in
your power, which William Barron confirms in his late letters to
the house."
"We have nothing to fear from the lawyer Jones should he come
here, but I understand he has gone to the Sandwich Islands, and is
likely to make a journey to the other world. Mr. Barron has caused
a most minute examination to be made in the archives in the City of
Mexico, the result of which has been that neither Alvarado nor
Micheltorena was authorized to grant titles for lands in
California, nor does there appear to have been any approval or
confirmation of such grants as they took upon themselves to
Page 67 U. S. 79
grant -- so that the title of the Berreyesa's land, either by
Alvarado or by Micheltorena, if opposition is made, is
valueless."
"This being the case, few of the California titles would be good
if determined by the vigorous application of the Mexican law. Mr.
Barron has procured documents to confirm this view of the case, but
we have resolved not to make use of such documents except in our
own defense, as we do not wish to injure anyone; but in the case of
the Berreyesas, we are compelled to use all means in our power to
counteract their proceedings or those of their abettors if they
persist in their late proceedings."
"If it was not that I am an interested party, I would recommend
to them to secure their Rancho by silence, for I am well assured
that by adopting hostile measures against us, they may lose it
altogether. The Rothschilds have a large quantity of quicksilver on
hand, and the miners thought that by competition between them and
New Almaden it might come down greatly in price, and kept off from
purchasing, but an agreement has been come to between both parties
by which this competition is done away with, and the price will be
maintained at a fair rate."
"In consequence, however, of the expectation of the miners few
sales have been made and little of the proceeds of sales realized,
but from the arrangement alluded to it is hoped that the sales will
soon be considerable. You will find by B., F. & Co.'s letter
that your wishes have been complied with, in debiting you with the
$1,700 in the account of your share of the sales of
quicksilver."
"With best respects to Mrs. Forbes and your family, I am, my
dear sir, yours, very truly,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"Addressed: James A. Forbes, Esq., San Clara, California"
"Endorsed: Alex. Forbes, Jan. 10, 1851. No. 17."
These were the letters in the package deposited with Davidson.
Mr. Lawrence and Mr. James Eldridge, who had an interest adverse to
that of the claimants, had agreed to pay James Alexander Forbes
$10,000 down and $10,000 more at a future time for the privilege of
using them to compel a compromise, and it was stipulated that until
needed for that purpose they should remain in Mr. Davidson's
custody, whence they could
Page 67 U. S. 80
not be taken by either party without the consent of the other.
The process which brought them into court was issued at the
instance of the District Attorney of the United States, who, in
doing so, acted upon his own sense of official duty, not prompted
by any private party and without knowing anything of the agreement
between Lawrence and J. A. Forbes. Forbes received the
consideration he bargained for.
There was another letter from Alexander Forbes to James
Alexander Forbes, not in the package produced by Davidson, of which
the following is a copy:
"Monterey, March 28, 1848"
"MY DEAR SIR -- I have to apologize for not writing you before
this as I promised I would respecting the purchase of your shares
in the mine of New Almaden, but really, as your opinion of their
value is so widely different from mine, I considered it almost
hopeless to make you any further proposals."
"I do not, however, leave this without making the necessary
arrangements to effect that object, and have therefore authorized
Mr. Walkinshaw and Manl. Dias to wait on you with my final offer
for the purchase of those shares."
"Were I not already so deeply interested in this negotiation, I
would never think of investing another dollar in it, but this
interest renders it necessary for me to have the control of all the
shares in order that I may dispose of the whole whenever an
opportunity may offer, and save myself from the heavy loss that
would ensue should it unluckily leak out that in fact the documents
procured by Castillero in Mexico, as his title to the mine and
lands, were all obtained long after the occupation of California by
the Americans."
"This unfortunate irregularity cannot be easily repaired, and
serious objections might be made even to the legality of our new
act of possession."
"I need scarcely remind you of the importance of preserving
profound secrecy in all these matters, and in case you do not
accept my offer, I hope you will not fail to send me your power to
act for you in any arrangement I may make."
"I send you three vols. of the Mechanic and Engineers' Magazine,
which I beg your acceptance of, and I hope you will continue
Page 67 U. S. 81
your correspondence as usual, and inform me of what is passing
in California."
"I am, my dear sir, yours, very truly,"
"ALEX. FORBES"
"James A. Forbes, Esq., Santa Clara"
J. A Forbes produced this some months after the others had been
given in evidence. He swore it was an exact and true copy of the
original, which he had received in regular course, and that the
original was in the hand writing of Alexander Forbes. Why he did
not produce the original itself he undertook to explain by
declaring that he had it in a carpet bag at a hotel in San
Francisco, and while he was out it was stolen, though his room and
his carpet-bag were both locked, and he did not perceive, when he
came back, that either had been disturbed. He was subjected to a
long cross-examination, which did not establish the integrity of
his conduct or the good faith of his statements, but seriously
injured his credit. In addition to this, the claimants attacked his
general character.
James J. Birney was called to support the statement of Forbes,
and he swore that the copy of the letter offered in evidence was
made by him; that it was a true copy; that he knew the handwriting
of Alexander Forbes, and that the original, from which he copied
it, was written by Alexander Forbes. The answer of the claimants to
Birney's testimony was the production of witnesses who swore that
his reputation for veracity was not such as to make him a safe
witness.
When Mr. Trist went out to Mexico in 1848 to negotiate a treaty
of peace, he was instructed by Mr. Buchanan, the Secretary of
state, to insist upon a cession of certain territory and to
stipulate that all grants in the ceded territories made by Mexico,
after the 13th of May, 1846, should be absolutely null and
void.
Mr. Trist reported to the State Department the treaty made by
himself and the Mexican Commissioners, which contained the
following declaration on the part of Mexico:
"The Mexican government
declares that no grant whatever
of lands in Texas has been made since the second day of March,
one
Page 67 U. S. 82
thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, and that
no grant
whatever of land in any of the territories aforesaid has been made
since the thirteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and
forty-six."
Mr. Trist, in his dispatch to the State Department of January
25, 1848, (accompanying the treaty), explains why the treaty had
taken this form instead of the stipulation which he had been
instructed to make.
"With respect," said he,
"to grants of land made by the Mexican authorities, the proviso
contained in my instructions
was strenuously objected to upon a
point of national honor and decorum. No such grants had been made
since the 13th May, 1846. This they knew, and consequently the
proviso could have no practical effect. But it is implied that they
have been made, or might have been made, and that nevertheless the
government committed the injustice of revoking them, which in
fact it had authority to do. Moreover
it involved an
acknowledgement that from the day when hostilities broke out
on the north of the Rio Bravo,
the Mexican government had lost
the right to make grants of land in any part of its territory
subsequently occupied by us. Feeling the force of these objections,
I requested to make sure of the fact stated by them, and also
in regard to no grants' having been made in Texas since the
revolution, which had been incidentally mentioned by one of them
(the Mexican negotiators).
And this having been done in a
manner which left no shade of doubt on their minds, the declaration
which will be found at the end of Article 10 was agreed upon in
lieu of the proviso."
After the treaty had been ratified by the president and Senate
of the United States with some amendments, Messrs. Clifford of
Maine, and Sevier, of Arkansas, were sent out as commissioners to
exchange ratifications with the Mexican government. Their
dispatches to the State Department, only a part of which has been
printed, show that there was much discussion between them and the
Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject of the land
grants, and particularly with respect to the effect which might be
produced upon the titles by the suppression of the 10th Article.
The necessary explanation was given to quiet these fears. The
dispatches do not state specifically what the explanations were,
because the substance of them was written down in the form of a
protocol and signed by the representatives of the two
governments. The following is the explanation referred to, so far
as it relates to this subject:
Page 67 U. S. 83
"The American government, by suppressing the tenth Article of
the Treaty of Guadalupe, did not in any way intend to annul the
grants of land made by Mexico in the ceded territories. These
grants, notwithstanding the suppression of the article of the
treaty, preserve the legal value which they may possess, and the
grantees may cause their legitimate titles to be acknowledged
before the American tribunals."
"Conformably to the law of the United States, legitimate titles
to every description of property, personal and real, existing in
the ceded territories
are those which were legitimate titles
under the Mexican law in California and New Mexico
up to
the 13th of May, 1846, and in Texas up to the 2d of March,
1836. . . ."
"And these explanations having been
accepted by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mexican Republic,
he
declared in the name of his government, that, with the
understanding conveyed by them, the said government would proceed
to ratify the Treaty of Guadalupe as modified by the Senate and
government of the United States."
Most of the evidence was given after the cause came into the
district court. This is but an outline of it. Many documents and
numerous details of fact, some of them not altogether without a
certain degree of importance, are unavoidably omitted, the object
being to give only such as appeared necessary to make the arguments
of counsel and the opinion of the Court intelligible.
The Land Commission (Mr. Commissioner Thompson, dissenting)
confirmed the title of the claimants
"to the mine, with the right of enjoying the privileges as mine
owner, under the Mexican law, of three thousand varas in every
direction from the mouth of the mine."
All the Commissioners concurred in rejecting the claim to two
leagues, under the Lanzas dispatch.
The claimant appealed to the district court from so much of the
decree "as rejects his claim for two square leagues of land granted
to him in colonization," and the United States appealed from that
part which confirms the mining privilege.
The opinion of the District Judge was in favor of confirming the
claimant's title to the two leagues under the dispatch, but the
circuit judge being of a contrary opinion, that part of the claim
was rejected. Both judges agreed that the mining title,
Page 67 U. S. 84
claimed under the proceedings before the alcalde, was legal and
sufficiently proved, and it was accordingly confirmed with seven
pertinencies each of two hundred varas square to be laid out in
such manner as the claimants might elect, but so that the original
mouth of the mine should be within them.
From the decree, of the district court both parties appealed to
this Court.
Page 67 U. S. 144
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD.
These are appeals from a decree of the District court of the
United States for the Northern District of California, brought here
under the Act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1851, entitled "an
Act to ascertain and settle the private land claims" in that
state.
Page 67 U. S. 145
Provision was made by the first section of that act for the
appointment of commissioners to examine all such claims, and decide
upon their validity, and it was provided by the 8th section of the
act that every person claiming land in that state by virtue of any
right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments
should present the same to those commissioners for their
adjudication.
Pursuant to that requirement, Andres Castillero, on the 30th day
of September, 1852, presented the claim in controversy for
adjudication to the Board of commissioners constituted under that
act, and at the same time submitted certain documentary evidences
of title, to show that the claim ought to be confirmed. Among other
things, he represented in his petition to the effect that in the
year 1845, he discovered a mine of cinnabar in the then
jurisdiction of San Jose, which is now known as the County of Santa
Clara, in the State of California, and that having formed a company
for working the mine, he, on the 3d day of December of that year,
received from the magistrate of that jurisdiction, in due form, the
juridical possession of the mine and also of certain adjacent land,
to the extent of three thousand varas in all directions, averring
in the same connection that all the facts so alleged would appear
by the duly authenticated papers issued from the office of that
magistrate, copies of which were submitted with the petition. He
also represented that soon after his discovery, the record of his
mining possession, or a testimonio of the same, was submitted to
the
Junta de Fomento y Administrativa de Mineria, the
highest mining tribunal of Mexico, and that the members of that
tribunal, on the 14th day of May, 1846, after an examination of the
laws relative thereto and mature deliberation, declared that the
juridical possession so given, although embracing an unusually
large extent of land, was in conformity to law and fully justified
by the circumstances of the case, and recommended to the president
through the Minister of Justice, not only that his mining
possession should be confirmed, but that two square leagues of land
should also be granted to him in fee for the benefit of his mining
operations. Petitioner accordingly claimed the two
Page 67 U. S. 146
leagues of land in fee as well as the mining possession, and in
support of the claim to the land, he alleged that the Minister of
Justice, on the 20th day of the same month, informed the
Junta
de Fomento that the president had acceded to the
recommendation and granted the land; that on the same day he also
notified the Minister of Relations of the same fact, in order that
the proper decree might be issued; and that the Minister of
Relations, on the 23d day of May, 1846, issued his order to the
governor of the department directing him to put the petitioner in
the possession of the same two square leagues of land. Referring to
the last dispatch and assuming it to be a grant, he also alleged in
his petition, that on receiving the same, he started to go to that
department for the purpose of surveying the land and taking
juridical possession of the same, but was interrupted in his
journey and prevented from so doing by the operations of the war
between the two countries.
Such is the substance of the representations of the petition so
far as respects the title of the claimant, but he also alleged that
he had ever since continued in possession both of the mine and the
land, and that he and those claiming under him had made extensive
and expensive improvements on the premises. Claimant presented
certain documentary evidences of title before the commissioners
which it becomes important to notice because it was upon those that
he relied to show that the prayer of his petition ought to be
granted. They consisted of certain proceedings alleged to have
taken place before the alcalde of San Jose Guadalupe in respect to
the registry of the mine, and certain subsequent proceedings of the
Junta de Fomento and other public authorities of the home
government, which were introduced as showing a confirmation of the
doings of the alcalde in respect to the registry of the mine and an
absolute grant of the two square leagues of land.
I. Petitioners in such cases are required by the act of Congress
not only to present their claims to the commissioners, but also the
documentary evidences of title on which they rely to support the
same, and in obedience to that requirement, the
Page 67 U. S. 147
claimant presented the documents referred to in his petition, of
which the following is a summary:
1. His petition, dated November 22, 1845, addressed to the
alcalde of first nomination, representing that he had discovered a
vein of silver with a
ley of gold on the rancho of Jose
Reyes Berreyesa, which he wished to work in company, and requesting
the alcalde, in conformity with the ordinance on mining, to fix up
notices in public places of the jurisdiction, in order to make sure
of his right when the time for the juridical possession should
arrive, according to the laws upon that subject. Immediately
following the petition is a certificate signed by Pedro Chabolla
certifying that the petition is a copy of the original to which he
refers, and which certificate purports to have been executed on the
13th day of January, 1846, at the Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe, and
to have been signed in the presence of two assisting witnesses.
2. Claimant also introduced another document purporting to be a
supplemental petition to the same alcalde dated the 3rd day of
December, 1845, in which he represented that, in addition to silver
with a
ley of gold, he had, in the presence of several
bystanders, taken out liquid quicksilver from the mine, and
requested to add that statement to his previous representation in
order to secure his right. Both of the petitions purport to have
been executed at the Mission of Santa Clara and to have been signed
by the claimant. Appended to the supplemental petition also is a
certificate signed by Pedro Chabolla, which is of the same date and
in all respects similar to the one connected with the first
petition.
3. Following the last named petition and certificate is the
document filed before the commissioners as the copy of an original
then relied on by the claimant as the proper evidence to show that
he made due registry of the mine, and that the juridical possession
of the same was duly given to him by competent authority in
accordance with the regulations of the mining ordinance.
Considering the importance of the document, it will be given in
full. Unlike what is usual in title papers
Page 67 U. S. 148
executed by Mexican officials, it has no introductory caption
whatever, but the translation reads as follows:
"There being no deputation on mining in the Department of
California, and this being the only time since the settlement of
Upper California that a mine has been worked in conformity with the
laws, and there being no
Juez de Letras, (Professional
Judge) in the Second District, I, the alcalde of First Nomination,
citizen Antonio Maria Pico, accompanied by two assisting witnesses,
have resolved to act in virtue of my office for want of a notary
public, there being none, for the purpose of giving juridical
possession of the mine known as Santa Clara, in this jurisdiction,
situated on the rancho of the retired sergeant Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, for the time having expired which is designated in the
ordinance of mining, for citizen Don Andres Castillero to show his
right, and also for others to allege a better right, between the
time of denouncement and this date, and the mine being found with
abundance of metals discovered, the shaft made according to the
rules of art, and the working of the mine producing a large
quantity of liquid quicksilver, as shown by the specimens which
this Court has, and as the laws now in force so strongly recommend
the protection of an article so necessary for the amalgamation of
gold and silver in the Republic, I have granted three thousand
varas of land in all directions, subject to what the general
ordinance of mines may direct, it being worked in company, to which
I certify, the witnesses signing with me, this act of possession
being attached to the rest of the espediente, deposited in the
archives under my charge. This not going on stamped paper, because
there is none, as prescribed by law."
"Juzgado of San Jose Guadalupe, December 30, 1845."
"ANTONIO MARIA PICO"
"Assisting witnesses:"
"Antonio Sunol"
"Jose Noriega"
Annexed to this document or immediately following it is a
receipt signed by the alcalde and purporting to have been executed
at the same time and place as the principal document, in
Page 67 U. S. 149
which the signer certifies that he has received $25 on account
of the fees for the possession of the quicksilver mine, named Santa
Clara, which is in the jurisdiction under his charge.
4. Connected with the document, appertaining to the proceedings
before the alcalde, is another of considerable importance in the
investigation, which is dated the 2d of November, 1845, and is
denominated in the transcript as the writing of partnership.
Like the preceding petitions, it was executed at the Mission of
Santa Clara, and by its terms it purports to be a partnership
between the claimant and Jose Castro, Secundino Robles, and Teodoro
Robles, and Jose Maria R. S. del Real, for the working "of a mine
of silver, gold and quicksilver, in the rancho of Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, in the jurisdiction of the pueblo of San Jose
Guadalupe." Article 1 provides to the effect that the claimant,
"conforming in all respects to the ordinance of mining, forms a
regular perpetual partnership" with the persons before named,
adding that "the half of the mine, which is that of which he can
dispose, will be divided into three parts" -- that is, "four shares
to Jose Castro, four shares to S. and T. Robles, and the other four
shares" to the Padre Real, "as a perpetual donation." Parties were
restrained by the instrument from alienating their shares, and the
provision was that the expenses should be borne in proportion to
the shares. Stipulation was also made that the claimant should have
charge of the operations when present, but in his absence they were
to be conducted by the Padre Real, and it was also stipulated that
the agreement should be authenticated by Manuel Castro, the Prefect
of the Second District. His certificate is appended to the
document, in which he certifies, under date of the 8th of December,
1845, that it is a copy of the original, and the certificate
purports to have been executed at Santa Clara, in the presence of
the alcalde, to whom the petitions were addressed. Congress
recognized the existence of war between Mexico and the United
States, on the 13th of May, 1846, and it is not denied that the
official functions of the Mexican officers in that department
entirely ceased as early as the 7th of July in that year. Reference
to these dates becomes necessary,
Page 67 U. S. 150
especially to the latter, because after that time the civil
officers in that department during the war were such as were
appointed by our military commanders.
5. He also introduced another certificate, which applies to each
and all of the foregoing documents. It is signed by James W.
Weekes, alcalde of San Jose Guadalupe, and reads as follows:
"I certify in due form, that the foregoing is a faithful copy,
made to the letter from its original, the 'espediente' of the mine
of Santa Clara, or New Almaden, which exists in the archives under
my charge, to which I refer. And in testimony thereof I have signed
it this 20th day of January, 1848."
Four additional certificates are also appended to this
espediente, as it has been called in argument at the bar. Of these,
the first was executed at San Francisco, and is signed by James
Alexander Forbes, British Vice-Consul, in which he certifies under
date of the 21st of January, 1848, that the signature of the last
named alcalde is the true and proper handwriting of the person it
represents. None of the other three were executed in California,
but respectively bear date at Tepic, in the Department of Jalisco.
One is signed by Jesus Vejar, a notary public, in which he
certifies under date of the 15th of March, 1850, to the effect that
the signature of the British Vice-Consul is genuine. Another is the
signature of the first alcalde at that place, in which he certifies
under the same date that the mark and signature of the notary are
those he is accustomed to use, and the last is the certificate of
the consul of the United States at that place, in which he
certifies, under date of the 1st of December, 1850, that "the
signatures attached to the foregoing document are in the true
handwriting of the subscribers."
II. Other documents were also introduced by the claimant as
showing a confirmation of the doings of the alcalde in respect to
the registry of the mine, and which it is insisted by his counsel
establish his right to the two square leagues of land. They do not
purport to be originals, but were admitted in evidence as sworn
copies of originals, alleged to be on file in the archives of the
Junta de Fomento, and other departments of the supreme
Page 67 U. S. 151
government at the capital of the Republic. Briefly described,
the documents of this class introduced before the commissioners are
as follows:
1. Copy of a letter from the claimant, dated at the Mission of
Santa Clara on the 19th of February, 1846, and addressed to Tomas
Ramon del Moral, in which he states in effect that he has
discovered an abundant deposit of cinnabar, and that he sends with
the communication some of the ore and a little quicksilver, that it
may be assayed.
2. He also introduced a copy of a letter from J. J. de Herrera,
which was addressed to the same person as the preceding letter, in
which the writer, under date of the 13th of April, 1846, professes
to give certain extracts from two letters received by him at the
City of Mexico from the claimant, while the latter was at the
Mission of Santa Clara. These letters, as described in the copy of
the communication given in evidence, were dated on the 19th and 22d
of February, in the same year, and the extracts represent the
claimant as saying that at the distance of five leagues from the
Mission to the west he had discovered and denounced a very abundant
mine of quicksilver, and that he had sent to his correspondent some
of the ore procured from the top of the vein to confirm his
statement, together with a little quicksilver which was taken out
with the greatest facility.
3. Copies of two communications, showing that the specimens of
ore so sent were submitted to the
Junta Facultativa, and
that an assay founded on a mean of the different specimens, gave a
"ley" of twenty-five and a half percent
4. Copy of a letter or report from the president of the junta to
the Minister of Justice, under date of the 5th of May, 1846,
communicating the fact of the reception of the specimens of ore and
of the successful result of the assay.
5. Copy of the reply of the Minister of Justice, dated four days
afterwards, in which he states that the president
ad
interim of the republic learns with satisfaction that the
claimant has discovered a deposit of quicksilver of excellent
quality.
6. Claimant also introduced a copy of a communication signed by
him under date of the 12th of May, 1846, addressed to the
Page 67 U. S. 152
junta for the encouragement and administration of mining, as
fully set forth in the transcript.
Referring to his discovery as a mine of quicksilver in the
Mission of Santa Clara, he states that he has denounced and taken
possession not only of said mine named Santa Clara, but also of an
extent of three thousand varas in all directions; that he has
formed a company to work it, constructed the pit, and complied with
all the conditions prescribed by the ordinance. Intimation is there
given that he could easily have secured aid from foreign houses,
but that he preferred that the establishment should be entirely
national, and for that reason had not hesitated to apply to the
junta for such assistance as he at present needed. His
representation was that he only wanted a small advance of $5,000,
on account of the scarcity of coin in that department, and an
immediate remittance to the mine of retorts, cylinders, and other
small distilling apparatus, and also iron flasks for bottling up
the quicksilver. He suggested that he would have proposed a
contract of partnership to the junta as an avio, or some other
agreement, if there had been time to furnish the proofs and details
which would be required for such an arrangement, but being obliged
to leave the capital within a few days, he found it necessary to
restrict himself to "that which appears to present no difficulty
and which may open a way to a future agreement." What he desired of
the junta was not only that they should accede to his requests as
far as they had the power, but that they should send such as they
could not grant to the supreme government, recommending their
adoption, and with that view he submitted nine propositions, which
were as follows:
"
First. The junta, in the act of approving the
agreement, will give me a draft for $5,000 on some mercantile house
in Mazatlan."
"
Second. On my part, I bind myself to place in said
port, within six months after leaving it, fifty quintals of
quicksilver, at the rate of $100 each, which I will send from the
first taken out, with absolute preference over every other
engagement."
"
Third. The junta will order that there be placed at my
disposition
Page 67 U. S. 153
before leaving the capital, the eight iron retorts which it has
in its office, and all the quicksilver flasks which can be found in
the
negociacion of Tasco, which are fit for use; and,
lastly, it will deliver to Senor Don Tomas Ramon del Moral, my
attorney, the sums to pay for the retorts, cylinders, and other
kinds of small apparatus, which may be ordered to be made for the
negociacion, to the amount of $1,000."
"
Fourth. I will receive the retorts of the junta at
cost price, and the flasks which I may select at $2 a piece,
agreeably with their valuation."
"
Fifth. The ascertained value of said retorts and
flasks, and that of the sums which may be delivered to Senor Moral,
I will return in term of one year from this agreement, and also the
premium on the draft on Mazatlan, in quicksilver, placed in said
port at the price of $100 the quintal; but if the junta should wish
to take one or more 'acciones' in the mine, it shall be left as a
party payment of the sum corresponding to one or more
'barras.'"
"
Sixth. While the company is being formed, during the
period of one year, counted from the date on which this agreement
shall be approved, and the $5,000 spoken of in the first
proposition being paid, I will give the preference to the junta in
the sale of quicksilver placed in Mazatlan, at the rate of $100 the
quintal."
"
Seventh. The junta shall represent to the supreme
government the necessity of approving the possession which has been
given me of the mine by the local authorities of California, in the
same terms as those in which I now hold it."
"
Eighth. It shall also represent the advantage of there
being granted to me, as a colonist, two square leagues upon the
land of my mining possession, with the object of being able to use
the wood for my business."
"
Ninth. For the compliance of this contract I pledge
the mine itself and all its appurtenances."
7. On the 14th of the same month, the president of the junta
communicated the letter of the claimant, or petition as he calls
it, to the Minister of Justice, and in that communication the mine
is described as the quicksilver mine in the Mission of Santa
Page 67 U. S. 154
Clara in the Department of California. Claimant also introduced
a copy of that communication. Among other things, the writer states
that the junta "has no hesitation in recommending the petition" to
the favorable consideration of the government; that they, the
junta, are of the opinion that the sum of $5,000 should be advanced
to the applicant on the terms proposed, and that they should be
authorized to furnish him with such iron retorts and flasks as they
had on hand, and to advance him the other $1,000 asked, which, as
they stated, could be employed in the construction of retorts,
cylinders, and other small apparatus for the use of the mine.
They also refer to the reasons assigned by the claimant for
deferring the formation of a contract of partnership, or avio, and
state in effect that they, the junta, regard it as satisfactory.
Reference is also made to that part of the claimant's petition in
which he represents that he has denounced and taken possession not
only of the mine, but also of an extent of three thousand varas in
all directions, and their views upon that subject were, that the
possession given by the local authorities was "not in conformity
with the ordinance," because it embraced an extent greater than the
ordinance allowed, but notwithstanding that fact, they presented
various arguments for the consideration of the department to show
that, under the circumstances of the cases, it might be sustained.
In respect to the two square leagues of land solicited by the
claimant as a colonist, the junta declined to express any opinion
for or against the application for the reason, as stated, that they
had no information upon the subject, and therefore left that matter
to be decided by the president as he might think proper.
8. Both the petition of the claimant and the recommendation of
the junta were, by the Minister of Justice, laid before the
president, and the former on the 20th of May, 1846, sent a dispatch
to the junta informing them that the president had been pleased to
approve, in all its parts, the agreement made with the claimant,
"in order to commence the working of said mine," and that
the corresponding communication was made to the Minister of
Relations to issue the proper orders respecting that
Page 67 U. S. 155
which was contained in the eighth proposition for the grant of
lands in that department. Under the same date, a decree, so called,
was entered by the Minister of Justice in the margin of the
communication received by him from the junta, in the following
terms:
"Granted in the terms which are proposed, and with respect to
the land; let the corresponding order issue to the Minister of
Relations for the proper measures of his office, with the
understanding that the government accedes to the petition."
Copies of the dispatch of the Minister of Justice and of the
last named document were also introduced by the claimant.
9. On the same day, the Minister of Justice sent a dispatch to
the Minister of Relations informing him of what had been done, in
which it is also stated that the president had acceded to the
petition of the claimant and that the dispatch was transmitted to
the end that there might be granted to the claimant, as a colonist,
two square leagues upon the land of his mining possession. Copy of
that dispatch was also introduced by the claimant.
10.
Finally, the claimant introduced a copy of a
dispatch from the Minister of Relations to the Governor of
California, dated on the 23d day of May, 1846, in which the former,
after transcribing the dispatch to him from the Minister of
Justice, and incorporating a copy of the same into his own
dispatch, as an explanation of the transaction, adds as
follows:
"And I transcribe it to your Excellency, that in conformity with
the provisions of the laws and decrees relative to colonization,
you may give Senor Castillero possession of the two square leagues
above mentioned."
Remark should be made that in all of the documents introduced as
copies of originals on file in the department of the supreme
government, the mine is described as one discovered by the claimant
in the Mission of Santa Clara; and in no one of them is any
allusion made to the fact that it was situated on the rancho of
Jose Reyes Berreyesa, as represented in the first petition of the
claimant and repeated in the act of juridical possession alleged to
have been executed by the alcalde.
Page 67 U. S. 156
11. Parol testimony was also introduced by the claimant in
support of his claim both to the mine and to the two square leagues
of land, to which some brief reference will be made. He proved by
Charles S. Lyman that he, the witness, made a survey of the land
around the mine in the month of February, 1848, at the request of
James Alexander Forbes, of California, and Alexander Forbes, of
Tepic, in Mexico, who was at the mine at the time of the survey.
His orders were to lay out two square leagues, and he states that
he was shown a grant, or a copy of a grant, from that quantity from
the Mexican government. They requested him to locate the grant so
as to cover certain mining rights called "pertenencia," extending
three thousand varas in every direction from the mouth of the mine,
and he states that it was so surveyed as to have the mouth of the
mine as nearly in the center as could be without covering land of
the neighboring ranchos claimed by individual owners. Field notes
of that survey were exhibited, and Fernando Alden, who was also
examined by the claimant, testifies that he assisted in making a
part of it, and he confirms the testimony of the first witness as
to the location of the alleged grant. By his testimony it also
appears that he heard of the grant in 1846, when he was in Mexico,
and that he was employed by Alexander Forbes, the agent and partner
of the claimant, to go to California for the purpose of working the
mine, erecting buildings, and occupying the land so granted, and he
testifies that he first went to live on the land about the 1st of
April, 1847, and continued to reside there until about a year
before he gave his testimony, acting as the agent and overseer of
the company holding under the claimant. Witnesses were also
examined by the claimant to prove that the copy of the act of
possession executed by the alcalde, and the other papers included
in that espediente, were true copies of the originals and that the
originals were genuine documents. To prove these facts, he called
and examined Frank Lewis, Deputy Recorder for the County of Santa
Clara, who, upon being shown a certain paper entitled "Posesion de
la mina de Sta. Clara de Ano 1845," stated that he obtained it from
the office of the Recorder of that county. Having made that
statement,
Page 67 U. S. 157
the witnesses was then requested to compare the copies filed in
the case with the corresponding parts of that paper, and after
having done so, he testified that they were true and exact copies.
Two witnesses, Antonio Sunol and Jose Noriega, who, it will be
remembered, were the assisting witnesses to the act of possession
executed by the alcalde, were also called and examined by the
claimant in respect to the authenticity of the supposed original
document. They were accordingly requested to examine the same, and
having complied with that request, respectively testified that all
the signatures, including their own, were genuine. Claimant also
called and examined Jose Maria La Fragua in respect to the class of
documents introduced as copies of originals on file in the archives
of the supreme government, and his testimony was to the effect that
he had compared all those documents with the originals in the City
of Mexico, and found them to be correct.
Commissioners, or a majority of them, adjudged that the claim to
the mine was valid, and confirmed the mining right or privilege of
the claimant, as pertenencia, to the extent of three thousand varas
in all directions from the mouth of the mine, but they unanimously
adjudged the claim to the two square leagues of land to be invalid,
and rejected that part of the claim.
Appeal was taken both by the claimant and by the United States
to the District Court of the United States for the Northern
District of California.
Much additional documentary evidence was introduced in the
district court, and more than one hundred additional witnesses were
examined in respect to the matters involved, or supposed to be
involved, in the controversy. Parties were fully heard, and on the
18th day of January, 1861, the district court entered a decree
confirming the claim to the mine, but diminishing the mining right,
or privilege, as compared with the decree of the commissioners, and
adjudging the claim to the two square leagues of land to be invalid
and rejecting the same. By the terms of the decree, the mining
right or privilege of the claimant is described and defined as "a
piece of land embracing a superficial area, measured on a
horizontal plane, equivalent to
Page 67 U. S. 158
seven pertenencias," regarding each pertenencia as a solid of a
rectangular base two hundred varas long, of the width established
by the ordinance, and in depth extending from and, including the
surface, to the center of the earth.
Whereupon both parties appealed to this Court. No. 123 is the
appeal of the claimant, and No. 133 is a cross-appeal of the United
States.
Power to decide upon the validity of any claim presented to land
in California by virtue of any right or title derived from the
Spanish or Mexican government as matter of original jurisdiction
is, by the Act of the 3d of March, 1851, exclusively conferred upon
the commissioners appointed under the first section of that act.
Appellate jurisdiction, however, is conferred upon the respective
district courts of the United States for the Northern and Southern
Districts of California, and finally upon this Court. In deciding
upon any such claim, the rule of decision is, as prescribed by the
eleventh section of the act, that the court or tribunal making the
decision shall be governed by the treaty under which the lands were
acquired, the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the
government ceding the same, the principles of equity, and the
decisions of this Court, so far as they are applicable.
III. Enough has already been remarked, in view of those
provisions, to show that there are three principal questions
involved in the record of very considerable importance.
First. Whether the claim of the petitioner to the two
square leagues of land, under the rules of decision already
mentioned, is shown by the documentary and other evidence to be a
valid one within the meaning of the eighth section of the act
providing for the adjudication.
Secondly. Whether the commissioners had jurisdiction to
decide upon the validity of the claim to the mine and mining right
or privilege as described in the petition, or in other words
whether the claim to the mine, together with the pertenencias to
the same, as recognized in the Mining Ordinance, is a claim to land
within the meaning of the provisions of the 8th section of that
Act.
Page 67 U. S. 159
Thirdly. Whether the claim to the mine, including the
mining right or privilege as set forth in the petition, is shown by
the documentary and other evidence to be a valid one under the
rules of decision already described.
1. Title to the two square leagues of land, it is insisted,
became vested in the claimant by virtue of the documents on file in
the department of the supreme government, as evidenced by the
copies filed in the case at the time the petition was presented to
the commissioners. They consist, it will be remembered, so far as
that part of the claim is concerned, of the communications from the
claimant to the
Junta de Fomento, their report or
recommendation to the Minister of Justice, his reply to the same,
together with the decree made by him in the margin of their
communication, and his dispatch to the Minister of Relations, and
the dispatch of the Minister of Relations of the 23d of May, 1846,
to the governor of the department where the land was situated.
Forty witnesses or more, mostly from the City of Mexico, were
examined by the claimant to prove the authenticity of those
documents or of the corresponding originals on file in the archives
of the supreme government, and various other proofs in the form of
exhibits were also introduced for the same purpose, filling a large
space in the transcript which contains more than three thousand
five hundred pages of closely printed matter.
Such testimony and proofs were regarded as essential, because it
was and is insisted by the United States that the documents were
fabricated, but in the view we have taken of the case, it will not
be necessary to decide or consider that question, and consequently
neither the testimony of the witnesses or the exhibits on that
point will be reproduced. According to the evidence introduced by
the claimant, Mariano Parades y Arrillaga, assumed the functions of
president
ad interim of the Republic on the 15th day of
December, 1845, and the same proofs show that he continued in
authority as such until the 29th day of July of the following year,
when he surrendered his power and for a time took command of the
army.
Counsel for claimants assume that during that period, the
Page 67 U. S. 160
president was in the exercise of extraordinary powers, and it
must be conceded that the evidence is full to that effect, although
it may well be doubted whether such of his official acts as were in
violation of law have ever been ratified by the Mexican government.
Assuming that the president was in the exercise of extraordinary
powers on the 23d day of May, 1846, the claimant insists that the
dispatch of that date from the Minister of Relations to the
governor of the Department of California, especially when it is
considered in connection with the marginal decree and dispatch of
the Minister of Justice of the 20th of the same month, is of itself
an absolute grant of the two square leagues of land described in
his petition.
Conceding the power of the acting president of the republic to
make such a grant of the public domain, the question then is one of
construction, and in that view of the case it becomes necessary to
examine with care so much of the several documents as relate to the
claim for the two square leagues of land. Petitioner's
representation to the
Junta de Fomento was that he desired
such a grant in order that he might be able to procure sufficient
firewood for his mining works, and the effect of his request, as
stated in his eighth proposition, was that they, the junta, should
recommend to the supreme government that there be granted to him,
"as a colonis," two square leagues upon the land of his mining
possession. When he made that request for a grant as a colonist, he
evidently referred to the colonization laws as containing the
authority to comply with his request and make the grant. Those laws
had then been in operation for more than twenty years, and
consequently he must have expected, even if the government acceded
to his petition, that the grant would be issued in conformity to
those laws, and of course must be executed by the governor, subject
to the approval of the departmental assembly.
Such also was the view taken of the matter by the junta in their
communication to the Minister of Justice, as plainly appears from
the language employed by them in describing his eighth proposition.
They refer to it as a petition in which the claimant solicits as a
colonist two square leagues of land "upon
Page 67 U. S. 161
the surface of his mining property for the purpose of supplying
himself with the firewood necessary for the reduction of the ores,"
evidently showing that they regarded it as an application under the
colonization laws. Nothing is expressed in the decree or memorandum
made by the Minister of Justice in the margin of the communication
from the junta which, if rightfully understood, affords any
countenance whatever to the views of the claimant. Reliance is
placed upon the introductory words, to-wit, "Granted on the terms
proposed," but it is so obvious from what follows in the same
connection that those words refer to the terms proposed as an
arrangement for exploring and operating the mine that it is
difficult to see how anyone can be misled in regard to their
import. Justification for that remark will be found in the
directions immediately given "with respect to the land," which are
that the corresponding order be issued to the Minister of Relations
for the proper measures of his office, with the understanding that
the supreme government accedes to the petition. Strong doubts are
entertained whether the order, "with respect to the land," was
intended as anything more than the usual office direction to the
corresponding clerk in the department to prepare and put in form a
dispatch upon the subject which should express the views embraced
in the marginal directions.
Support to that view is certainly derived from the fact that a
dispatch was prepared and sent on the same day which, in its
concluding sentence, contains substantially the same language, in
the form of a request that the "orders corresponding" may be
issued. Other matters, however, are stated in the dispatch which
ought not to be overlooked. After stating the fact that he had laid
the communication of the junta before the president, he proceeds to
say that "His Excellency had been pleased to approve, in all
respects, the agreement made with the claimant in order to commence
the working of said mine," adding that he communicates the
information that there may be granted to the claimant, as a
colonist, the two square leagues of land, and requesting the
Minister of Relations "to issue orders corresponding." Additional
orders, therefore, were assumed to be necessary, and
Page 67 U. S. 162
the concluding sentence of the dispatch to the Minister of
Relations, written on the same day, and already referred to, shows
what kind of orders were contemplated at the time the marginal
decree was made. Prepared as those documents were on the same day,
they must be considered together, and when so considered, it is
clear and beyond doubt that the marginal decree with respect to the
land was not drafted or intended as a grant or any evidence of a
grant, for if it had been, the officer who drafted it never would
have asked for any order upon the subject from a coordinate
department of the government.
Request was made by the claimant, in the first place, that a
grant might be made to him as a colonist, and it conclusively
appears, we think, from an examination of those dispatches that the
Mexican officials who wrote them never for a moment contemplated
that the claimant was to have a grant of land in any other mode
than by the usual proceedings under the colonization laws. Abundant
confirmation of that proposition, if any be needed, is to be found
in the dispatch from the Minister of Relations to the governor of
the department, which is the document that the claimant professes
to regard as an absolute grant of the land described in his
petition. Mexican officials, in their correspondence upon official
matters of domestic concern, usually transcribe and incorporate
into their own dispatches such communications as they have
previously received upon the same subject from other official
sources. Such was the course pursued by the Minister of Relations
in his dispatch to the governor of the department. He accordingly
transcribed into his dispatch a copy of the one sent to him from
the Minister of Justice, in which is also contained a copy of the
before mentioned communication to the junta, and referring to the
entire dispatch, he states in effect, that he transcribed it to the
governor in order that he, the governor, in conformity with what is
prescribed by the laws and dispositions upon colonization, may put
the claimant in possession of the two square leagues of land which
are mentioned in the communication. Conformity to the laws and
regulations upon the subject of colonization grants is plainly
contemplated and required by the directions of that
Page 67 U. S. 163
dispatch, and consequently it is clear that the governor could
not put the claimant into the possession of the described tract in
any other mode than by the usual proceedings under those laws.
2. Claimant calls this a grant, and it is his privilege to do so
if he sees fit; but it is vain for him to expect that this Court
can give its sanction to any such manifest error. Vacant lands in
California belonged to the supreme government, and the laws for the
disposition of the same emanated from that source.
United
States v. Knight,, 1 Black 242.
General rules and regulations upon the subject were accordingly
ordained authorizing the governors of territories, under certain
specific conditions, to grant such lands to such of the persons
therein described as might ask for the same for the purpose of
settlement and cultivation. Persons soliciting such lands were
required by those rules and regulations to address a petition to
the governor setting forth their names, country, profession and
religion, and also to describe the land asked for as distinctly as
possible, by means of a diseno or map annexed to the petition. He
was not required to prove his representations, but it was made the
duty of the governor to obtain the necessary information to enable
him to determine whether the case fell within the conditions
specified in the regulations, both as regarded the applicant and
the land. None of these conditions, of course, was ever complied
with, because the proofs show and it is conceded that the dispatch
was never transmitted to the governor and that the claimant never
returned to that department. Application for a grant was never made
under that dispatch, and so far as appears, the governor of the
department was never informed that it had been issued. Unless the
lands were vacant, such an application would have been fruitless,
as the governor had no power to grant any other than vacant lands.
Suppose it to be true that the mine is on the rancho of Jose Reyes
Berreyesa or that of Justos Larios, then the power of the governor
to make the grant was entirely wanting and it would not benefit the
claimant if it were now shown that the mine was and is on public
land because, if his representations are to be credited, he and all
those associated with
Page 67 U. S. 164
him fully believed that it was not a part of the public domain.
Contrary to this view, it is insisted by the claimant that inasmuch
as the president, by whose direction the dispatch was issued and
delivered to the party, was in the exercise of all the powers of
government, the nondelivery of the dispatch to the governor of the
department is wholly immaterial, that the dispatch itself was a
decree of concession, and the placing it in the hands of the
grantee was a sufficient delivery to vest an equitable title at
least in the claimant.
3. Power in the president to make such a grant is not denied by
the United States, but the question is whether he exercised or
attempted to exercise any such power, which under the circumstances
must depend upon the construction to be given to the dispatch of
the Minister of Relations addressed to the governor of the
department. Explanations already given show to a demonstration, we
think, that such is not the true construction of the dispatch, and
consequently the proposition of the claimant cannot be sustained,
and in rejecting the proposition as untenable, we place our
conclusion upon the ground that the proposition assumes an
erroneous construction of the dispatch under consideration, and is
based entirely on that assumption.
4. Attempt is made to support the proposition by some of the
remarks of this Court in the case of
United
States v. Castillero,, 23 How. 468, but it is
evident that the construction given to the opinion of the Court in
that case is quite as erroneous as that given to the dispatch of
the Minister of Relations. Title to the Island of Santa Cruz, near
the coast of that department, was claimed in that case by virtue of
a regular grant from the governor. Such grant, it is true, had been
issued by the governor under a special dispatch from the Minister
of the Interior, but the statement is nevertheless correct that the
claimant held the island under a formal grant which was in the list
of grants included in the Jimeno Index. Lands of the islands prior
to the 20th day of July, 1838, had never been granted by the
governor of that department, and the better opinion is that the
colonization laws did not confer the power to make such grants.
Authority upon that subject was on that day conferred upon the
governor in
Page 67 U. S. 165
connection with the departmental assembly by a general order, as
is more fully explained in that opinion. Direction was given to the
governor on the same day by a special dispatch that one of the
islands such as the claimant in that case might select should be
assigned to him before they proceeded under the general order. He
accordingly selected the island mentioned, and the governor issued
title papers to the donee. Objection was made here to the
confirmation upon the ground that the grant had never been approved
by the departmental assembly, but the court overruled the
objection. Absolute directions were given in that case in respect
to lands not authorized to be granted under the colonization laws,
and the power so conferred had been exercised and the doings of the
governor in making the grant acquiesced in for a period of eight
years before the jurisdiction of the territory was acquired by the
United States. Compare that statement, which is undeniable, with
the facts of this case and it is obvious that the supposed analogy
utterly fails.
By the terms of the dispatch under consideration, the
proceedings in this case were directed to be "in conformity with
what is prescribed by the laws and dispositions upon colonization,"
and of course the discretion of the governor and that of the
departmental assembly were to be exercised in the performance of
their respective duties under the obligations imposed by law.
Something also remained to be done by the claimant in order to call
forth the exercise of that discretion. He must prepare and present
his petition describing the land, and he must also prepare and
present, if required, a diseno or map of the land in order that the
governor might have the means of ascertaining whether the tract
solicited was vacant and so situated that it might properly be
granted to the applicant. No such petition was ever presented, and
no action of any kind ever took place upon the subject. But we
forbear to pursue the comparison, as it must be obvious, we think,
to every unprejudiced mind that the two cases are in no substantial
respect alike. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the
claim to the two square leagues of land cannot be sustained.
Page 67 U. S. 166
IV. Before entering upon the examination of the questions
involving the validity of the title of the claimant to the mine and
mining right or privilege claimed by him, it becomes necessary to
consider and decide the question whether the commissioners under
the Act of the 3rd of March, 1851, had jurisdiction over such a
claim. Counsel for the claimant maintain the affirmative of that
question, but the jurisdiction of the commissioners is denied by
the counsel of the United States upon several grounds:
1. They insist in the first place that the ownership of a mine
under the Mexican law was not the ownership of the land in which
the mine was situated; that it was simply the ownership of the
right to take from the soil the minerals therein to be found, and
was recognized as a right severed from all public and private land
which was vested in the sovereign and which did not pass by a grant
of the land, and was capable of being acquired only by a title from
the sovereign power, wholly distinct from the title to the
land.
2. Several of those propositions, if properly restricted and
rightly applied, may well be admitted, because when so restricted
and applied they are undoubtedly correct. Mines under the Mexican
law may be the subject of rightful ownership distinct from the land
as such for agricultural or other ordinary uses. Ownership of a
mine, however, as secured under the mining ordinance by registry
and juridical possession, does not consist alone in the right to
take from the soil the minerals therein to be found, but it also
embraces, if necessary to the working of the mine, a right to the
exclusive possession and use of the surface of the land for an
indefinite period within the boundaries of the pertencias
appertaining to the mining right or privilege. Such rights are by
law regarded as severed from private land and also from public land
when granted by the usual forms of conveyance for agricultural or
other ordinary purposes. Gamboa by Heathfield, p. 132, sec. 5.
Rights to a mine not registered can only be acquired from the
sovereign power, and it is true, as contended by the United States,
that the forms of such a conveyance are wholly distinct from those
employed in the ordinary
Page 67 U. S. 167
process of granting lands. Another branch of the same
proposition, not yet reproduced, may also be admitted in the same
qualified sense. Mining rights under Mexican laws undoubtedly are
usually held upon conditions not affecting the title to the land as
derived under the ordinary conveyances, and it is also true that
such rights may be acquired and held by others besides the owner of
the land under the ordinary grants, and that such rights are
terminable when by their use the minerals contained in the soil are
wholly removed. Granting all this, still the question arises
whether a mine, together with the mining right or privilege
appertaining to the same, is not land within the meaning of the Act
of Congress under which the commissioners were appointed. Persons
claiming lands in California by virtue of any right or title
derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments are required to
present the same to the commissioners for adjudication, and of
course the commissioners have jurisdiction to decide upon the
validity of all such claims. 9 Stat. at Large 632.
3. Questions concerning mines and mining rights in Mexico depend
in a great measure upon the provisions of the Ordinance of the 22d
of May, 1783, which, although ordained long before her
independence, by the sovereign of the parent country, is still in
force and constitutes the principal code of the Republic upon that
subject. Omitting unimportant words, article 1 of the 5th title
reads as follows: "Mines are the property of my royal crown as well
by their nature and origin as by their reunion declared by law."
Article 2 contains the following provision:
"Without separating them from the royal patrimony, I grant them
to my subjects in property and possession in such manner that they
may sell them, rent them, pass them by will, either in the way of
inheritance or legacy, or in any other manner alienate the right
which in the mines belongs to them, on the same terms in which they
themselves possess it, and to persons capable of acquiring it."
Rockw. on Mines, p. 49; Halleck Coll. 222.
Discoverers of a new mine in which no pit or shaft had been
opened might acquire three pertenencias, and if worked in
company
Page 67 U. S. 168
a certain additional number not exceeding seven in all. Writers
do not exactly agree as to what is a pertenencia, but the better
opinion is that it is a square of two hundred varas, or five
hundred and fifty feet.
Prima facie, the owner of freehold
lands, says Bainbridge, is entitled to all the minerals on and
underneath the surface with the exception of royal mines, but he
admits that the rule just stated is only a presumption of law, and
that a mine may form a distinct possession and inheritance by the
production of a title distinct from that to the surface. Bainb., p.
4. He also admits that when mines form a distinct inheritance and
are not attached to the ownership of the lands in which they are
situate or form a part of a demesne of a manor, a title to them may
be acquired or lost in the same manner as to a common estate of
freehold. Bainb., p. 31. Property in minerals unsevered from the
land, says Collyer, whether held together with or separately from
the property in the land, is what the law terms a corporeal
hereditament, as distinguished from the mere right to work for
them, which is an incorporeal hereditament, and he also says that
an estate in minerals is considered an estate in land, and is
transferable
only under the same restrictions, whether
conveyed with or without a conveyance of the adjacent soil. P.
1.
4. courts of justice also have had occasion to assert the same
general principles. Plaintiff in ejectment was allowed, in
Turner v. Reynolds, 23 Penn. 199, to recover a coal mine
which he had described in his writ as land, although his title was
under a conveyance to him not of the tract of land, but of the coal
which was unsevered. Coal and minerals in place are land, say the
court in
Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Penn. 483, adding in the
same connection that it is no longer to be doubted that they are
subject to conveyance as such. Minerals beneath the surface of the
land, it is held in the same case, may be conveyed by deed,
distinct from the right to the surface, and in enforcing that view
the court remark that nothing is more common in that state than
that the surface right should be in one and the mineral in another,
and we have no doubt that the rule there laid down is correct.
Comyn v. Wheatley, Cro.Jac. 150.
Page 67 U. S. 169
Regarding the claim to be fully proved as set forth in the
petition, which is the proper view to take of the case in
determining the question under consideration, we are of the opinion
that the objection to the jurisdiction of the commissioners cannot
be sustained, and it is accordingly overruled. Rockw., chap. 11, p.
519-529; 530-532.
V. Having come to that conclusion, it becomes the duty of this
Court to examine the third question presented for decision, which
is whether the claim to the mine, including the mining right or
privilege as set forth in the petition, is shown by the evidence to
be a valid one within the rules of decision already described.
1. Property in mines not discovered and registered according to
law, whether the mine was on public or private lands, was vested,
as has already appeared, exclusively in the supreme government, so
that private persons could not acquire it or any interest in it in
any other mode than that prescribed in the provisions of the mining
ordinance. Reference therefore must be made to those provisions to
ascertain what they are and what the discoverer is required to do
in order to acquire such a property. Persons discovering one or
more mineral hills absolutely new in which there is no mine or
trial pit open may, under article 1, title 6, of the ordinance,
acquire, in the principal vein which they may select, three
pertenencias, continuous or interrupted, according to certain
prescribed measurements, and if they have discovered more than one
vein they may have one pertenencia for each, to be determined and
marked out within the term of ten days. Halleck Coll., p. 223,
title 6, art. 1.
Discoverer of a new vein in a hill known and worked in other
parts may have in it two pertenencias, provided he specifies them
within ten days, as mentioned in the preceding article, p. 223,
art. 2. Article 3 provides that he who asks for a new mine in a
vein known and worked in other places shall not be a discoverer.
Such persons as are described in the preceding articles who desire
to secure the benefit of those provisions are required by article 4
of the same title to present themselves with a written statement
before the mining deputation of that
Page 67 U. S. 170
territory or the nearest one, should there be none there,
stating in it their names and those of their partners, if they have
any, the place of their birth, their residence, profession and
employment, and the most particular and distinguishing feature of
the place, hill or vein, of which they ask adjudication, all of
which circumstances and the hour in which the discoverer presents
himself shall be noted in a book of registry, which the mining
deputation and Notary, if there be one, shall keep, and this being
done, his written statement shall be returned to him attested for
his due security. Notices are then to be affixed to the doors of
the church, the government houses, and other public places of the
town for due information, and the command is that the discoverer
within ninety days shall make or cause to be made in the vein or
veins of his registry a pit or well (pozo) of one and a half varas
in diameter at its mouth and ten varas deep, and that as soon as
this shall be done, one of the deputies shall personally go,
accompanied by the Notary, if there be one, and if there be none,
by two assisting witnesses and by the professional mining expert of
that department, to inspect the course and direction of the vein,
its width, its dip or inclination to the horizon, called lay or
slope, its hardness or softness, the greater or lesser solidity of
its sides, and the kind or principal indications of the mineral,
taking an exact account of all this in order that it may be added
to the corresponding part of his registry, with the evidence of
possession, which shall immediately be given to him in the name of
the sovereign measuring to the party his pertenencias, and causing
him, as required in the subsequent directions of the ordinance, to
fix stakes in his boundaries. Following these regulations, and as
the conclusion of the article in which they are contained, it is
ordained to the effect that when all this is done "there will be
delivered to him an attested copy of the proceedings as a
corresponding title."
Contestants appearing during the ninety days may prefer a
counterclaim, and in that event it becomes the duty of the tribunal
to adjudge the right to him who shall make the better proof, but no
one shall have any right to be heard unless he
Page 67 U. S. 171
shall appear within that time. Halleck Coll., p. 224, arts. 4
and 5.
Strict compliance with the law is required, as appears by all
the writers upon the subject, and the 13th article of title 19
provides in effect that the regulations shall be executed with the
greatest exactness, precisely as they are written and intended.
Halleck Coll., p. 307; Rockw., p. 110; Thompson on Mines, 183.
Properly speaking, says Gamboa, the register is the book in
which deeds and grants are entered for perpetual remembrance
thereof, so that if they be lost, torn or defaced or if any
question be raised as to their identity or authenticity, recourse
may be had to such book. Registry, says the same author, is the
basis of a title to a mine, and the attributive cause of the
subject's right of property in it, the Crown having subjected the
proprietor to this obligation when he made the mines common, so
that
"no mine can be lawfully worked until registry is made, without
which it is liable to be registered by any other person, the form
of the ordinance not having been complied with."
Although that commentary was written before the date of the
ordinance which must furnish the guide in this case, still the
views of the writer have an important bearing upon the questions
presented, as showing the universality of the rule that not even
the discoverer can acquire any title to a mine without registry.
Gamboa, pp. 143, 145.
2. Petition in this case was presented to the commissioners on
the 30th day of September, 1852, and on the 8th day of January,
1856, their decree was made confirming the claim to the mine and to
the entire mining right or privilege as therein set forth. When the
petition was filed, the claimant, as required by law, also
presented the documentary evidences of title on which he relied to
show that the claim ought to be confirmed. Throughout the whole
period that the case was pending before the commissioners, those
documents appear to have remained on file as the foundation of the
claim, and were finally urged upon the consideration of that
tribunal as true copies of originals existing in the office of the
magistrate before whom they
Page 67 U. S. 172
purported to have been executed. Final adjudication was made by
the commissioners and the claim confirmed upon that ground, and so
far as appears, without the slightest suspicion that the copies
filed in the case as documentary evidence under the Act of Congress
were not true copies of originals on file as alleged or that the
originals did not import absolute verity. They, of course, regarded
the documents as authentic and considering how fully they are
attested by official certificates, and that all of the signatures
were thoroughly proved by the positive testimony of two witnesses,
it is difficult to see how they could have come to any different
conclusion, especially as there was no opposing evidence in the
case. Additional testimony, however, of a very important character
was taken upon the subject in the district court while the case was
pending there, and it now becomes the duty of this Court to decide
the question upon a very different state of facts. Other parties,
it seems, besides the petitioner are interested in this claim, and
in order that the evidence may be understood and the testimony of
the witnesses properly appreciated, it becomes necessary to advert
to the circumstances under which some of these parties acquired
their supposed title.
According to the testimony, the mine is within the county of
Santa Clara and is situated in a spur of the Sierra Azul or Blue
Mountain, some sixteen or seventeen hundred feet above the level of
the sea, and fifteen miles southwardly from the City of San Jose.
Discovery of mineral there was first made by the Indians at a very
early period, and they were accustomed to obtain the mineral and
use it for paint. Civilized men also had knowledge of the mineral
and of the location of the mine more than twenty years before the
discovery made by the claimant, but it nowhere appears that anyone
had discovered that the mineral contained quicksilver. Two persons,
Antonio Sunol and Louis Chaboya, erected a mill on a stream in that
neighborhood sometime during the year 1824, and tried to get silver
out of the mineral. People generally knew that there was a mine
there, but they did not know what kind of a mineral it contained.
By authority of the government, the claimant, in the
Page 67 U. S. 173
autumn of 1845, made a journey to the fort of John A. Sutter, to
negotiate with the proprietor for its purchase. Proceeding from
Monterey, he and his party, consisting of Jose Castro and four
others, besides a guard of some twenty soldiers, traveled on the
route leading through Santa Clara, and his testimony shows that
when near that place, this mine was mentioned by his principal
companion. While there, some of the specimens of the ore were shown
to him, and one of the witnesses testified that he visited the
mine. Some examination of the mineral was made by him at that time,
but he presently left and pursued his journey to Sutter's fort,
where he arrived on the 11th day of November, 1845. Remaining there
but a short time, he then returned to Santa Clara, where he pursued
his investigations by certain rude experiments and discovered that
the mineral contained quicksilver. His first step, as alleged, was
to form a partnership for working the mine. Such an instrument
bearing date the 2d day of November, 1845, is one of the documents
which was filed with the petition. Original interests in mines are
usually acquired under a division of the mine into twenty-four
parts, called barras or shares, and by reference to the instrument
of partnership it will be seen that it was framed upon that
principle. Four shares were assigned to Jose Castro, four shares to
S. and T. Robles, four shares to the Padre Real and twelve shares
were retained by the claimant. They commenced working the mine in a
small way, and the claimant remained there until sometime in the
month of March or April following, when he left for the City of
Mexico and never returned to that department. Affairs of the mine
were left, at least for a time, in hands of the Padre Real.
On the 13th day of January, 1846, James Alexander Forbes,
British Vice Consul for California, wrote to Eustace Barron, of the
firm of Barron, Forbes & Co., at Tepic, that the claimant was
working a quicksilver mine near the Mission of Santa Clara.
Alexander Forbes of the same firm and British Vice Consul at Tepic,
on the 15th day of April, 1846, wrote to J. A. Forbes requesting
the former to furnish him as correct information as possible
respecting the quicksilver mine mentioned in his preceding
Page 67 U. S. 174
letter. Possession of the mine was, prior to the 22d day of
September, 1846, delivered to James Alexander Forbes by the Padre
Real, the agent of the claimant, as appears by the fact that on
that day he wrote to Alexander Forbes, of Tepic, that he was in
charge of the mine and was about making a bargain for four shares.
Two shares were purchased by James A. Forbes of S. & T. Robles
about the time he took possession of the mine. Arrangements were
made with equal activity by Alexander Forbes to get control of the
same property. On the 24th day of November of the same year, he
instructed his agent in the City of Mexico to purchase shares for
him of the claimant, and on the 28th day of the same month he
concluded with the agent of Jose Castro a contract for a lease or
avio of the mine for the term of sixteen years, which term is not
yet expired. His agent purchased five shares for him in the City of
Mexico, and other shares were also purchased by James A. Forbes.
Shares were also purchased by Robert Walkinshaw and other parties
in the City of Mexico and elsewhere. Most or all of the deeds of
conveyance, whether executed by the claimant, Castro, the Messrs.
Robles, or the Padre Real, refer to the writing of partnership as
the foundation of the title, and none of them makes any reference
whatever for any purpose to the supposed act of registry, or to the
act of juridical possession supposed to have been executed by the
alcalde of San Jose Guadalupe.
3. Appeal was taken by the United States to the district court
on the 15th of April, 1856, and from that time to the date of the
final decree the case was pending in that court. Reasons for the
appeal, as assigned by the United States, are that the claim is
invalid and that is the principal question that remains to be
considered. Written notice was served upon the claimant by the
district attorney of the United States on the 18th day of August,
1856, to produce the original paper of which Exhibit A is a copy,
to be used in the examination of witnesses. Exhibit A comprises the
documents filed with the petition as copies of originals on file in
the proper office of the alcalde. Claimant accordingly produced the
document which is the one denominated Exhibit R, No. 2, in the
record. Recurring to the
Page 67 U. S. 175
document, it will be seen that while it has all the certificates
appended to it which are described in the copies filed with the
petition, still it shows to a demonstration that the copies were
neither faithful nor to the letter, as was well said by the
district judge when his attention was first called to the subject.
Certificate of James W. Weekes is one of the number of certificates
appended to the document. When produced, it was shown to him while
he was under examination as a witness, and upon being asked whether
he had ever seen the paper before, he answered that he had and that
the signature to the certificate was his signature. At first he
seemed to suppose that it was a copy of what remained in the
archives at that time, but immediately stated that he himself
recorded it in the book of registry, and that he received the
document which he so recorded from James Alexander Forbes. He was
appointed alcalde in 1848, and he expressly states that the person
before named brought the paper to him and requested him to record
it, and that he did so while he was alcalde. Original document was
presented to the witness, as he states, by J. A. Forbes, and the
copy was also made by him showing that the witness not only made
the record without any other knowledge of the paper than what he
received from his employer, but that he also signed the certificate
certifying that it was "a faithful copy made to the letter from its
original," without ever having compared it with the paper presented
and when in point of fact it was not a true copy. Examination of
James W. Weekes took place on the 18th of August, 1857, and on the
14th of December in the same year, James Alexander Forbes was also
examined by the United States upon the same subject. His testimony
fully confirmed the statements of James W. Weekes that the copy was
made on the 20th day of January, 1848, and that the certificate of
the alcalde, as well as the body of the instrument, were in his own
handwriting, showing that all the alcalde had to do in the matter
was to affix his signature to a paper already prepared. Witness
last named thinks he prepared the copy at the mine, and he states
positively that he obtained the paper which he used as the original
from Alexander Forbes, who was then at
Page 67 U. S. 176
the mine. Pressed to explain where he got certain words
appearing on the first page of the document, he frankly admitted
that he did not know, and finally stated that he copied the paper
that was handed to him by his namesake and associate in that
business. Attempts were made to impeach this witness, but his
material statements are so fully confirmed that it is unnecessary
to reproduce the evidence in that behalf. Unmistakable proof
therefore is exhibited that the adjudication of the commissioners
was based upon documents which were fabricated, and it follows as a
necessary consequence that the claimant, when he filed his
petition, did not comply with the provision of law which required
him to present to the commissioners the documentary evidences
relied on by him in support of his claim. Those papers, strictly
speaking, are denominated the registry, the act of juridical
possession and the writing of partnership, but the counsel at the
bar have treated the entire document as an espediente, and as that
is a convenient designation, it will be adopted in this
investigation.
4. Espediente No. 1, called by the Attorney General the Weekes'
espediente, must be rejected as invalid. Certain characteristics of
the paper, however, should be noted in addition to those already
mentioned in order that the other documents subsequently introduced
may be compared with it as a test of their verity. Caption and
endorsement as translated are
"Year 1845. Espediente of the denouncement, possession, and
partnership of the quicksilver mine called Santa Clara,
jurisdiction San Jose Guadalupe, in upper California."
Contents are: 1. petition of claimant announcing the discovery
of a silver mine with
ley of gold; 2. supplementary
petition stating that besides silver and gold he had taken out
liquid quicksilver; 3. Act of possession signed by Antonio M. Pico;
4. receipt of same for fees, amounting to $25; 5. writing of
partnership.
Date of act of possession is Juzgado of San Jose Guadalupe,
December 30, 1845. Articles of partnership are for a mine of
silver, gold and quicksilver, and are dated on the 2d day of
November, 1845, some twenty-five days before quicksilver was
discovered.
Noting these characteristics as proper to be considered in
Page 67 U. S. 177
connection with those previously mentioned, we dismiss the
document as wholly unworthy of credit.
5. Second espediente, called the Fernandez espediente by the
Attorney General, is the one introduced by the claimant on the 6th
day of November, 1857, when Jose Fernandez was examined a second
time as a witness. His first examination was on the 28th day of
March, 1855, while the case was pending before the commissioners.
No such espendiente was exhibited then, and no inquiries were made
of the witness upon the subject. Request was made of the witness on
this last occasion to look at the document shown him by the
claimant and say whether he knew in whose handwriting it was and
whether the signatures of Pedro Chabolla or Chaboya appearing
thereon were genuine. Answer of witness was that the document was
in the handwriting of Salvio Pacheco and that the respective
signatures of Chabolla were genuine. Other documents were then
shown to the witness, and upon being asked whether the signatures
were genuine, his answer was in the affirmative. Those documents
are as follows: 1. petition of Jose Castro dated the 27th day of
June, 1846, addressed to the alcalde of first nomination of the
Pueblo of San Jose de Guadalupe, in which, among other things, he
solicits three pertenencias for himself and associates in addition
to those previously conceded and requests that the petition may be
attached to the former espediente; margin of that paper contains an
order signed Pacheco and dated Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe, June
29, 1846, as follows: "Let this be included and archived as the
party requests;" 2. Claimant's two petitions in respect to the
registry of the mine; 3. alcalde's act of possession, which is
dated Juzgado de San Jose Guadalupe, December, ___, 1845.
Signatures to the act of possession are Antonio Ma. Pico with
Antonio Sunol and Jose Noriega as assisting witnesses. Separate
certificates of Pedro Chaboya are appended to each of those papers.
Three of the certificates are without date, but the one appended to
the act of possession is dated on the 13th day of August, 1846.
Writing of partnership, so called, is wanting in the espediente,
which came from the hands of the claimant. Although Pedro Chabolla
was
Page 67 U. S. 178
examined as a witness by the claimant, still no questions were
asked him respecting this document. Testimony of Salvio Pacheco
shows that the whole body of the instrument is in his handwriting,
but he omits to state from what he copied it, and fails to give any
explanation upon that subject. He says he is acquainted with the
signature of Pedro Chaboya, and that his signatures to his
certificates are genuine, but he did not see him sign his name and
does not state how he became acquainted with his handwriting.
Signer of the certificate testifies that he could not write, that
he could only "paint his name," and that it was with great
difficulty that he could read any kind of writing. Caption of the
document is No. 1, and it is endorsed "Diligencias en el Registro,"
which signify that it should be promptly registered. Receipt of
Antonio Ma. Pico, as shown on espediente No. 1, is wholly wanting
in this document. Considering that the signer of the certificates
could not write or read writing and has not been called as a
witness to verify the document, it is entitled to very little
consideration. Circumstances, however, will render it necessary to
recur to this paper again after referring to certain other
documents introduced by the claimant.
6. Espediente No. 3, called by the Attorney General the Halleck
espediente, is endorsed as filed in the case, on the 30th day of
January, 1858, but it is certain that testimony respecting it was
introduced at an earlier date. Deputy Recorder of Santa Clara
County was examined by the United States in respect to a similar
paper on the 18th day of August, 1857, but insisting upon his right
to retain the document, a traced copy of it was made, and on the
twenty-ninth day of the same month, the copy was filed in the case
by the United States. On the 23d day of October following, another
Deputy Recorder of that County was examined by the claimant in
respect to the same or a similar document. Exhibiting a document,
entitled "Posesion de la mina Sta. Clara, ano de 1845," he stated
that he obtained it from the Office of the Recorder. Enquiry was
made of him when he went into that office, and whether he did not,
in 1852, see there the document produced. His answers were that he
had the entire charge of
Page 67 U. S. 179
the office from the fall of 1852 to the summer of 1853, but that
he had no recollection of seeing the document there during the
first year. Explanations were then given by the witness in which he
stated that the first recollection he had of the document was a few
days before the date of the filing on the back of the paper, which
is as follows: "Filed February 25, A.D. 1853, at 12 o'clock. A. M.
-- J. M. Murphy, Recorder, by S. C. Houghton, Deputy," who is the
witness, and he goes on to say that just previous to that time,
James A. Forbes called at the office of the recorder, and after
describing the paper, desired to see the record of it. Search was
accordingly made by the witness, but he could find none such there,
although he says that he and the applicant searched for it more
than a day. What the party was looking for, says the witness, was
the record of the paper, and not the paper itself, but they could
find nothing of the kind, although the search was thorough and
faithful.
Unsuccessful though they were at that time, still the desired
document, in the course of a few days, was found there without any
further search, for the witness states that some days after that,
he found the paper in the office, either in the top of his desk or
one of its pigeon-holes, and he says that he was surprised that it
should be there without his knowing it, but having found it, he
kept it safely until the party who inquired for it came, and it was
then filed at his request. Attention is called by the claimant to
the fact that there was written in pencil on the back of the paper,
as follows, "Filed 3 o'clock, P.M., 18 January, 1851 -- J. T.
Richardson Recorder, S.C. C.," but in view of the circumstances
which surround the paper, the fact referred to cannot have much
weight. Pencil marks could be added to the filing quite as easily
as the paper itself could be foisted into the pigeon-holes in the
desk of the Recorder. Interrogatories were also propounded to H. W.
Halleck in respect to that document, and the time when it was
deposited in the office of the Recorder of Santa Clara County.
Speaking of the document, the witness said he thought it to be
the one taken by the mayor "in my presence" from his office, and
transferred to the office of the county recorder in the
Page 67 U. S. 180
winter of 1851, during the session of the Legislature, and he
thought in the month of January of that year.
Recollection of witness is that he first went to the office of
the recorder for a copy of the papers connected with the mine, but
was told that the greater portion of the old alcalde papers were in
the office of the mayor. Learning that fact, he went to the latter
office, where, on overhauling certain old papers in an old desk, he
found this one among them. Witness, as he states, only remembers
the papers he found there from the general subject matter of its
contents, as purporting to be an original paper, containing the
denouncement and juridical possession of the mine. Document
embracing a copy of espediente, number one, was shown to the
witness, and he was asked whether it was not a copy of the one he
found in the office of the mayor; to which he answered, that he
could not remember whether it contained the same papers as that,
more or less. Obviously the recollections of the witness upon the
subject are very imperfect and indistinct, and consequently his
statements are so qualified and so far short of positive
declarations that they can hardly be regarded as evidence.
Indistinct, however, as the recollections of the witness are, still
it is evident that he regards the paper as the original
denouncement and juridical possession of the mine, because he says
so in answer to the direct interrogatory put to him by the United
States, but his opinion in that behalf cannot be regarded as
satisfactory proof of the fact, especially when considered in
connection with his previous answers as to his means of knowledge
and the state of his recollections.
7. Those interested in the mine could not have believed on the
13th day of December, 1850, that any such original document, or
duly authenticated copy thereof, was in the State of California, as
is evident from the affidavit of their counsel, signed and sworn to
on that day. Suit had been commenced in the County court, by the
widow and heirs of Jose Reyes Berreyesa, against all of the persons
in possession of the mine, to recover possession of a certain tract
of land, including that in which the mine was situated. Defendants
were Isidoro de la Torre, of Mazatlan; Alexander Forbes, William
Barron, and Eustacho Barron, of Tepic;
Page 67 U. S. 181
John Parrot, of San Francisco; and James A. Forbes, and Robert
Walkinshaw, of the County of Santa Clara. Court granted a rule on
the 13th of September, 1850, requiring defendants to produce
"certain papers or copies thereof," to be used in the trial of that
cause. Among those specified in the motion were certain papers of a
pretended denouncement of the mine in 1845. Papers were not
produced, and the affidavit of the counsel was filed to support a
motion for a continuance. Affidavit stated to the effect that the
original denouncement of the mine of New Almaden, and the act of
juridical possession given of the same in the year 1845, were held
by parties in Mexico, which had not then been received, although
the defendants had exercised all due diligence to procure and
produce them.
Referring to the contents of this espediente, it will be seen
that it contains: 1. Petition Jose Castro, already described; 2.
petitions of claimant; 3. alcalde's act of possession.
None of the certificates exhibited in the other espedientes is
to be found in this document. Testimony was adduced to show that
the several papers were genuine, and the witnesses most relied on
for that purpose were Jose Castro, Antonio Ma. Pico, together with
Antonio Sunol and Jose Noriega, the two assisting witnesses to the
act of possession. Full proof was exhibited that no one of the
papers was written by the person or persons who signed it, and it
was satisfactorily shown that each paper was in a handwriting
different from all the rest. Satisfactory proof also was exhibited
that the petition of Jose Castro was in the handwriting of Benito
Diaz, and he testified that he wrote it five or six months after
our conquest of that department. Writing of partnership, and the
receipt of Pico for his fees are both wanting in this document.
Caption of the document is: "Posesion de la Mina de Sta. Clara, ano
de 1845," and the act of possession is dated Juzgado de San Jose
Guadalupe, December ___, 1845.
8. Two inventories, purporting to contain a list of documents in
the Juzgado of San Jose, were also introduced. Included in the
schedule of the first one, which is dated on the 2d day of January,
1846, is the following: posesion de la Mina de Sta.
Page 67 U. S. 182
Clara, a D. Andres Castillero; but the second, which is dated on
the 10th day of November of the same year, shows no trace of any
such paper. Testimony of H. C. Melone should also be noticed in
this connection, as he was the first clerk of the alcalde's court,
under our military occupation. His statement is that he never saw
the document or heard it spoken of, although he had occasion to
examine the papers there, one by one, in order to select such as
should go to the office of the Recorder from such as he was
required to keep as county clerk.
9. Fourth espediente is the one called the Walkinshaw espediente
by the Attorney General, and is the last of the series introduced
by the claimant, as the documentary evidences of his title, to the
mine and mining right, or privilege described in his petition.
Contents of the espediente are as follows: 1. Petitions of the
claimant, as in the first espediente. Appended to each is also a
certificate of Pedro Chabolla, dated the 13th of January, 1846,
certifying that the petitions respectively were copies of
originals, and each certificate purports to have been signed in the
presence of P. Sansevan and Jose Sunol, as assisting witnesses; 3.
Pico's receipt for twenty-five dollars as fees. Introductory part
of the receipt corresponds to that in the first espediente, but he
also describes the mine as one
"in lands pertaining to Don Jose
Reyes Berreyesa." Castro's petition and the writing of
partnership are both wanting, and there is no certificate of Pedro
Chabolla appended to the act of possession or any certificate of
any kind. Another peculiarity of this document consists in its
caption, and as that part of the paper is of considerable
importance in the investigation, it will be given without
abbreviation. It is as follows:
"
YEAR 1845"
"
Espediente of the denouncement, Possession, and Partnership
of the Quicksilver Mine called Santa Clara -- Jurisdiction of San
Jose Guadalupe, in Upper California."
"November 22, 1845 -- Don Andres Castillero makes the
denouncement of the aforesaid, in the Pueblo of San Jose Guadalupe,
for want of deputation of Mining and of Judge
de letras.
"
Page 67 U. S. 183
"December 3, 1845 -- Writing which the said Castillero
presented, testifying to have taken out quicksilver and other
metals, asking that it be annexed to the espediente."
"December 30, 1845 -- Act of possession, which, with the
assisting witnesses, the alcalde of the Pueblo of San Jose gave to
Don Andres Castillero, of the mine of Santa Clara, because of the
time of the notices being completed."
"December 30, 1845 -- Receipt for the fees of the possession,
signed by the Judge of San Jose."
"December 8, 1845 -- Writing of partnership for the works of the
mine, authorized by the Prefect of the 2d District."
Partnership of the quicksilver mine is one of the matters
enumerated in the title of the caption, and the writing of
partnership is one of the documents circumstantially described in
the last article of the same. Espediente produced, contains no such
paper, and the inference is a very strong one that it has been
spoliated by someone having an interest to suppress the missing
paper. Description of the paper, as exhibited in the last article
of the caption, gives the date as of the 8th day of December, 1845,
which is a very material variation from the other copies presented
in this record. Discovery that the mineral contained quicksilver,
notwithstanding what is stated in the articles of partnership, was
not made until late in November, 1845, after the claimant returned
from Sutter's Fort. Articles of partnership, as exhibited in the
first espediente, were dated before the quicksilver was discovered,
and yet the discovery, as set forth in that document, was described
as of a mine of silver, gold, and quicksilver, which inconsistency
tended strongly to impair confidence in the entire espediente.
Petition had been pending nearly eight years when this espediente
found its way into this case. First espediente was filed on the
30th day of September, 1852, and this one was filed on the 17th day
of July, 1860. Time enough, certainly, had elapsed to enable a
party to examine and ascertain what, if any, contradictions or
inconsistencies appeared in his proofs, and to give him an
opportunity to employ all proper means to obviate any such
difficulty. Produced, as this document was, at so late a stage of
the litigation,
Page 67 U. S. 184
it must be held that the burden of proof is upon the party
producing it, not only to establish the authenticity of the paper,
but to do so by clear and satisfactory evidence. On the 27th of
July, 1860, Pedro Chabolla was examined in respect to this
espediente. Inquiry was made of him, whether his signature and
those of the assisting witnesses were genuine, and upon looking at
the document, he answered both questions in the affirmative,
although he admitted, in the same deposition, that he never learned
to write, and that it was with difficulty that he could "paint his
name." His account of the matter was that the papers were brought
to him from the mine, and he says he signed them because he was
requested to do so, and when asked how he knew the papers were
correct, his answer was that he did not examine them, adding that
"it was not for me to do that." One of the assisting witnesses,
Jose Sunol, is dead; but the other, Pedro Sansevan, was examined,
and confirms the statements of the preceding witness as to the
genuineness of the signatures; but two witnesses examined by the
United States, testified, without qualification, that the witness
had previously stated to them that he signed the documents in the
year 1848, and that they were copies.
Theory of claimant now is that espediente No. 3 is the original
filed in office, and that the espediente under consideration was a
duplicate executed at the same time and delivered to the party.
Three witnesses, Antonio Ma. Pico, Antonio Sunol, and Jose Noriega,
were recalled and examined to prove that the document was executed
in duplicate. They stated nothing of the kind in their first
examination, nor did they do so in their second depositions. When
called for the third time, after the fourth espediente had been
discovered and introduced, the witness first named said that the
document was signed on the day of its date, and he had no doubt he
delivered it to the claimant; but the other two witnesses were less
positive, and were only able to say that they supposed the document
was signed at its date. Learned counsel admit that the theory in
this behalf was started at rather a late stage in the
investigation, but endeavor to excuse the claimant upon the ground
that
Page 67 U. S. 185
the fact was unknown to his attorneys, and that his witnesses
did not remember it. Attorneys are certainly without fault, and so
are the witnesses, unless they have finally attempted to remember
what never occurred, which, from all the circumstances, there is
too much reason to fear.
Parties holding large and valuable interests in real estate are
generally careful to secure title papers which are supposed to be
correct in form, and their solicitude and vigilance in preserving
them are more or less active, according to their importance and the
magnitude of the interest involved. Contrary to what might have
been expected, as shown by experience, the claimant in this case,
and those holding under him lost all the original title papers to
the mine, although the espediente, as they allege, had been
executed in duplicate, and the mine and mining right or privilege
were of incalculable value and importance. Fortuitous circumstances
artistically described in the testimony, led, it seems, according
to the theory of the claimant, to the discovery of the third
espediente, called by his counsel the original, in the depository
where it belonged, and where everyone who made any enquiries upon
the subject must have known that the papers of the alcalde's office
had been deposited.
10. Impressions still prevailed, as the claimant represents, in
the minds of those interested in the mine that there was somewhere
in existence a duplicate original, but all enquiries and search for
it had proved ineffectual until the time when the fourth espediente
was discovered under the extraordinary circumstances detailed in
the record. Those circumstances are well described by the witness,
Thomas Bell, and inasmuch as they were even more fortuitous than
those under which the third espediente was discovered, it may be
well to allow the witness to state them in his own language. He was
examined on the 17th of July, 1860, the day this last espediente
was filed. Witness says:
"Sometime about three weeks ago, at the request of Mr. Billings,
I was looking for the documents relating to the barras in the mine
of New Almaden, which at one time had belonged to Padre Real; not
finding one of the documents which I was in search
Page 67 U. S. 186
of among the papers of the mine, I asked Mr. Young to get the
box containing the papers relating to the estate of Walkinshaw, to
see if it could not be found there. He produced the box, and then
we proceeded to overhaul the papers. I saw a bundle marked 'Papers
relating to the disputed barra,' which I opened, and in looking
over these papers I found one endorsed 'Titles of Mines.' I was
struck with the antique appearance of the paper, and knowing that
it was suspected that Walkinshaw had had documents relating to the
Almaden mine in his possession, after glancing over the papers, I
took them to the office of Messrs. Peachy and Billings, to
ascertain more particularly their nature. It was then discovered
that it was an espediente which they had been anxious to obtain for
a long time."
Explanation of the transaction as given by the claimant is that
Robert Walkinshaw, the undisputed owner of two shares in the mine,
brought suit against Bolton, Barron & Co., to establish his
right to a third share claimed by him on which the defendants
refused to pay him dividends. He employed counsel and gave him
certain papers which the counsel, who is now one of the counsel in
the case, retained in his possession from January, 1853, when he
was employed to bring the suit, until May, 1858, when he returned
them to his client who gave him a receipt for the papers. Receipt
is dated on the 14th of May, 1858, and the first paper named in it
is a document in Spanish, headed
"Ano de 1845, Espediente de denuncio posesion y compania de la
Mina de Azogue nombrado Santa Clara, jurisdiction de St. Jose
Guadalupe, en la Alta California."
Five pages writing and certificate, endorsed "Titles of
Mine."
Day after the date of that receipt the party signing it sailed
for Scotland, where, in the following August, he died. Document
remained among the effects of the deceased in the care of his
son-in-law and the executor of his estate until it was brought to
notice in the manner already described.
Deposition of the son-in-law, who was the executor of the
estate, was also taken by the claimant. He confirmed the statement
of the preceding witness, but adds that he had previously
Page 67 U. S. 176
examined the papers of the deceased in search of documents
relating to the title of the Almaden mine without any such success.
Where the box had been kept, and whether so situated as to be
accessible to other persons or not, the witness does not state; but
he does state that the decedent before he left the country, handed
him the documents found in the bundle, and that he enveloped them
"in a piece of paper" and labeled the envelope.
His search on the former occasion, as the witness admits, was
especially directed to find the testimonio of the act of juridical
possession, but he made no such discovery at that time. First
search, as in the matter of the third espediente, was unsuccessful,
but the second was attended with no difficulty. Such a discovery at
that stage of the controversy was doubtless thought to be an
acquisition as valuable as it was unexpected, and if the document
could be regarded as an authentic paper, free from suspicion, the
claimant and those holding under him, in one aspect of the case,
might well be of the opinion that its importance could hardly be
over estimated.
Assuming the other espedientes to be genuine, still the evidence
in regard to them, even if viewed according to the theory of the
claimant, showed conclusively that article 4, title 6, of the
Mining Ordinance had not been complied with, because it was
conceded that no attested copy of the proceedings had been
delivered to the acquirer of the mine as "a corresponding title."
When he filed his petition before the commissioners, he also filed
copies of the first espediente. Both the copies and the original,
subsequently produced, represented that the act of juridical
possession contained the day of the month on which it was executed,
and besides the document embraced the receipt of the alcalde for
his fees and two certificates of Pedro Chabolla dated on the 13th
of January, 1846, appended to the two petitions of the claimant.
Those particulars were all wanting in the respective documents
subsequently introduced. Favorable adjudication under such a state
of facts could not rationally be expected, unless these glaring
inconsistencies could be explained, because their effect was not
only to impair all confidence in those documents,
Page 67 U. S. 188
but also to discredit all the witnesses who, under oath, had
verified the first espediente and the several papers of which it
was composed.
Mention is made of these circumstances as showing the urgent
necessity there was for additional proof and the corresponding
inducement to commit fraud by fabrication and forgery. Counsel of
the claimant admit in their brief that from the time James A.
Forbes was examined as a witness in relation to the first
espediente, until May or June, 1860, it remained inexplicable,
whence came the word thirty in the date of the first copy of the
act of juridical possession, whence came the copy of the receipt of
the alcalde for his fees, and whence came the copy of the two
certificates of Pedro Chabolla which follow the respective
petitions of the claimant. All these were found in the copy
produced and filed as the first espediente, and up to that time had
been treated by the claimant as parts of a genuine document.
"Whence they came," say the counsel, "was the mystery," but their
theory is that the mystery was solved by what they now call the
duplicate copy of the act of juridical possession, and in support
of the theory they suggest, that it had long been supposed that
such a copy must have been delivered by the alcalde to the
claimant. Suggestions were also made as to the mode in which Robert
Walkinshaw might have become possessed of the supposed original
document; but it is a sufficient answer to all these suggestions to
say that they are founded on mere conjecture, are not supported by
the evidence, and have little or no foundation in the probabilities
of the case. Production of that espediente, say the counsel,
"furnished the means of bringing in the testimony of all the
witnesses concerned in (its) preparation who were yet living."
Accordingly those witnesses who were called for the third time and
reexamined, and although in their former depositions they had
uniformly spoken of the espediente supposed to have been executed
before the alcalde in the singular number, without any intimation
in respect to a duplicate, yet at last, after the petition had been
pending nearly eight years, they were, as they state, able to
recollect that a duplicate was executed at the same time
Page 67 U. S. 189
and delivered to the claimant, but their recollections upon the
subject are by no means as distinct as they were on a former
occasion they testified to the effect that the first espediente was
a genuine document. Such testimony under the circumstances, is not
entitled to credit, and such theories as those set up in respect to
the supposed existence, loss and discovery of the third and fourth
espedientes as genuine original documents are too speculative,
sound too much in fiction, and are too thoroughly saturated with
improbability to receive credence in a court of Justice.
11. Frequent reference is made by the claimant in this
connection to the evidence adduced as to the proceedings of the
Junta de Fomento and other departments of the supreme
government, as tending to confirm the testimony introduced to prove
the genuineness of these documents, and it may be conceded that the
evidence referred to has some indirect bearing in that direction,
but it must be borne in mind that no one of those documents, nor
any part thereof, was ever submitted to those departments, or to
anyone of them, and it is by no means certain that the officers of
those departments, or anyone of them, ever heard that any such
documents had been executed. They had doubtless heard what the
claimant had stated in his communication to the
Junta de
Fomento, but there is no evidence to show that they had ever
heard anything more than that in respect to any of the supposed
proceedings of the local authorities upon that subject. None of the
documents were presented to them by the claimant, and of course
there could have been no action in respect to their genuineness,
which is the question now under consideration. Arguments which
confound the question as to the genuineness of the documents,
supposed to have been executed before the alcalde, with the
question of confirmation by the Home government, afford very little
aid in the decision of the case, and, in point of fact, are
entitled to no weight, because their effect, if any, is to
mislead.
Strong, however, as our impressions are that the evidence fails
to show that anyone of the four espedientes, introduced by the
claimant, is entitled to credit, still we are disinclined, in
view
Page 67 U. S. 190
of the great complication of the evidence upon the subject, to
rest the decision of the case upon that ground.
VI. Two other principal objections are made to the confirmation
of the claim:
First. It is insisted by the United States, that it is
not shown by competent evidence, that a public tribunal, empowered
by law to take jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
acquisition of a mine, or mining right, or privilege, has ever
acted in this case, and adjudicated to the claimant the title to
the mine, as alleged by him in the petition.
Secondly. That if such a tribunal is shown by competent
evidence to have taken any action in the case, still it does not
exercise its special and limited jurisdiction in a manner required
by law so as to constitute or evidence any title to the mine
claimed by the petitioner.
1. Mines under Mexican laws, as before explained, whether
situated in public or private lands, belong to the supreme
government, and private persons can only acquire a title in one not
previously discovered and made individual property according to
law, by conforming substantially to the conditions ordained in the
provisions of the 4th article of the mining ordinance as herein
previously recited. Applicant must resort to the proper tribunal
and present his written statement, specifying in it his name and
the names of his partners, if he has any, the place of their birth,
their residence, profession and employment, and the most particular
and distinguishing features of the place, hill or vein, of which he
asks adjudication. The title to such properties are acquired by the
citizen or subject wherever Spanish law prevails by the
adjudication of the proper tribunal having jurisdiction of the
subject matter. Contrary to what is supposed by the claimant, is
the adjudication, or decree, of the proper tribunal in a case duly
presented for decision, and the registry of the
adjudication together with the proceedings on which it is
founded, which vest the title in the applicant, and not the mere
fact of discovery as was supposed at the argument. Without proof of
discovery by the applicant, there can be no adjudication in his
favor, but the discovery of a mine, by a party in whose favor there
has been
Page 67 U. S. 191
no adjudication by a tribunal having jurisdiction of the subject
matter, secures no right or title to the discoverer. Boundaries
also must be fixed to carry the adjudication into effect or rather
to complete it, else the title or claim, like other indefinite and
uncertain interests in lands, will be void for uncertainty. Marking
of boundaries also is essential under all circumstances, whether
the mine is situated in public or private lands, for if the
location is in public lands, compliance with the requirement is
essential to show what extent of the public domain has been
segregated from the mass of such lands and has passed into private
ownership.
2. Public convenience, therefore, in such a case requires that
the boundaries should be fixed, and, besides, unless the limits of
the pertenencia were fixed and staked, or monuments set, other
tribunals, whose duty it is to adjudicate lands to applicants for
agricultural purposes, would be subjected to embarrassment and be
led into error. Definite limits also to mining rights or privileges
are equally necessary and important, where the same happen to be
located upon the lands of private individuals, in order that the
land owner, as contradistinguished from the owner of the mine, may
have the means of knowing and be judicially notified, as to what
portion of his land has been condemned and appropriated to the use
of another.
3. Registry, also, is expressly required by the very article of
the mining ordinance under which the party in this case claims
title to the mine, and it is a great error to suppose that a
compliance with that provision is shown by proving that sheets of
paper, not executed at the same time, but assumed to constitute an
espediente, were at some time placed in the office of the alcalde
and remained there for a time in one of the pigeonholes of his
desk. Such a suggestion is destitute of any foundation. On the
contrary, the requirement is in express terms that the statement of
the discoverer, together with the time when he presented
himself,
"
shall be noted in a book of registry, which the
deputation and notary, if there be one, shall keep, and in respect
to the action of the tribunal on the application, the provision is
that an exact account shall be taken"
in order that it may be
Page 67 U. S. 192
added to the corresponding part of the registry with
the
evidence of possession, which shall immediately be given. Act
of possession, therefore, is to be added to the registry, together
with the action of the tribunal on making the adjudication, and
they are both required to be noted in a book (Libro) of
registry.
4. Strict compliance with that provision is required as matter
of public policy, because the mines of a country like Mexico are a
great sources of revenue to the government, and because it tends to
prevent disputes and litigation; prevent fraud and false swearing;
secure such rights of property, and promote order and a good
understanding among miners holding and working contiguous
pertenencias. 1 Gamboa per H., pp. 143, 144.
The tribunal empowered by the mining ordinance to exercise this
jurisdiction was "the deputation of Mining" for the territory or
district where the mine was situated, or the nearest one thereto,
should there be none there. Halleck Coll. 224. Former ordinances,
especially that of 1584, on which Gamboa wrote, conferred the power
of adjudicating such titles exclusively on the Mining court within
whose jurisdiction the mine was situated. Ord. 1584, art. 17,
Gamboa per H., 139. Section 17th of that Ordinance also
provided
"that in case
such registry be not made in the manner,
and within the prescribed time, any person may register such mine,
and shall thereby have and acquire the right which such discoverer
or other person who might have required the registry,
would
have had if he had caused the registry to be made."
Gamboa, p. 141.
5. Cases occurred under that Ordinance where mines were
discovered in districts having no Mining court, and in that state
of the case there was no tribunal in the parent country which had
jurisdiction of the subject matter, and of course the matter had to
be referred to the sovereign power, and to remedy the embarrassment
arising under such circumstances from the want of a court to
adjudicate such titles, it was provided, in the mining Ordinance of
1783, that the court "nearest thereto" should have jurisdiction of
such a case. Parties concede that the ordinance last named was in
force at the date of these proceedings, and unless it can be shown
(and the burden is upon him who avers
Page 67 U. S. 193
it) that the provision referred to has been modified or
repealed, it is clearly applicable to this case. Constitution of
Mexico vested all the judicial powers of the Republic in one
supreme court of Justice, and other courts and tribunals to be
constituted in conformity to the instrument. Coll. Mexican
Constitution; tomo 1, titulo 5, art. 123. Pursuant to that
provision the Tribunal General of Mining, on the 20th of May, 1826,
was deprived of its powers. New regulations were then adopted,
which were from time to time amended, but it is not important to
notice those decrees, because on the 2d day of December, 1842, a
new system, carefully digested, was put in force, the 4th article
of which constituted and regulated the tribunals of mining. Halleck
Coll., pp. 409, 424, 434, 441.
Among other things it provides for the creation of "courts of
the first instance" in each department, and for the mode of their
election, and also provides that those courts, within their
respective districts, shall exercise the executive, judicial, and
economical powers given by the old ordinance. Halleck Coll. p. 441,
title 4, art. 26.
6. Courts of the First Instance were never organized in the
Department of California, and the argument of the claimant is that
in consequence of that fact the ordinary tribunals, as for example,
an alcalde could take jurisdiction over such a subject matter, and
on the application of the discoverer, could adjudicate the title.
But the position cannot be sustained, because by the express law of
the republic, as evidence in the special decree of the 14th of
January, 1843, it is provided that territorial deputations may
continue to exercise their functions "until the courts of First
Instance . . . are established." Halleck Coll., p. 443. Support to
the position cannot be derived, as is supposed, from the fact that
the law was so in some of the dependencies of Spain prior to 1783,
because it is from the express terms of the Ordinance of that year
that the mining deputation derived their exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject, and inasmuch as the supposed analogy on which the
position was based fails, the position must fall with it.
7. Mexican policy also, and administration in regard to that
Page 67 U. S. 194
department, afford strong ground to conclude that no such power
was intended to be conferred upon any of the officers of the Local
government. Those officers were a governor, appointed by the
supreme government, a departmental assembly, consisting of seven
members, who were chosen by electors, but their election was
subject to the approval of the home government.
Most of the important functions of the local government were
performed by the governor and the departmental assembly, but the
law also made provision for the appointment of prefects, who were
to be nominated by the governor and confirmed by the general
government; also sub-prefects, who were to be nominated by the
prefects and approved by the governor. Provision was also made for
ayuntamientos or municipal councils, whose ordinary
members were elective; and also for the appointment of alcaldes and
juaces de paz or justices of the peace, whose numbers were
to be fixed "by the departmental assembly, in concurrence with the
governor." Arrillaga, Recop., pp. 202, 214, 223, 230. Judicial
functions were exercised by the prefect as well as the alcalde, and
no reason is perceived for holding that the latter could adjudicate
a mining title which might not be adduced with equal and even
greater force to show that the same important duty might be
performed by the prefect; but the truth is there was no law which
gave either the one or the other any pretense of jurisdiction in
any such matter. theory of claimant is, and so is the argument,
that the jurisdiction must have been confided to some of the
officers of the department, and that the presumption is that the
alcalde had jurisdiction, inasmuch as it is not shown that courts
of first instance had been constituted and organized.
Giving the argument, however, its utmost force, it only shows
that a law conferring upon an alcalde such a jurisdiction would
have been a convenience to the inhabitants, and especially to the
claimant; but it has no tendency to show there was any such law,
which is the question to be decided. Opinion is expressed by two or
three of claimant's witnesses that an alcalde might make such an
adjudication, but they exhibit no law to that effect, nor do they
attempt to prove there was any such general
Page 67 U. S. 195
usage, and inasmuch as their opinions are not competent
evidence, their testimony may be dismissed without further remark.
Authorities of Mexico had long dreaded the influence of foreigners
in that department, and although the policy of the home government
was to promote the settlement and growth of the department, still
they had always manifested an unwillingness to confer any more
power upon the local government than was necessary to accomplish
those objects.
Mineral wealth, if discovered, would furnish a motive to attempt
the conquest of the department, and it may well be inferred that
the authorities of the Home government had determined to reserve
the adjudication of titles to such important public interests to
the federal tribunals. Strong support to that view of the case is
derived from the course pursued by those authorities when the land
system of the department was devised and put into operation.
8. Power to grant vacant lands was as early as the 18th of
August, 1824, vested in the governor, in concurrence with the
departmental assembly. Additional regulations upon the subject were
adopted on the 21st of November, 1828, which exhibit a system as
complete and perfect as is to be found anywhere. Granting vacant
lands for agricultural purposes was by no means regarded as a
matter of so much public importance as the adjudication of titles
to newly discovered mines. Those provisions and regulations confer
very ample power upon the governor to grant vacant lands in
concurrence with the departmental assembly, but they confer no
power upon them or upon any of the local authorities to adjudicate
titles to mines. Grants of land made under those laws did not
convey to the grantee the unsevered minerals in the soil or any
interest in them, and there is no ground whatever to hold that the
supreme government ever conferred upon any of the local tribunals
any jurisdiction upon the subject under consideration. Authority of
the alcalde, therefore, cannot be inferred from the fact of its
exercise, or from the fact that no other tribunal of the department
was authorized to exercise such a jurisdiction.
VII. But if the alcalde had power to take jurisdiction of
the
Page 67 U. S. 196
subject matter, still it is insisted by the United States in the
second place that he had only a special and limited authority, and
that he did not exercise it in the manner required by law. 1. His
proceedings were based upon the written statement of the claimant,
and that was upon its face exceedingly imperfect if not absolutely
insufficient. Some of the provisions of the mining ordinance are
doubtless merely directory, others may be regarded as conditions
subsequent, but those appertaining to the registry of the mine,
together with the action of the tribunal thereon, and in respect to
the juridical possession of the same, are evidently conditions
precedent; so that it is necessary, in order to support a title to
such a right or privilege as a discoverer, to show that the party
substantially performed those conditions. Unless a claimant shows a
substantial compliance with those requirements the conclusion is
inevitable, not that he has forfeited his right to the mine, but
that he never acquired any such title. Forfeiture is of that which
a party hath, but he cannot be said to have forfeited what he never
had acquired, as the title to that which he had never acquired,
must always have been in the state or in another person.
2. Nothing like forfeiture is pretended by the United States,
and no such question arises in the case; but the proposition is
that the claimant never acquired any right or privilege in the mine
even if he was the discoverer, because he did not, as required by
law, pursue the necessary steps to give vitality to the inchoate
privilege or preemption accorded to the discoverer to proceed
according to law, and ripen such privilege or preemption into a
perfect or complete right by a registry of that which he had
discovered before the proper tribunal, and by securing the
juridical possession of the same under a legal adjudication of the
title. His discovery, and its registration, as is well said by the
counsel of the United States, gave him a right, within ninety days
to make an opening into the vein, and the further right to apply to
the proper public authority and have that which he claimed to have
discovered defined and set out to him, and its boundaries marked,
and a record made of his title to the defined pertenencias. When
all this is done according to law,
Page 67 U. S. 197
the inchoate privilege or preemption of a discoverer so to
proceed is then ripened into a perfect or complete right, and his
title to the mine comes into existence.
3. Returning to the written statement which in this case is the
petition of the claimant addressed to the alcalde, and noting the
representations it contains, it is clear that it is not a
compliance with the requirements of the ordinance in many respects.
Ordinance, for example, requires a written statement of the most
particular and distinguishing features of the place, hill, or vein
of which adjudication is asked, or of which he asks the grant, as
the phrase is rendered in some of the translations. Representation
in the statement or petition is that he, the claimant, has
discovered a vein of silver with a
ley of gold "on the
rancho of Jose Reyes Berreyesa, which was a hacienda of a league
square, mostly table land, with disputed boundaries." Another
requirement of the ordinance is that the applicant shall give "the
names of his partners, if he has any, and the place of their birth,
their residence, profession, and employment," and by article 6, of
title 7, the discoverer is expressly forbidden to denounce a mine
for himself having entered into a contract of partnership, and yet
the claimant's petition which shows that there was a partnership,
fails to disclose the names of his partners or any of the required
particulars, and it also shows that he denounced the mine to
himself alone.
4. Strong doubts are entertained whether the alcalde, even if he
had jurisdiction of the subject matter, was authorized to proceed
and adjudicate the title upon the basis of such a statement; but it
is not necessary to decide that question, as there are two other
defects in the proceedings which are fatal to the pretensions of
the claimant. No such registry of the particulars concerning the
mine, or of the action of the alcalde upon the allegations of the
petition, or of his proceedings in respect to the juridical
possession of the mine was ever made, as is required by the
provisions of the ordinance, nor were the pertenencias measured or
definitely located, or the boundaries fixed, or the stakes set, as
is therein required. Registry has been required as the basis of the
title to a mine wherever Spanish law has prevailed
Page 67 U. S. 198
for more than three centuries, and probably no case ever
occurred within that period which more fully showed the absolute
necessity for such a rule or more fully exemplified its wisdom than
the case under consideration.
When the alcalde was first called and examined in another suit
concerning the proceedings before him, in respect to the registry
of this mine, and the supposed juridical possession given of the
same, he testified that the claimant applied to him to go and give
him possession of the mine, according to the Mexican custom. Taking
the account of the matter, as he then gave it, to be true, he went
there with the claimant and others, and pointed out such boundaries
as he thought the claimant ought to have; but he expressly stated,
on that occasion, "that no fixed possession was given to him," for
the reason that there was a dispute between him and Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, on whose rancho the mine was situated.
Berreyesa, as the witness stated, would not consent that
possession should be given unless the claimant would admit that he,
Berreyesa, should have an interest in the mine, and as the claimant
would not do that, he, the witness, did not give any fixed
possession of the mine. Witness was three times examined in this
case, and on two of the occasions, he was interrogated upon this
subject. His statements are to the effect that he, with the
claimant and others, went to the mine; that after they arrived
there, he sent for Jose Reyes Berreyesa, the proprietor of the
Rancho, and that he accordingly came to the mine; that he, the
witness, made known to Berreyesa what it was that was proposed to
be done; that at first he objected, but finally consented, and that
he, the witness, delivered the possession to the claimant. They
made no survey, fixed no boundaries, and set no stakes, and the
witness expressly states that he had no idea whether the three
thousand varas in all directions were to be laid out in a square or
round; that a part of the tract only was to be located around the
mine, and the residue on the public domain in that
neighborhood.
6. Nothing was done on the land, and if the witness is to be
believed, very little was said, except that he stated that he
Page 67 U. S. 199
delivered that three thousand varas in all directions to the
claimant. During the examination he was reminded of his former
statements upon that subject, and was requested to explain the
differences, but his answer was that, according to his
understanding, there was no contradiction between his testimony
then given and the statement in the act of possession. Alcalde
Antonio Ma. Pico had a secretary by the name of Jose Fernandez, who
was a witness in this case, and who was also the
escribano
of the court, but the Padre Real expressed a wish that these
documents, whatever they were, should be prepared by one Gutierrez,
a teacher at the Mission of Santa Clara, which was a league or two
from the Juzgado of San Jose Guadalupe. They were not, therefore,
prepared by the Secretary of the court, and all he knows upon the
subject is that two or three days after the party returned from the
mine, the schoolmaster, Gutierrez, brought him the document, and
said, "there, now, it is all finished, and here is your fee,"
giving him three dollars and a half, and "so," in the language of
the witness, "the document remained in the court," but he expressly
states that he never read it, or examined it and when asked by the
United States what he did with it, he answered: "It remained there
in court. I did nothing else with it."
Other witnesses were examined upon these topics, but the
statement given contains the substance of the evidence on both; and
all the witnesses agree that there was no survey, no stakes set,
and no boundaries marked in any manner. On this state of the case,
it is insisted by the United States, that the acts of the alcalde
were absolutely void, but the claimant insists that even conceding
the irregularities to have been such as represented, still that the
acts of the alcalde were not absolutely void, but at most only
voidable, and that they were afterwards ratified and confirmed by
the supreme government.
7. Reliance, it is proper to remark, is placed by the claimant
upon the evidence of ratification, as affording a sufficient and
complete answer to all the objections taken to the claim made by
him to the mine. Examination of that evidence, as exhibited in the
copies of documents, introduced as true copies of originals
Page 67 U. S. 200
on file in the departments of the supreme government, has
already been so fully made that a brief reference to it in this
stage of the investigation will be sufficient.
Statement of the claimant in his communication to the
Junta
de Fomento is that he had discovered a mine of quicksilver in
the Mission of Santa Clara; that he had denounced and taken
possession, not only of the mine, but also of an extent of three
thousand varas in all directions, that he had formed a company to
work it, had constructed the pit, and had complied with all the
conditions prescribed by the ordinance. Required, as he was, to
make the representation in writing, it was of course prepared with
deliberation; and yet he falsely states that the mine is situated
"in the Mission of Santa Clara," and suppresses altogether the fact
stated in his petition, and repeated in the act of possession, that
the mine was situated on the rancho of Jose Reyes Berreyesa.
He refers to none of the documents, and none were produced, and
this remark applies as well to his seventh proposition as to his
representations in the preliminary part of his communication to the
junta. They adopted his seventh proposition, and recommended to the
president, through the Minister of Justice, that the possession
given to the claimant by the local authorities, as he represented,
should be confirmed. Two accounts are given, as to what was the
action of the president on the occasion. First, in the dispatch of
the Minister of Justice, and secondly, in that of the Minister of
Relations.
In the first, the language is that the president "has been
pleased to approve in all its parts the agreement made with (the
claimant) in order to
commence the working of said mine;"
and in the second, the language is the same, except that the
purpose of the agreement, as described, was
"to commence the
exploration of that mine." Neither the one or the other
contains a word which, by any proper construction, can be held to
confirm the acts of the local authorities, or any of them, or to
vest in the claimant any right, title, or interest in the mine.
None of the documents, executed by the alcalde were before the
president, and it does not appear that he ever heard of them in any
other
Page 67 U. S. 201
manner than by those vague representations, or others of a
similar character. Action of the president evinces caution and
circumspection, and the several communications, taken together
clearly show that he did not act at all upon the seventh
proposition of the claimant, or upon his representations in respect
to the juridical possession of the mine; and there is nothing in
the marginal order in any respect inconsistent with this view of
the case, as it is evident that the purpose and intent of that
order was accomplished in the contemporaneous dispatch of the
Minister of Justice. Credence was evidently given to the
representations that a mine had been discovered, and the president
was willing that an advance of $5,000 or $6,000 should be made to
the claimant to enable him to commence its exploration. Directions
were accordingly given to approve the agreement to that extent, and
to make the advance and furnish the retorts and other apparatus
therein mentioned.
8. Second grants of land in the Department of California were
seldom made by the governors, and as the claimant already had one,
he could hardly expect to obtain another without the special
approbation of the supreme government. Hence his eighth proposition
that a grant should be made to him, "as a colonist," which was
approved by the president so far as appears in the dispatch of the
Minister of Relations already explained. Grants of that description
conveyed no interest in the minerals, as was well known to the
claimant; and in respect to the eighth proposition, the president
was silent, evidently reserving that matter for further information
and a more deliberate consideration. Irrespective, therefore, of
the question of fraud, we are of the opinion that, by the true
construction of the several communications, the claimant fails to
show that the acts of the alcalde have in any manner been ratified
or confirmed by the supreme government.
It is clear, therefore, that the respective documents executed
before the alcalde must stand or fall, by what appears in the
instruments, when considered in connection with the evidence,
showing what was done at the time of their execution. Conceding
full credit to the witnesses, and giving the utmost scope to
their
Page 67 U. S. 202
testimony consistent with the language employed, still it is
obvious from the claimant's own showing that he never made any
registry of the mine, within the meaning of the provision requiring
it to be made. Such a document cannot be said to have been
registered, merely because it was handed to the secretary of the
alcalde, before whom it was executed, and was for a time somewhere
in the courthouse, especially when it appears that it was
subsequently abstracted from the depository, if such it may be
called, and was not returned to it for years afterwards, and then
clandestinely and under circumstances of the greatest suspicion.
Constrained as we are to regard the facts in point of view, the
conclusion is inevitable that there was no legal registry of the
mine, and the evidence is all one way to show that there was no
survey of the nine hundred pertenencias granted, and no boundaries
were fixed, and no stakes were set as required in the ordinance.
Assuming, therefore, that the alcalde had jurisdiction over the
subject matter, still, as it was but a special and limited
authority, in order to give any validity to his acts he must
exercise it in the manner required by law, and not having done so,
his acts are void.
United States v. Osio, 23 How. p. 283;
United States v. Castillero, 23 How.
64 U. S.
466.
VIII. Conduct of claimant throughout shows that he knew that he
had no title as is plainly to be inferred from the fact that in the
several conveyances made by him he never referred to the registry
of the mine or to the acts of juridical possession supposed to have
been executed before the alcalde as the source or foundation of his
title.
1. Whenever he referred to the source of his title he uniformly
pointed to the writing of partnership, sale of five barras or
shares of the mine was on the 17th day of December, 1846, made by
the claimant to Alexander Forbes, of Tepic.
2. Negotiations for the purchase and sale commenced on the 5th
of the same month between the claimant and Francisco M. Negrete,
the agent of the purchaser. Several interviews took place, but the
negotiations were suspended to await the arrival of the Padre
Ugenio McNamara, the agent of Jose Castro. He arrived from Tepic a
short time before the contract of sale was
Page 67 U. S. 203
completed, and Negrete testifies that up to that time he had
seen no other document than the writing of partnership, and no
other had been mentioned. Padre McNamara brought with him the
contract of lease or avio, which had been concluded between him, as
the agent of Jose Castro, and Alexander Forbes.
3. Claimant approved the contract of avio, voluntarily putting
into it his claim to the two square leagues of land. At the same
time also he executed the conveyance of the five shares to the
purchaser, but in none of these transactions was any mention made
of the registry of the mine or of the act of juridical possession,
leaving it to be inferred that the writing of partnership was the
only document ever executed before the alcalde, or certainly that
there was no other, that the claimant thought proper to exhibit to
a purchaser.
IX. Much stronger evidence, however, is exhibited in the record
to show that the parties most interested in the mine, and who were
engaged in working it, knew full well that the supposed title was
invalid, as is fully shown by the correspondence between James A.
Forbes and Alexander Forbes, or between the former and Barron
Forbes & Company. More than forty letters between these parties
are exhibited in the record.
Brief references will be made to such as have the most direct
bearing upon the question under consideration, omitting all such
parts as are not material to the inquiry, but preserving the
substance. 1. Under date of the 5th May, 1847, James A. Forbes
suggests to William Forbes, but evidently in reply to letters
received from Alexander Forbes, that it is of the most vital
importance to obtain from Mexico a positive, formal and
unconditional grant of the two sitios of land conceded to the
claimant according to the decree appended to the contract, and also
an unqualified ratification of the juridical possession which was
given of the mine by the local authorities, including, if possible,
the three thousand varas of land given in that possession as a
gratification to the discoverer. He also suggests in the same
letter that the documents should be made out in the name of the
claimant and his partners.
2. No letter is produced which is a direct reply to that
communication.
Page 67 U. S. 204
Record shows that Alexander Forbes visited California early in
October, 1847, and it appears that he remained there until near the
close of March, 1848, engaged, at least for a part of the time, in
exploring the mine and in overseeing the prudential affairs of the
Company. During that period other persons acquired an interest in
the mine, and among the number were Barron, Forbes & Company,
and they accordingly wrote to James A. Forbes, under date of the
11th of April, 1849, informing him that hereafter he might expect
that the mine would be worked to the utmost of its capabilities of
production. On the 20th of May, 1849, they wrote another letter to
the same individual, saying in effect that from certain
circumstances that he had mentioned it might be necessary to
purchase some lands in the vicinity of the mine and hacienda of New
Almaden, and authorized him to make such purchases, not to exceed
in price the sum of $5,000, as might be necessary to the secure
possession of the mine and hacienda, or to effect such other
arrangements as he might deem necessary for that purpose.
3. Seven days after the date of that letter, and before it was
received, James A. Forbes arrived at Tepic, and while there left
with Alexander Forbes the following memorandum to be delivered to
the claimant: "Very private." Memorandum of the documents which Don
Andres Castillero will have to procure in Mexico.
"1st. The full approbation and ratification by the supreme
government of all the acts of the alcalde of the District of San
Jose, in Upper California -- in the possession given by the said
officers of the quicksilver mine situated in his jurisdiction, to
Don Andres Castillero, in December, 1845."
"2d. An absolute and unconditional title of two leagues of land
to Don Andres Castillero, specifying the following boundaries -- on
the north by the lands of the Rancho of San Vicente and Los
Capitancillos; on the east, south, and west by vacant lands or
vacant highlands."
"3d. The dates of these documents will have to be arranged by
Don Andres, the testimony of them taken in due form, and
Page 67 U. S. 205
besides, certified to by the American Minister in Mexico, and
transmitted to California as soon as possible."
"Tepic, May 27, 1849."
Proofs in the case show that the author of that memorandum
returned to San Francisco, and on the 28th day of October
following, in a letter to William Forbes, he again called his
attention to the importance of his former suggestions as to the
necessity of perfecting the title to the mine. In that letter he
also referred to verbal explanations previously given by him to his
correspondent and Alexander Forbes, and then proceeds to impress
upon the mind of his correspondent the vast importance of securing
from Mexico the documents comprised in the memorandum left with
Alexander Forbes, when he was in Tepic, for the claimant. Two days
afterwards he wrote again to Alexander Forbes, in which letter,
among other things, he says to his correspondent, you will now
readily perceive the great importance of my advice to you to
purchase a part both of the lands of Cook and of the Berreyesas.
You were of the opinion that this measure would not be necessary in
view of the supposed facility of getting the title to the mine
perfected in Mexico, and he complains that more than five months
have elapsed since it was decided that the claimant should procure
the necessary documents in that city, and that they have not been
sent to him.
4. His description of his situation shows plainly that he was in
great want of the documents, because he says that on the one side
he depended upon the precarious and illegal possession of the mine
granted by the alcalde of the district to the claimant, who was
himself in reality the judge of the quantity of land given by the
alcalde; and on the other side, he says he was attacked by the
purchasers of the same land declared by the claimant himself to
comprise the mine. Evidently that letter was regarded as one of
importance, for it called forth two replies, one from Barron,
Forbes & Co., and one from Alexander Forbes. By the one first
mentioned, he was informed by his correspondent that on the 13th of
the same month they had enclosed to him a notarial copy of the
grant of land made by the Mexican government to the claimant.
Page 67 U. S. 206
They acknowledged therein the receipt of his letters, thanked
him for his able conduct, expressed satisfaction in view of the
document sent, that he had not been obliged to purchase the land of
Berreyesa, but submitted the matter to his best judgment,
requesting him, however, to keep in view, "that at all hazard, and
at whatever cost, the property of the mine must be secured,"
adding, "Castillero, we expect, will soon be here from Lower
California, and if anything can be done in Mexico, he is the
fittest person to procure what may be wanted." Recurring to the
other letter, it will be seen that it was more guarded, but the
writer recommends that his correspondent and agent should proceed,
without fear of disapproval, or waiting for instructions, in taking
such measures as shall preserve this valuable "negotiacion" from
any risk from those unprincipled claimants who have lately given
him so much trouble, or from any other proceedings that may take
place.
5. Another letter, also, was written by Alexander Forbes to
James A. Forbes, under date of the 1st of December, 1849, in which
he stated that the copy of the grant of land made to the claimant
was, by mistake, not the one meant to be sent; and he explains the
difference, which was that the one sent was directed at the foot to
the governor, but the proper one was directed to the claimant, and
was deposited at Monterey. Explanation is also given as to the
difference in the legal effect between the two documents, which
was, as explained, that by the first one the delivery by the
governor was perhaps necessary, whereas the other, being addressed
directly to the claimant, did not require that formality, nor was
any other proceeding necessary, thus making it, as the writer
affirmed, a better document than the greater part of the other
titles for lands in that department.
Having made these explanations, he then expressed the hope that
the well known cleverness of his correspondent had already enabled
him to find out the mistake; suggesting, but rather doubtingly,
that the one previously sent should be withdrawn, and the second
one substituted in its place; but presently, as if upon reflection,
mentions another difficulty which might arise, and that was that
the copy of the grant of the two
sitios of land
Page 67 U. S. 207
inserted in the contract of lease or avio was also directed to
the governor, and in view of that fact he finally decided to send a
copy of all the documents and leave it to the good judgment of his
correspondent to make such use of them as he should think proper.
Nothing need be remarked respecting the copy of the document last
sent, except to say that if it was addressed to the claimant it was
a forgery, as the whole evidence shows that but one dispatch upon
the subject was ever issued by the Minister of Relations, and that
was directed to the governor.
6. Reference will next be made to another letter from Alexander
Forbes under date of the 3d of February, 1850, which is also
addressed to the same person as the preceding letter. Among other
things the writer states that he has every reason to believe that
the documents mentioned by his correspondent would be found in the
City of Mexico, and as the claimant would return that way he had no
doubt they would be procured. In another part of the same letter he
also states that at present they think it may be the best plan "to
get an authenticated copy of the approval of the Mexican government
of the grant of three thousand varas given by the alcalde on giving
possession of the mine,"
"as a doubt may be started whether the alcalde, acting as the
'Jues de mineria,' had a right to make this grant, yet if
approved by the government of Mexico,
before the possession of
the country by the Americans, there could be no doubt on the
subject. . . ."
Castillero says such approval was given, and that on his arrival
in Mexico he will procure a judicial copy of it. This is the plan
we shall adopt if we hear nothing from you to alter this
resolution. Writing from the mine, James A. Forbes, on the 26th day
of February, 1850, replied to that letter, and the importance of
that reply makes it necessary to give a somewhat extended extract
from it as disclosing the intent and purpose of the entire series.
Speaking of the claimant, he says:
"He succeeded in obtaining the grant of two sitios to himself on
the mining possession in
Santa Clara, while that very act
of possession declares that the mine is situated on the lands of
one Jose R. Berreyesa, five leagues distant from Santa Clara,
and
Page 67 U. S. 208
you will at once perceive that such a discrepancy would not fail
to attract the attention of United States Land commissioners and to
put the case of the mine in great risk in the judicial ordeal to
which its title will be subjected."
"Without troubling you with what I have so many times written
and explained to you verbally, on the importance of the acquisition
of the
document, I will only say now what it must be, and
it is this:"
"1. A full and complete ratification of all the acts of the
alcalde of this jurisdiction in the possession of the mine."
"2. A full and unconditional grant to Castillero of two sitios
of land covering that mining possession, expressing the boundaries
stated by me in the memorandum I left with you at Tepic. Both of
these documents to be of the proper date, and placed in the proper
governmental custody in Mexico, and"
"3. The necessary certified copies of them duly authenticated by
the American Minister in that capital, taken and sent to me at the
earliest possible moment."
Prompt reply was made by Barron, Forbes & Co., to that
communication, under date of the 2d of March, 1850, in which they
say:
"Mr. Barron and Don Andres Castillero, are about to proceed to
the City of Mexico and will attend to what you have recommended.
When that letter was written, the persons therein named were about
to proceed to Mexico, but Alexander Forbes, nine days later, wrote
a letter to the same correspondent, in which he stated that Mr.
Barron and Castillero have gone off to Mexico, and I wrote them
today
respecting the document you know of, which, if possible,
will be procured."
Wishing, doubtless, to keep his correspondent well advised of
the efforts being made to comply with his requisition for the title
papers to the mine, he wrote him again on the 7th of April, 1850,
in which he stated
"that Mr. Barron and Castillero have arrived in Mexico, and have
every prospect of
finding the documents you are aware of,
and which will, of course, be forwarded as soon as possible."
Counsel for claimant admit that everyone of these letters are
genuine, and the proofs in the case are full to that effect.
Comments upon these extraordinary documents are unnecessary, as
Page 67 U. S. 209
they disclose their own construction and afford a demonstration
that those in the possession of the mine, holding it under
conveyances for the claimant, knew full well that he had no
title.
X. More than that can hardly be required in this case, but it is
equally true, and satisfactory proofs are exhibited in the record
to show it, that Mexico herself knew, must have known, that the
pretensions of the claimant were unfounded, else she never could
have agreed to the 10th article of the treaty, or, when that was
stricken out, never could have given her sanction to the
corresponding explanations that were signed by the duly authorized
representatives of both countries. Remarks, however, upon that
topic are unnecessary, and we forbear to pursue the subject.
The decree of the district court in No. 133 is reversed, and in
the other the appeal is dismissed, and the cause remanded with
directions to dismiss the entire petition.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON, dissenting:
I am of the opinion that Castillero acquired an incipient right
by the discovery of the mine, and the surface of the land lying
above the mine to the extent that it was adjudged to him by the
district court.
I also think Castillero made registry of his discovery before
the proper tribunal according to the Mexican laws as they existed
in the Territory of California at the time the registry was made
and notified to the public. That the alcalde had jurisdiction as a
judicial magistrate in the absence and nonexistence of any other
authority in California to make the registry and give possession;
and that this state of the law was virtually recognized by the
Mining junta at the City of Mexico, when Castillero applied to that
tribunal for assistance in money, lands, and retorts, to assist him
in working the mine. The request was promptly granted by the junta,
with two leagues of land to furnish fuel for evaporating the
quicksilver; and this proposed grant, the President of Mexico
sanctioned, referring the application for the grant of land to the
governor of the territory, but which was never presented, and could
not be, owing to the American war.
Page 67 U. S. 210
These officers of the supreme government were fully aware that
no mining boards existed in California, nor any courts of the first
instance, and that therefore the court of the alcalde was the
tribunal exercising the powers of a court of the first instance.
Such is the settled construction of the alcalde's power in
California.
Mena v. Le Roy, 1 Cal. 220. The rule in Mexico
was that in the absence of Mining Deputies, the ordinance Judges
might act, and did in fact act, both in registering the
discoverer's application and in giving him judicial possession of
the mine. So various witnesses prove, and among them Mr. Larkin,
our consul at Monterey, at the time of this discovery.
I think it true, beyond any reasonable ground for doubt, that in
other parts of Mexico, alcaldes did act on applications such as
that of Castillero, where gold or silver was discovered, and that
many mining titles are held by virtue of registries and acts of
possession transacted before alcaldes, and recorded in the form of
espedientes in their courts, just as the evidence of Castillero's
was found in alcalde Pico's office. Nor have I any doubt, whatever,
that if the Mexican government had continued in California, that
the title to this mine would have been confirmed to Castillero, not
only promptly, but without dispute, concerning
small and
immaterial irregularities. That government, in my judgment, would
have recognized the discoverer's equity, founded on the right of
discovery. This discovery is free from doubt, nor is the
fact of discovery disputed. So the Mexican officers from
the president down, treated it when presented to them, and so the
judges of the district court held, when they confirmed the claim.
Their judgment, and the reasons for it, we are called on to review;
and it is due to them to say, that, in a long judicial life, I have
never had presented to me, a case so laboriously and thoroughly
investigated in the lower courts. With them this case has been the
study for years. The claim, perhaps, covers the most valuable mine
in the world, and its title has been litigated at an expense and
with a degree of labor and ability, rarely equaled, and never
excelled within my experience.
I have examined the opinions of the judges who decided the
Page 67 U. S. 211
cause in the district court and the briefs of counsel, and have
verified the arguments by the record on all material questions, so
far as I thought them material, and my opinion is that the law and
the facts discussed by the district court, and on which its
judgment is founded, furnish reasons that cannot be answered,
showing that the claim is valid. And I adopt the opinion and
reasons preceding the judgment below as my opinion in the case
here.
Judge Hoffman's individual opinion displays an astuteness and a
knowledge of the facts, and of the mining laws applying to the
controversy, hardly to be excelled, and with which I fully concur,
with the exception, that I think he was in error in maintaining
that the president of Mexico granted the two leagues of land
covering the mine. The president referred the request of Castillero
for the land to the Governor of California, to be proceeded on by
him, according to the Act of 1824, and Regulations of 1828. This
was not done by the governor, because the United States troops
expelled him and broke up the Mexican authorities exercising the
granting power, before he had time to act.
It was obviously a matter of great anxiety with the supreme
government, that this quicksilver mine should be worked
immediately, and as extensively as possible, because Europe had to
be relied on for a supply of quicksilver, without which the gold
and silver mines of Mexico were comparatively worthless. This
discovery of Castillero was, therefore, esteemed by the mining
junta and the higher officers as of the greatest importance. So
important was it deemed, that our government was officially
notified by our Consul, Mr. Larkin (acting nearest to the mine),
that the discovery had been made. The mine drew to its development
a great amount of capital. Nearly a million of dollars has been
expended in opening and bringing forth its resources. The public
have been benefited many millions by the quicksilver furnished to
those working the gold mines discovered in California, and on both
sides of the Rocky Mountains. The public benefit, past and
prospective, can hardly be overestimated. So far from being the
subject of reproach and severe criticism, the wealthy proprietors
who have worked this mine
Page 67 U. S. 212
with success, are entitled to our approbation, as they have
undoubtedly been public benefactors. Truly, their object was gain;
but they have done that which poverty could not accomplish, and
they have done that which the United States, as the successful
litigant, will, in all human probability, fail to do, that of being
successful miners.
Much stress has been laid on the fact, that James Alexander
Forbes proposed to his associates to forge a title to this mining
property: Forbes, apprehending that Castillero's claim was not
valid, because the proceeding to acquire a legal interest was
irregular. But no step was taken to fabricate an apparent title;
nothing was done towards its accomplishment. The proposition died
in its conception, and as a controlling circumstance in the case
the fact is worthless.
1. That Castillero discovered the mine is true beyond
controversy.
2. That he registered the fact of discovery in the alcalde's
office, and that it was made notorious, is, I think, true. It was
officially communicated to the Mexican Congress by Secretary of
Interior Relations; that it was prominently notorious in
California; was officially communicated to our government, and was
published in the newspapers of the Sandwich Islands.
3. Nor is it open to any dispute, as it seems to me, that
Castillero's right, as a discoverer, was recognized by the supreme
government of Mexico, as a valid and highly meritorious claim.
4. The mine was never denounced by anyone for irregularity in
the proceeding to perfect the title to it, nor for abandoning the
possession.
In this condition the claim stood when we acquired the country;
and we are bound by the treaty to protect all just private
interests in lands in the territory acquired by it. I therefore
think the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WAYNE, dissenting:
I concur with MR. JUSTICE CATRON and MR. JUSTICE GRIER, for the
reasons given by them, and for other reasons expressed in the
printed opinions of Judge
Page 67 U. S. 213
McAllister and Judge Hoffman, in dissenting from the judgment of
this Court just announced in this case.
I think that the claim and title of the petitioner, Andres
Castillero, to the mine known by the name of New Almaden, in Santa
Clara County, Northern District of the State of California, is a
good and valid claim and title, and that the said Andres Castillero
and his assigns are the owners thereof, and of all the ores and
minerals of whatsoever description therein in fee simple. In my
judgment, also, I concur with the learned Judges of the district
court &c., that the said mine is a piece of land embracing a
superficial area, to be measured on a horizontal plane, equivalent
to seven pertenencias, each pertenencia being a solid, of a
rectangular base, two hundred Castilian varas long, of the width
established by the Ordinanza de Mineria of 1783, and in depth
extending from and including the surface down to the center of the
earth; said pertenencias to be located in such manner as the said
Andres Castillero or his assigns may select, subject to the
following conditions: first, that the said pertenencias shall be
contiguous, that is to say, in one body, and secondly, that within
them shall be included the original mouth of the mine, known as New
Almaden.
Having thus fully expressed my concurrence in the decree
rendered by the district court in favor of Andres Castillero and
his assigns and my dissent from its reversal by this Court, I will
add that in my opinion it is fully shown by the testimony and
documents in the record that in no thing done by Castillero or his
assigns, in connection with the mining claim, is there any proof of
fraud, and I believe from the testimony and from those documents
that the petitioner and his assigns have rights under the 8th
article of the treaty with Mexico, of which they cannot be deprived
by any judgment rendered by this Court or its proceedings upon the
record brought into this Court by appeal.
I adopt and herewith annex to this dissent the opinion of his
Honor, Ogden Hoffman, District Judge (as embodied in the record) as
the best way of showing my appreciation of the law
Page 67 U. S. 214
and merits of this case, and of his judicial learning and
research in connection with it:
The claimant in this case asks the confirmation of his title
to:
First. A mine of quicksilver situated in Santa Clara
County, and called the mine of "New Almaden," including three
thousand varas of ground measured in all directions from the mouth
of the mine.
Second. Two square leagues of land situated upon the
land of the above mentioned mining possession.
It is objected that this Court has no jurisdiction to decree a
confirmation of the former claim. The objections relied on by the
United States are two:
1. That by the Act of 3 March, 1851, the jurisdiction of this
Court is confined to cases where the interest claimed is a fee
simple interest, or such as in equity should be converted into one,
and that such interest was not held by the owner or grantee of a
mine by Mexican law.
2. That the subject matter of this claim is not "land," within
the meaning of the act.
The first objection is not only wholly unsupported by the words
of the act, but it is inconsistent with the sense of justice and
the sacredness of treaty stipulations which we must presume to have
actuated Congress.
1. The act declares that every person claiming lands by virtue
of
any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican
governments shall present his claim, etc.
There is thus no specification as to the
nature of the
claim, except that it must be to
"land," nor of the
estate or
interest claimed. It may be leasehold
or freehold, conditional or indefeasible, for years or in fee.
2. That such estates constitute property, in its fullest sense,
will not be denied.
If, then, claims to such estates in lands cannot be presented
for confirmation under the act of 1851, or if presented are to be
rejected, this species of property in land is not merely
unprotected, but by the terms of the act it is confiscated, for the
13th
Page 67 U. S. 215
Section provides that all lands the claims to which have been
finally rejected or which shall not have been presented within two
years shall be deemed, held and considered as part of the public
domain of the United States.
It cannot, therefore, be imputed to Congress that it meant to
declare all lands public property the claims to which were not
presented, and at the same time restrict the right of presenting
claims to a limited number of cases, thus ignoring and confiscating
all rights of property in land but those of a particular
description, when all were equally sacred under the laws of nations
and the stipulations of the treaty.
3. But even if the jurisdiction of this Court were limited, as
supposed, the estate of the owner of a mine under the Mexican and
Spanish ordinances was of at least as high a decree as a
determinable fee at common law, and the concession of a mine
conveyed to him full property in the very substance of the
mine.
As, however, the nature of the mine owner's estate in a mine
cannot be considered without examining and ascertaining what was
the nature of a mine itself, and whether it constituted "land," as
that term is used in the common law, and in the act of Congress,
the point will be treated of in considering the second objection to
the jurisdiction of the court.
2. Is a mine
land within the meaning of the act of
Congress?
"By the civil law," says Gamboa,
"all veins and mineral deposits of gold and silver ore, or of
precious stones, belonged, if in public ground, to the sovereign,
and were part of his patrimony, but if on private ground, to the
owner of the land, subject to the condition, that if worked by the
owner he was bound to render a tenth part of the produce to the
prince as a right attaching to his crown. It subsequently became an
established custom in most kingdoms that all veins of the precious
metals, and the produce of such veins, should vest in the Crown and
be held to be a part of the patrimony of the King or Sovereign
Prince. That this is the case with respect to the Empire of
Germany, the Electorates, France, Portugal, Arragon, and Catalonia
appears from the laws of those countries and from the authority of
various authors."
1 Heath. Gamboa 15.
Page 67 U. S. 216
The reasons for attributing to the sovereign this right of
property in a part of the soil of the land of his subjects, it is
not necessary to recapitulate; but that the distinction between the
ownership of the surface, and that of the mines or minerals beneath
it, was recognized at a very early period, appears from the law of
the partida, which declares that the property of the mines shall
not pass in a grant of the land by the King, although not excepted
out of the grant -- and even if included in it, the grant shall be
valid as to mines only during the life of the King who made it; and
a similar rule prevailed in England with respect to mines of the
royal metals, which alone were held to belong to the sovereign by
prerogative.
The distinction thus drawn between the right of property in the
surface, and that in the minerals beneath, is founded on the
essential difference in the qualities of the various substances of
which the earth is composed. It has accordingly been recognized in
the jurisprudence of all nations.
In Spain, as we have seen, mines do not pass in grants of land
(fundos) by the Sovereign, unless particularly mentioned. (1
Heathf. Gamb. 132) To the same effect is Solorzano, Pol.Ind. lib.
6, ch. 1 No. 17, who says:
"So that, although private persons may allege and prove that
they possess such lands (tierras) and their appurtenances by
special gift and concession of the Prince, no matter how general
may be the words in which the grant is made, this will not of
itself be of any avail or advantage to them for acquiring or
gaining thereby the mines which may be discovered in the lands,
unless it is so specially provided and expressed in said
grant;"
and Colmeira (Der.Adm.Esp) observes:
"Jurisconsults and Publicists agree in the opinion that it is
proper to distinguish in the soil (en el suelo) the right of
property in the superficies (de la superficie) from that in the
depth (del fondo). Truly, the man who acquires a piece of land
gives not the least labor nor advances the smallest capital in
consideration of the riches (las riquezas) which it may conceal. He
examines its fertility, its situation, its extent, and all the
circumstances which determine its value as a building lot or
agricultural land, but he does not take into account the mines
Page 67 U. S. 217
which, perchance, it may conceal in its bowels. There is not,
then, the least relation between the proprietor [of the land] and
the subterranean matter from which any right can be deduced."
So, Lares, a Mexican author, in his Derecho Administrativo, p.
93, remarks:
"The law, then, has not recognized property in the mine to be in
the owner of the soil, but has made the property in the mine to
consist in the grant which the Nation makes to him who registers or
denounces it conformably to the ordinance."
By the French law of 1810, the same distinction is recognized,
and all mines of gold, silver, platinum, lead, mercury, etc., are
declared not to belong to the owner of the soil, but to be governed
by the Mining Laws (Teulet's Sup. to Codes, Verb. Mines). "From the
moment," says the author last cited,
"when a mine shall be conceded even to the proprietor of the
surface, this property shall be distinguished from that of the
surface, and thenceforth considered a new property,"
and, Le Guay, in his Thesis on Mining Legislation, says he
"agrees with Mirabeau in the proposition that any legislation
which does not recognize two species of property, one in the
surface of the earth, and the other in its depth, would be
absurd."
P. 125.
In his work on the General Jurisprudence of Mines, M. Blavier
observes:
"It is a truth which has been admitted for a long time, that the
preservation and prosperity of mines depend essentially on the
adoption of a system of laws calculated to reconcile the interests
of the public with that of those who work them. . . . It is these
conditions which the governments of ancient and modern states have
sought to fulfill in admitting, nearly all of them, that the
sovereign alone has the right to dispose of the public property in
mines, or to confer on others the useful enjoyment thereof."
This regalian right, or right reserved by the whole state to
dispose of subterranean property as public property independent of
the private ownership of the land which conceals it, seems to have
been recognized in Germany from the earliest periods (Cancrin.
Dr.Pub. des Mines en Allemagne, p. 2), and M. Blavier remarks: "It
is therefore not surprising that this
Page 67 U. S. 218
regalian right should have been confirmed by nearly all the
governments of the northern countries."
But it is unnecessary to multiply authorities in support of a
principle so universally recognized.
From the foregoing citations it is clear:
1. That the grant or ownership of the superficies or land which
contains the mine confers no right of property to mines in the
bowels of the earth, or even on its surface, and
2. That this property in the mines is, by common consent of
almost all modern states, deemed to be vested in the state
represented by the sovereign, and is a regalian right. Indeed, it
would seem, that these two propositions are sufficiently
demonstrated by the fact that mining ordinances exist in almost
every state possessed of considerable mineral wealth, for those
ordinances are but the dispositions made by law for the exercise of
this regalian right, or right of property in all mines, whether in
public or private land.
Having thus established that the right of property in mines is
wholly distinct from the ownership of the soil and that the former
remains in the sovereign notwithstanding the possession of the
latter by a private person, we proceed to inquire:
1. Did this right to the mine constitute a right to "land," as
that term is used in the acts of Congress?
2. If so, did the miner by registry and denouncement acquire an
estate in "land," and what was its quantity and quality?
These two inquires, though in form separate, are nevertheless
intimately connected. for the nature of the subject matter of the
right of property reserved by the sovereign can best be ascertained
by inquiring what was the subject matter of the estate conveyed to
the subject by registry and denouncement, as also the quality and
quantity of such estate. "For how," as remarked by Lares, "can the
nation grant that which it has not, or how can it give to one
person what belongs to another?"
It will be shown that minerals owned by a title wholly
independent of the property in the lands in which they are
situated, still form a part of the land itself, and constitute land
in the strictly legal acceptation of that term at common law.
Independently
Page 67 U. S. 219
of authority, it would seem clear that, it being admitted that
"various sections of the soil divided horizontally" (1 Eng.Law
& Eq.Rep. 249) may belong as separate properties to different
persons, the sections which are beneath the surface must constitute
"land" as much as those which are upon it. The vein of ore or the
bed of coal is "land" as fully and completely as the superficial
earth, and he who owns the former owns
land as much as he
who owns the latter. On this point the English authorities are
agreed.
Nor is the application of those authorities to the question
under consideration at all affected by the circumstance that in
England, the regalian right to mines is held to extend only to
mines of the precious metals, for the owner of lands in which mines
of the base metals are situated, having alienated to one person the
mine, but reserved to himself or alienated to another the lands in
which the mine is found, the question whether the owner of the mine
is an owner of "land" would be presented precisely as if the
severance of the two rights of property had originally existed and
the several properties derived by separate grants from the
Crown.
"When the mines form part of the general inheritance, they will,
of course, be transferred along with the lands without being
expressly mentioned in the conveyance; but when they form a
distinct possession or inheritance, a title to them must be
established without reference to the general title of the lands in
which they are situated."
Bainbridge on Mines, p. 4; Rockwell, p. 536.
They are capable of livery and being Mines, p. 4; Rockwell, p.
536.
In the latter situation,
"they still, of course, retain the qualities of real estate, and
will be transferred by conveyances applicable to the particular
disposition of them intended to be made."
Ibid.
The are capable of livery and being made the subject of
ejectment. Cro.Jac., p. 150.
"By the name of
minera, or
fodini plumbi, the
land itself shall pass in a grant if livery be made, and also be
recovered in an assize." Co.Litt. 6 a.
It is held that mines do not lie in grant, but pass like
other
Page 67 U. S. 220
hereditaments by livery of seizin.
Chetham v.
Williamson, 4 East 476; 2 Barn. & Cress. 197.
When a reservation in a deed of feoffment is made in favor of
the grantor of mines, no livery is necessary, for the grantor will
never have been out of possession; but when the exception is in
favor of a stranger to the legal estate, livery cannot be dispensed
with. Co. Litt. 47 a; 1 Ad. & Ell. 748.
In numerous English cases, the distinction is clearly drawn
between a mere license to dig and carry away ores in land of which
the possession is retained by the grantor and a demise of the mine
itself, by which an estate in the land is created; nor is it
necessary to constitute such an estate that the grantee acquire any
right or interest in the surface -- for minerals are capable of
forming a distinct inheritance in the lands of which they are a
part, and consequently an actual estate may be both created in and
restricted to any specified kind of minerals. 19 Vesey 158; 4 East
469; 2 Barn. & Ald. 724; Bainbridge on Mines 3, 55, 124, 141,
170.
In
Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 403, it was held that a
grant of a stratum of coal in the land of another is a grant in fee
simple of a real hereditament, and that the widow of the grantee
was dowable of all the mines of her husband, as well those which
were in his own landed estates, as the mines and strata of lead, or
lead ore and coal, in the lands of other persons.
In
Wilkinson v. Proud, 11 Mees. & Wels. 33, it was
held that a right to a given substratum of coal lying under a
certain close is a right to land, and cannot be claimed by
prescription. But a bare right to dig and carry away coal in
another man's land may.
An action of ejectment, an assize, a common recovery trespass,
an action for use and occupation, and almost all the legal remedies
applicable to "land" can be maintained at common law with respect
to a
mine. But they do not lie for an incorporeal thing.
Ad. on Eject., 18-20; Co.Litt. 6 a.; Bainbridge on Mines 141; 2
Barn. & Ald. 737; 4 Barn. & Ald. 401; 2 Strange 1142.
The case of
The Queen v. The Earl of Northumberland,
Plowden
Page 67 U. S. 221
310, is relied on by the counsel of the United States to show
that in England, the right of the King to royal metals in the lands
of a subject is a merely incorporeal right or easement, like rights
of common, way, estovers, and the like.
But it is not so said in the case. It is merely said that as the
subject may acquire by usage, title or interest in the freehold or
inheritance of the King as common, way, estovers, etc., so the King
may possess by prerogative a title or interest in the freehold of
the subject. It is not said that the title or interest of the King
in royal mines is identical with the title or interest of the
subject, who has a right of common, way, estovers, etc., in the
King's lands.
If the private owner of the inheritance can by his grant sever
the right of property in the soil from that in the mine and vest
the ownership of the former in one person and of the latter in
another, and if the mine so owned is "land," it is not easy to
perceive why, when the severance is effected by law and the King is
the owner of the mine, he should not also be deemed the owner of
"land," and this whether the royal right is confined, as in
England, to a particular description of mines, or extends, as in
Spain, to all mines.
That this was not meant to be decided in the case in Plowden is
clear, for no question was made as to whether the right of the King
was a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament, and the judgment of
the court was
"that all ores of gold and silver in the lands of subjects,
whether the mines thereof be opened or unopened, with power to dig
in the lands of the subjects for the same, and to carry them away,
with all other incidents thereto,
belong of right to the
Queen."
From the forgoing authorities it is abundantly clear that the
law of England is not guilty of what Mirabeau calls the absurdity
of refusing to recognize two species of property, one in the
surface of the earth and the other in its depth.
That in the case of royal mines the property in the mines
remains in the Crown, distinct from the general ownership of the
land in which they are situate, and in the case of base mines, the
general owner may sever by his own grant the property in the
Page 67 U. S. 222
mines from the property in the lands. But in both cases, the
mine or strata of minerals form part of the land itself, and are
land in as strictly legal a sense as the non-metalliferous
portions of the soil.
Having thus seen that a property in veins of metals is a
property in
"land," notwithstanding it is entirely
independent of the property in the soil which contains them, and
that it is so regarded whether the severance between the two
species of property be effected by the grant of the sovereign to
whom royal metals belong or by the owner of the inheritance, who,
by the law of England, was the owner of the base metals within his
lands, we will next inquire what was the nature of the estate which
was acquired by registry and denouncement under the Spanish and
Mexican laws.
This inquiry will necessarily involve a consideration of the
nature of a mine under those laws, for it is admitted, as urged by
the counsel of the United States, that an estate in a mine may
closely resemble an estate in land, while the subject matter of the
two estates may remain essentially different.
It will therefore be shown not only that the estate of a mine
owner is nearly identical with a fee simple conditional estate in
land at the common law, but that the subject matter of that estate,
viz., "a mine," as defined in the ordinances, is "land" in
the strictest sense, as proved by its intrinsic nature and by the
application to it in Spanish and Mexican laws and treatises of
terms which describe and express what is understood in our
jurisprudence by the word
"land."
In the earlier periods of the Spanish Monarchy it was
established as a principle of Castilian law that all mines found in
the Royal Seignory belonged to the Crown. All persons were
prohibited from working them except under royal license. Part. 3,
tit. 28, law 11; Nov.Recop. lib. 9, tit. 18, law 1.
In 1387, permission was given to every person to work mines
found within his own inheritance or in that of other persons with
their permission. Nov.Recop. lib. 9., tit. 18, law 2.
And as early as 1526 and 1551, a general royal license was given
to work mines discovered in the Indies on giving an account thereof
to the governor and payment of a certain proportion
Page 67 U. S. 223
of the product to the Crown. Recop. de las Ind. lib. 4, tit. 19,
61, 14.
On the 10th January, 1559, Philip II., by a law promulgated on
that day, extended to all mines of gold, silver and quicksilver
found within the Kingdom, whether on royal land or on those of
lordships, or of the clergy, or in public, municipal, vacant or
private lands, the right of ownership which had previously been
vested in the Crown, as to mines found within the Royal Seignory,
and all mines of the three metals named were declared "to be
resumed and incorporated in the Crown and royal patrimony of the
King" excepting only such mines of gold or silver, as had, under
previous grants to individuals, been begun to be worked, and were
then actually worked. Nov.Recop. lib. 9, tit. 18, 1. 3, Halleck's
Mining Laws, pp. 6, 15; Rockwell 113, 116.
The reasons for this act of high sovereignty are set forth in
the preamble of the law. They are chiefly founded on the policy of
stimulating the discovery and working of mines by giving to all
subjects of the Crown the right of discovering and acquiring the
ownership of them in limited parcels in order that thereby this
source of national wealth might be developed, instead of being
locked up, as theretofore, in the hands of a few who did not or
would not develop it. Rockwell's Gamb.Comm. 127; Nov.Recop. lib. 9,
tit. 18, 1. 3; Halleck's Transc. 6-11.
It thus became an established and fundamental principle of the
Spanish law that all mines of gold, silver, quicksilver, and other
metals, whether found on public or private lands, belonged to the
sovereign. Rockw.Gamb. 126, 127; Solorzano Polit.Ind., lib. 6, cap.
1, No. 17; Ordenanzas de Mineria 68; Ordinances of 1783, lib. 5,
art. 1; Ordinances of 1584, lib. 6, tit. 13, 1. 9.
To carry into effect the policy thus inaugurated, ordinances
were established in 1584 (called by Gamboa the Old Ordinances)
which continued in force until August 22, 1783, when the New
Ordinances, as they were called by Gamboa, were enacted.
By these new ordinances, all former edicts and ordinances were
revoked, so far as they were opposed to the provisions of the new
law, except the provisions of the law of 1783, so far as they
Page 67 U. S. 224
treated of the incorporation into the royal patrimony of the
gold, silver, and quicksilver mines of the Kingdom.
The 2d article of the New Ordinances is as follows:
"And in order to benefit and favor our subjects and natives, and
all other persons whatsoever, even though foreigners to these our
kingdoms, who may work or discover any mines of silver already
discovered, or to be discovered, we will and command that they
shall have them, and that they shall be their property in
possession and ownership, and that they may do with them as with
anything their own, observing, as well in regard to what they have
to pay by way of duty to us, as in all else, what is prescribed and
ordered in this edict."
Halleck's Transc. 70.
By the laws of the Indies, the Emperor Charles and King Philip
II had made a similar grant to all their subjects, whether
Spaniards or Indians (except certain officers), authorizing them to
work the mines freely and without impediment, and "making them
common to all persons, wheresoever situate," provided, that the
Indians should not be injuriously treated and that no other parties
be prejudiced. 1 Heathf. Gamboa, 20, book IV., lib. XIX., law 1;
Recop. de las Indies; Halleck's Transc. 130, 140.
From the very ample terms of these grants a doubt arose, says
Gamboa, whether the mines were still to be regarded as the peculiar
right of the Crown or whether they were to be considered as the
absolute property of the subject.
On the one side, Don Mateo de Lagunez and Cardinal de Luca were
of opinion that as all mines in the Indies had been declared
"common," and all persons were at liberty to try for them, wherever
situate, it was to be inferred that the mines were no longer vested
in the Crown and that the effect of the Ordinances was precisely
the same as if the mines had been made private property
(
particulares), as they may be by concession and
privilege.
This opinion Gamboa combats, and after discussing the question
at length, concludes that the mines remained a right of the Crown
and annexed to the royal patrimony, and that the laws made the
vassals
"participants" of this right, not giving them
Page 67 U. S. 225
the private and absolute property to use at will, but in
subjection to the Ordinances, and that although the laws concede to
them the ownership and property (dominio y propiedad,) it is by
"participation," and not by absolute translation (por participacion
y no por translacion absoluta), the supreme right of property (alto
dominio) remaining in His Majesty.
"The correct opinion then seems to be," says Gamboa,
"that the mines remain attached to the Crown (que S. M. mantiene
en su corona las minas), and that the King, not being able to work
them himself, has admitted his subjects to a share of them (dio
parte a los vasalos) under various restrictions and subject to
various liabilities."
The opinion advocated by Gamboa appears to have been adopted in
the Ordinances of 1783, in which many of the suggestions of Gamboa
were embodied (Gamboa, chap. 11).
The first two articles of title V of that Ordinance are as
follows:
"
Art. 1. Mines are the property of my Royal Crown, as
well by their nature and origin as by their reunion, declared in
law IV., lib. XIII, book VI., of the Nueva Recopilacion."
"
Art. 2. Without separating them from my royal
patrimony, I grant them to my subjects in property
(en
propiedad) and possession in such manner that they may sell
them, exchange them, rent them, donate them, pass them by will,
either in the way of inheritance or legacy, or in any other manner
alienate the right which in the mines belongs to them, on the same
terms on which they themselves possess it, and to persons capable
of acquiring it."
Halleck's Transc. 222.
It was under these last Ordinances that the rights of Castillero
were acquired, but as they adopted the views of Gamboa as to the
Ordinances of 1584, his Commentaries on the latter, and definition
of the mine owner's estate acquired under them, are of controlling
authority in the interpretation of the Ordinances of 1783.
In Section 24, 19, Gamb.Comm.Heathf.Transc. 27-28, he
observes:
"Having established then the regalian right of His Majesty in
the mines, and that this right is entirely consistent
Page 67 U. S. 226
with the right of disposition and property (con el dominio y
propiedad) of the subjects, it is indisputable that as a
consequence of their passing to the latter with power to dispose of
them, as their own (como cosa suya) all the incidents of
'property' (propiedad y dominio) must attach in favor of
the proprietor, and that they may therefore be exchanged, sold,
leased or alienated by contract, donation and inheritance, may be
given as a portion in marriage, or may be charged with a rent, and
that interest may be demanded for the purchase money while
remaining unpaid, etc."
"There passes, then, to the subject the direct dominion or
property, as also the right to the use (dominio directo o
propiedad, y tambien el util) by virtue of the favor and grant of
the sovereign -- which we hestitate not to call a gift on
conditions (una modal donacion), as will appear upon considering
the rules by which that species of grant is defined in law: that is
to say, that it be a free and complete act, which being perfected,
a charge attaches on the donee from that time forth (and the being
worded as a condition makes no difference), and that upon the
failure of the modification limited by the donor in his own favor
or in that of a third person, or of the Kingdom or Republic, the
gift determines, as will be seen by reference to the various text
and doctors."
Ch. 11, sec. 25.
Throughout the Commentaries of Gamboa, the estate of the mine
owner in the mine is called the "dominio y propiedad," and in sec.
15, ch. XXI, he says:
"Another privilege treated of by the authorities above alluded
to is that of appropriating nine parts of the metal, paying only
the tenth to the King as an acknowledgement of his having shared
with his subjects the direct and superficial ownership (de aver
participado a sus vasallos el
dominio util y directo) of
so valuable a kind of property
(de tan preciosos
fundos)."
We have already seen that the "alto dominio" of eminent domain
is reserved by the King, by virtue of which and of the conditions
on which the grant is made, a new grant may be made if the first be
forfeited by breach of the conditions,
viz.: the payment
of the fifth, and the observance of the Ordinances,
Page 67 U. S. 227
which Gamboa calls the modo, or gravamen with which the donation
is charged, and which make it a "donacion modal." -- Chap. 11, art.
26.
From the foregoing citations the nature of the estate in the
mine acquired by registry and denouncement under the Spanish laws,
might seem sufficiently clear.
It will, however, not be inappropriate to show what in Spanish
law is the meaning of various terms which are used in the
Ordinances, and by Gamboa, as descriptive of his estate. Those
terms are "propiedad," "propiedad y posesion," "propiedad y
usufructo," "propiedad y utilidad," "plena propiedad," "dominio,"
"pleno dominio," "dominio absoluto y perpetuo," "dominio directo y
util."
"Propiedad,' is the right to enjoy and dispose freely of things
which are ours, so far as the laws forbid not. Commonly, the
dominion which is not accompanied by the usufruct is called
'propiedad,' or 'nuda propiedad,' and the dominion which is
accompanied by the usufruct is called 'plena propiedad.' Escriches
Dict., verb. 'Propiedad."
"Dominio," is the right or power to dispose freely of a thing,
if the law, the will of the testator, or some agreement does not
prevent.
It is divided into the full, and the less than full -- "dominio
pleno y menos pleno."
"Dominio pleno y absoluto" is the power which one has over
anything to alienate independently of another -- to receive its
fruits -- to exclude all others from its use.
"Dominio directo," is the right a person has to control the
disposition of a thing, the use (utilidad) of which he has
ceded.
"Dominio util," is the right to receive all the fruits of a
thing subject to some contribution or tribute, which is paid to him
who reserves in it the "dominium directum." -- Escriche's Dict.
verb. "Dominio;" Alvares' Institutes vol. ii., pp. 23, 33.
It appears, therefore, that the words which the laws and
commentators apply to the miner's estate,
viz.: "propiedad
y usufructo," "plena propiedad," "pleno dominio," "dominio directo
y util," etc., are descriptive in the Spanish law of the
highest
Page 67 U. S. 228
estate or right of property in land which the subject can
acquire.
It would seem to be higher than any right of property in land
enjoyed in England, for, says Blackstone, "A subject has only
usufruct and not the absolute property of the soil;" or, as Sir
Edward Coke expresses, "he hath the
dominium utile,'
but not the `dominium directum.'" Comm. bk. 2, ch.
7.
The ownership of the subject in the mine remains, however,
subordinate to the dominium altum, or eminens, or dominio alto of
the Crown.
But this is merely the right tacitly reserved by the government
or sovereign authority of a state, and to which all individual
rights of property are subject, to take possession of the property
in the manner directed by the constitution and laws of the state,
whenever the public interest may require. Per Ch. Walworth;
Beekman v. Saratoga R. Co., 3 Paige 45.
The fact that the estate of the mine owner may be forfeited or
determined by a failure to comply with those of the ordinances
which impose that penalty,
i.e., by breach of the
conditions subsequent attached to the gift, in nowise affects its
nature as an estate in fee.
Every estate held by feudal tenure was subject to forfeiture for
breach of the conditions on which it was granted. Nor were these
conditions always expressed in the grant, for every act of the
vassal which amounted to a breach of his allegiance, or the tie
which bound him to his lord, operated a forfeiture of the land.
In a grant of a mine the principal conditions, the breach of
which worked a forfeiture were 1st the payment to the Crown of its
proportion of the products, and 2d, the working it according to the
laws.
If no breach of these conditions occurred, the estate of the
miner would continue forever.
It therefore closely resembled a conditional or determinable fee
at common law. 1 Prest. on Est., 480. The number of cases where, by
the Ordinances of 1584, the mine was declared forfeited (perdida)
was no less than fifteen, but many of these causes of
Page 67 U. S. 229
forfeiture were totally abolished, and the rigor of the laws was
essentially mitigated by the Ordinances of 1783, and subsequent
laws.
The decree of the Cortes of Spain, of January 26, 1811, exempted
the miners of quicksilver from the payment "of all
duties,
even including
the duty of the fifth, or the proportion
which the miner is bound to pay," and annulled
"all dispositions which opposed free trade
in said
mineral, and the security of
absolute and perpetual
ownership (dominio absoluto y perpetuo) of the miner, provided,
that in managing and working them, he observe the general rules
established on the subject."
In the communication from the Secretary of the Regency,
transmitting to the Royal Tribunal General of New Spain this
decree, he says:
"Under this date, I notify your Excellency, that the prerogative
of Seignory, which from remote times the Vice-Royal Treasury has
reserved to itself with respect to mines of quicksilver, has been
annulled by the General and Extraordinary Cortes, in consequence of
the resolution and manifestation of the Council of Regency,
enacting at the same time that the said mines shall be worked under
the same rules and ordinances as those of gold, silver, and other
metals, and that their possessors shall preserve their ownership
and usufruct (propiedad y usufructo,) and in no case shall they be
obliged to alienate them to the state -- giving them permission
moreover to sell their products to anyone who will pay the highest
price for them. This measure affirms in a manner
inviolable the ownership (propiedad) and profits
(utilidad) of this kind of real estate (de talis juicas), and
dispels the reasonable fears which prevented individuals from
taking them under their care."
It would not be easy to find words to express more strongly the
notion of a permanent and inviolate right of property, than the
language of this decree and communication. Orden. de Min., pp.
79-82; Halleck's Mining Laws, pp. 381-385.
One of the principal causes of forfeiture established by the
Ordinances of 1584 was the failure to work the mine for four
consecutive months. But even this provision, so necessary to
Page 67 U. S. 230
secure the great object of the Crown in conceding the mine --
viz.: the development of the mineral resources of the
country -- was regarded as highly penal, and therefore to be
strictly construed. It was thus easily evaded, for by working the
mine for a few days every four months the forfeiture was avoided.
This defect was remedied in the Ordinance of 1783, which declared
that the omission to work for eight months, whether successive or
interrupted, in any one year should forfeit the mine, but the judge
before whom the mine was denounced was authorized to admit, in
addition to the excuses allowed by the former law, any "other just
causes which, combined with their former merit, might render the
miners worthy of equitable consideration." Halleck Transc. 244;
Ord. of 1783, Art. 15; Heathf. Gamboa 80-86.
Some of the other causes of forfeiture were for the breach of
directions in the Ordinances clearly necessary for the security of
the mine or of the operatives -- such as removing the pillars or
supports of the mine or in other ways neglecting to comply with the
rules of the Ordinances or the directions of the competent
authorities as to their security and preservation and their better
working. Ord. of 1783, Arts. 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; Halleck's
Transc. 342,
et seq.
In some cases these forfeitures were only imposed after repeated
offenses, (Art. 10), and all the facts were to be judicially
ascertained in appropriate proceedings.
From the foregoing it results that although "the observance of
the Ordinances" was in strictness a condition of the concession,
yet in fact the forfeiture of the mine was a punishment or penalty
imposed for violations of salutary and necessary rules, incurred in
but a limited number of cases, and when no equitable considerations
existed for mitigating their rigor.
A determinable fee, however, determined by the act or event
expressed in its limitation, usually beyond the control of the
tenant, and the occurrence of which could not be imputed to him as
a fault, still less as a violation of law.
The annexing of conditions subsequent to grants seems to have
been a policy by no means peculiar to Spanish jurisprudence with
regard to mines. It was intended to provide a
Page 67 U. S. 231
security for the attainment of those objects which formed the
consideration for the grant.
These, in colonization grants, were generally occupation and
cultivation. In Florida and Louisiana, the settlements were made
under a preliminary concession or warrants of survey, and on the
fulfillment of the conditions, the final or perfect title was
issued.
In Mexico, however, under the Law of 1824 and the Regulations of
1828, a perfect title issued in the first instance, but charged
with conditions as to occupation and settlement, and the grant
provided that "if the grantee failed to comply with the conditions,
he should lose his right to the land, and it might be denounced by
another."
I am unable to perceive any substantial difference between the
estate of the colonization grantee and that of the mine owner. Both
liable to denouncement and forfeiture for noncompliance with the
conditions expressed in or annexed by law to the grant, and in both
cases equitable excuses could, in general, be received for the
omission.
In the California land cases, the existence in the grants of
conditions subsequent has never been regarded as presenting any
obstacle to their confirmation -- where no forfeiture had accrued
and been judicially ascertained under the former government.
Having thus ascertained the nature of the mine owner's estate in
the mine, we are next to consider what was the nature of a mine
itself, considered as a subject of property.
From the quality of the estate, and the fact that it possessed
all the incidents of an estate in
land -- that it was
alienable, devisable, and inheritable -- that it could be leased,
charged with a rent, mortgaged, and given as a portion in marriage,
etc., it might reasonably be concluded that the Spanish law, like
the English, regarded the mine as
"land." But all doubt is
removed by recurring to the terms which were applied to it. It is a
"fundo," or land. 1 Gamb., ch. V., sec 5;
id. ch. xxi.,
sec. 15. "bienes raices," or real estate.
id. ch. xvii.,
sec. 22. It is "bienes immobles," or immovables.
Id., ch.
xxiii., sec. 6. All the rules relating to pititory and possessory
actions for lands are
Page 67 U. S. 232
applied to it, ch. xxiii., secs. 1, 6, 19; and in these cases
the proceedings may be for the ore, or merely to substantiate the
right of property in the mine, (sobre los metales o puramente sobre
la propiedad). Ch. xxiii., secs. 20, 21.
The fact that a judicial delivery of possession was authorized
to be made, indicates that the thing to which the title or right of
property had attached was a corporeal hereditament. It is laid down
by Alvarez (Inst. v. 11, 23,
et seq.) as an axiom of the
civil law, that "only things corporeal can be delivered, since only
these can be transferred by corporeal act from one to another." And
this corresponds with the rule of the common law, that corporeal
hereditaments pass by livery of seizin, while incorporeal
hereditaments lie only in grant.
As the Ordinances gave to the miner the right of property in and
possession of the mine, the judicial delivery of the mine, after
the title
to the thing had been acquired by denouncement
and registry, vested the mine owner with the right
in the
thing, and gave him the
full dominion -- the title to and
the right in the thing, the right to dispose of it, and the right
to use --
dominio directo y util. It is unnecessary to
pursue this discussion further.
No one, I think, who examines the Ordinances and the
Commentaries of Gamboa with care, can avoid the conclusion that the
mine owner, by denouncement and registry, and the delivery of the
possession to him, obtained, under the Mexican law, a right to and
property in the mine, and that the mine so acquired consisted of
the very substance of the minerals of which it was composed -- was
a corporeal hereditament like a mine or stratum of ores in the
English law, and was land in the strictest and fullest sense of the
term.
The case of
Fremont v. The United
States, 17 How. 565, is relied on by the counsel of
the United States as sustaining his objection to the jurisdiction.
In that case, the Court said:
"In relation to that part of the argument which disputes the
right on the ground that the grant embraced mines of gold and
silver, it is sufficient to say that under the mining laws of
Spain, the discovery of a mine of gold or silver did not destroy
the title of the individual to the land granted.
The only
question before
Page 67 U. S. 233
the Court is the validity of the title. And whether
there be any mines on this land, and if there be any, what are the
rights of sovereignty in them, are questions which must be
discussed in another form of proceeding, and are not subjected to
the jurisdiction of the commissioners or the court, by the act of
1851."
It will be seen that the only question before the court was
whether the fact that mines of gold and silver had been discovered
on land which had been previously granted under the colonization
laws, destroyed the title of the individual to the land granted. It
was of course held that it did not. Whether there were any
outstanding rights of sovereignty in such mines, and, if so, what
was their nature, and in what sovereign they were vested, the court
declared itself without jurisdiction to determine.
But it was not decided, nor could it have been intended to be
decided, that a private grantee of a mine under Mexican law could
not present his claim for confirmation under the act of 1851. That
question was not before the Court. And even if the language is to
be construed as extending to a right to a mine acquired under
Mexican law by a private individual, and is not to be restricted,
as its terms imply, to rights of sovereignty outstanding in the
United States or the State of California, it must be regarded as
obiter dictum -- not necessary to the determination of the
case, and relating to a question which did not and could not have
been presented by it.
A similar decision of the point presented for determination had
already been made by the Supreme Court in
Delassus
v. The United States,, 9 Pet. 117. The claim in
that case was, like that of Fremont, for the confirmation of a
concession of a tract of land. It differed from the case of Fremont
in the circumstance that the motive of the petitioner in soliciting
the grant was declared to be to make explorations for lead
mines.
But the Court held that the concession was for land, and as all
claims for lands were submitted to its jurisdiction, without any
reservation in the act of Congress of claims for lands containing
lead mines, a confirmation could not be withheld.
In Fremont's case, the same objection --
viz., that the
land
Page 67 U. S. 234
granted contained mines -- was taken, and the court held, that
that circumstance did not impair the validity of the grant, or
divest its jurisdiction over it as of a claim to land. Such, it
seems clear to me, was the whole scope and effect of the
decision.
The nature of a
claim to a mine, as distinguished from
the right of an agricultural grantee to the surface, and the
jurisdiction over such a claim confided to the commissioners by the
act of 1851, were not considered, or intended to be decided.
My conclusions, then, on the question of jurisdiction, are:
1. That the jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to
those cases where the estate claimed in lands in California is a
fee -- or such as in equity should be converted into a fee.
2. That even if it were, the estate of a mine owner in a mine
is, under Mexican and Spanish law, a fee with conditions
subsequent, closely resembling that of a grantee under the
colonization laws.
3. That by the common law of England the ownership of the
surface may be vested in one person, and that of the mine, or
substratum of mineral in another, and that the latter is "land" in
its strictest sense.
4. That by the Spanish and Mexican laws, a mine, considered as a
subject of property, and distinct from the ownership of the
surface, is "land," or rather, that terms are applied to it in
those laws which are the precise equivalents of the common law term
"land."
And that therefore this Court has jurisdiction to ascertain and
settle a private land claim to a mine, the title to which is
derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments, as of a claim to
"land."
Having thus ascertained that a mine is
"land," and that
the estate of the mine owner closely resembled a conditional fee at
common law, we will next briefly inquire by what proceedings and in
what manner that estate was acquired.
Such an inquiry naturally precedes an examination into the
genuineness of the alleged title to the mine, and the determination
of its legal effect if found to be genuine.
In art. 4, tit. VI., of the Ordinances of 1783, entitled "Of
the
Page 67 U. S. 235
modes of acquiring mines -- of new discoveries, registries of
veins, and denouncement of mines abandoned or forfeited," is as
follows:
"Those mentioned in the preceding articles must appear with a
written statement before the deputation of Mining of that
territory, or the one nearest, if there should be none there,
stating in it their name and those of their partners, if they have
any; the place of their birth, their residence, profession and
employment; and the most particular and distinguishing features of
the place
(sitio), hill
(cerro), or vein, of
which they ask the adjudication. All of which circumstances, and
the hour at which the discoverer presents himself, shall be noted
in a book of registry, which the deputation and Notary
(Escribano) of Mines, if there be one, shall keep, and
this being done, his written statement shall be returned to the
discoverer for his due security, and notices shall be fixed to the
doors of the church, government houses, and other public places of
the town, for due information. And I order that within ninety days
he shall have made in the vein or veins of the registry, a pit
(poso) of a vara and a half wide, or in diameter, and ten
varas down, or in depth; and that as soon as this is done, one of
the deputies shall personally go, accompanied by the notary, if
there be one -- and if there be none, by two assisting witnesses
and a professional mining expert of that territory -- to inspect
the course and direction of the vein, its width, its inclination to
the horizon, which is called
echado or
recuesto,
its hardness or softness, the greater or less firmness of its
sides, and the species or principal indications of the mineral --
taking an exact account of all this, in order that it may be added
to the corresponding part of its registry, with the evidence
(fe) of possession, which shall immediately be given in my
Royal name, measuring to him his
pertenencias, and causing
him to fix stakes
(estacas) in his boundaries, as will
hereafter be mentioned; which being done, there will be delivered
to him an attested copy of the proceedings as a corresponding
title."
"
Art. 5. If during the ninety days anyone shall appear
pretending to have a right to said discovery, he shall have a
brief
Page 67 U. S. 236
hearing in court, and it shall be adjudicated to the one who
best proves his claim; but if he appear after that time, he shall
not be heard."
"
Art. 7 provides, that when a question shall arise as
to who is the first discoverer, he shall be held such who shall
have first found metal in the vein -- and in case of doubt, he who
shall first have registered it."
It is well said by one of the counsel for the claimants, that
the object of the various Mining Ordinances of Spain was to
stimulate and promote to the utmost extent the discovery of mines
and the development of their riches.
The means adopted to stimulate
discovery were to give
to the discoverer the mine he might discover -- the state reserving
for itself a small part of its products. The means by which the
development of the riches of the mine was secured, consisted in
making the continuance of the right of property dependent on
working it to the extent and in the manner prescribed by law.
Discovery, therefore, was recognized by those laws as the real
foundation of the right, and the true consideration for the grant
of property in a mine.
Gamboa considered the discoverers of mines as entitled even to
greater encouragement than the inventors of useful arts. Heathf.
Gamb. 1, 259. And in all the Mining Ordinances of Europe, the right
of the discoverer is recognized by the promise of a grant of the
mine as a reward for the discovery.
In the
Sala Mejicana, vol. 2, 58, discovery is declared
to be one of the modes of acquiring mines, and it is recognized as
a species of occupation, and as constituting a source of title,
like the finding of a buried treasure, precious stones, and the
like.
In the jurisprudence of Spain and the Continental Nations,
discovery, with regard to mines, as a source of title and
consideration for the grant, corresponds with occupation and
cultivation under our own preemption laws with regard to vacant
public lands; and in all the claims to lands in Florida and
Louisiana submitted to the Supreme court, the fact of settlement,
under a contract for or with a just right to expect a title,
Page 67 U. S. 237
has been regarded as a valuable consideration secured by the
state, and creating an equitable obligation to confer the
title.
But this inchoate right created by discovery must be perfected
in the manner prescribed by law.
It is therefore required that the mine be registered, and
without registry, says Gamboa, no mine could be lawfully worked,
and it remains liable to be registered by any other person -- the
form of the ordinance not having been complied with. Chap. v., sec.
2. The reasonableness of this regulation, he remarks, is evident.
It is not necessary to recapitulate the various arguments by which
he vindicates its policy and necessity.
As the revenue was interested in a portion of the product of the
mine; as the public policy required that an account should be taken
of so important a part of the national wealth; as the mine owner,
from the moment of registry, became subject to laws designed to
secure the development of the mine he had discovered -- for these
and other reasons, it was indispensable to provide a mode in which
the discovery should be formally made known to competent authority
and the right of the discoverer judicially declared and defined.
Registry is therefore said by Gamboa to be the fundamental title,
or the base of the title (el titulo fundamental de las minas) and
the attributive cause of the subject's right of property in it, for
the Crown has conceded the mines and made them common, subject to
his burden or condition (gravamen). Ch. v., sec. 2.
And in other places he speaks of registry as "el titulo
fundamental de el dominio de las minas." Ch. xi., sec. 2; ch. vii.,
sec. 3.
The registry, however, did not constitute the
title to
the mine in the sense of being itself a concession or grant.
The registry, or formal declaration of the discovery in the
manner prescribed by law, was the fulfillment of the condition
imposed in the general grant by the sovereign on the discoverer of
mines, and on its performance the law itself annexed the title as
the legal consequence of discovery and registry. It still remained
subject to further conditions -- some to be performed
Page 67 U. S. 236
before a formal delivery of possession could be given, and some
to be perpetually observed under penalty of forfeiture.
The registry was therefore required to be made before a judicial
tribunal, and not before an administrative officer, who, like the
governors of California, might exercise a discretion as to whether
or not the concession should be made. The declaration of the
ownership of the discoverer was termed an "adjudication," and even
after registry, and at any time during the period allowed the
person registering for digging the pit, any person pretending to
have a right to the discovery was entitled to a hearing
"in
court," and the mine was
adjudicated to him who best
proved his claim.
In sec. 14 of chap. v., Gamboa states that
"Registries of mines in the Indies are not to be made before
royal officers, but before the justices of the department alone,
and the oath of the discoverer that he will bring in to be stamped
all the gold and silver, etc., is to ensure the due levying of
duties, and is not to be made upon the registry of a mine
the
title to which comes under the cognizance of the justice."
In section 15 he says:
"But
judicial matters, such as registry, denouncement,
the giving possession, etc., are the province of the justices, and,
by way of appeal, of the royal audiences."
In sec. 24 he defines registry to be "any judicial order, or
proceedings (autos o diligencia) which authenticate and afford
evidence of some judicial act."
The whole proceeding thus seems to have been the judicial
recognition and declaration of a previously existing right,
asserted and established in the manner required by law, rather than
the creation and conferring of a title which had no previous
existence.
Thus, Gamboa, in speaking of the necessity of registering says:
"And therefore the discoverer,
if he would preserve his
right, should give notice of his discovery and make himself
known." Ch. v., 4.
So in sec. 17 of the same chapter,
"If, after the expiration of the term of twenty days, some other
person should come forward and register, the discoverer loses his
right, this being
Page 67 U. S. 239
the penalty he is liable to pay for his culpable default, in
neglecting to register
his mine, and thus frustating the
ends of the ordinances, for a mine which is worked without being
registered is not properly to be called a mine, and does not merit
the name, even though it should yield good ore."
"The ordinances give the name of mines to such only as are
registered, because the registry is the fundamental title [el
titulo fundamental] to every mine, and because the omitting to make
registry evinces a vicious intention to dispose of the ore or
silver clandestinely, in fraud of the right of the Crown, and to
put impediments in the way of other individuals who might wish to
take mines upon the same vein, or at the same spot."
1 Heathf.Gamb. 150.
In neither the Ordinances of 1584 nor in those of 1783 is
mention made of any title paper to be delivered to the party
containing, in terms, any grant or concession of the mine.
His "statement" is, by the Ordinances of 1783, to be returned to
him, after its contents have been duly noted in the register, "for
his security," and when he shall have dug his pit he is to be put
in possession, if no adverse claim be interposed. But the only
evidence of his title consists in the judicial ascertainment and
record of the fact that he declared his discovery in the form
required by law, which being done, the law itself gave the title on
the conditions fixed by the ordinances. When the pit had been dug
and judicial possession given, the 4th Article of the Ordinances of
1783 directed, as we have seen, that an authorized copy of all the
proceedings (de las diligencias) should be given him as his
corresponding title (come titulo correspondiente). To perfect and
secure the right to a mine, registry was in all cases
indispensable. In making it, all that was necessary was "to
manifest the person, the place, and the ore." But if the mine had
previously been worked and was denounced for abandonment or other
cause of forfeiture, a preliminary proceeding called a denouncement
was required. This was in the nature of an accusation against the
former owner charging him with having left the mine unworked or
having come within some other ground of forfeiture. Upon this
question a summary
Page 67 U. S. 240
judgment was had after notice to neighbors, proclamation, etc.
If the mine was declared forfeited, the denouncer was nevertheless
obliged to register it and go through the same proceedings as the
discoverer had done. Heathf.Gamboa, ch. v., secs. 21-22, p.
153.
That the discoverer of a mine was recognized by the law as
having acquired a right to it, even before registry, is further
shown by the terms of the 20th Ordinance of 1584, which enacts that
"No person shall presume to register, or to enter in the register a
mine which is not
his own property, under the penalty of
one thousand ducats," etc.
Among the cases mentioned by Gamboa to which this law applies is
that of a person other than the discoverer of the ore registering a
mine before the expiration of the twenty days allowed by the
ordinance to a discoverer for registering his mine. 1 Heathf.
Gamboa, pp. 156, 158.
The discoverer is thus treated as the true owner of the mine,
until, by failing to register within the time prescribed, his
rights are lost; and the registry of the mine within that time by
any person in his own name is considered and punished as a
fraudulent attempt to acquire the property of another, like a
similar act by the mortgagee of the mine, or by the curator or
tutor of a minor, and other cases mentioned by Gamboa.
From these and many other provisions in the ordinances and
passages in the Commentaries of Gamboa, the nature and effect of
registry is unmistakably manifested; nor can our views of it depend
upon the meaning we attach to a single phrase of Gamboa (el titulo
fundamental), as to the correct translation of which a question was
raised at the bar.
The foundation of the right to a mine was discovery. But this
right was lost unless the discoverer made known the fact before the
judicial tribunal authorized to receive such declarations. The
proceeding for the purpose was entirely
ex parte, and
consisted merely of a production of the ore, a description of the
place where it was discovered, and the person of the discoverer.
These facts being duly made known and recorded, the title passed by
operation of law, unless within the time limited
Page 67 U. S. 241
someone having a better right appeared. The foundation of the
denouncer's right was in principle the same.
Having brought to the notice of the court, and established that
a mine was abandoned or had been forfeited, the law gave him the
right to register it in his own name, like a new mine, except that
not being an original discoverer, the mining space (pertenencias)
to be assigned to him was more limited.
The registry cannot be regarded as the base of the title to the
mine in the sense that without registry, a right of property could
in no case be asserted to it, for as we have seen, even after
registry by an alleged discoverer, and after he had dug his pit,
obtained judicial possession, and even had his pertenencias
measured, anyone pretending to have a right to the discovery could
within ninety days from the date of the registry assert his claim
and procure the mine to be adjudicated to him; but where no
objection was interposed, and the person registering was the true
discoverer of the mine, the causing it to be registered, or the
formal declaration of his discovery was the fulfillment of the
condition established by law upon which his inchoate right as a
discoverer became a perfect right of property (although, until the
pit was dug, he was not entitled to a judicial delivery of
possession, nor could he alienate the mine). And the register
itself, or the record of the procedure, became his fundamental
title
paper or
evidence of his title, for it
established judicially the fact of the discovery and the fact that
he had declared it as required by law.
I have thus endeavored to arrive at a clear conception of the
nature and effect of the registry of a mine and of the rights of a
discoverer, that we may be better able to judge of the validity of
the alleged registry by Castillero and correctly to estimate the
equitable or inchoate rights he may have acquired as the discoverer
of a new mine.
Having premised this much as to the rights of a discoverer, and
the nature, objects and effect of a registry we will now
particularly consider the provisions of the articles under
examination.
It will be observed that to effect a registry and to entitle
himself to the judicial delivery of possession of the mine, the
Page 67 U. S. 242
only acts required of the discoverer were 1st, his appearance
before the deputation with a written statement of the facts
necessary to set forth, and 2d that he should within ninety days
thereafter make a pit in the vein of his registry of the required
dimensions.
The noting in the book of registry of the contents of the
statement, the hour at which the discoverer presented himself, the
notices for due information, etc., were acts to be performed by the
judge or deputation. It would seem that any injurious effect on the
discoverer's right by the omission of the first of these
formalities was intended to be provided against by the direction
that the written statement should "be returned to him for his due
security," and, it is presumed, with a certificate annexed of the
fact and time of its presentation.
We learn from Gamboa that in 1727, the Viceroy Marquess of Cassa
Forte issued an order, dated as Mexico, commanding the royal
officers and justices to send an account of the mines within their
several districts, whether at work or abandoned, etc., and in case
they should have no book of registry for the mines which might have
been registered there, to form one with all possible dispatch, that
an account might thus be obtained of all the mines in the Kingdom,
from which a general book might be made up, etc. "But we are not
aware," says Gamboa,
"that this order, so agreeable to the spirit of the ordinances
now under consideration and so important to the interests of the
revenue in a public and of the subject in a private point of view,
was soon carried into effect."
We find here no intimation that the failure of the officer to
enter the registry in a book in any way impaired its validity, and
this notwithstanding that the ordinance he was considering (Art.
XIX,) expressly requires the Mining Administrators of each District
to keep a book in which all registries made in such District were
to be entered, and for this purpose the miners were required to
send authenticated copies of such registry to that officer.
Gamboa goes on to observe that
"the original proceedings (diligencias) ought
not to be
given into the custody of the owners until the registry, etc., be
made in the proper book, for
Page 67 U. S. 243
otherwise these important instruments would be exposed to the
contingencies alluded to above, and very serious difficulties may
arise in subsequent dealings in ascertaining whether the registry
or denouncement was made with due solemnity, the time and manner of
making it, the greater or less antiquity of the mine,"
&c.
This suggestion appears to have been adopted in the Ordinances
of 1783, which provide, as we have seen, that the contents of the
statement and the hour at which it was presented, shall first be
noted in the book of registry, and the statement then returned to
the discover "for his due
security."
The registry having been effected, the working of the mine could
lawfully be commenced at once, and within ninety days the pit was
required to be dug. As soon as this was done, formal possession
could be given.
If, however, the party who had registered the mine failed to do
this, his rights were, by the Ordinances of 1584, forfeited, and
the mine might be denounced by and adjudged to another. As,
however, from the nature of the vein, a pit of the depth of three
estados might be wholly unnecessary, or the hardness of the rock,
the caving in of the pit, the breaking out of springs of water
&c., might prevent the digging of the pit within the time
limited, it was provided by the ordinance that the justice, on an
application made to him and an investigation, might dispense with
this requirement of the law or enlarge the time for its
fulfillment, as might be necessary.
In the Ordinances of 1783, the penalty of forfeiture is not in
terms imposed for the omission to dig the pit within ninety days.
It is presumed, however, that a breach of so positive and important
a provision of law would, if without excuse, under the later
ordinances have rendered the mine liable to denouncement.
By Art. 4, of the Ordinances of 1783, the pertenencias of the
mine were required to be measured, and the stakes fixed in the
boundaries at the time possession is given.
By the Ordinances of 1584, the miner was not obliged to do this
until cited by some neighboring miner
"who asked for
Page 67 U. S. 244
stakes. Ten days were then allowed him to select the ground he
might prefer, or, using our mode of expression, to
locate
his pertenencias -- subject, however, to the condition that his
original pit of possession, or fixed stake, should be within the
limits of the boundaries he might select. If he failed to make his
selection within ten days, his boundaries were established by the
justice. But this designation of his pertenencias was not final,
for he might at any time afterwards, on discovering the true course
of the vein &c., apply to have his stakes bettered
(mejorar
las estacas), and his boundaries might be altered in any way
not injurious to the neighbor, between whose mine and his own the
boundaries had already been established."
1 Heathf.Gamb. 297, 298, 325; 2 Heathf.Gamb. 10.
The frauds and litigation to which this practice gave rise led
Gamboa to suggest that everyone should by positive ordinance be
required to set out his boundaries at the time possession was
given, under pain of incurring the forfeiture of the mine and of
being
ipso facto deprived of it, even though not denounced
by any other party. 2 Heathf. 10, 11.
This suggestion was adopted in the Ordinances of 1783, except
that the omission to set out the boundaries at the time possession
is given was not declared to forfeit the mine
ipso
facto.
But notwithstanding this establishment of boundaries, the miner
could improve the location of his stakes
(mejorar las
estacas) or change his boundaries by the authority of the
deputation of the District, provided it could be done without
injury to his neighbors, who were to be summoned and heard in the
matter. Ord. of 1783, art. 11, Halleck's Transc. 236.
It thus appears that the giving possession was, under the
Ordinances, a formal proceeding, like a livery of seizin, of which
the measurement of pertenencias or the establishment of boundaries
did not of necessity form a part, and that although these acts were
required to be done by the Ordinances of 1784, their omission did
not forfeit the right of property acquired by the registry; still
less does it appear that their performance was a condition
precedent to the vesting of the title.
In all cases where land was granted under the Mexican
colonization
Page 67 U. S. 245
laws, a formal judicial delivery of possession was in strictness
required. But it has never been held by the Supreme Court that this
formality was necessary to vest the title or right of property, and
in the majority of cases passed upon by this Court it was not
given. In its own nature, it was an act which supposed the
existence of a title acquired, but had no effect in conferring one,
that having already been done by the concession or grant. I see no
reason to make any distinction between the judicial delivery of
possession of an agricultural grant and that of a mine, or for
considering that the omission of that formality would be fatal to a
right of property already acquired in the one case more than in the
other.
We shall see, however, when we examine the proofs in this case,
that the alcalde, accompanied by witnesses of assistance, gave to
Castillero judicial possession of the mine he had discovered, as
well as of three thousand varas in all directions from it, which he
undertook to grant him; that no pertenencias were measured or
stakes fixed, but that Castillero had already commenced working the
mine and had dug a pit, the precise dimensions of which do not
appear; that he continued in possession, and working his mine with
the full knowledge not only of the authorities of the department to
whom he made known his discovery, but of the American consul and
the inhabitants generally, and that this possession has been
retained by his assigns and representatives to this day.
I proceed to consider the evidence as to the registry of the
mine by Andres Castillero, and having ascertained what was in fact
done by him, to determine its validity and effect.
The documents relied on by the claimants as constituting the
registry of the mine of New Almaden are:
1st. A written statement by Andres Castillero addressed to the
alcalde of the First Nomination of the Pueblo of San Jose, dated
November 22, 1845, setting forth his name, office and residence,
and the fact that he had discovered a vein of silver with a
ley of gold on the land of the retired sergeant Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, which he desired to work in company. He
Page 67 U. S. 246
therefore requests the alcalde to fix up the proper notices in
order that his right might be made sure when the time for giving
the judicial possession should arrive.
2d. A second statement addressed by Castillero to the same
officer, and dated December 3, 1845, setting forth that on opening
the mine previously denounced by him he had taken out, besides
silver with a
ley of gold, liquid quicksilver. He
therefore asks the alcalde to unite this representation to the
previous denouncement and to place it on file.
3d. The act of juridical possession. In this document the
alcalde recites:
"There being no mining deputation in the Department of
California, and this being the only time since the settlement of
Upper California that a mine has been worked in conformity with the
laws, and there being no Juez de Letras, (Professional Judge) in
the Second District, I, the alcalde of First Nomination, citizen
Antonio Maria Pico, accompanied by two assisting witnesses, have
resolved to act in virtue of my office, for want of a notary
public, there being none, for the purpose of giving juridical
possession of the mine, known by the name of Santa Clara, in this
jurisdiction, situated on the land of the retired Sergeant Jose
Reyes Berreyesa, the time having expired which is designated in the
Ordinance of Mining for citizen Don Andres Castillero to show his
right, and also for others to allege a better right between the
time of denouncement and this date; and the mine being found with
abundance of metals discovered, the shaft made according to the
rules of art, and the working of the mine producing a large
quantity of liquid quicksilver, as shown by the specimens which the
court has, and as the laws now in force so strongly recommend the
protection of an article so necessary for the amalgamation of gold
and silver in the Republic, I have granted three thousand varas of
land in all directions, subject to what the General Ordinance of
Mines may direct, it being worked in company, to which I certify,
the witnesses signing with me; this act of possession being
attached to the rest of the espediente, deposited in the archives
under
Page 67 U. S. 247
my charge, this not going on stamped paper because there is
none, as prescribed by law."
"Juzgado of San Jose Guadalupe, December ___, 1845."
"ANTONIO MARIA PICO"
"Assisting witnesses:"
"Antonia Sunol"
"Jose Noriega"
These documents are produced from the Recorder's Office of Santa
Clara county. They were found in the mayor's office at that place
in 1850, by Capt. H. W. Halleck, and by the mayor transferred to
the recorder's office, where they now remain. It appears that a
large portion of the archives or papers belonging to the former
alcalde's office in San Jose were deposited in the mayor's office
of that place, a knowledge of which circumstance induced Capt.
Halleck to institute a search in the latter place, which resulted
in the discovery of the document.
The espediente thus produced contains several papers besides
those enumerated above. These papers will hereafter be referred
to.
In investigating the genuineness of these documents, it will be
convenient to consider:
1st. The proof of the signatures attached to them.
2d. The evidence tending to establish that the documents were
executed at the time they bear date, and were filed or archived in
the alcalde's office. And
3d. The proofs which show that in fact the mine was discovered
and denounced, and the judicial possession given, as stated in the
act of possession.
The act of possession is signed by Antonio Maria Pico, as
alcalde, and by Jose Noriega and Antonio Sunol, assisting
witnesses. All these persons have been sworn, and testify to the
genuineness of their signatures and that they were affixed on the
day the instrument bears date. T he genuineness of these signatures
and that of Castillero is also proved by other witnesses.
I do not understand that the fact that the instruments were
signed by the parties whose names they bear is seriously
questioned, as all of them except Castillero were produced, and
Page 67 U. S. 248
testified not only to their own signatures, but to the facts
which the documents recite. The theory of the government, which
supposes these statements to be false, must admit their readiness
to affix their names to antedated documents.
The real questions, therefore, are
when were these
documents prepared and signed and
when were they placed in
the alcalde's office?
2. On this point we have, as before stated, the evidence of
Pico, the alcalde and the two subscribing witnesses, Sunol and
Noriega.
We have also the testimony of Jose Fernandez, who was Sindico
del Juzgado and Escribano of the court in 1845. This witness not
only swears to the handwriting of the documents and the genuineness
of the signatures, but states that he saw the espediente in 1845,
when it was brought to him by Gutierrez, in whose handwriting the
body of the decree is. He also swears that he saw it again in 1849
among the archives of the office, he being then second alcalde.
James W. Weekes, a witness called by the government, testifies
that he saw the espediente in 1846-1847, when Burton was alcalde,
and in 1848, when he was himself alcalde. He is unable, however,
positively to identify the espediente now produced with the "little
book" which he saw in the office when Burton was alcalde. This
witness, in 1848, certified, at the request of Mr. James Alexander
Forbes, to a copy of the espediente. The copy was prepared by James
Alexander Forbes from a document handed to him by Alexander Forbes,
of Tepic, (who was then in California), not from the original in
the alcalde's office. The certificate of Weekes that it was a
faithful and literal copy of the latter document was obtained, but
no comparison was made of the copy made by Mr. Forbes with the
original, the witness supposing, as he states, that it was correct.
The copy thus certified to by Weekes differs from that found in the
alcalde's office in several particulars, which will hereafter be
noticed.
The claimants have also produced the original inventory of
papers and effects in the alcalde's office, which, as was
customary,
Page 67 U. S. 249
was on the 1st of January, 1846, signed by the outgoing alcalde,
Pico, and receipted by the incoming alcalde, Chavolla.
This document is produced by the Clerk of the City of San Jose.
It was found amongst other papers which had accumulated under the
government of the alcaldes of the pueblo, and which now form part
of the archives of the city. The signatures and rubrics of Pico and
Chavolla to the inventory are proved, and the document itself is in
the handwriting of Jose Fernandez, the Escribano or Secretary of
the Juzgado.
In this inventory, amongst nearly a hundred entries of papers
and records and of the smallest objects belonging to the office --
such as candlesticks, old knives, tables and benches -- is found a
note of a document entitled "Pesecion de la mina de Santa Clara a
Don Andres Castillero."
No attempt has been made to impeach the genuineness of the
signatures to this document, nor is it said that there is anything
in the handwriting of the important entry in question or in its
position on this list which could suggest the idea of a possible
interpolation. Unless this entry be forged, it would seem
conclusive evidence that a document of the kind described was on
file in the alcalde's office on the 1st of January, 1846.
Another inventory of a similar kind, made on the 10th day of
November, 1846, about nine months subsequently to the former, has
been produced by the United States from the archives of San
Jose.
In this inventory no entry of the document in question is found.
If the lists were in other respects similar, the omission of this
one item might possess much significance. But the two lists seem to
be different in many particulars, and though some of the entries
are alike in both, several which appear in the first are wanting in
the second. That all the papers mentioned in the first inventory
must have existed on the files of the office and should have been
noted in the second inventory is evident. When, therefore, we find
not only the "Posecion" of the Mina de Santa Clara, but several
other documents omitted in the second inventory, we necessarily
conclude that the latter was prepared in the loose and inaccurate
manner in which the
Page 67 U. S. 250
public business of such offices was usually conducted in those
primitive times.
A striking illustration of the incompleteness of the second
inventory is presented by the evidence offered by the United
States. Three documents are produced from the Archives of San Jose,
purporting to be orders by the alcalde for the publication of the
denouncements of mines -- one of the lands of Justo Larios, another
on those of Jose de J. Vallejo, and a third on the rancho de Ojo de
la Coche. These orders are dated in April, March, and June, 1846. I
find no one of them noted in the inventory made in the succeeding
November. And yet both the documents and the inventory are produced
as genuine by the United States.
I can see nothing, therefore, in the omission of the entry of
the possession of the mine of Santa Clara in the second inventory
which, in the absence of any suggestion that the handwriting or the
color of the ink of the entry in the first inventory differs from
those of the rest of the document (as would be the case if it had
been interpolated after any considerable interval), or that the
position of the entry on the list would have rendered such an
interpolation possible, should weaken the force of the evidence
afforded by the inventory that a document, purporting to be the
possession of the mine of Santa Clara, was on file in the Archives
of the alcalde's office of San Jose on the 1st January, 1846.
3d. As to the proofs which show the facts of denouncement,
judicial possession, and working of the mine about the time
indicated by the documents.
We have already seen that the subscribing witnesses, the
alcalde, and Jose Fernandez testify to the fact that the possession
was given as described by them.
It is shown, however, by evidence which is uncontroverted, that
in December, 1845, and early in 1846, Castillero and his partners
were notoriously known to be working a mine of quicksilver of which
they claimed to be the owners by denouncement. That these facts
were made known to the governor of the department, and by him
communicated to the
Page 67 U. S. 251
supreme government. That they were known to the United States
consul, and by him communicated to his own government and also to a
Cabinet Minister of the government of the Sandwich Islands, with
whom he corresponded and by whom his letter was published in a
Hawaiian newspaper of the date of July 25, 1846, a copy of which is
produced. That the mine was, in December, 1845, worked by Indians
under the superintendence of Chard, an American employed by
Castillero, who is produced as a witness, and whose employment
continued until about the middle of 1846. That in December, 1845,
it was visited and examined by Col. J. C. Fremont, to whom
Castillero, who claimed to own it, explained the Mexican mode of
acquiring titles to mines by denouncement and registry, but
declined some overtures for its purchase made to him by
Fremont.
Other allusions to and recognition of the possession and grant
of three thousand varas, in letters, judicial proceedings &c.,
at a late period, but previous to the supposed date of their
fabrication, will subsequently be considered.
Among the documents alleged to have come from the City of
Mexico, traced copies of which are exhibited, was a communication
from Pio Pico, governor of the Californias, to the Minister of
Relations, dated February 13, 1846. In this letter governor Pico
states that he encloses a letter from Don Andres Castillero,
apprising him of the important discovery of a quicksilver mine, and
transmitting a sample of the quicksilver. He therefore begs the
Minister of Relations to bring it to the superior knowledge of His
Excellency the president &c.
On the margin of this letter is the usual note, stating its
reception on the 6th of April, 1846, and that it is noted with
satisfaction &c. The letter of Castillero alluded to in the
foregoing, dated 10th December, 1845, is also produced from the
Mexican Archives. On searching the Archives in this City, for
records of this correspondence, there was found the borrador, or
office copy, of the letter from Pio Pico, and a letter from
Castillero -- not the one enclosed by the governor in his
communication to the Minister of Relations, for of that, he states
in that communication, he sends the original -- but a subsequent
letter,
Page 67 U. S. 252
dated December 15th, 1845. In this letter he states: "I have the
satisfaction of informing you if you have not received my other
letter through the prefecture, that I have discovered," &c.,
repeating substantially the contents of the former letter, which
had, in fact, been received and enclosed to the Minister of
Relations. It is not disputed that these documents are in the
Archives. The borrador, or draft, of Pico's communication to the
Minister, is in the handwriting of Olvera, who was Secretary of the
assembly at the time.
There was also found, at the same time, by Mr. Hopkins, the
Keeper of the Archives, amongst those records a letter from Manuel
Castro, the prefect of the Second District, to the secretary of the
departmental government, dated December 31, 1845. In this letter he
states that "Castillero has denounced and is now working a
quicksilver mine," and after felicitating the Secretary, and
through him the governor, on so beneficent a discovery, he adds,
that he encloses a petition by Castillero for two square leagues of
land adjacent to his mine. A borrador, or draft of the reply of the
Secretary to this letter is also found in the archives, but it
appears to have been cancelled by black lines drawn
transversely.
The handwriting and the signatures of these documents are proved
by Pio Pico, who also states his recollection of having dispatched
J. M. Covarrubias with his letter of the 13th of February, 1846, to
the Minister of Relations, and the bottle of quicksilver sent to
him by Castillero.
The testimony of Pico on this point is corroborated by that of
Jose M. Covarrubias, who swears that he left San Pedro in the
schooner Juanita, Captain Snook, on the 14th of February, 1846,
taking with him the governor's dispatch, Castillero's letter, and a
bottle of quicksilver, all of which he delivered on his arrival at
Mexico to the Minister of Relations, Mr. Castillo y Lanzas. Files
of the "Diaro Oficial," the government newspaper, published in
Mexico, and of the "Monitor Republicano," and the "Republicano,"
also published in Mexico, are produced, and under the heading of
marine news there are found notices of the arrival of the
Juanita, Captain Snook, at Mazatlan, on the 2d
Page 67 U. S. 253
of March, 1846, twelve days from San Diego; of her departure on
the 12th of the same month from Mazatlan for San Blas, having on
board as passengers Jose Maria Covarrubias and others.
It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the letter of Castillero
of the 10th of December, 1845, a traced copy of which is produced
from the Mexican Archives, was in fact sent to governor Pico, and
by him transmitted in February, 1846, to Castillo Lanzas, Minister
of Relations, together with the dispatch, the borrador of which is
found in the archives in this city, and a bottle of
quicksilver.
There are also produced by the claimants two letters from
Castillero to M. G. Vallejo, of Sonoma.
In the first of these, dated December 2, 1845, Castillero
says:
"While waiting for the time of my departure, I have employed
myself as a miner, having extracted from the same vein quicksilver,
silver, and gold, in surpassing quantities."
In the second letter, dated December 21, 1845, he, amongst other
things, informs Vallejo that he has found such abundance of
quicksilver that he has extracted twenty pounds of it from twenty
arrobas of ore &c.
These letters are produced and proved by General Vallejo. I do
not understand that the genuineness of Castillero's signatures to
them is disputed. As Castillero left California in the spring of
1846, and has never returned, they must have been written about the
time they are dated, unless we suppose they have since, and after
an interval of many years, been written in Mexico, antedated, and
sent on to Vallejo to be produced by him -- a supposition which the
contents of the letters and the allusions in them to personal
matters and contemporaneous events of slight importance render
wholly inadmissible. There is also produced by the claimants a copy
of the
Polynesian, of the date of July 25th, 1846, which
contains a letter from G. P. Judd, the Minister of Finance of the
Hawaiian Kingdom, to the editor of the newspaper, enclosing a
letter received by the Minister from Thomas O. Larkin, United
States Consul at Monterey, dated June 24, 1846. In this letter,
which is also published in the
Polynesian,
Page 67 U. S. 254
Mr. Larkin informs Mr. Judd of the discovery of a quicksilver
mine seventy miles north of Monterey, and states that in 1845,
"a Mexican being in the vicinity examined the rock and
immediately denounced the place before the nearest alcalde, and
then made known what it contained. The owner, with a priest, in a
small and imperfect manner has commenced extracting the metal."
After describing the process adopted by them, he adds: "They
obtain about fifteen percent of the metal."
The receipt of this letter in the Sandwich Islands is sworn to
by the editor and publisher of the newspaper. He is wholly
unimpeached. The fact that it was published in the newspaper on the
day alleged, is sworn to by a gentleman of San Francisco, who read
it, and whose attention was particularly drawn to it. A copy of the
paper is produced and filed. From among the papers of the late Mr.
Larkin is produced, by his son, the reply of Mr. Judd to his
father's communication. The reply is dated July 20, 1846. It
acknowledges the receipt of Larkin's letter of the 24th ultimo,
(June) with a specimen of the ore, and it states that he had sent
it to the editor of the
Polynesian for insertion. The
handwriting and signature of Mr. Judd are proved by persons
intimate with him.
It has already been mentioned that files of several Mexican
newspapers, published in 1846, have been produced by the claimants.
In the "Diario del Gobierno de la Republica Mexicana," of the 27th
December, 1846, we find credited to the "Espia de la Frontera," a
newspaper not produced, a notice of the account given in the
"Polynesian," of the 24th July, of the discovery of a quicksilver
mine seventy miles north of Monterey, and the same notice
purporting to be taken from the same paper, the "Spy of the
Frontier," is found in the "Republicano," of the 9th December, and
in the "Monitor Republicano," of the 6th.
It is unnecessary, however, to dwell on these incidental
corroborations, for the fact of the reception of Larkin's letter by
Mr. Judd, and its publication in the
Polynesian cannot be
doubted.
The claimants have also produced from the files of the State
Department at Washington, extracts from official dispatches of
Page 67 U. S. 255
Mr. Thos. O. Larkin to the then Secretary of state. These
extracts are certified by Mr. Cass, November 28, 1859.
The first dispatch of Mr. Larkin is dated May 4, 1846.
The extract produced states that:
"Near the Mission of Santa Clara there are mountains with veins
of quicksilver ore, discovered by D. Andres Castillero, of Mexico,
in 1845, which the undersigned has twice seen produce twenty
percent of fine quicksilver &c. . . . By the laws and customs
of Mexico respecting mining, every person or company, foreign or
native, can present themselves to the nearest authorities and
denounce any unworked mine. The authorities will then, after the
proper formalities, put the discoverer in possession &c. . . .
Up to the present time there are few or no persons in California
with sufficient energy or capital to carry on mining, although a
Mexican officer of the army, a Padre, and a native of New York, are
on a very small scale extracting quicksilver from the San Jose
Mine."
There is also produced from the consular book of Mr. Larkin, a
dispatch addressed by him to the American Minister at Mexico, dated
April 3, 1846.
After mentioning the intended departure of Don Andres Castillero
from this port (Monterey) in a few days, for Acapulco, on board the
Hawaiian barque
Don Quixote, as commissioner to Mexico,
from General Jose Castro, and that he would arrive in Mexico by the
25th or 30th of this month (April), Mr. Larkin says:
"At the Town of San Jose, eighty miles from Monterey, Don Andres
Castillero has discovered a quicksilver mine. The ore produces from
fifty to sixty percent I have seen him, from an old gun barrel, in
thirty minutes run out about thirty percent in pure quicksilver.
This must be a great advantage to California."
In a letter to Captain Montgomery, of the U.S. ship
Portsmouth, dated May 2, 1846, Mr. Larkin communicates to
that officer substantially the same information.
These extracts from Mr. Larkin's correspondence are important,
not only as showing that the mine had been discovered, and was
being worked in the spring of 1846, but that the mode of acquiring
a mine, as understood by Larkin, was precisely that
Page 67 U. S. 256
alleged to have been adopted in this case. And further, that
"the officer," the "Padre," and "the native of New York," spoken of
as working the mine, were undoubtedly Castillero, Padre Real, and
William G. Chard, as will hereafter appear.
The whole official dispatch of Mr. Larkin to the Secretary of
state, is produced by the son of the former, from the letter book
of his father. The portions extracted and certified to by Mr. Cass
are all that is important to notice.
That the mine was worked by Castillero in January, 1846, is
shown by the deposition of Col. Fremont.
That gentleman states that in January, 1846, he visited the mine
in company with Capt. Hinckley; that the latter introduced him to
Castillero, the
owner of the mine, who showed him the
excavations, the heaps of ore &c., and explained the process of
extracting the metal. Impressed with the value of the mine, he
spoke slightly to him about purchasing it, but Castillero was not
disposed to converse on the subject. Castillero informed him that
he had acquired his mine by denouncement, and explained the nature
of the proceeding. Acting on this information, Col. Fremont
subsequently denounced the mines upon his own property of
Mariposa.
He also adds that Capt. Leidesdorff, with whom he had spoken as
to the purchase of the mine, supposed it might be effected for
$30,000, "an immense sum of money in California in those days."
The working of the mine, so far back as December, 1845, is also
proved by Mr. Wm. G. Chard. This witness testifies that he was
employed by Castillero and the priest Don Jose Maria Real; that he
went there to open the mine in November or December, 1845; that the
metal was extracted by heating the ore in gun barrels; that while
working in this way, the possession was given, in December, 1845,
or January, 1846. The witness enumerates among those present on
that occasion the alcalde Pico, Sunol, Noriega, Fernandez, and the
old man Berreyesa. He does not recollect to have seen Castillero on
the ground when possession was given -- a circumstance, as observed
by counsel, not surprising -- for Castillero, Chard states, was
constantly coming and
Page 67 U. S. 257
going, and on one visit stayed there eight days; but the
statement indicates the good faith of the witness in declining to
swear to what he did not recollect.
Mr. Chard describes the operations at the mine. They were
conducted by himself, another white man, a blacksmith whom they
called Old Billy, and some Indians. He built a furnace and smelted
the ore in some large whaler's try-pots, capable of holding three
or four tons of ore. He remained in this employment until August or
September, 1846.
Chard states himself to be a native of Columbia County, New
York. He is evidently the "native of New York" to whom Mr. Larkin
refers in his dispatch. His testimony is uncontradicted and his
character unimpeached.
There is much other testimony which corroborates the foregoing
on various points, but which it is unnecessary to notice. It
relates chiefly to the first visit of Castillero to the mine; his
first experiments with the ore; his trip to Sutter's Fort and visit
to Vallejo, at the baptism of whose child he was godfather, and who
thus became his compadre, by which title he addressed him in his
letters already cited; his return to Santa Clara, and the formation
of the partnership between himself, Castro, Father Real and the two
Robles, in November, 1845. As this writing of partnership is
conceded to be genuine, and as it relates to the working of the
mine of silver, gold, and quicksilver, on the land of Jose Reyes
Berreyesa, the fact that the mine was discovered at that time must
be taken to be admitted.
We thus find that early in December, 1845, the discovery and
denouncement of the mine was made known to the Governor of
California, and the information, with a sample of the quicksilver
produced, by him transmitted to Mexico. That in May, 1846, Mr.
Larkin officially communicated the fact of the discovery and the
working of the mine, with an explanation of the mode of acquiring
title to it under Mexican laws, to our government.
That in June of the same year, he informed Mr. Judd of the
discovery of the mine in 1845, and the fact that it had
been
immediately denounced.
That in January, 1846, Col. Fremont visited the works, and
Page 67 U. S. 258
conversed with the
"owner;" that its reputed value was
then about $30,000.
That it had been worked from the November or December preceding
by a person employed by Castillero, and continued to be worked by
the same person, until August or September, 1846.
It has appeared to me incredible that Castillero, a Mexican,
acquainted with mining laws, should, on discovering so valuable a
mine, have omitted to denounce it. That he knew the necessity of
the proceeding, we learn from Fremont, as did also Larkin,
a
foreigner, as is shown by his dispatch.
To suppose that Castillero, with a knowledge of the great value
of the mine, of the necessity and efficacy of a denouncement,
neglected, notwithstanding his statements to the governor, to take
the simple proceedings he is alleged to have done, and that Larkin
was entirely mistaken as to the fact of his having done so, is to
suppose what I cannot but consider a moral impossibility.
I am aware that the fact that the mine was denounced by
Castillero, and claimed and worked by him as owner, does not
necessarily show that a juridical possession of it was given, or
that the record of that possession is genuine. It is shown,
however, by evidence in part introduced by the United States, that
the juridical possession, as alleged to have been given, was
recognized and alluded to in the correspondence of the parties, and
in official acts of alcaldes, before the date at which, on the
hypothesis of the United States, the forgery was committed.
So early as January 30, 1846, James Alexander Forbes, in a
letter to Eustace Barron, of Tepic, apprises the latter that
"D. Andres Castillero, a sort of commissioner from the Mexican
government, is now working a quicksilver mine near the Mission of
Santa Clara, which has yielded forty percent upon the assay of
mineral employed,"
and on the 5th of May, 1847, the same person, who had in the
interval been placed in charge of the mine, in a letter to
Alexander Forbes, who had become a part owner, urges him
"to obtain from the government of Mexico the unqualified
ratification of the
judicial possession which was
Page 67 U. S. 259
given of the mine by the local authority of this
jurisdiction, including, if possible, the three thousand varas of
land given in that possession as a gratification to the
discoverer."
The fraudulent nature of this suggestion is obvious, but it
nevertheless implies that a juridical possession and a
gratification of three thousand varas had already been given, a
ratification of which was thought necessary.
In the preceding March, the same person, together with
Castillero, Castro, Real, and the Robles, had been sued by the
owner of an adjoining rancho for working on it contrary to law. It
would seem from the imperfect record of that suit, produced from
the archives of the alcalde's office, that a survey of the mine was
ordered and the plaintiffs mulcted in costs; a result which could
hardly have occurred if the persons working the mine on the lands
of another had been destitute of record evidence of their rights.
The fact that a survey of the mine was ordered, would seem to be a
recognition of the mine owner's right to his mine, and that the
boundaries of his possession were capable of being ascertained.
On the 14th of August, 1847, allusion to this suit, and a still
more explicit reference to the juridical possession, is made in an
official letter of James Alexander Forbes, then H.B.M. Vice-Consul
for California, to John Burton, alcalde.
In this letter, Mr. Forbes informs the alcalde that
"two persons have commenced digging a pit, by the direction of
Mr. Cook (the plaintiff in the former suit), within the limits of
the juridical possession of the mine."
He adds,
"Permit me to
refer you to the documents which exist in your
office, upon which was founded your conviction of the justice
of your decision in March last in relation to the claim of Mr.
Cook, and to request that you will be pleased to adopt such
measures for the protection of the owners of the mine, and of those
who are legally interested in the same, as you may deem most
conducive to that end."
The genuineness of this letter is not disputed. It will be
observed that, though written in August, 1847, it refers the
alcalde to documents existing in his office upon which a decision
rendered in the March preceding was based.
Page 67 U. S. 260
On the 19th of January, 1848, Alexander Forbes, who had come to
California, made a petition to the alcalde, Weekes, to
"visit and inspect the mine, as required by the ordinances, and
to determine the direction and inclination of the vein, for the
purpose of reforming and correcting (since there is occasion for
it) the
boundaries of the former act of possession, and to
correct such other mistakes as may appear in it."
In conformity with this petition, the alcalde proceeded to
inspect the works; and having ascertained the true course of the
vein, and admitted the right of the owner to an improvement of
stakes (mejora de estacas), he established his boundaries,
assigning to him
four pertenencias, the location of which
he designates; but without prejudice to the right and title of the
mine (siendo constante el derecho y titulo de la mina) to the
gratification or gift (gracia) of land conceded in the original act
of possession.
Whether the four pertinencias which were thus designated were
all which, under the ordinances, a discoverer, though working in
company, was entitled to, we will hereafter consider. The only
purpose for which the proceeding is now referred to, is to show
that its date (January, 1848) and about the supposed time of the
alleged forgery, "an original act of possession," containing a
"gracia" of land of a much larger extent, is plainly alluded to as
existing; nor is the force of this fact weakened by the
circumstance that Weekes, the alcalde, may have been ignorant, and
willing to comply with all that Alexander Forbes required; for the
fact that the latter inserted such an allusion in the document he
may have caused Weekes to execute, is at least evidence that at
that early day he claimed that there was in existence an original
act of possession, including a
gracia of an extensive
tract. It will be observed that the petition of Alexander Forbes to
Weekes is dated January 19, 1848. Its object was to procure the
judicial ascertainment of the inclination and depth of the vein, to
correct the boundaries of the former act of possession, and to
decide upon an increase of pertenencias and the square
corresponding to them. But if, at that very time, Forbes had
already fabricated, or was about to fabricate, an act of
possession, which was to be antedated and placed in the
archives,
Page 67 U. S. 261
where no document of the kind had hitherto existed, the
application to Weekes, and the designation of pertenencias by him,
would be wholly superfluous, if not absurd, for in the forged paper
which was to serve as the original act of possession by the Mexican
authorities, the designation of pertenencias might have been
inserted and the boundaries established in any way the forger might
desire. All objections or doubts as to the authority of an American
alcalde to act under Mexican Mining Ordinances would thus have been
avoided; and the same alcalde who, according to the theory of the
United States, was induced to recognize and affirm the existence of
an act of possession, either not in his office or recently forged
and placed there, could, with equal facility, have been brought to
recognize an act of possession which should be free from the errors
and uncertainties which he was called on to correct, and which
should contain as many pertenencias as he was desired to
designate.
Similar allusions to the original registry and act of possession
are found in various judicial proceedings during the year 1849. On
the 18th October of that year, Robert Walkinshaw, between whom and
James Alexander Forbes a contest for the possession of the mine had
arisen, filed a complaint against the latter, averring himself to
be "the owner of one-eighth of the mine,
by title derived under
the original act of registry."
Previously to the filing of this complaint, Mr. Horace Hawes, a
lawyer of much acuteness, and very familiar with Mexican law, had
denounced the mine before the alcalde for abandonment. In this
denouncement he describes it "as known in
its original title of
registry as the Mine of Santa Clara."
In the proclamation issued thereupon, on the 23d October, 1849,
the alcalde describes the mine "as known and designated in its
original act of registry as that of Santa Clara, and now
known by the name of New Almaden." On the refusal of the alcalde to
take jurisdiction of the proceeding, Mr. Hawes files a protest,
dated 15th November, setting forth that,
"besides having failed to work the mine, the alleged owners had
never acquired any title thereto, by
reason of the insufficient
registry
Page 67 U. S. 262
thereof, which he stands ready to prove in court by
witnesses, records and documents,"
&c.
As Walkinshaw, though he had originally obtained possession of
the mine as the agent of Castillero and his assigns, was in these
proceedings endeavoring to acquire the mine for himself, and
cooperating with and assisted by his attorney, Mr. Hawes, these
references to the original act or title of registry conclusively
show that such a document was on all sides admitted to exist,
though Mr. Hawes maintained it to be
"insufficient;" nor
is it conceivable that when Hawes and Walkinshaw, by possessory
suits, by denouncement for abandonment, by purchasing the lands of
adjoining rancheros &c., were struggling with so great
pertinacity to obtain the mine for themselves, they should have
utterly failed to disclose the fact, of which Walkinshaw could not
have been ignorant, that no registry had ever been made, and that
the document purporting to be the act of possession was a recent
forgery, then lately interpolated among the archives.
In the correspondence between James Alexander Forbes and
Alexander Forbes, and the other owners of the mine, the necessity
of procuring fraudulent and antedated title papers from Mexico, is
repeated and urgently represented. But the fraud recommended is the
fabrication of an absolute grant of two sitios of land, and a
ratification of "the acts done by the alcalde in the possession
given by him of the quicksilver mine in his jurisdiction."
Such are the very terms of the memorandum of "documents to be
procured by Castillero," alleged by James Alexander Forbes to have
been left by him in Tepic, in May, 1849. And in October of the same
year, chagrined, it would seem, that his suggestions had not yet
been acted on, he complains that he is obliged to depend on
"the precarious and illegal possession of the mine granted by
the alcalde of this District to Castillero, who was in reality the
judge of the quantity of land given by the alcalde."
Whether the doubts here expressed as to the legality of the
possession be well or ill founded, it is clear that in this
most
Page 67 U. S. 263
confidential communication, where no motive existed for
suppressing or distorting the facts of the case, that possession is
treated as having actually been given, and the record of it as
actually existing and genuine, though the possession itself is
considered precarious and illegal.
Having thus reviewed the evidence which establishes the
genuineness of the act of possession by the testimony of the
witnesses to the document; of those who were present when the
possession was given, and who testify to the fact; by the
production of documents from the Archives of California, and the
correspondence, both private and official, of the United States
Consul at Monterey; by the testimony of unimpeached witnesses that
the mine was, early in 1846, claimed by and recognized as belonging
to Castillero, and worked by him as such; by the proofs afforded,
by a correspondent admitted to be genuine, that the act of
possession was treated and spoken of by the parties, when writing
in the most confidential manner, at a time when they could not have
been ignorant of the facts, as genuine, though perhaps invalid, and
was so recognized in various judicial proceedings by persons who
would certainly have discovered and denounced any forgery which
might have been committed, and finally, the intrinsic improbability
of the supposition that Castillero would have omitted to denounce a
mine, of the great value of which he was fully aware, and the means
of acquiring a title to which, under the Mining Ordinances, he was
well acquainted with, as was also Mr. Larkin, a resident foreigner.
I shall next consider more particularly the nature and contents of
the documents produced by the claimants, as well as the principal
objections to them urged by the counsel for the United States.
These documents are four in number. The first is the original
espediente, produced from the Archives of the City of San Jose, and
discovered by Capt. Halleck, in 1851, among the Archives of the old
alcalde's office, in the office of Belden, the mayor of San
Jose.
This document contains the two representations of
Castillero,
Page 67 U. S. 264
and the act of possession with the original signatures of
Castillero, the alcalde, and the assisting witnesses.
It also contains a petition of Jose Castro, dated June 27, 1846.
In this petition, Castro states that he represents the person and
rights of Capt. D. Andres Castillero, and other individuals
composing the company in the quicksilver mine which Senor
Castillero denounced on the 3d day of December, 1845, and of which
possession was given on the 30th of the same month and year. He
therefore claims that, in conformity with the Mining Laws, there be
given three pertenencias in continuation of the first; and that
this petition be attached to the espediente of denouncement, and
remain among the Archives. On the margin of this petition is an
order, signed "Pacheco," directing it to be archived as prayed
for.
If this document be genuine, it affords important evidence of
the date of the judicial possession.
The handwriting of the petition is sworn by Fernandez to be that
of Benito Diaz. The signature of Castro is proved by himself, and
he testifies that it was signed at its date, having been prepared
from a draft left with him by Castillero. He also states that the
handwriting of the marginal order is that of Salvio Pacheco, and
the signature that of Dolores Pacheco; and that after sending the
petition to the alcalde he left Santa Clara, but was informed, on
his return, by the alcalde, in presence of Manuel Castro and Juan
B. Alvarado, that this petition had been granted.
Salvio Pacheco is also produced, and testifies to his own
handwriting and the signature of his brother, the alcalde. He
swears that the order was written at its date. As this witness has
been produced by the United States to sustain the character of a
witness impeached by the claimants, it is presumed that his own
character is not liable to the imputations from which the United
States rely on him to shield another.
The only evidence tending to show that the petition was not
written at its date is that of Benito Diaz. He does not precisely
specify the time at which it was written; but it can be
gathered
Page 67 U. S. 265
from his testimony that it was at the end of 1847, or the
beginning of 1848.
But this witness is unfortunately too well known to the Court to
permit any reliance to be placed upon his unsupported declarations.
I have not been able exactly to understand on what theory this
petition is supposed to be forged.
If the act of possession be genuine, it is immaterial, so far as
the rights of the parties are concerned, whether the petition be
antedated or not; but it is not easy to imagine the motive of the
parties in fabricating a petition addressed to an alcalde who had
ceased to be in office, and whose antedated marginal order did not
even purport to convey any rights. Had the marginal order contained
a grant of an increased number of pertenencias, some motive for
fabricating it would have existed; but it merely directs the
petition to be archived; and the application for an increase of
pertenencias is in substance renewed in the petition of Alexander
Forbes to Weekes, made in 1848, at the very time when we are asked
to suppose this petition of Castro was fabricated. If the act of
possession be genuine, and the Castro petition be antedated, the
conduct of the parties seems to me inconsistent, absurd, and
inexplicable. But if the act of possession was itself fabricated in
1848, and did not exist at the date when the Castro petition was
fabricated, the acts of the parties are equally incomprehensible.
Of what use could it be to have a petition for an increase of
pertenencias included among archives which contained no registry or
denouncement, or grant of any pertenencias whatever? It may be said
that the fabrication of the act was then in contemplation; but if
so, why not make that document contain all that was desired as to
the number of pertenencias, designation of boundaries &c? Why
accumulate superfluous forgeries, involving the necessity of new
perjuries, and largely increasing the risks of detection, and why
resort to the proceedings had before Weekes for the ascertainment
of boundaries and an increase of pertenencias, when it was known
that the fundamental title to the mine had yet to be forged, and
might be framed in any way to suit the interests of the
parties?
Page 67 U. S. 266
The counsel for the United States has urged upon the court the
inconsistency between the petition of Castro for three additional
pertenencias and the supposition that a concession of three
thousand varas in all directions, amounting to nine hundred
pertenencias, had already been obtained. But this objection,
whatever be its force, seems to admit the genuineness of the Castro
petition, or it attributes to the fabricators the absurdity of
contriving at the same time two forged documents repugnant to each
other. That an act of possession, either genuine or forged, was in
existence when Castro's petition was drawn, is evident, for the
dates of the denouncement and of the judicial possession are given.
To what end then, file a petition which could have no other purpose
than to furnish a plausible argument against the genuineness of the
previous concession of three thousand varas?
From all the evidence, and on consideration of all the
circumstances connected with this petition, I confess myself unable
to discover any sufficient reasons for considering it forged.
The claimants have also produced a document alleged by them to
have been delivered to Castillero shortly after the date of the
judicial possession.
It contains certified copies of the two representations of
Castillero, purporting to have been made on the 13th January, 1846,
and a duplicate original of the act of possession signed by Antonio
Maria Pico. Appended to these is a receipt by Pico for twenty-five
dollars, dated December 30, 1846.
This document was recently found among the papers of Robert
Walkinshaw, deceased. It is shown in the deposition of Hall
McAllister, Esq., who was counsel for Walkinshaw in a suit
respecting a share of the mine, that the document was placed in his
possession by Mr. Walkinshaw early in the year 1853, and that it
remained in his office until May, 1858, when he delivered it to
Walkinshaw.
The genuineness of the signatures is testified to by all the
assisting and subscribing witnesses, except Jose Sunol, who is
dead.
This espediente does not contain the petition of Castro, for
Page 67 U. S. 267
the certified copies appear to have been made on the 13th
January, while the Castro petition was not filed until the June
following. There is one circumstance, however, which, though
entirely accidental, affords important proof of its genuineness. In
copying the first representation of Castillero, it appears that a
line was omitted. This has been supplied by another hand, and the
handwriting is that of Castillero. As Castillero left California
early in 1846, and has never returned, we must suppose that this
interlineation was made before he left, or else that the document
was fabricated here at a later period, sent on to Castillero in
Mexico, interlined by him, and returned to Walkinshaw's possession
before January, 1853, when he delivered it amongst other papers to
Mr. McAllister. But that he was in possession of "some important
papers of the original registry of the mine," in 1849, appears from
James Alexander Forbes' letter of October 28, of that year; and it
also appears from the certified copy made out by Weekes on the 20th
January, 1848, that the espediente we are now considering must have
been the document which James Alexander Forbes copied, and which
Weekes erroneously certified to be a literal copy of the original
in his office. The year in which it is supposed by the government
that these titles were fabricated, in 1848. How, then, could this
espedient have been made, certified to by the subscribing
witnesses, sent to Castillero, interlined by him, and returned to
California in time to be copied by Forbes, and certified to by
Weekes, on the 20th January, 1848? And why, if the Castro petition
had then recently been written by Benito Diaz, and antedated, was
it not included in this espedient, concerning which so much pains
were taken?
The omission of the Castro petition in this espediente seems to
me, I confess, an important corroboration of the statements of the
witnesses who prove the genuineness of the signatures.
There is also produced the copy of this espediente, by Weekes,
already alluded to. Weekes himself swears that he made it, and he
is corroborated by James Alexander Forbes. I do not understated
this fact to be disputed.
The claimants have also produced a copy of the original
espediente,
Page 67 U. S. 268
certified by Pedro Chabolla, on the 13th August, 1846, to be a
literal copy of the original acts (autos) in the archives of his
office.
The whole of this copy is proved by Salvio Pacheco, to be in his
own handwriting, and to have been made at its date. It contains the
Castro petition, which had been made in the preceding June, and
attached to the original on file, and it even omits, like the
original, the date of the act of possession -- that date being on
both papers December -- 1845, and not December 30, as in the
testimonio or duplicate original given to Castillero. That the
document was scrupulously compared it further evident from the fact
that in the copy of the date of Castillero's first representation
is the Mission de Santa Clara, November 22, de 845, instead of 1845
-- and on turning to the original, we find in the printed copy that
the first figure of the date is separated by a comma from the three
other figures. I have not had an opportunity to examine the
original, which remains at San Jose; but it would seem from the
printed transcript that the date is written in an unusual manner,
which has been either exactly reproduced or has led to the omission
of the first figure in the copy.
It has been earnestly contended by the counsel for the United
States, that the nonexistence of the original espediente in the
archives of San Jose, even so late as December 23, 1850, is proved
by the affidavit of Mr. Halleck, at that time, and since,
Superintendent of the Mine, and counsel for James Alexander Forbes
in a suit brought against him and Walkinshaw by the Berreyesa. In
this affidavit, which was made in answer to an order obtained by
the plaintiffs, in the suit upon the defendants, requiring them to
produce the papers on which they intended to rely as a defense, or
copies thereof, Mr. Halleck swears:
"That the defendants have exercised all due diligence to procure
and produce said papers in court, by writing immediately on the
receipt of the above-mentioned order to the
parties in Mexico
who hold them. But to this date the defendants have not
received them. . . . And the defendants specify among others the
following papers and documents as absolutely necessary
Page 67 U. S. 269
to them before they can proceed with the trial of this cause,
viz.:"
"1st.
The original denouncement of the mine of New Almaden,
and the juridical possession given of the same year 1845."
"2d. The confirmation of said denouncement and possession by the
supreme government in 1846, and prior to the late declaration of
war by the United States against Mexico."
"3. The original grant of land, including said mining
possession, made by the supreme government of Mexico, prior to the
declaration of war as aforesaid, to the owners of said mine."
It is obvious that this affidavit states that the original
denouncement and judicial possession of the mine was then in
Mexico, and not in the alcalde's office. That Mr. Halleck, then
lately appointed superintendent of the mine, might have been
ignorant of the fact that those papers were among the archives of
the alcalde's office, is conceivable, and he may also have accepted
the assurances of his client, James Alexander Forbes, that he had
exercised all due diligence to procure them, as sufficient to
authorize his affidavit of that fact, but it cannot be supposed
that James Alexander Forbes could have labored under a similar
misapprehension. We have already seen that in August, 1847, he had,
in an official letter to alcalde Burton, referred him to the
documents existing in his office, upon which was founded his
conviction of the justice of his decision in relation to the claim
of Mr. Cook, in the preceding March.
In January, 1848, he had himself copied and procured Weekes to
certify to the espediente containing certified copies of
Castillero's representations and a duplicate original of the act of
possession. This espediente has since been produced from among
Walkinshaw's papers, and its possession by him, or his counsel, is
traced back as far as 1853. The circumstance that it is interlined
in the handwriting of Castillero, proves it to have been at some
time in his possession. As Castillero left California early in
1846, it is in a high degree improbable that the document could
have been fabricated here, sent on to him in Mexico, and returned
before January, 1848, when it was copied by Forbes and certified;
nor does such a hypothesis comport with the
Page 67 U. S. 270
theory of the United States, which supposes the forgeries to
have been committed about the time of the Weekes certificates. It
is almost equally improbable that this document, after being copied
by Weekes, should have been again sent to Mexico, and returned to
Walkinshaw in time to be found among his papers in 1853.
There is no reason to presume that the Weekes copy ever left
this state. It was produced by the claimants when proceedings were
first instituted before the Board of commissioners, in 1852. It is
clear, therefore, that as the order of the court called for the
documents on which the defendants relied, or copies thereof, it was
easy for Mr. Forbes to have satisfied the order by furnishing the
copy required.
It also appears from his own letters that he had already
received a notarial copy of the Lanzas dispatch on which they rely.
A copy of this could also have been furnished. We are thus
compelled to seek for some other motive for withholding those
copies which the order required, and which, on any theory of the
case, he could readily have furnished. That motive seems to me
apparent. From the 5th of May, 1847, up to the 26th of February,
1850, James Alexander Forbes had not ceased to urge upon his
associates the necessity of obtaining fabricated documents of
title. In his letter of February 26, 1850, he again dwells upon the
necessity of carrying his suggestions into effect, and specifies
the required documents as follows:
"1. A full and complete ratification of all the acts of the
alcalde of this jurisdiction, in the possession of the mine."
"2. A full and unconditional grant to Castillero of two sitios
of land, covering that mining possession, expressing the boundaries
stated by me in the memorandum I left with you at Tepic. Both of
these documents to be of the proper date and
placed in the
proper governmental custody in Mexico."
On the 7th of April, 1850, Alexander Forbes, of Tepic, writes to
James Alexander Forbes:
"Mr. Barron and Castillero have arrived in Mexico, and have
every prospect of finding the document you are aware of, and which
will, of course, be forwarded as soon as possible. "
Page 67 U. S. 271
When, therefore, in December, 1850, James Alexander Forbes
represented to Mr. Halleck that papers had been sent for, and were
daily expected from Mexico, it cannot be doubted that he referred
to the documents, the fabrication of which he had so urgently
recommended. The description of the expected documents in the
affidavit, in no respect applies to the Lanzas dispatch; for the
ratification, and the grant of two
sitios, are evidently
described as two separate instruments, and they are spoken of as
"of the proper date," viz.: "prior to the late declaration
of war by the United States against Mexico;" that is, prior to the
13th of May, 1846; whereas the Lanzas dispatch is dated on the 23d
of May.
We have already shown that James Alexander Forbes could readily
have complied with the order of the court by furnishing
"copies" of the denouncement and registry, and of the
Lanzas dispatch, both of which he must have then had in his
possession. The statements, therefore, which he made to his
counsel, and on which the affidavit was founded, were evidently
made for delay, and to enable him to receive the more full and
explicit documents he so much desired. Such being the motive and
intent of Mr. Forbes, the allegation that "the original
denouncement of the mine was in Mexico," may well be taken as made
in furtherance of the same object, and to give increased force to
his showing, for the postponement which he was so anxious to
obtain.
That Mr. Halleck should have embodied in an affidavit these
representations of Forbes will perhaps not be surprising to anyone
acquainted with the facility, often too great, with which counsel
receive and adopt in affidavits statements made by their clients in
the progress of a cause. Such has seemed to me the more probable
explanation of this affidavit. For whatever may have been therein
sworn to, I can see no reason for concluding, on the strength of
that affidavit alone, and in the face of the mass of testimony
which had been adduced to the contrary, that the espediente of the
mining possession was not then in the alcalde's office.
It was also strongly urged by the counsel of the United
Page 67 U. S. 272
states, on the hearing, that the nonexistence of the alleged act
of possession and concession of three thousand varas was proved by
the acts of the parties themselves and their dealings with each
other.
The circumstances chiefly relied on were:
1. The fact that in the Castro petition, drafted by Castillero,
three pertenencias are asked for, in continuation of the one
already obtained.
2. That in the power of attorney executed by Castro, on the 12th
June, 1846, to McNamara; in the contract by McNamara, under the
power of attorney, executed in Tepic on the 28th November, 1846;
and in the ratification of that instrument by Castillero in Mexico,
on the 17th December, 1846, the mine is spoken of as consisting of
only three pertenencias, while the grant of three thousand varas is
not mentioned.
3. That in the numerous deeds and acts of sale by which barras
or shares in the mine were transferred, the writing of partnership
executed by the original owners of the mine is the only document
referred to, no allusion is made to the possession of three
thousand varas, or to any tract of land whatsoever; and the
Espediente of Registration is, for the first time, mentioned in the
deed from Padre Real to Walkinshaw, dated August 9, 1849.
These objections, so far as they relate to the mention of the
pertenencias, will more conveniently be considered in treating of
the legal effect of the judicial possession; but in respect to
omission of all allusion in the deeds, either to the registration
or to "lands," it is to be observed that to many of these deeds,
James Alexander Forbes was a party. We find by his letter of May 5,
1847, that at that date the "ratification" of three thousand varas
of land given by the alcalde, and the concession of two sitios of
land to Castillero, were known to and spoken of by him as having
actually been made, the object of that letter being to urge the
necessity of obtaining an unqualified ratification of the mining
possession, and a positive, formal and unconditional grant of the
two sitios. Similar references to the act of possession, and the
order of Castillo Lanzas, occur throughout
Page 67 U. S. 273
his correspondence. And as we have already seen, the former
document and the fact of registration is referred to in various
legal proceedings by Forbes and Walkinshaw in the years 1847-1848,
as also in Alexander Forbes' petition to Weekes in January,
1848.
The inferences, therefore, which might otherwise be drawn from
the silence of the deeds on this point, seem to be repelled by the
fact that, in letters and various judicial proceedings, the
registration, the grant of three thousand varas, and the concession
of two leagues, are frequently spoken of and claimed to have been
made.
It will be noticed that in the first representation of
Castillero, dated November 22, 1845, the mine is described as a
vein of silver with a
ley of gold; and, by his second
representation, it appears that he subsequently, and at some time
previous to December 3, discovered it to contain quicksilver. The
writing of partnership, however, dated November 2, describes a
silver mine with a
ley of
gold and quicksilver,
showing that twenty days previous to his first denouncement he must
have been aware of the existence of quicksilver in the vein. This
discrepancy is forcibly urged by the counsel of the United States,
as affording conclusive proof that the alleged denouncements are
forgeries.
It seems, from the evidence produced by the claimants, that in
the month of October, 1845, Castillero and Castro set out from
Monterey, to visit General Vallejo at Sonoma and General Sutter at
Sutter's Fort. On their way, Castillero, at the suggestion of
Castro, examined the spot which, as the latter told him, had for a
long period been reported to be a mine, but of what kind was
unknown. He assayed the ore, and found a little gold and silver,
and a small quantity of quicksilver. The latter he considered of no
importance.
The party proceeded to Sonoma, and thence to Sutter's Fort, and
set out on their return on the 12th November. On reaching Santa
Clara, Castillero made further assays of the mineral. "He then
discovered," says Castro, "abundance of quicksilver, denounced the
mine as a quicksilver mine, and formed a company
Page 67 U. S. 274
to work it." But this statement is evidently erroneous, for the
writing of partnership is dated November 2, and, if executed at its
date, must have been made when the parties were on their way to
Sonoma and Sutter's Fort, and not on their return from the latter.
But if Castillero, at the latter date, had discovered quicksilver
in large quantities, how can we account for his first
representation, which omits all mention of that metal, nor for his
second representation which announces the discovery of it, as
having been made after the date of his first representation,
i.e. after November 22.
It is quite probable, however, that Castro may be in error, if
he means to state that Castillero discovered the abundance of
quicksilver and denounced the mine as a quicksilver mine
immediately on his return to Santa Clara, Castro himself went on,
as he states, to Monterey. The party, having left Sutter's Fort on
the 12th November, must have reached Santa Clara between the 16th
and 20th. It may well be said, therefore, that Castillero made his
first representation immediately on his arrival, and subsequently
made the further assays spoken of by Castro, in consequence of
which he prepared his second or amended denouncement. On this
hypothesis we can account for his omission to mention the existence
of quicksilver in his first denouncement, as he did not then know
that it existed in sufficient quantities to deserve attention. But
whatever explanation of this discrepancy be offered or conjectured,
I have been unable to perceive how it furnishes the conclusive
evidence of the fraudulent character of the denouncement, which the
counsel for the United States supposes it to afford.
If these papers were forged about the year 1848, they must have
been forged at a time when the character and great value of the
mine were well understood. What motive, then, can be suggested for
fabricating two representations, in one of which the existence of
quicksilver in the vein was entirely ignored?
Impressed, as the parties must then have been, with the great
value of the mine, as a mine of quicksilver, can it be supposed
that, merely to give the appearance of truth to the documents
Page 67 U. S. 275
they were fabricating, they caused them to express a pretended
ignorance of the nature of the vein?
Even if so refined and subtle a cunning could be attributed to
them, the same cunning would not have suffered them to overlook the
fact that the writing of partnership existed, which fixed upon them
the knowledge of the existence of quicksilver in the vein twenty
days before the date of the first denouncement.
I confess that, though unable to demonstrate how his discrepancy
has occurred, I perceive in it rather what the ingenious counsel
for the United States has on another occasion characterized as the
"deshabille of truth," than that meretricious ostentation of
consistency, which falsehood would not have neglected to
display.
But the circumstance that I have found most difficult to account
for, and which most strongly suggests suspicions as to the
genuineness of the act of possession, is the failure of Castillero
to exhibit, or even mention, it during his protracted negotiation
with M. Negrete. The correspondence of the latter with his
principal, Alexander Forbes, shows that Castillero was called on to
exhibit his title papers. He responded by producing the writing of
partnership and, after a little delay, the Lanzas dispatch. He not
only does not exhibit the "copia autorizada," which, if genuine, he
must have received before his departure from California, but he
does not even mention that he has been put in possession and
received a concession from the alcalde of a tract of three thousand
varas in extent, nor that any such possession had been ratified by
the supreme government. So far as appears from the instrument
executed at that time, and the testimony of Mr. Negrete, the
writing of partnership was the only document of title to the mine
relied on, and an interest in the two leagues grant during the term
of the lease is added as a kind of voluntary cession to the
Aviadores. In all the deeds which passed between the parties for
several years, no allusion whatsoever to the act of possession
occurs, but the writing of partnership and a mine of three
pertenencias are alone spoken of.
That the parties were ignorant of the precise number of
pertenencias allowed by the law is not improbable, and that
they
Page 67 U. S. 276
should have treated the mine as consisting of the number of
pertenencias assignable to a discoverer, can be reconciled with the
facts as they are claimed to have existed. But the omission of
Castillero to exhibit the act of possession, which constituted his
only title paper for the mine, and the only evidence of his
denouncement and registry, and which alone showed that the persons,
or any of them mentioned in the writing of partnership, had any
rights whatever in the subject matter of their contract, is a
circumstance which I have found it impossible to account for.
Even on the hypothesis that he had neglected to bring with him,
through accident or otherwise, a copy of the act of possession, it
would still seem almost inevitable that he should have given to Mr.
Negrete some information of the existence of such a paper, and at
least mentioned the alcalde's concession of three thousand varas.
No explanation of this circumstance is offered by the claimants. I
have been much impressed with its significance. It might well seem
to justify the inference, not that the mine was not discovered and
worked as alleged, or that it was not in some manner denounced, or
that the alcalde did not give a possession, as sworn to by the
witnesses -- for of these facts, there can, I think, be no doubt --
but that the record of the act of possession has been since
fabricated and antedated.
But when we consider the vast number of perjuries and
complicated forgeries which such a supposition involves, and the
grave and almost insuperable objections which present themselves to
any theory of forgery, no matter what date be assigned for its
commission, and especially if we accept the date fixed by the
counsel for the United States (
viz., subsequent to
February 2, 1848) it seems impossible, under the proofs, to adopt
the hypothesis of the United States.
Our daily experience apprises us that events are constantly
occurring which would,
a priori, be pronounced in the
highest degree improbable. That which is true does not always
present the appearance of truth, and it is not usually safe to
discredit positive testimony to a fact on an estimate of what would
be likely to have happened.
Page 67 U. S. 277
But in this case, if, reasoning on the extreme improbability
that Castillero would have failed to produce to Mr. Negrete the act
of possession, if it existed, we adopt the conclusion that it did
not then exist, we encounter improbabilities greater than those we
are seeking to avoid.
For admitting, as we must admit, that he discovered the mine;
that its great value, estimated by Col. Fremont at $30,000, was
known to him; that he denounced it in some form, as is stated by
Mr. Larkin to Mr. Judd, and to his own government by himself, and
by Castro to the Governor of California, as was notorious
throughout the country -- it is, as before observed, almost
incredible that he should not have made the denouncement in
writing, and substantially as is now claimed. If the papers were
fabricated after February, 1848, how can we account for the copy
certified to by Weekes in January of that year, and which must then
have contained the interlineation in Castillero's handwriting, who
was absent in Mexico?
How can we account for the useless forgery of the Castro
petition, which the counsel for the United States allege to have
been made by Diaz in 1847, and which speaks of the denouncement and
act of possession, which had not yet been fabricated? Why, if the
parties were then preparing their spurious documents, did they, at
the same time, ask for additional pertenencias, when the documents
they were forging could be made to express all that they
desired?
How shall we explain the absence, throughout James Alexander
Forbes' voluminous correspondence, of any reproach, or even regret,
that the forgery had been so clumsily effected as to leave the act
of possession "precarious and illegal;" how account for the
allusions to the documents of registry in judicial proceedings,
official letters of Forbes to the alcalde, and the entire absence
of any accusation or hint of forgery, when Walkinshaw, who must
have been in the secret, was struggling so fiercely with Forbes for
the acquisition of the mine?
These, and many other considerations which might be offered, are
sufficient, without now alluding to the large number of witnesses
who swear to the genuineness of the documents, to apprise
Page 67 U. S. 278
us that the theory of forgery is beset with greater difficulties
than the supposition that Castillero, for some unexplained reason,
omitted to produce or allude to the act of possession, which,
nevertheless, existed.
Assuming, then, the genuineness of the act of possession, I
proceed to inquire what this document and the proofs show to have
actually been done -- and what was its legal effect.
In the first place, it appears that the written statement
required by Art. 4, tit. VI., of the Ordinances, to be made by the
discoverer, was in fact presented by Castillero. The vein was
described as situated on the lands of Berreyesa, and the discoverer
declared that he wished to work it in company. The names of his
partners were not stated as enjoined by the ordinances.
It does not appear that the corresponding entry, in a book kept
by the alcalde, was made, nor was the "statement returned to the
discoverer for his" due security.
Whether notices were affixed, as required by the ordinances, is
perhaps not clearly established, although some witnesses testify to
the fact.
It further appears, that within the ninety days limited by law a
pit had been dug, the mine opened and working commenced, and that
at the expiration of thirty-eight days from the date of the
denouncement, judicial possession of the mine was given.
It is not pretended that any number of pertenencias were
measured to Castillero when possession was given, nor that he was
called to fix stakes in his boundaries, as directed by the
ordinance.
It has already been shown that, by the spirit and terms of the
ordinances, discovery was recognized as the true foundation of
title to a mine. That the registration was but a formal
announcement of the fact of discovery, and only required, in the
language of Gamboa, three things to be manifested -- "the person,
the place, and the ore." That upon this declaration, the law itself
annexed the title, and the mine was said not to be granted, but to
be adjudicated, by the judicial tribunal which had jurisdiction in
such matters. That from the moment of denouncement
Page 67 U. S. 279
the discoverer had the legal right to commence working his mine,
and was required within ninety days to dig a pit of certain
dimensions under penalty of forfeiture of his right, but that as
soon as this was done he was entitled to receive judicial
possession of his mine; and this, notwithstanding that the period
allowed for others to show a better right, had not elapsed.
It was also shown that under the old ordinances no measurement
of pertenencias was required to be made when possession was given;
though this was required by the Ordinances of 1783, the penalty of
forfeiture was not by those ordinances annexed to the omission to
do so, though such a provision had been recommended by Gamboa. It
was also shown that the requirement of the ordinances with regard
to noting the contents of a statement in a book &c., was
directory to the alcalde, and that his neglect of duty in that
respect ought not to impair the vested right of the discoverer any
more than the omission to record a colonization grant should effect
the title of a
bona fide grantee of land. The duty of
recording registries in a book to be kept for the purpose was also
imposed by ordinances prior to the time of Gamboa; but that author,
though he strongly urges its policy and convenience, nowhere
intimates that a failure by the mining tribunals to comply with
this requirement of the law affected the title of the mine owner --
whose rights were evidenced by the copy of the "diligencias" or
proceedings which was delivered to him -- which corresponded to the
"attested copy of the proceedings" which, by the Ordinances of
1783, was required "to be delivered to the party as his
corresponding title."
If these views be correct, it follows that all the provisions of
the ordinances indispensably necessary to vest the title in the
discoverer of a mine have in this instance been followed. And
Castillero, by his denouncement, the digging of a pit within ninety
days, and the judicial possession given, acquired by law a right to
him mine, with a number of pertenencias allowed to a discoverer
working in company.
But it appears from the loose and informal document executed by
the alcalde that in addition to the juridical possession
Page 67 U. S. 280
which he was empowered to give, that officer "concluded to grant
to Castillero three thousand varas in all directions, subject to
that which the General Mining Ordinance indicates."
It will be observed, that the alcalde does not here pretend to
adjudicate the mine to the discoverer, nor to put him in possession
of any designated number of pertenencias, but to grant him a large
tract of land about his mine. It is unnecessary to say that such a
concession, even of public land by an alcalde was wholly void, and
as against either the sovereign or a private owner, conveyed no
rights whatever.
It is insisted by the counsel of the United States, that this
distinction between the possession of the mine and the
gracia, or gift, of three thousand varas, is due entirely
to the ingenuity of counsel for claimants, and is not found in the
words or sense of the instrument.
We have already seen that the same distinction is clearly taken
in James Alexander Forbes' letter of May 5, 1847. We will hereafter
see that it is alluded to in Castillero's communication to the
junta, in which he states "that he has taken possession not only of
said mine, but also of an extent of three thousand varas in all
directions from that point."
The distinction is not, therefore, a recent suggestion of
ingenious counsel.
That it is very clearly expressed in the very inartificial
document called the act of possession, is not pretended.
Taken literally, that document merely states that
"I, the alcalde, have resolved to act, by virtue of my office,
in order to give juridical possession of a mine known by the name
of Santa Clara, and (after sundry recitals) have concluded to grant
him three thousand varas in all directions, subject to what the
Mining Ordinance indicates."
Nor is it pretended that any possession of the mine as
distinguished from the three thousand varas, was given. That the
alcalde, the assisting witnesses and others, went to the mine for
the purpose of giving a possession of some kind, is clear; but he
made no measurements, and fixed no stakes. He probably told
Castillero that he gave him possession of the mine
Page 67 U. S. 281
and added that he might take three thousand varas in every
direction around it.
The explanations of this act given by Pico himself, are confused
and contradictory.
In his first deposition, taken on behalf of the claimants, Pico
says:
"Castillero told me he required three thousand varas in all
directions, and I told him to take them. He told me he had that
right by reason of his being the first discoverer of the metal.
According to what Castillero told me, I believed that I, as
alcalde, had authority to do that, there being no other
Juez de
Letras. He was a man learned in all those subjects."
He adds:
"I do not know whether it [the land of which he gave possession]
was round or square, because I made the division in different
directions, as I proposed to Castillero; that is to say, that he
should take it where it was vacant, or in the mountains, because
the rancheros would not have mountains -- they wanted plains
only."
In a subsequent deposition, taken some three years afterwards --
viz., in 1860 -- Pico admits that he had stated in a
deposition taken in another case, that he pointed out the
boundaries which Castillero was to take, but gave him no fixed
possession; that there was a question between Castillero and
Berreyesa -- Berreyesa would not consent that possession should be
given to Castillero unless he would admit that he (Barreyesa)
should have an interest in the mine. In consequence of this, I did
not give any fixed possession of the land.
In a subsequent part of the deposition of 1860 (Ans. 17), Pico
says:
"I intended to grant only what was intended by the ordinance
around the mine, and the rest to be taken on public land. . . . I
never intended to grant another man's land."
(Ans. 16.) When reminded by the counsel for the United States
that the mine was at some distance from the nearest body of public
land, recognized as such at that time by himself, and asked how he
could have granted three thousand varas, to be measured in all
directions from the mouth of the mine; if he intended only to grant
public land, the witness replies:
"It was because Berreyesa agreed with Castillero at the time,
and told me I might
Page 67 U. S. 282
grant the land, provided I did not include the land needed for
cultivation, and therefore I made the grant."
And in Answer 24, he admits that three thousand varas in all
directions would include part of Berreyesa's land as well as public
land.
Amidst these confused and contradictory statements it is, I
think, not difficult to perceive what was really done, or attempted
to be done, by the alcalde. He was aware, and so informed
Berreyesa, as he states, that
"the ordinances authorized a certain quantity of land around the
mine to be granted, whether on public or private land -- that is
that to the discoverer and to the one working in company, a certain
number of pertenencias were to be assigned. How many neither he nor
probably Castillero knew. But in addition to these pertenencias,
which determined the extent of the mine, he also undertook to grant
a tract of three thousand varas to be taken on public, or on
Berreyesa's land, if the latter consented. The transaction with
regard to this grant seems to justify the observation of James
Alexander Forbes, in his letter of October 30, 1849, that the
possession of the mine granted by the alcalde to Castillero 'was
precarious and illegal; the latter being in reality the judge of
the quantity of land given by the alcalde.'"
The concession of the three thousand varas is by its terms
provisional, for it is declared to be "subject to what the General
Mining Ordinance indicates;" nor does it purport to be a concession
of the tract described, as of so many pertenencias of the mine, but
rather a grant of land as a gracia or gift.
The difference is important, for in the one case Castillero (if
the grant were valid) would, under the Mexican laws, have been the
owner, not only of the large tract conceded to him, but of all the
mines which might be discovered within it; in the other, he would
merely have owned the mineral veins within the pertenencias allowed
by law, while all others within the three thousand vara tract would
have remained liable to denouncement by anyone who might discover
and be ready to work them.
Castillero himself seems to have understood that he was entitled
to four pertenencias, for in the petition of Castro, which was
drafted by himself, there is asked "three pertenencias in
continuation
Page 67 U. S. 283
of the first." It is not, however, very clear that three
additional pertenencias are here asked for, or perhaps Castro may
have misunderstood Castillero's instructions, for it appears that
in his ratification of McNamara's contract, made at Mexico,
December 17, 1846, Castillero describes the mine as of three
pertenencias only. That such was understood to be the dimensions of
the mine by all parties in 1846 and 1847 appears not only from
their acts of sale, but from the testimony of James Alexander
Forbes.
This witness states that
"in 1846 he received from Padre Real possession of the mine, the
hacienda, about a mile distant from it, the mining utensils, and
some ores. No definite extent of land was specified. It was
understood that the mine contained three pertenencias at that time,
but the hacienda was not understood to be within the three
pertenencias."
The possession transferred by him to Walkinshaw in 1847, and
again on his return from Tepic received back from Walkinshaw, is
stated to have been like the original possession received from
Padre Real. It comprised the hacienda and the mine, but no definite
tract of land.
In a subsequent part of his examination, he says:
"There was only one act of possession which I understood to have
been given. This embraced three pertenencias, so far as regarded
the mine. Three pertenencias, and also lands about the hacienda, I
understood to have been given to Castillero in 1845."
"These lands were understood to be of the extent of three
thousand varas,' he adds; and in the deed received by him from the
Robles, and which conveys 'all their rights and shares in each one
of the
three pertenencias of the mine,' their interest in
the lands and hacienda passed; for, 'by Mexican custom, a sale of
barras in a mine includes an interest in the hacienda."
In the possession obtained by Alexander Forbes from Weekes,
alcalde, in January, 1848, four pertenencias seem to have been
considered the number to which the parties were entitled, and a
tract two hundred varas long and eight hundred wide, comprising
exactly four pertenencias, is designated by the alcalde.
It is, I think, apparent, that from 1846 down to a late
period
Page 67 U. S. 284
the parties interested considered themselves the owners of a
mine, with the number of pertenencias allowed by law -- whether
three or four, they seem to have been uncertain -- and that this
ownership, acquired by registration and denouncement, carried with
it the ownership of the hacienda or reducing establishment. But
they seem to have attached, so far as we can discover from their
acts of sale, proceedings at law &c., little importance to the
rights in the large tract six thousand varas square, which the
alcalde assumed to grant them partly on public and partly on
private land. On no other hypothesis can we account for the
omission to mention the word "lands" in any of their conveyances
during so long a period.
No inference of fraud can, however, be justly drawn from this
circumstance, for the same omission is observable in deeds and
proceedings
after the date of the supposed forgery as
before it.
But whatever may have been the notions of the parties as to
their rights, it is, I think, plain that the possession given to
Castillero should legally be treated as having included two
entirely distinct objects: one, the mine properly so called,
comprising the pit or "pozo de posecion," with the limited number
of pertenencias allowed by the ordinances, and the other, a tract
of land six thousand varas square, which the alcalde assumed to
grant, but of which no
"fixed possession was given."
This distinction between the judicial possession of the mine,
which the tribunal having jurisdiction of mining matters had a
right to give, and a grant of more than a square league of land,
partly on private and partly on public, is not only admitted but
insisted on by the counsel for the claimant. Its importance will
appear hereafter when we come to consider the alleged
"ratification" of the mining possession by the supreme
government.
By Art. 14, tit. VI., of the Ordinances of 1783, it is provided,
that
"Any one may discover and denounce a vein or mine, not only in
common land, but also in the private lands of any individual;
provided he pays for the land of which he occupies the surface, and
the damage which immediately ensues therefrom, according to the
valuation of experts appointed by both parties, and a third in case
of disagreement. The same being understood
Page 67 U. S. 285
with respect to him who denounces a place (sitio) or waters for
establishing works, and working the machines necessary for the
reduction of ores, which are called haciendas, provided they do not
include more land, nor use more water than may be necessary."
It is not pretended that in this case any denouncement of a
sitio or of waters for a hacienda, was made. Had such been the
case, and the title to a hacienda duly acquired by the mine owners,
it may well be that, as affirmed by Mr. Forbes, a sale of a barra,
or share, in the mine would have conveyed, by Mexican usages, a
corresponding interest in the hacienda. But the parties appear to
have selected and taken possession of this hacienda, relying on the
grant of six thousand varas square, made by the alcalde, or on some
arrangement made with Berreyesa, the reputed owner of the land.
Antonio Maria Pico, in his last deposition, seems to desire it
to be understood that Berreyesa gave an oral assent to the grant,
provided it did not include the level land; and in a previous
deposition before the land commissioners, the same witness
testified that a written contract was entered into between
Berreyesa and the owners of the mine, by which the former was to
have a share in the mine, and was to be paid for the wood and
limestone used in the establishment. After the possession was
given, Berreyesa demanded a compliance with the contract, and wrote
to Padre Real to that effect. It does not appear that any
arrangement was entered into with him. He was soon after killed by
the Americans, and the hacienda and tract of three thousand varas
in every direction has remained in the possession of the New
Almaden Company to this day.
I am unable to perceive how, under these circumstances, and in
the absence of any denouncement of the sitio used for a hacienda,
Castillero can be deemed to have acquired, by the attempted
concession of the alcalde, any title whatever to lands beyond the
limits of the pertenencias which the law allowed.
With respect to these, the Ordinance does not expressly declare
whether the denouncer of a vein or mine on private land is required
to pay for the land of which he occupies the surface as
Page 67 U. S. 286
a condition precedent to the vesting of his title. It would seem
that he is not.
The denouncement or formal declaration of discovery is evidently
the first step to be taken; the pit is then to be dug and the
discoverer is, by the terms of Art. iv., to be put at once into
possession. No provision is here made for a suspension of
proceedings until the land can be valued and paid for, nor until
the expiration of ninety days can the denouncee be sure that
someone having a better right will not present himself; as the
private land owner is only to be paid for the surface land which is
occupied, and the ensuing damage, it would seem impossible to
ascertain what amount of surface land is to be occupied until the
number of pertenencias is fixed and their boundaries marked out,
which can only be done when judicial possession is given.
The ordinance seems to contemplate a claim or proceeding
instituted by the land owner; for it provides that the land shall
be appraised by experts appointed by both parties. If, therefore,
the payment for the land, and satisfaction for damages, are
conditions precedent to the vesting of any title to the mine, the
land owner might, by refusing to appoint an expert, indefinitely
postpone its acquisition -- thus defeating the policy of the Mining
Laws, as well as the right of the discoverer, which those laws so
fully recognized, and so amply protected. For it is not to be
forgotten, that under the Spanish as well as all other Mining
Ordinances, the discoverer was considered the true owner and
creator of the wealth he had discovered, and that the grantee of
the superficies had merely the right to an indemnity for actual
damage done by the occupation of a small portion of the surface.
But to hold, under the circumstances of this case, that no title
vested by denouncement and discovery, because the claim of
Berreyesa was not first satisfied, would be peculiarly
inequitable.
The mine, it is true, was generally understood to be on his
land, and denounced as such. But no judicial measurement of his
land had been made, nor were his boundaries established. It is to
this day unsettled, whether in fact the mine is within the
boundaries of Berreyesa, or those of his neighbor, Justo
Larios,
Page 67 U. S. 287
or without both, on public land. Had Berreyesa been paid, as
required by the ordinances, it may yet prove that the payment was
unnecessary, because the mine was on public land, or to the wrong
person, because it is on the land of Justo Larios. Where land was
gratuitously distributed in tracts from one to eleven square
leagues in extent, the indemnity which experts would have awarded
for the occupation of a few rectangles of the surface, two hundred
varas long by two hundred wide, would have been little more than a
nominal sum; and to defeat the meritorious title of a discoverer,
because under such circumstances the indemnity was not paid, would
seem unjust and absurd.
The next question to be considered on this branch of the case is
whether the alcalde had, under Mexican laws, jurisdiction to
receive denouncements, make registrations, and adjudicate the
titles of mines.
By art. iv., tit. vi., of the Ordinances of 1783, the discoverer
was required to present himself before the deputation of that
territory (territorio), or the one nearest if there should be none
there.
It is unnecessary particularly to examine the nature and
organization of the special tribunals to which the ordinance
refers. It is sufficient to say that they were composed of deputies
chosen by the enrolled miners of each mining territory, who
themselves were members of the great mining corporation or body of
matriculated miners throughout the Kingdom of New Spain.
These Special Tribunals were in the federal territory abolished
by the Constitution of 1826 and by the law of 1837.
But by the law of December 2, 1842, courts of first instance,
composed of three territorial deputies elected in the manner
prescribed in the ordinance, were required to be established in
each of the departments by the governor, in concert with the
departmental junta, and with the previous approval of the supreme
government.
To these courts were given substantially the powers formerly
possessed by the territorial deputations under the ordinances.
Under this law, mining tribunals were established in various
departments, but none were ever organized in the Californias.
Page 67 U. S. 288
It is contended, that inasmuch as these tribunals existed in
some parts of Mexico, it was the duty of the discoverer to address
himself to the one nearest to his mine; and that that tribunal
alone had jurisdiction in the premises.
It is not disputed, as a general principle of Mexican law, that
in default of any of the authorized special tribunals, their
functions devolve upon the courts of general jurisdiction. The
question then is was there any special tribunal to which the
discoverer of a mine in the Department of the Californias could
address himself.
It seems to be considered by the counsel for the United States,
that the provision of the ordinance which directs the discoverer to
the deputation of the nearest territorio, in default of any
deputation within his own territorio, of necessity directs him to
the nearest departmental court organized under the law of 1842, if
there be none in his own department. But this provision of the
ordinance is not adopted or alluded to in the law of 1842, the
small territorios, in each of which a mining deputation was by the
Ordinances of 1783 to be established, in no respect corresponded to
the great divisions of the Mexican Republic called "departments,"
in a single one of which both the Californias were included. The
deputies under the ordinances were to be elected in each Real or
Asiento of mines by the matriculated miners
"of that place"
(lugar), whose names were embraced in a book kept by the judge
and notary of that mining place (Mineria).
I am not informed what were the ordinary territorial limits of
the Reales or Asientos of mines here spoken of; but it is obvious
that they could not have been larger than would be consistent with
the convenience of the miners who were required to enroll their
names, and every year to vote at elections. When, therefore, it
happened that in a newly discovered mining district, no deputation
had been elected, the discoverer was reasonably directed to the
nearest deputation, which would ordinarily be at no great
distance.
But to send him to a remote department of Mexico on such an
errand would be a absurd, and a practical denial to him of any
Page 67 U. S. 289
right whatever to register his mine. Nor could in such case the
other provisions of the ordinances be complied with; for to what
purpose affix notices on the doors of the churches in Chihuahua,
that an individual had discovered or denounced a mine in Upper
California, and how could one of the deputies personally go, and
within ninety days inspect the mine, examine the pit, and give the
possession as enjoined by the ordinances?
That no such proceedings could have been contemplated by the law
of 1842, is also clear from the terms of the law itself. The
governor and junta of each department were to establish, as we have
seen, as many courts of first instance as were required within
their limits.
It is to be presumed that the jurisdiction of each of these
courts was restricted to the territorial limits assigned to it; but
it certainly did not extend beyond the boundaries of the
department. Art. XXVI provides that "Each one of these courts shall
exercise
within its territory the executive and economical
powers given by the old ordinance," &c. How, then, can it be
supposed that, organized under the authority of the department, and
with its jurisdiction restricted to its territory, it could take
cognizance of mining matters in another department, separated from
it by hundreds of leagues, and with which communications were rare
and difficult.
It is, I think, beyond doubt, that at the time of the discovery
of this mine, there were not only no special tribunals in
California which had jurisdiction in mining matters, but there were
none anywhere established in Mexico which possessed jurisdiction to
make a registration of a mine discovered in California. On the
principle of Mexican law already referred, the functions of the
special tribunals, under these circumstances, devolved on the
courts of ordinary jurisdiction -- or rather the jurisdiction
remained in them, as it had done in the federal territory from the
adoption of the Constitution of 1824 and the law of 1837, it never
having been divested in this department by the establishment of
special tribunals under the law of 1842.
If, then, the ordinary courts had cognizance of mining
matters
Page 67 U. S. 290
in the Californias, the jurisdiction must have been vested in
the alcaldes, for no ordinary courts of first instance existed.
By the decree of May 23, 1839, the judiciary of each of the
departments was to be composed of justices of the peace, alcaldes,
judges of first instance, and a superior tribunal.
But this organization was not perfected in the Californias, and
the alcaldes in this department appear to have exercised the
functions and jurisdiction which would otherwise have belonged to
the courts of first instance.
In the decree of March 2, 1843, it is stated, that in the
Californias there had been no courts of second and third instance
established in the Californias, New Mexico, and Tabasco, and by act
28th, the governors of those departments are ordered
"to take care that justice is punctually and completely
administered in first instances by Judges of that grade, if there
be such, or by alcaldes, or Judges of the Peace."
But even if the authority of an alcalde to take cognizance of
mining matters were doubtful, it ought, I think, to be sustained as
that of a
de facto officer exercising an undisputed
jurisdiction.
The registration of a mine was a simple proceeding, of which the
principal objects were to apprise the government of its existence,
so that it might secure its portion of the produce -- to given an
opportunity to other persons to show a better right than that of
the alleged discoverer or denouncer, and to subject the latter to
the salutary rules of the ordinance as to its working and
preservation. When the discoverer had made known his discovery in
the manner prescribed by law, and dug his pit of possession, the
law itself gave him the title.
It would seem, therefore, that if the discoverer addressed
himself to the only judicial authority of the country, and if that
authority, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the governor and
inhabitants of the department, took cognizance of the matter and
adjudicated the mine to him, a presumption in favor of the rightful
exercise of power ought to be indulged. Nor should we affirm the
alcalde's acts to be void, except on the clearest proofs that he
was wholly without jurisdiction in the premises.
Having thus seen that by the discovery and registration of
his
Page 67 U. S. 291
mine, and by the possession given by the alcalde, Castillero
acquired a right to the mine, with the number of pertenencias
allowed by law, I proceed to inquire what number of pertenencias he
thus became entitled to.
By art. 1, tit. vi., of the ordinances, it is provided that
"the discoverers of one or more mineral hills
(cerros),
absolutely new, in which there is no mine nor trial pit open, may
acquire in the principal vein which they select, as many as three
pertenencias, continuous or interrupted, according to the
measurements which are hereinafter prescribed; and if they have
discovered more veins, they may have one pertenencia in each vein,
said pertenencias being discovered and marked out within the term
of ten days."
Art. 2, tit. xi., provides:
"Although by these ordinances I prohibit any individual miner
who works in the ordinary limits from denouncing two contiguous
veins on the same vein -- notwithstanding this, I grant to those
who work in company, although they be not discoverers, and without
prejudice to the right which by reason thereof they may have in
case they are such (y sin perjuicio del derecho que por este titulo
deban tener en caso de que lo sean), the right to denounce four new
pertenencias or mines which have been worked and abandoned, even
when they are contiguous and on the same course."
It is claimed that, under these provisions, Castillero was
entitled as a discoverer to three pertenencias, and as one working
in company, to four additional pertenencias, making seven in
all.
The counsel for the United States contends that the allowances
of pertenencias mentioned in the foregoing articles, are not
cumulative, and that four, or the number given to him who works in
company, are all that can be acquired.
The determination of this question entirely depends upon the
true meaning of the Spanish text. The counsel for the United States
insists that the Spanish phrase quoted above reads when properly
translated: "And without prejudice to the right which by this title
[
viz., that of discoverers] they may be entitled to have
in case that they may be such."
Page 67 U. S. 292
That is that although it was prohibited to an individual miner
to denounce two contiguous mines, yet those who work in company may
denounce four pertenencias, either new and unopened, or old and
abandoned mines, and this right is not to prejudice their rights as
discoverers, in case at any time thereafter they may
become such.
If, however, we attribute a present and not a future
signification to the verb, the meaning of the phrase would be, that
all persons working in company shall have four pertenencias, and
shall enjoy this right without prejudice to their rights as
discoverers, in case
they are such -- that is, all persons
working in company shall have four pertenencias, and if they be
also discoverers, their rights as such shall remain to them.
I do not pretend to be able to determine, from a knowledge of
the Spanish, which is the true translation of the phrase. I have
therefore addressed myself for information to several persons
skilled in that language. They all concur in adopting the
translation suggested by the claimants.
There are some general considerations which serve to strengthen
my belief in its correctness.
The object of the law was to determine the extent of mining
spaces, or pertenencias, to be allowed to miners. As the merit of
the discoverer was greater than that of one who merely denounced a
forfeited mine, and as the policy of the law was to encourage and
reward discoveries, it gave to the discoverer, though working
alone, three pertenencias, if his discovery were of an absolutely
new hill, in which no mine had been opened; but if the discovery
were of a new vein in a hill known and worked in other parts, he
was allowed to acquire two pertenencias. It was also the policy of
the law to promote the development of mines by encouraging the
formation of companies, the associated capital of which would
enable them to prosecute the works on a larger scale and with
greater efficiency. Title ix., in the 1st article, enjoins upon the
Viceroy to encourage, promote, and protect all such partnerships by
all convenient measures.
In furtherance of the same policy, article 2 gives to all
those
Page 67 U. S. 293
who work in company the right to acquire either four new and
unopened pertenencias, or four mines (of one pertenencia each)
which have been worked and abandoned. The law which prohibited the
acquisition of two contiguous pertenencias by an ordinary miner, is
pro tanto repealed, while those which determined the
rights of discoverers are allowed to remain.
Such would seem the natural mode of carrying out the evident
policy of the law-giver.
For why should the ordinary miner be rewarded with three
additional pertenencias, because he works in company, and the
discoverer only be allowed one additional pertenencia?
The law recognizes the two species of merit -- that of discovery
and that of working in company. If a miner possesses both, ought he
not to receive the rewards allowed for both?
The phrase, "and without prejudice to their rights as
discoverers," &c., is evidently intended to guard against
interpretation of the provision prejudicial to the rights of the
discoverers. It is the exclusion of a possible conclusion which
might otherwise have been drawn.
But could it have been supposed that because persons working in
company are to have four pertenencias, no one of them could have
the rights of a discoverer, if at any future time, and perhaps at a
distance from his mine, he discovered an entirely new hill? Such a
construction of the provisions in favor of partnerships would have
been wholly unwarranted. This could not, therefore, have been the
conclusion intended to be excluded. But it might have been supposed
that the law, in giving to partnerships four pertenencias, meant to
fix the maximum number of contiguous mines which the same
individuals could in any case acquire. If, as discoverers, they
were already entitled to three, the formation of the partnership
would give them but one more. Both provisions would thus have been
satisfied. Three of the pertenencias would be held by a double
title -- that of discovery, and that of working in partnership --
while the fourth would be given for the latter reason alone.
To guard against this construction, the provision was inserted
that the allowance to partners should be without prejudice to
Page 67 U. S. 294
their rights as discoverers, in case they were such; and in this
view the provision was sensible, and perhaps necessary. It left to
each kind of merit its appropriate reward, and gave to the miner,
who united both in himself, all the privileges which the law
attached to each.
I am therefore of opinion that under the mining ordinances
referred, Castillero, as a discoverer, and as one working in
company, was entitled to seven pertenencias.
Having thus ascertained what acts were done and rights acquired
by Castillero in California, we will next consider the title
claimed to have been obtained by him from the supreme government of
Mexico.
The facts as alleged by the claimants, are as follows:
Early in 1846, and while he was yet in California, Castillero,
impressed with the importance of the brilliant discovery he had
made, communicated the fact in two letters addressed to J. J. De
Herrera, former president of Mexico, dated at the Mission of Santa
Clara on the 19th and 22d February, 1846, respectively, and also in
another letter written on the last mentioned day to Don Tomas Ramon
del Moral, at Mexico.
These letters, together with some specimens of cinnabar and a
small flask of quicksilver, were sent by the hands of Lazaro Pina,
who sailed from Monterey for Mazatlan in the brig
Hannah
in the early part of March, 1846.
Extracts from the two letters to Herrera were, it appears,
furnished by him to Senor Moral, and a note embodying these
extracts, together with a copy of Castillero's letter to himself,
were, by Senor Moral, about the middle of April, 1846, communicated
to the Junta de Fomento y Administrativa de Mineria, a body charged
with the development and encouragement of mining interests in
Mexico, and the administration of certain funds connected with the
same object.
There were also transmitted by Moral to the junta, at the same
time, some specimens of cinnabar which had been delivered to him by
Pina.
On the 21st April, 1846, the junta addressed a letter to Jose
Maria Tornel, Director of the College of Mining, transmitting
to
Page 67 U. S. 295
him copies of Castillero's letters and the specimens of
cinnabar, and requesting that an assay might be made of the
latter.
On the 23d April, Tornel, by an order on the margin of the
letter of the junta, directed the specimens to be sent to the junta
facultativa, or faculty of the college, for assay.
The result of the assay was communicated to Tornel by Senor
Moral, president of the junta facultativa, on the 24th April, 1846,
and the receipt of this letter was acknowledged on the 29th of the
same month of Tornel, who, on the same day transmitted the letter
of Moral of the 24th, announcing the result of the assay, to the
Junta de Fomento. His official communication on the
subject was received by them on the 3d May, and on the 4th, ordered
by an "acuerdo" or marginal order to be sent to the government. On
the succeeding day,
viz., the 5th, a communication signed
by Vicente Segura, president of the junta, and Isidro R. Gondra,
First Clerk, was accordingly addressed to the Minister of Justice,
in which was stated the reception of the specimens, and their
transmission to the director of the college for assay. A copy of
the communication of the director of the college, stating the
result of the assay, was also embodied in the junta's letter, and
the Minister of Justice was informed that the junta had already
asked Castillero what kind of aid or protection he needed for the
encouragement of his brilliant enterprise &c.
This letter was received by the Minister of Justice on the 9th
May, as shown by the marginal note of its contents and reception,
and on the same day the Minister formally acknowledged its receipt
in a dispatch addressed to the junta.
On the 12th May, 1846, Castillero, who had sailed from
California in the barque
Don Quixote and arrived in
Mexico, submitted to the junta nine propositions in writing in
which he indicated the kind of aid and protection he required. He
had previously, however, appeared before them, given a verbal
account of his discovery, and been requested by the junta to
furnish a written statement as to what aid he required.
On the 14th May, 1846, the junta transmitted the written
statement of Castillero to the Minister of Justice, retaining a
Page 67 U. S. 296
copy in their own office. In this communication of the junta,
the government is urged to accept the propositions of
Castillero.
Among the propositions thus made by Castillero to the junta, and
by the latter transmitted to the Minister of Justice, were the
following:
"7th. The junta shall represent to the supreme government the
necessity of approving the possession which has been given me of
the mine, by the local authorities, in the same terms as those
which I now hold it."
"8th. It shall also represent the advantage of there being
granted to me, as a colonist, two square leagues upon the land of
my mining possession, with the object of being able to use the wood
for my burnings."
The communication of the junta, enclosing the propositions of
Castillero, and urging their acceptance, was received by the
Minister of Justice, and on the 20th May, the following "acuerdo"
was noted on the margin:
"Granted in the terms which are proposed, and with respect to
the land, let the corresponding order issue to the Minister of
Relations for the proper measures of his office, with the
understanding that the supreme government accedes to the
petition."
This "acuerdo" is signed with the rubric of Becerra, Minister of
Justice.
On the same day (May 20), Becerra addressed to the president of
the junta an official dispatch, as follows:
"
Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction"
"MOST EXCELLENT SIR: -- Having reported to His Excellency, the
president
ad interim of the Republic, your Excellency's
communication of the 14th inst., with which you were pleased to
transmit with a recommendation the petition of Senor Don Andres
Castillero, for the encouragement of a quicksilver mine which he
has discovered in the Mission of Santa Clara, in Upper California,
His Excellency has been pleased to approve in all its parts the
agreement made with that individual in order to commence the
working of said mine, and on this day the corresponding
communication is made to the Minister of Exterior Relations and
government, to issue the proper orders with respect to that
Page 67 U. S. 297
which is contained in the 8th proposition for the grant of lands
in that department."
"I repeat to your Excellency the assurance of my esteem."
"God and Liberty. Mexico, 20 May, 1846."
"BECERRA"
"To His Excellency, D. Vicente Segura"
"President of the
Junta de Fomento de Mineria"
On the same day Becerra addressed to the Minister of Relations
an official communication, in which he transcribes the foregoing
dispatch to Segura, and adds:
"And I have the honor to transcribe to your Excellency, to the
end that with respect to the petition of Senor Castillero to which
his Excellency the president
ad interim has thought proper
to accede, that there be granted to him as a colonist two square
leagues upon the land of his mining possession, your Excellency
will be pleased to issue the orders corresponding."
In obedience to these orders, the Minister of Exterior
Relations, Castillo Lanzas, on the 23d of May, 1846, directed an
official dispatch to Pio Pico, Governor of California, in which,
after transcribing the foregoing communication of Becerra, he
says:
"Wherefore I transcribe it to your Excellency, in order that in
conformity with what is prescribed by the laws and dispositions
upon colonization, you may put Senor Castillero in possession of
the two square leagues which are mentioned."
"God and Liberty, Mexico, May 23, 1846."
"CASTILLO LANZAS"
"To His Excellency the Governor of the Department of the
Californias"
Upon these last dispatches,
viz., that from Becerra to
the
Junta de Fomento, of May 20th, and that from Castillo
Lanzas to the Governor of California, of May 23d, the claimants
rely, as constituting a ratification of the grant by the alcalde of
three thousand varas in every direction, and a concession of two
square leagues of land. They also claim that the "acuerdo" or
marginal order found in the communication of the junta of May
14,
Page 67 U. S. 298
1846, amounts, in equity at least, to a concession of all that
the junta recommended.
The proofs of the foregoing allegations consist of a large
number of espedientes from various public offices in Mexico -- of
certified copies of the actas or minutes of the proceedings of the
two juntas,
viz., the Junta de Fomento and the Junta
Facultativa, of the College of Mining -- of certified transcripts
of entries in official books of the Ministers, and of the parol
testimony of Members of the juntas, Clerks in the offices by whom
the documents were written, and of the Minister himself, Castillo
Lanzas, who was the author of the dispatch of May 23. These
witnesses swear, not only to the existence of the archives, the
handwriting and the genuineness of the various documents, traced
copies of which are produced, and to the accuracy of those copies,
but also to the facts stated to have occurred, or to such parts of
the transactions as each was personally concerned in.
Some of these witnesses, who were brought from Mexico by the
claimants at great expense, have held distinguished official
positions, are of advanced years, and independent fortunes.
The United States aver that their testimony is false and
perjured, and that the documents sworn to by them are forged and
antedated. To arrive at a just estimate of the force of the
evidence and reasons on which the United States rely to support
this accusation, a brief statement of the nature and amount of the
proofs offered by the claimant is necessary.
In the short summary of the evidence which I propose to give, I
shall follow rather the chronological sequence of the events
alleged to have occurred, than the order in which the various
documents were produced.
It will be remembered that the Junta de Fomento was first
notified of the discovery of a mine of quicksilver by Castillero by
receiving from Don Tomas Ramon del Moral a communication containing
copies of letters from Castillero, that this communication was sent
to the director of the college that an assay might be made and by
him referred to the president of the faculty, who in due time
reported the result of the assay to the
Page 67 U. S. 299
president, who in turn communicated it to the junta, and the
latter to the Minister of Justice.
There is accordingly produced from the Archives of the College
of Mining the original communication of the
Junta de
Fomento, signed by the president, Vicente Segura, and
addressed to the director of the college, together with copies of
the communication of Moral, which, with the specimens of cinnabar,
were sent to the Director. The accuracy of the traced copy
produced, and the existence of the original in the College of
Mining, is testified to by Jose Maria de Bassoco, for many years a
member of the junta, and by Balcarcel and Castillo, Professors in
the College. These witnesses also swear to the handwriting of the
dispatch, and of the copies of the letters, to the genuineness of
the signatures of Vicente Segura, president of the junta, and of
Gondra, the chief clerk of the junta, who certifies to the copies
which accompany the dispatch. On the margin of the dispatch is an
acuerdo, or order signed "Tornel," directing it to be sent to the
junta facultativa. The fact that Tornel was director of the
college, and the genuineness of his signature, are also proved by
the same witnesses.
From the archives of the junta facultativa of the college are
produced traced copies of the minutes of a session of the board on
the 24th April, 1846 (erroneously dated 24th March). These minutes
show a resolution of the Board, that a report of what had been
done, and the result of the assay made by Professor Herrera, be
communicated to the director of the college. From the same archives
is produced a traced copy of the reply of the Director General
Tornel to the report of the Board, in which he acknowledges the
receipt of a letter from Moral, president of the faculty, of the
24th April, communicating the result of the assay. The accuracy of
these traced copies, and the existence, genuineness and handwriting
of the originals, are proved by the Professors Castillo and
Balcarcel, who were present at the meeting of the faculty, and who
not only swear to their personal recollection of the facts, but
also testify that the cinnabar was received, an assay made, a
meeting of the faculty on the subject held, and the specimens
deposited with appropriate
Page 67 U. S. 300
labels in the cabinet of the college, where they now remain.
From the archives of the Junta de Mineria are produced traced
copies of the office copy of the communication sent to the director
of the college, the original of which is found, as we have seen, in
the archives of the latter; also a traced copy of the communication
received from the director of the college, announcing the result of
the assay -- with a marginal note directing it to be transmitted to
the government, signed by Segura, President of the
Junta de
Fomento.
There is also produced from the same archives, a traced copy of
the borrador or office copy of the communication thereupon
addressed by the junta to the Minister of Justice, together with a
traced copy of his reply, dated May 9, 1846.
There is also produced from the same archives a traced copy of
the borrador or draft of a second communication from the junta to
the same minister, transmitting to him the petition of Castillero,
for aid &c., and recommending it to the favorable consideration
of the government.
A traced copy of the reply to this communication by the Minister
of Justice, is also produced from the same archives.
Appended to the espediente containing it, are certificates of
Manuel Couto, Secretary of the Administration of the Mining Fund,
and in charge of the archives of the office of Mineria.
A certificate of Vicente Segura, certifying to the official
character and handwriting of Couto.
A certificate of P. Almazan, Chief Clerk of the Ministry of
Encouragement, Colonization &c., certifying to the official
character of Segura, Administrator of the Mining Fund, and to that
of Couto, the Secretary, and that the archives of the office are in
charge of the latter, and also to their signatures and seals.
A certificate of J. Miguel Arroyo, Chief Clerk of the Ministry
of Exterior Relations, certifying to the official character of
Almazon, and to his signature and the seal of his office.
And, finally, a certificate of John Black, U.S. consul,
certifying to the official character and signature of Arroyo, and
also that he is the person authorized by law to legalize Mexican
documents
Page 67 U. S. 301
to be used in foreign countries, and that the seal of the
department affixed to the documents is the same used in the
legalization of all documents by that officer.
The accuracy of the traced copies, the existence and handwriting
of the originals, where those originals are borradors or drafts,
and the existence and handwriting of the signatures to the
originals, where they are the original communications received by
the junta, are proved by Mr. Bassoco, by the Professors Balcarcel
and Castillo, by Miranda and Yrisarri, who were employed in the
Ministry of Justice, by Manuel Couto, who testifies that he copied
Castillero's petition from his rough draft, and by Castillo Lanzas,
the former Minister of Relations of Mexico.
From the archives of the Ministry of Relations, to which the
archives of the Ministry of Justice have been transferred, are
produced traced copies of the communication addressed by the junta
to the Minister of Justice, informing him of Castillero's
discovery, and embodying the communication received by the junta
from the directors of the college, informing the junta of the
results of the assay.
A traced copy of the draft of this communication, as we have
seen, is produced from the archives of the office from which it
emanated. A traced copy of the borrador or draft of the minister's
reply to this communication, is also produced from the same
archives, in all respects conforming to the original reply, a
traced copy of which, as before stated, is produced from the
archives of the office to which it was directed.
There is also produced, from the same archives, a traced copy of
the communication of the junta, enclosing and recommending
Castillero's petition, corresponding with the borrador produced
from the archives of the junta, and a traced copy of the borrador
of the reply of the Minister, in like manner corresponding with the
original produced from the archives of the junta.
On the margin of the communication of the junta is the usual
membrete or memorandum of its contents, and an "acuerdo" or order
of the minister in regard to it. The latter is signed with the
rubric of the minister, and the official dispatch transmitted
Page 67 U. S. 302
to the junta conforms entirely to the acuerdo or resolution
taken on the subject, and noted in the margin of the communication.
There is also produced from the same archives a certified copy of
the draft of the communication addressed by the Minister of Justice
to the Minister of Relations.
From the archives of the Ministry of Relations is produced a
traced copy of this last communication of the Minister of Justice,
the borrador of which is found in the office of the latter, and a
borrador of the communication or dispatch addressed, in pursuance
of the order of the Minister of Justice, by the Minister of
Relations, Castillo Lanzas, to Pio Pico, Governor of California.
And, finally, the claimants produce from their own custody, the
original of the last mentioned dispatch, signed by Castillo Lanzas,
and addressed to the Governor of California.
It may here be observed that from the archives of the Ministry
of Relations is also produced a traced copy of the communication of
Pio Pico, of February 13, 1846, addressed to the Minister of
Relations, informing him of Castillero's discovery, and
transmitting Castillero's letter of December 10, 1845. There is
also produced from the same archives a traced copy of the borrador
of the reply of the Minister, dated April 6, 1846.
We have already seen that the borrodor of Pico's communication,
and the original of the minister's reply, are found among the
archives of California in this city. Their genuineness is
undisputed.
To the traced copies from the archives of the Ministry of
Justice are affixed the certificate of Arroyo and seal of his
department, as also the certificate of Black the United States
Consul, in the same terms as those already mentioned.
The accuracy of the copies, the existence of the originals in
the archives of the offices to which they belong, their
handwriting, and the genuineness of the signatures they bear, are
sworn to by the escribientes, or clerks, by whom they were copied,
some of whom are still connected with the ministries, by M. de
Bassoco, and by the ex-minister Castillo Lanzas himself.
There is also produced a traced copy of an extract from a book
now existing among the records of the Ministry of Justice.
Page 67 U. S. 303
It contains various entries or notes, purporting to have been
made from May 11, 1846, to May 20, 1846. Amongst those made on the
20th, is an entry of the membrete or memorandum of contents of the
junta's letter to the minister, of May 14, and of the accerdo or
resolution taken by the minister on the subject. On the top of the
first page on which the communication of the junta is written, are
found these letters and figures: "L. g^1 15, S. f. 140 v^at."
Jose M. Yrisarri, the Fifth
Oficial of the Ministry of
Justice, being interrogated as to the meaning of this inscription,
testifies that it means "Libro General, vol. 15; reverse of page
140," and that the entry already mentioned is found in the volume
and page referred to. He further states that this inscription, or
reference, was made by himself, as was also the entry on the book
to which it refers.
The original dispatch of Becerra to the Minister of Relations,
is stated by Miranda and Yrisarri, to be in the handwriting of the
former. The "acuerdo" on the margin is said by Castillo Lanzas to
be in his own handwriting and signed with his genuine rubric; and
the draft of the dispatch addressed by him to Pio Pico, to be in
the handwriting of Mr. Quintanar, an employee of the Ministry of
Relations in 1846. The original dispatch addressed to Pio Pico is
proved to be in the handwriting of A. J. de Velasco, by Castillo
Lanzas, and by Velasco himself. The signature of Castillo Lanzas is
proved by Lafrague, former Minister of Relations in Mexico, by
Velasco, who wrote the dispatch, and by Castillo Lanzas
himself.
It is also testified by Mr. Negrete, that this identical
dispatch was handed to him in December, 1846, by Castillero; that a
copy of it was inserted in the instrument by which Castillero
ratified the McNamara contract, and the original sent by him
(Negrete) to Alexander Forbes, of Tepic, on the 19th of December,
1846.
In corroboration of this statement of Mr. Negrete, there is
produced a series of letters written by him to Alexander Forbes,
from December 5, 1846, to February 6, 1847. In these letters Mr.
Negrete, informs Mr. Forbes of the state of his then pending
negotiation with Castillero, and in his letter of December 18,
Page 67 U. S. 304
advises him that he transmits "the document showing the grant
which the supreme government made in favor of Don Andres Castillero
for two leagues of land," &c.
These letters, which Mr. Negrete swears he saw for the first
time since they were written, when produced to him by the claimants
in this country, he testifies are in his own handwriting and that
of his clerk, Oruna, and signed by himself. He also identifies
three checks or orders drawn by himself on his banker, Don Donato
Manterola, one in favor of Castillero for $4,000, and receipted by
the latter, and two in favor of Don Nazario Fuentes, the Notary,
for $137.25, and $29.75, respectively, both of which are receipted
by Fuentes.
The testimonio or authenticated copy of Castillero's instrument
of ratification, containing the Lanzas dispatch, is exhibited. It
is signed by Nazario Fuentes, the notary public, whose signature
and
signo are attested by three Notaries Public in a
certificate under the seal of the National College of Notaries of
Mexico, dated December 19, 1846.
A second copy of the same instrument, issued from the office of
the Notary Fuentes, under his hand and seal, is also produced. It
is dated February 6, 1847, and is certified by three Notaries
Public, under the hand and seal of the national College of
Notaries. Among the three Notaries signing these certificates is
Villalon. This gentleman has been examined as a witness. He
testified that his signature and
signo on each of the
certificates are genuine, that they were affixed at their
respective dates; that the signatures of the other Notaries are
genuine, as is also the seal of the national College. It is also
shown that this instrument of the ratification was brought to
California by Mr. Walkinshaw in 1847, when he took charge of the
mine, and the terms of James Alexander Forbes' ratification, in
which the language of Castillero's act is copied, show that the
latter must have been before him when writing his own ratification
of the McNamara contract -- a conclusion rendered certain by the
very distinct allusion in Forbes' letter of May 5, 1847, "to the
possession of two sitios ordered to be given by the dispatch of
Senor Castillo Lanzas."
Page 67 U. S. 305
The claimants have also produced from the Archives of the
Junta de Fomento, traced copies of the original
borradores, or drafts, of the minutes of the junta in April, May,
September, November and December, 1849, also a traced copy of the
clean copy made from those minutes, and authenticated by the
rubrics of the members of the junta who assisted at the sessions,
and finally, a copy of the entire volume 3d of the Minutes of the
junta from April 2, 1846, to June 30, 1847.
In these minutes, amongst a great number of other entries, we
find a record of the action of the junta from the reception of the
specimens of cinnabar to the payment of the Notary Calapiz, when
further proceedings were abandoned.
In the actas of the session of April 23, 1846, is an entry of
the receipt of specimens of cinnabar from the Presidio of Santa
Clara, in California, and a resolution that they be sent, with
copies of Castillero's letters, to the Director for assay.
On the 4th of May, the receipt of the letter of the Director
inserting the report of the junta Faculatativa is noted, and it is
resolved that it be transcribed to the supreme government,
representing that a reply has been made to Senor Castillero, asking
him what kind of protection or assistance he requires.
On the 6th of May, the actas show that Don Andres Castillero
appeared and made a verbal report &c., and the junta resolved
that Senor Castillero should present his indications in writing. On
the 14th of May, the receipt of the communication from the Minister
of Justice dated May 9 is noted.
On the 25th of May is a like note of the receipt of Becerra's
dispatch of the 20th, approving the agreement made with Castillero
&c., and a resolution of the junta that the proper judicial
agreement be drawn up immediately &c.
On the 29th of May, is a note of an order for the payment of $25
to the Notary Calapiz, for proceedings in the instrument of
agreement which had been made with Castillero to assist his
quicksilver enterprise &c.
The accuracy of the traced copies of the actas is testified to
by Mr. Bassoco, who compared them with the originals; and he also
proves the existence and authenticity of the originals in the
Page 67 U. S. 306
archives of the junta, and the genuineness of his own rubrics
and those of his colleagues affixed to them.
The claimants have also produced, and filed as an exhibit, an
original report made by the
Junta de Fomento to the
Minister of Justice relative to the matters confided to its care.
This report is embodied in a report made to the national Congress
by Jose M. Lafragua, Minister of Relations, and read before that
body on the 14th, 15th, and 16th December, 1846.
The original manuscript "Memoria," or report by the junta, is
stated by Mr. Bassoco, to have been procured by himself from
Escalante, the agent of Lafragua. Its proper place of custody was
the Ministry of Relations, but M. de Bassoco supposes that it had
probably been taken by Mr. Lafragua to his own house, when the
latter was preparing his report to the national Congress, and
accidentally remained among his papers. He identifies the
signatures and rubrics of Vicente Segura and Isidoro R. Gondra,
which are affixed to it, and states his conviction that it is the
identical document sent in by the junta to the Minister.
On referring to the "actas" of the junta, we find it noted on
the 5th of November, 1846, that a dispatch was received from the
Minister of Relations, dated November 3d, calling for an account of
the labors of the junta, to be furnished within eight days.
It also appears that on the 9th the reading of the report was
commenced, that it was concluded at the session of the 16th, and a
resolution adopted, that the report should be transmitted to the
government, and that on the 5th of December, a communication from
the Minister acknowledging its receipt was received by the
junta.
Two copies of the report of Lafragua, in which the Memoria was
embodied, are also offered in evidence by the claimants. It is a
printed volume of considerable size.
Of these copies, one was originally produced by the claimants
and identified by Mr. Lafragua, Mr. Bassoco and others.
A second copy has recently been produced and identified by the
Hon. J. P. Benjamin, one of the counsel in the cause, as having
been received by him in 1849, from Don Jose Garay, the
Page 67 U. S. 307
validity of whose grant he was then investigating. The volume
remained in Mr. Benjamin's possession until about two years ago,
when Mr. Rockwell, also of counsel for claimants called on him to
retain him in this cause. In the course of conversation Mr. R.
alluded to an official report of Mr. Lafragua, which, in his
opinion, contained conclusive proof of the genuineness of the title
of the claimant. From his description Mr. Benjamin thought he
recognized the volume in his possession as the one referred to, and
immediately procured it from an adjoining room. On examination, it
was found to contain the passages relating to the discovery of the
mine &c., which are found in the copy previously produced by
the claimants. Mr. Benjamin was not, until that time, aware that it
contained anything in reference to the mine. At Mr. Rockwell's
request, he allowed him to retain the volume, which he recognizes
as the one now produced.
The claimants have also offered in evidence files of the
"Diario," the "Republicano," and the "Monitor Republicano,"
newspapers, in which the reading of Lafragua's report, on the 14th,
15th and 16th December, 1846, is noticed.
It is unnecessary to extract at length the passages in this
report, in which reference is made to Castillero's discovery, and
the action of the government upon it.
They merely contain an account of the presentation of the
specimens to the junta by Senor Moral -- the assay, the inquiry of
Castillero as to the assistance he desired, his petition, and the
junta's agreement to it; the approval of the agreement by the
supreme government, and the failure to carry it into effect, owing
to the order of the supreme government, of May 10, 1846, directing
the suspension of all payments from the public Treasury.
In the foregoing statement of the documentary and other proofs
on which the claimants rely to show the action, by the Mexican
authorities, in reference to the important discovery of Castillero,
much evidence as to various handwritings, signatures &c., has
been omitted.
Enough has been set forth to show the nature and the force
Page 67 U. S. 308
of the proofs offered in support of the genuineness of the
documents exhibited.
It will be seen that the proofs do not consist of any one set of
papers derived from a single office, the archives of which might
have been falsified and the officials corrupted.
Each document is found in two, and some in three, distinct
repositories. The barradores are produced from the offices from
which the communications emanated; the originals from the offices
to which they were sent, and in some instances the communications
are, according to the Mexican custom, inserted in dispatches from
the office to which they were originally directed, and those
dispatches are found in the archives of the Ministry to which they
are addressed.
All the papers are so intimately connected and complicated with
each other that it is almost impossible to suppose any one to have
been fabricated unless the whole series be spurious. They are
written in various handwritings, with a multitude of signatures,
rubrics, etc., of well known individuals attached to them. The same
document contains, in some instances, no less than four different
handwritings --
viz., that of the clerk who drew it, of
the official who signed it, of the clerk who wrote the membrete and
acuerdo, and that of the minister by whom the latter was
signed.
The writing is sworn to be that of clerks attached for many
years to the offices from which the papers emanated. Their
handwriting must therefore be well known, and a forgery of it could
readily detected.
When we consider the long series of forgeries and the almost
innumerable perjuries which must have been committed if these
documents are not genuine, the crimes imputed to the witnesses are
as appalling as the extent and almost endless ramifications of the
conspiracy to commit them are incredible.
We must suppose that professors in a national college, forsaking
their scientific pursuits, have carefully fabricated false minutes
of the proceedings of the faculty of which they were members; that
they have made a tedious and dangerous journey to sustain, by
carefully prepared perjuries, the forgeries they
Page 67 U. S. 309
had committed; and that they have had ingenuity and depravity
enough to give to their statements the appearance of truth, by
inventing circumstantial details as to the reception of the
specimens, the assay made of them, their deposit in the cabinet of
the college, and even the purport of the tickets or labels upon
them, which, as they state, can be seen by any visitor to the
College.
With regard to the
Junta de Fomento, the forgeries and
perjuries imputed are still more complicated and improbable. Not
only must the various dispatches alleged to have been addressed by
them to the director of the college, and to the Minister of
Justice, with the signatures of the president of the junta, and of
the secretary, the handwriting of the clerk who drew the marginal
notes upon them, and the rubric of the minister appended, have
either been forged, or falsely sworn to have been written at their
dates, but a series of
actas, which record the proceedings
and resolutions of the junta, must have been fabricated, or
extensively interpolated, and the rubrics of the members forged.
And, as if reveling in supererogatory crimes, they must also have
fabricated the borradores, or rough drafts, from which the clean
copies of the minutes were made out -- the existence of which would
hardly have been suspected, and which it would naturally be
supposed had been destroyed.
They must also have prepared a voluminous report to the minister
in which has been inserted an account of these proceedings
precisely such as, if they had taken place, we should expect to
find. The manuscript of this report, which is claimed to have been
accidentally left among the private papers of the minister to whom
it was addressed, must have been forged or the interpolated
passages inserted in it in a manner to defy detection. And they
must also, at least as early as 1848 or in the beginning of 1849,
before this case was presented or a tribunal constituted to decide
upon it, have procured the same interpolations to be made in the
printed report of the Minister Lafragua, read to the National
Congress in December, 1846, a copy of which was in the hands of Mr.
Benjamin at least as early as the fall of 1849.
After procuring these various forgeries and interpolations
to
Page 67 U. S. 310
be made, the claimants must have induced numerous witnesses to
elaborate and swear to a series of perjuries -- minute,
circumstantial and plausible -- the invention of which displays
nearly as much skill and ingenuity as the testimony in regard to
them, if false, discloses moral turpitude.
They must have succeeded in suborning not merely a few nameless
and obscure individuals, but numerous persons in high official and
social positions; and especially Mr. de Bassoco, a gentleman
venerable for his years and respectable for the singular
intelligence and amenity with which he sustained the protracted,
acute, and most searching cross-examination of the counsel for the
United States.
They must also have procured two ex-ministers of relations to
perjure themselves not merely by false testimony before a
commissioner in Mexico, but in court, within our jurisdiction and
subject to our laws, with a full knowledge that the government
alleged the claim to be spurious, and that no efforts would be
spared to detect and punish those who were concerned in the
supposed conspiracy to defraud it.
Again, this vast conspiracy, from its nature, could not have
been successfully carried out without the complicity or connivance
not only of nearly all the officials in the various offices at the
alleged dates of the papers, from the lowest probationary clerk or
"meritorio" up to the minister of state himself, but also of those
officers employed when the forged papers were afterwards placed in
the archives, as well as of all those who still more recently have
certified to their genuineness, and yet, from all these persons
concerned in or cognizant of the crime, no whisper has been heard
betraying the important secret. Mr. Black, the United States
consul, continues to attach his certificate to the papers without
suspecting that he might be lending his aid to a conspiracy to
defraud his own government, and Mr. Forsyth, the United States
Minister to Mexico and for some time resident at the capital,
examines the documents at the various ministries and states
that
"they are found in the several offices where they appropriately
belong, were produced by the
Page 67 U. S. 311
officers having custody of them, and that he saw nothing
whatever to cause him to doubt their being genuine originals."
But the proofs of the genuineness, in part at least, of the
documents obtained from Mexico are obtained from another and an
unquestionable source.
Among those documents was found, as has been mentioned, the
dispatch of Pio Pico, with the original letter of Castillero of
December 10, 1845, conveying to the supreme government the first
news of the discovery. There was also produced a traced copy of the
borrador of the reply of the Minister.
It is stated by counsel that the reception of these documents
from Mexico first suggested to them the propriety of instituting a
search for evidence of the correspondence in the archives in the
Surveyor General's office.
The search was accordingly made, and there was found the draft
of Pio Pico's letter to the Minister, the original of the
minister's reply, together with a letter from Castillero clearly
referring to a previous one of the 10th December.
I am not aware that the genuineness of these documents produced
from the archives in this city is questioned.
It thus appears that the archives from Mexico are corroborated
on the only points where, from their own nature, they were
susceptible of corroboration by other records.
The existence of the documents now relied on to establish the
title of the claimants, at least as early as the spring of 1847 and
prior to the date of the supposed forgery, is also shown by
testimony adduced by the United States.
We have already seen that in James Alexander Forbes' letter of
May 5, 1847, he alludes to "the possession of two sitios ordered to
be given by the dispatch of Senor Castillo Lanzas."
In his letter of July 14, 1847, he speaks of the "two leagues
conceded to Castillero and socios," and throughout his
correspondence frequent and unmistakable allusions occur to the
Lanzas dispatch, with reiterated expressions of distrust of its
validity.
The same objections made to the document in 1847 are repeated
and enforced up to February, 1850, long after the date of
Page 67 U. S. 312
the alleged forgeries, but without the slightest intimation that
during that interval a second Lanzas dispatch had been fabricated.
The document now exhibited is open to all the objections, and
liable to every criticism originally made and so constantly
repeated to the document received by Mr. Forbes in 1847. He
complains in 1850 that his suggestions relative "to the attainment
of the important document," explained in his memorandum left at
Tepic, in 1849, have not been acted upon. He expatiates upon the
insufficiency and discrepancies of the Castillo Lanzas dispatch,
but he nowhere breathes a word of reproach or complaint that an
abortive and absurd forgery had been committed, the only result of
which had been to leave the title as "imperfect and ambiguous" as
before.
Had such been the case, we learn enough of Mr. Forbes'
disposition from this correspondence to feel sure that reproaches
would not have been spared.
There is one other consideration, and it is the last to which I
shall advert, which naturally leads us to infer, independently of
the proofs, that some proceedings similar to those alleged to have
been had, must have taken place in Mexico.
So far back as the Ordinances of 1783, quicksilver had been the
subject of distinct and special legislation. The fact that it was
indispensably necessary to the extraction of the precious metals
gave to it an exceptional character, and an ample and cheap supply
of it had been recognized as essential to the development of the
mineral wealth of Spain and Mexico.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate the various decrees and laws
of those countries designed to promote the discovery and production
of this metal. It is sufficient to say that out of the public
revenues of Mexico a part had been devoted to the formation of a
fund called the "Fondo de Azogues," to be used in searching for and
developing mines of quicksilver. On every quintal produced a bounty
was paid, and to those who should succeed in producing a specified
quantity per year, a large sum of money was to be given.
The hope of discovering rich mines of quicksilver within the
republic had led the junta to institute expensive explorations
Page 67 U. S. 313
in various parts of the country, and on all sides it seems to
have been considered a national object of primary importance to
liberate the republic from its almost entire dependence on the
mines of Almaden, from which the chief supply was obtained.
When, therefore, Castillero discovered a mine of which the
"ley" surpassed in richness any that had previously been
known, and when shortly afterwards he proceeded to Mexico, it is
not conceivable that he should have neglected to inform the junta
of his discovery and requested of it the assistance in the
prosecution of his enterprise which it was one of the most
important objects of its institution to furnish. That he would have
desired the ratification of his mining possession, and especially a
grant of two leagues, we may infer from the fact that he had
already solicited a similar grant from the Governor of
California.
That the junta would have received the announcement with the
utmost satisfaction, and zealously cooperated with him by
recommendations to the supreme government, and aiding him by all
means in its power, we might conclude even without any proofs of
the facts; and proceedings similar to those alleged to have
occurred, would have been the natural and almost inevitable
consequence.
These proceedings may, it is true, have been interrupted by the
breaking out of war and the alarming condition of public affairs;
nor do the considerations last suggested authorize us to assume
that the dispatch of Becerra, or that of Lanzas, were in fact
written at their dates; but they justify the conclusion that the
proceedings were initiated, and that the records of them produced
from Mexico are at least in part genuine.
Having thus given an imperfect summary of the proofs offered by
the claimants, I proceed to consider some of the objections urged
on the part of the United States.
It is contended that neither Lazaro Pina, who is alleged to have
carried the specimens of cinnabar to Mexico, nor Castillero
himself, could have arrived in that city at the time indicated by
the documents produced. If this be true, and an
alibi can
be proved as to those persons, we may well regard with suspicion
documents found to be false in so important a particular. But
Page 67 U. S. 314
the proofs offered by the claimants on these points are too
clear to admit of doubt.
We have already had occasion to notice the letters addressed by
Castillero while in this country to Gen. M. G. Vallejo, at the
christening of whose child he had assisted, and who thus became his
compadre.
In a letter addressed to Vallejo, and dated February 21, 1846,
Castillero says: "By the brigantine schooner which brought these
communications" (referring to communications spoken of in the
preceding sentence of the letter), "we have received information,"
&c.
"
This vessel sails shortly, and will carry communications of
what has occurred lately. Myself or Pina will leave in it, or both
together. I am only detained waiting the arrival of the
division which may touch here in a day or two."
In another letter dated March 11, 1846, to the same person, he
says: "Pina embarked on the 4th of this month in Monterey, and was
dispatched in perfect order. He will travel post to Mexico."
These letters are produced by General Vallejo. He swears that
they were received shortly after they were written. The signature
and handwriting of Castillero are not disputed. If antedated, they
must have been written by Castillero in Mexico, and sent on to
Vallejo to be produced and sworn to by him -- a supposition
extravagant in itself, and disproved by the intrinsic evidence of
the letters themselves, which contain allusions to passing events,
and are couched in a style impossible to invent after the lapse of
years.
In corroboration of this statement, the consular books of Mr.
Larkin, then United States Consul at Monterey, have been produced.
They are identified by Mr. Swasey, the consular clerk at that time.
From these books it appears that the brigantine schooner
Hannah was noted as about to sail to Mazatlan on the 4th
of March, the day on which Castillero supposed she had actually
sailed. It also appears that the Consul, desirous of sending
dispatches to the United States, detained her three days, and a
note in his memorandum book shows that she in fact sailed on the
7th.
Page 67 U. S. 315
Shortly after the sailing of the
Hannah, becoming
alarmed for the safety of Colonel Fremont, who was then encamped on
the peak of Gavilan and expecting an attack, Mr. Larkin sent by a
special courier dispatches to Santa Barbara in the hope of
intercepting the
Hannah at that port and of having them
conveyed by him to Commodore Sloat at Mazatlan.
That the
Hannah arrived at Mazatlan on the 1st April we
learn from various sources.
First. The "Diario Oficial," a newspaper published in
the City of Mexico, contains in the number published on the 22d
April, under the head of "Marine news. Mazatlan -- arrivals of
vessels," a notice of the arrival at Mazatlan, on the 1st April, of
"the American brigantine schooner
Hannah of eighty-nine
tons, Captain Benjamin F. Thusum, and a crew of ten men."
Second. From a letter of Mott, Talbot & Co.,
merchants of Mazatlan, addressed to Mr. Thomas O. Larkin, and found
among his papers since his decease.
This letter is dated "
U.S.S. Portsmouth, 1st April,
1846," and informs Mr. Larkin that his letters have this moment
arrived "per
Hannah."
Third. Mr. Larkin's letter to Capt. Gillespie, a copy
of which is found in his consular book, which Mr. Swasey swears to
have written himself.
In this letter Mr. Larkin says:
"Capt. Montgomery, of the Portsmouth, being under sailing orders
(the 1st or 2d instant), was waiting at Mazatlan for the Mexican
mail, when Commodore Sloat heard
per brig Hannah, of the
situation of Capt. Fremont near St. Johns, and immediately
dispatched the ship; she was twenty-one days from Mazatlan to
Monterey."
Fourth. The positive statement of Mr. Swasey, clerk to
Mr. Larkin, that the latter sent dispatches by the brig Hannah, in
March, 1846, in consequence of which the
Portsmouth came
to Monterey.
These proofs leave no room for doubt as to the sailing of
the
"
Hannah from Monterey, in the early part of March, with
Pina on board as a passenger, unless, indeed, we adopt the theory
of the government, and assume that the letter of Castillero to
Page 67 U. S. 316
Vallejo is forged, and that the latter has committed perjury;
that the notes of entries and departures in Larkin's consular book
are also forged; that the letter of Mott, Talbot & Co., is
forged; that the letter of Larkin to Fremont, of March 8, as also
his letter to Captain Gillespie of April 23, are forged; that a
number of the 'Diario Oficial,' purporting to be dated April 22,
has been prepared and procured to be printed, and a false entry of
pretended marine intelligence from Mazatlan inserted in it; and
finally, that Mr. Swasey, and probably Mr. Larkin's son, have
committed deliberate perjury in swearing to the genuineness of the
books and papers of the deceased consul. All this we must assume on
the faith of a single statement made by Captain Paty, of the bark
Don Quixote, to the effect that 'Don Andres Castillero and
his servant (Lazaro Pina, I think, was his name) were passengers'
on board his vessel on her voyage from Monterey, in April, 1846.
But even supposing that Captain Paty's memory is accurate, and that
Lazaro Pina did not sail in the
Hannah, but remained to
accompany Castillero in April, it only proves that the latter was
mistaken when he wrote to Vallejo from Santa Clara that Pina had
embarked on the 4th of March from Monterey. It may have happened,
that in the three days during which Larkin detained the
Hannah, something occurred to induce Castillero to
countermand his orders to Pina, and to send his letters and
specimens by another hand; for, it must be borne in mind, that
proofs of the precise mode in which a few letters and specimens of
ore were sent to Mexico fourteen years ago, cannot reasonably be
exacted of the claimants. It is surely enough if they show that a
vessel sailed about the time supposed, in which Lazaro Pina, or any
other messenger of Castillero, might have been a passenger. If the
United States contend that the letters and specimens were not and
could not have been received in Mexico at the time indicated in the
documents produced from that city, and therefore that those
documents are false, it is for them to establish the fact."
It is also suggested that Castillero was not in Mexico at the
time at which he is alleged to have presented himself before the
Junta de Fomento.
Page 67 U. S. 317
The evidence relied on by the United States to support this
assertion, consists of a publication in an evening paper in Mexico,
of the 6th of May, 1846, of the receipt by the government at the
last moment before the paper went to press of important
intelligence from California. As this intelligence was undoubtedly
contained in the dispatches sent by the vessel which carried
Castillero, it is inferred that he could not have arrived in time
to be present on the 6th at a meeting of the junta, and, therefore,
that the actas are false.
That Castillero might have reached Mexico in the first days of
May, is evident from the fact that he left Acapulco on the 24th of
April.
As to the precise time at which the dispatches of which he was
the bearer, or which had been sent by the vessel which conveyed him
to Acapulco, arrived in Mexico, we have no means of ascertaining,
except from the publication referred to.
The paper purports to have been published at three o'clock P.M.
of the 6th, as the dispatches were addressed to the government, and
not to the newspaper, it may be assumed that they were first
delivered at the appropriate Ministry. What the diligence or energy
of Mexican journalists may be, in obtaining the latest news, and
how long an interval would probably elapse before they would
possess themselves of the contents of a government dispatch, we are
wholly uninformed. That the news was communicated to the newspapers
shortly after twelve M. of the 6th, may be inferred from the fact
that it was in print at three P.M. It is not surely unreasonable to
suppose that the dispatch reached the government on the previous
evening, or early in the same morning. I see no reason why
Castillero might not, after delivering his dispatches, have
presented himself to the junta on the same day. It appears from the
minutes of the session of the 4th, that having learned the result
of the assay, the junta had made a reply to Castillero, asking him
what aid he required. Castillero would naturally, therefore, have
presented himself to the junta immediately upon his arrival; for,
besides the invitation of the junta, and his other reasons for
expediting the business, he had engaged the master
Page 67 U. S. 318
of the
Don Quixote to remain for him at Acapulco on her
return voyage. This Captain Paty testified he did. But after
waiting at Acapulco from the 21st of April to the 18th of May, he
received news that Castillero would meet him at Mazatlan or San
Blas. He touched at those places but heard nothing of him. The
circumstance, apparently unimportant, that Castillero determined to
rejoin the vessel at Mazatlan, and not at Acapulco, as originally
intended, is in precise accordance with the arrangement alleged to
have been entered into by him with the junta,
viz.: that
he was to receive the sum of $5,000 in the form of a draft on
Mazatlan.
The importance of this incidental corroboration is perhaps not
great. It seemed, however, worthy of mention.
But with regard to the inferences sought to be drawn against the
genuineness of the actas, from conjectures as to the probable time
of the arrival of the dispatches in Mexico, it seems to me obvious,
on any hypothesis that those dispatches must have been delivered,
and Castillero have arrived in Mexico, in time for him to present
himself before the junta on the 6th, as their minutes show.
From the foregoing, it appears that the evidence on the part of
the United States is insufficient, not only to disprove, but even
to raise a doubt as to the fact of the reception of Castillero's
letters and specimens, or of his own appearance before the junta at
the dates mentioned in the actas of that body.
But it is objected that the documents produced from Mexico are
not admissible in evidence.
This objection is based on the ground that all muniments of
title are incident to the land, and pass with it as if a part of
it.
That, therefore, all archives of Mexico relating to the
disposition of public lands in California, were included in the
treaty and passed to the United States with the cession of the
soil. It thus became the duty of the political power to execute the
treaty with reference to the muniments, as well as the land, and
until that is done, and the political power obtains those muniments
and presents them to the courts, the latter cannot judicially
recognize their existence.
Page 67 U. S. 319
No authority directly in point has been cited in support of this
position, but a vivid picture has been drawn of the possible evils
which might result if adverse claims to the lands of the United
States were allowed to be set up, founded on alleged public records
existing in a foreign country, and proved by the depositions and
certificates of foreign officials.
It will be seen that this objection would apply, although the
genuineness and the sufficiency of the documents to convey title
were undisputed. If a public and formal grant of a certain tract
had been made, to establish which and to show the proceedings which
led to it, evidence from the Mexican archives were necessary; if
the Congress had by law conveyed a title to an individual, of which
the only evidence existed in the reports of committees and the
journals of that body, the principle contended for would require
the court to reject all such documentary evidence, no matter in
what way proved or authenticated, for they are to be rejected, not
because their genuineness is doubtful, but because they are
archives and muniments of title to land.
It is admitted that, as a general rule, the right to muniments
of title passes with the land, and he who owns the latter is owner
of the evidences of his title to it.
But in the cases submitted to this Court under the act of 1851,
the inquiry always is, who is the owner, the United States or a
private individual?
The United States, in consenting to be sued, and in submitting
her rights to the determination of courts, has abdicated,
pro
tanto, her prerogative as a sovereign, and appears before the
court precisely as any individual who asserts an ownership in
land.
To say, then, that all muniments of title belong to the United
States as owners of land, and cannot be noticed by the courts until
commended to them by the Political department of the government, is
to assume the very point the suit was instituted to determine, for
the question is does the United States own the land? The claimant
avers that she does not, and never did, and in support of his claim
he produces muniments of title which, on the very principle
contended for, belong to him and
Page 67 U. S. 320
not to the United States, for they are the muniments of title to
his own land.
I cannot perceive, therefore, that the familiar doctrine of the
common law, which regards title deeds as incident to the land and
as passing with it, has any application.
In the argument submitted by the counsel for the United States,
the distinction seems to have been lost sight of between the
political rights of the United States as a sovereign and her purely
proprietary rights as an alleged owner of land, which are alone
passed upon in this class of cases.
In defining the boundaries of the territorial sovereignty of the
United States; in determining whether a particular tract is within
the limits of a territory the sovereignty of which has been ceded
by treaty to the United States, the courts must always adopt the
construction given to the treaty by the Political department,
Elam v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. 253. But when the United States
consent to appear merely as a suitor in the courts and to litigate
her rights with an adverse private claimant, the rights of both
must be determined by the application of the ordinary rules which
prevail in actions between private individuals.
It is remarked by the counsel for the United States:
"If the Judiciary were authorized to say what land was intended
to be transferred, and what papers as muniments of title and
incidental to the land, it might designate land and accredit papers
which the political department did not, and thus conflict might
arise within the government itself."
But this is precisely what the highest authority of the nation
has, by the law of 1851, enjoined upon the courts to do. The very
object of that law was that the courts
should ascertain
what lands passed to the United States by the treaty, and what
lands were private and did not pass. The question, by that law, was
converted from a political to a judicial one, and no conflict could
possibly arise, for the political and all other departments are by
law required to be governed by the decision of the court, which
determines what is public land belonging to the United States, and
what is private land belonging to individuals.
There is something repugnant to reason and justice in the
Page 67 U. S. 321
idea that the United States, after consenting to appear as an
ordinary litigant before the courts, and submit her proprietary
rights to their determination, should suddenly, in the midst of the
suit, throw off her character as a mere party to a suit respecting
the ownership of land, or rather, without ceasing to be such,
should resume and assert her sovereign rights, and announce to her
antagonist that evidences of title he offers, though genuine and
conclusive, shall not be admitted by the court unless presented to
it through and by herself; while, at the same time, she refuses to
obtain them from the foreign government, or to receive them, if
offered, or to present them to the court, if received.
Compared with such manifest injustice, the evils which might
result from possible impositions practiced on the courts by means
of forged archives &c., are insignificant.
I think the general objection to the admissibility of the
documents, because they are Mexican archives, not recognized as
such by the political department of the United States government,
cannot be maintained.
Assuming, then, the documents from the archives of Mexico to be
genuine and admissible, I proceed to consider their legal
effect:
1. As to the alleged ratification of acts of the alcalde Pico.
This ratification is supposed, by the claimants, to be contained in
the dispatch of Becerra to the junta, of May 20, 1846, and in the
marginal "acuerdo" on the letter of Vicente Segura, signed with the
rubric of the same Minister.
The dispatch of Becerra announces, as we have seen, to the
junta, that
"His Excellency [
i.e. the president] has been pleased
to approve, in all its parts, the agreement made with that
individual [
viz., Castillero] in order to commence the
working of said mine."
The "acuerdo" on the margin of Segura's communication is as
follows:
"Granted, in the terms which are proposed, and with respect to
the land, let the corresponding order issue to the Minister of
Relations for the proper measures of his office, with
Page 67 U. S. 322
the understanding that the supreme government accedes to the
petition."
An "acuerdo," or order on the margin of a letter, petition, or
communication of any kind, is merely an expression of the
determination of the Minister or other functionary to whom it is
addressed, in regard to its subject matter. Its chief use was to
direct the clerks or other subordinates in the preparation of the
reply, or in taking other action with regard to it. If the
proceedings has been interrupted after the "acuerdo" is affixed,
but before the dispatch is written or title issued as directed, it
may be regarded not unreasonably as a species of equitable title,
or as sufficient, coupled with other equitable circumstances, to
justify the party in asking the completion of the proceeding so
initiated. But when the title has issued, or the dispatch been
written in pursuance of the "acuerdo," when the latter has been
submitted to the Minister, and approved and signed by him, the
dispatch so approved and signed is the highest and best evidence,
not only of the action of the government in the premises, but of
the true intention of the "acuerdo," for, surely no argument is
necessary to prove that an official reply, signed by a public
officer, is better evidence of his resolution, with regard to a
particular application, than a direction to his subordinates as to
the form in which the reply is to be drafted.
Dismissing, then, the "acuerdo," or rather treating it as
intending precisely what the dispatch, prepared in obedience to it,
expresses, let us consider the true import and effect of the
latter.
It will be observed that the dispatch of Becerra does not, in
terms, profess to ratify any mining possession or grant, either of
lands or of pertenencias. Nor does it announce that the president
has been pleased to make such ratification. It merely informs the
junta that His Excellency has approved an agreement made by the
junta with Castillero.
It is not pretended that any such agreement was, at that time,
or afterwards, formally entered into between the parties. The
propositions of Castillero are dated May 12. The communication of
the junta is dated May 14, and Castillero himself, in
Page 67 U. S. 323
the preamble to the statement of his propositions, expresses his
persuasion that the junta will accede to his request
"so far as may be within its powers, and that it will send up to
the supreme government with a recommendation that which may require
the decision of the latter."
From the communication of the junta it is evident that the
authorization of the supreme government was necessary to enable it
to furnish Castillero with the iron retorts and flasks belonging to
it, as also to make him the loan he solicited of $5,000, payable in
quicksilver at $100 per quintal, and without the five percent
premium per annum which the law required it to exact.
Until the approval of the supreme government of this proposed
arrangement could be had, no formal contract could be entered into.
It was therefore not until May 25, and after the receipt of
Becerra's communication approving the proposed contract, that the
junta resolved "that the proper judicial agreement be drawn up
immediately, and that application be made for the draft for the
$5,000 on Mazatlan or Guadalajara," as appears by the actas of that
day.
That the agreement was never so drawn up and executed is
admitted; and on the 29th of May an order was made for the payment
of the Notary Calapiz "for proceedings relative to it," its
consummation having been prevented by the order suspending all
payments out of the quicksilver fund.
The language of the dispatch is, therefore, evidently inaccurate
in speaking of the approval of the agreement
made or
"convenio celebrado" with Castillero. Its evident
intention was to signify the approval by the government of the
agreement proposed to be made, and which the junta had expressed
its willingness and even anxiety to enter into.
What the agreement was, which, after the approval of the
government had been obtained, the junta and Castillero had fixed
upon and nearly consummated by a formal act before a notary, we
learn from the Report of the junta of November 17, 1846, produced
by Senor de Bassoco, and embodied in Mr. Lafragua's report in
December of the same year.
Page 67 U. S. 324
In this report, the junta, after giving an account of the
presentation of cinnabar ore &c., by Senor del Moral, of its
assay, and of their inquiry of Castillero what aid he required,
proceeds as follows:
"The Senor presented his petition in due form, and it having
been very attentively examined by the junta, he made his
propositions, to which this junta agreed, to-wit: that there should
be delivered to him $5,000 in money, eight iron retorts of those
which the junta ordered to be made for the examinations previously
made, and all the quicksilver flasks it had in the negotiation of
Tasco; Senor Castillero obligating himself, on his part, to repay
said advance in quicksilver at the rate of $100 per quintal, within
six months from his leaving the port of Mazatlan. This agreement
was approved by the supreme government on the 20th of the same
month; but on account of the declaration of blockade made by the
United States of the North, when he was about to receive the draft
on Mazatlan, the ministry issued the order of September 19 of this
year, directing the suspension of all payments of the branch of
quicksilver, except those for the support of the College and the
expenses of the office."
In this account of the cause, and the date of the abandonment of
the agreement with Castillero, the junta are evidently inaccurate,
for their own actas show that the communication informing them of
the blockade of Vera Cruz and Tampico, and directing the suspension
of all payments for the extraction of quicksilver, was dated on the
27th of May, and received by the junta on the 28th; and on the
29th, the Notary Calapiz was paid for his proceedings in relation
to the intended contract.
The communication of the 19th of September ordered that the
assets of the quicksilver fund should
continue to be used
merely for the support of the college, and it demanded a loan
of $25,000 from the Dotal Fund. This was strenuously opposed by
some of the members, on the ground that the Dotal Fund was the
private property of the creditors of that fund. As these
discussions occurred less than two months previous to the date of
the report of the junta, and were no doubt fresh in its
recollection, and as the report was prepared in great haste, only
eight days
Page 67 U. S. 325
being allowed for the purpose, the junta fell into the error of
ascribing the breaking off of the negotiation with Castillero to
the order of September 19, instead of to that of the 28th of
May.
But with respect to the agreement made with Castillero, and
approved by the supreme government, the report is very explicit. It
sets forth the terms of that contract with a clearness which leaves
no room for doubt as to what it was that the supreme government
approved.
The agreement thus entered into embraced all the subjects upon
which the junta had authority to act. Nor can it be said that the
approval of the supreme government was only required as to those
propositions of Castillero which related to the ratification of his
mining possession and a grant of two leagues, for we learn from the
letter of the junta that that body had no authority, without the
approval of the government, either to sell the retorts and flasks
desired by Castillero, or to lend him a large sum without interest,
to be repaid in quicksilver. But with the granting of lands, the
junta had nothing to do, and whatever might have been the
resolution of the government on Castillero's seventh and eighth
propositions, it would never have been communicated to the junta in
the form of an approval of an agreement into which they were
supposed to have already entered.
Some stress has been laid on the use of the word "concedido," or
"granted," in the marginal "acuerdo" of Becerra.
Had this word appeared alone, and been written on the margin of
Castillero's petition, it might, perhaps, have been considered
evidence that the whole prayer of the petition had been granted.
But it is written on the margin of the junta's letter, and clearly
imports that its request was granted,
viz., that the
proposed agreement was approved, as is unequivocally shown by the
official dispatch written on the same day, and in pursuance of the
marginal order of the Minister.
We shall presently see that the petition of Castillero was for
land, and not for additional mining pertenencias.
The acuerdo therefore adds:
"With respect to the land, let the corresponding order issue
Page 67 U. S. 326
to the Minister of Relations, for the proper measures of his
office with the understanding that the supreme government accedes
to the petition."
The corresponding order did issue -- we have it in Becerra's
dispatch to the Minister of Justice. The proper measures were taken
in his office -- we have them in his dispatch to the Governor of
California, and from it alone can we learn what was done by the
government "with respect to the land" petitioned for by
Castillero.
It has already been stated that the act of possession of the
alcalde Pico embraced two distinct objects: first, the judicial
possession of a mine, with the number of pertenencias allowed by
law -- but, how many, both the alcalde and the parties seem to have
been uncertain; secondly, a grant of a tract of land extending
three thousand varas in every direction, as a
"gracia" or
gift to Castillero. The distinction between these two acts of the
alcalde is not only admitted but strenuously insisted on by the
counsel for claimant, and it was contended that the first was legal
and valid, while the second is conceded to be utterly nugatory and
void.
When, therefore, Castillero asked that the junta would recommend
the approval by the supreme government of the possession which had
been
given him of the
mine, in the same terms as
those in which he then held it, he must have intended to ask either
for a ratification of the possession of the mine, or for an
approval of the grant of three thousand varas of land, or for
both.
That he did not ask for three thousand varas to be given him as
additional pertenencias, is admitted by one of the able and eminent
counsel who argued the cause for the claimant.
In the printed report of his argument, he is asked by Mr.
Randolph of counsel for United States:
You argue, then, that the junta, misunderstanding this document
of Castillero's, supposed it to be for additional pertenencias, and
as such recommended its confirmation.
Mr. Benjamin -- "Certainly."
But this was not the only error into which the junta fell,
for
Page 67 U. S. 327
they not only supposed that Castillero was seeking additional
mining pertenencias, and merely a tract of land for his hacienda
&c., as well as two square leagues to supply wood for his
burnings, but they supposed the three thousand varas so desired,
would only amount to fifteen pertenencias, whereas they would
amount to nine hundred. The junta evidently supposed that
Castillero solicited a tract three thousand varas long, and of the
width of one pertenencia. As a pertenencia is two hundred varas in
length, a tract three thousand varas long would comprise exactly
fifteen pertenencias. They overlooked the fact that the tract was
to be three thousand varas
"in every direction," or six
thousand varas square, making nine hundred pertenencias.
If then the supreme government had formally and unequivocally
signified its assent to this recommendation of the junta, and
ratified the possession as represented by them, it may well be
doubted whether in a court of equity it could be deemed to have
ratified any more than a possession of fifteen pertenencias, which
was all that Castillero, speaking through the junta, demanded.
But the fact, that the junta thought it necessary to devote so
much time, and to suggest so many arguments, to induce the supreme
government to ratify a supposed mining possession of fifteen
pertenencias, justifies the supposition that had they known it to
have comprised nine hundred pertenencias, they would probably have
withheld their recommendation.
That both the junta and the supreme government were willing to
assist the enterprise of Castillero by every means in their power,
is evident. Their object in so doing, was not to confer a favor on
Castillero personally, but to promote the production of quicksilver
in the largest quantities, and at the cheapest rates possible.
The same policy would have forbidden them to give a single miner
nine hundred mines of one pertenencia each, and thereby to exclude
from so large a tract all miners who might otherwise have
discovered and developed new mines in the vicinity and increased
the production and diminished the price of the metal the government
was so anxious to obtain.
Page 67 U. S. 328
It has appeared to me that the very considerations urged by the
counsel of the claimant with regard to the policy and interest of
Mexico in promoting the production of quicksilver render it
impossible that it could, consistently with that policy, have
consented to a monopoly by a single miner of a mining tract of such
enormous dimensions.
It is clear, therefore, that the supreme government could not
have intended to ratify the possession of the three thousand varas
as mining pertenencias.
But we have already seen that the approval by the government of
the agreement made by the junta, is conclusively shown not to
import a ratification or grant of any pertenencias or lands
whatsoever, for the terms of the agreement so approved are
disclosed to us by the junta itself, and can be ascertained as
exactly as if the formal instrument had been executed by the
parties, the approval of the government appended to it, and were
now before us.
It does not appear that the act of possession of Pico was ever
exhibited either to the junta or the supreme government. If it had
been, it would have disclosed the fact that the mine had been
denounced and possession of it given, as on the lands of Jose Reyes
Berreyesa. It would also have been seen that the alcalde had
assumed to grant a tract three thousand varas in every direction
from the mouth of the mine, which must have included a large
portion of the land of a private individual, even supposing that
the mine itself might not have been within his limits. Adopting the
obvious construction of the act of possession contended for by the
claimants, and regarding that act, and the ratification asked for
by Castillero, as referring to a tract of land and not to
additional pertenencias, and assuming with the distinguished
counsel for the claimants, that the junta was mistaken in supposing
that any number of additional pertenencias, whether fifteen or nine
hundred, were asked for, we may well doubt whether the supreme
government, if informed that this tract would in great part include
private property, would have so readily made the grant. We have no
reason to suppose that, as between individuals at least, rights of
property are not
Page 67 U. S. 329
as scrupulously respected and enforced by the Mexican as by
other nations.
Again, it is contended that in addition to the grant of three
thousand varas in every direction, made by the alcalde and approved
by the supreme government, there were also granted to Castillero
two square leagues of land, to be measured in like manner from the
mouth of the mine.
The mode adopted and the precautions observed by the supreme
government in signifying its willingness that such a grant should
be made, will hereafter be adverted to.
Our only concern with it at present is to observe, that on the
claimant's theory, the supreme government first ratified a
concession of six thousand varas square, or more than a league and
a quarter in extent, and then issued orders for a further grant of
identically the same land, with three-quarters of a league in
addition. Its resolution with regard to the latter is formally and
regularly communicated to the Governor of California, who was
directed to take the proper steps to carry out the intention of the
government; while with regard to the former, its determination is
supposed to be expressed in a declaration that it approves a
contract, the terms of which we know, and which has no reference,
nor could it have had, to grants of land; and the approval of
which, if it could by possibility be construed to mean an approval
of all Castillero's propositions would import a grant of the two
sitios, as clearly as it would import a ratification of the
concession of the six thousand varas square.
But the dispatch of Becerra to the Minister of Relations informs
us to what part of Castillero's petition the president thought
proper to accede, in language too explicit to be misunderstood.
After transcribing his letter to the junta, Becerra says:
"And I have the honor to transcribe it to your Excellency, to
the end that with respect to the petition of Senor Castillero, to
which his Excellency the president
ad interim has thought
proper to accede, that there be granted to him two square leagues
as a colonist,"
&c.
It is insisted by the counsel for the claimants, that the
words
Page 67 U. S. 330
"that there be granted to him two square leagues as a
colonist," are descriptive of the petition of Castillero to
which the president acceded. The observation is just. Such is no
doubt the true construction of the dispatch, and it establishes
beyond doubt, that in acceding to the petition the president meant
only to accede to that part of it which asked for a grant of two
leagues as a colonist, without expressing any resolution as to the
application for a ratification of the concession of three thousand
varas.
As, then, the supposed ratification is not contained in the
approval of the contract of the junta, nor in the acceding by the
president to the petition for two leagues in colonization, it must
be found, if at all, in the word "concedido" or
"granted"
in the acuerdo. But for the reasons given above, I am satisfied
that no such signification can be attached to that word in the face
of the dispatches written in pursuance of the acuerdo, and which
embody and explain its meaning.
But if any doubt could remain as to the true intention and
effect of the approval of the junta's contract, it would be
dissipated by the evidence afforded by the acts of the parties, of
the construction placed upon it by themselves.
Throughout the whole negotiation for the purchase of barras or
shares in the mine, conducted by Mr. Negrete on behalf of Mr.
Forbes with Castillero in person, the latter, though urged to
exhibit his documents of title, produces only the dispatch of
Castillo Lanzas for two leagues. In the instrument of ratification
the mine is spoken of as of three pertenencias in extent, and
Castillero
"cedes in favor of the contractors of supply (aviadores), and
for the sixteen years of his contract, the two square leagues of
land of which the government has made him a concession, as shown by
the official document which he presents, that it may be inserted at
the end of the present instrument."
The Lanzas dispatch is accordingly copied in the instrument, but
not the slightest allusion is made to any other grant of three
thousand varas in every direction made by an alcalde, and approved
by the supreme government.
Page 67 U. S. 331
In all the transactions between the parties, the idea is but
once suggested, that the approval of the junta's contract with
Castillero imported a ratification of the alcalde's concession of
three thousand varas.
It occurs in Alexander Forbes' letter to James Alexander Forbes
of February 3, 1850. In that letter Mr. Forbes says:
"We think at present it may be the best plan to get an
authenticated copy of the approval by the Mexican government of the
three thousand varas given by the alcalde on giving possession of
the mine. As a doubt may be started as to whether the alcalde,
acting as the Juez de Mineria, had a right to make this grant, yet,
if approved by the Mexican government before the possession of the
country by the Americans, there could be no doubt on the subject.
This takes in our hacienda, and
unless opposed by the
Berreyesas, would, I should think, settle the question.
Castillero says such an approval was given, and that on
his arrival in Mexico he will procure a judicial copy of it.
This is the plan we shall adopt, if we hear nothing from
you to alter this resolution."
"Since writing the foregoing, I have looked over your private
letter to William Forbes, dated 18th October, in which you state
the limits or boundaries as follows:"
"The boundaries must be expressed as joining on the north and
northwest by lands of the ranchos de San Vicento and de los
Capitancillos, and the east, south and west, by Serrania or Tierras
baldias"
"Castillero is
not certain of accomplishing this latter
plan, but thinks the first,
that is the three thousand
varas, the best."
It will be observed that this letter unmistakably discloses the
"plan," which James Alexander Forbes had suggested, and Alexander
Forbes adopted, of obtaining fraudulent and antedated documents
from Mexico expressing the boundaries of the two sitios &c. No
reliance can therefore be placed on the statement that Castillero
said the approval was given.
But whatever he may have told Mr. Forbes, the approval and the
agreement approved are before us, and we have already seen that
they contain no allusion to any concession of land by an
alcalde.
Page 67 U. S. 332
The silence of Castillero during his negotiations with Mr.
Negrete is far more significant than any statement made four years
afterward to Mr. Forbes, nor can it be said that at the time of
those negotiations he was ignorant of the action of government, for
the Castillo Lanzas dispatch, then in his possession, and inserted
at the end of the contract of ratification, recites the Becerra
dispatch, which contains the approval of the contract. the parties
were in Mexico; the public offices were accessible, and it would
have been easy to ascertain what was the contract approved. That
Castillero knew what that contract was cannot be doubted, and yet
he and all the other parties, through a series of years, treat the
dispatch as a concession of two leagues, but never suspect it to
contain evidence of, or to be in itself, a ratification of the
alcalde's gracia, or gratification. Even so late as the date of Mr.
Halleck's affidavit, James Alexander Forbes, with the notarial copy
of the Lanzas dispatch in his possession, never seems to have
imagined that the dispatch of Becerra inserted in it, and
announcing the approval of the junta's contract, constituted the
ratification he so much desired of the alcalde's grant of three
thousand varas.
I think it clear, therefore, that the dispatch of Becerra cannot
be construed to import a ratification of the action of the alcalde,
either in respect to the possession of the mine, or to the grant by
him of three thousand varas.
As to the alleged grant of two leagues. It cannot be denied that
if the documents produced by the claimants be genuine, they show
that Castillero presented a petition for two square leagues of
land; that this petition was by the
Junta de Fomento
submitted to the supreme government; that the junta was formally
apprised by the Minister of Justice that the proper communication
had been sent to the Minister of Relations, that suitable orders
might be issued by him with respect to that part of Castillero's
petition; that a communication was accordingly sent to that
minister, informing him that the president had acceded to
Castillero's petition, and requiring him to issue the corresponding
orders; and that the Minister of Relations, in pursuance of these
instructions, transcribed the communication to
Page 67 U. S. 333
the Governor of California, in order that in conformity with
what the laws and dispositions on colonization provided, he might
put Senor Castillero in possession of the said two leagues.
It is manifest that this dispatch of Castillo Lanzas does not by
its terms grant the land solicited. It contains no words
translative of title; it is not addressed to the supposed grantee,
but to the Governor of California; it cannot have been intended to
serve as a muniment of title to Castillero, for otherwise it would
have contained formal words sufficient to vest the estate in him.
It is merely an official communication addressed by one executive
officer to another, which, for aught that appears, might as well
have been sent to the Governor of California by a courier as by the
hands of Castillero. It contains, however, an unequivocal official
declaration that the president of the republic had thought proper
to accede to Castillero's petition, and an order to put him in
possession conformably to the laws on colonization.
The case thus resembles in some respects that of
United States v.
Lecompte, 11 How. 124, where the claimant had
obtained an order from the lieutenant governor directing the
Procurador del Comun to put him in possession, if in so doing no
prejudice would result to third persons.
The petition solicited two leagues at the place called
Llanacoco, to be located so as to include the entire prairie of
that name. The Supreme Court held that the order of the lieutenant
governor could not be construed to signify an absolute
unconditional grant of any specific land; and, as it was never
presented to the procurador, and the land had never been severed
from the public domain by that officer, and no occupation was shown
which could supply the deficiency by giving certainty and
definiteness to the claim, it was rejected.
If the reasoning of the Supreme Court be attentively considered,
it will be seen that they refused to treat the order of the
lieutenant governor as an absolute grant, for two reasons:
1st. Because it directed the petitioner to be put in possession,
"if in so doing no prejudice could result to third persons," and
the matter was referred to an officer, to whom the duty was
Page 67 U. S. 334
confided of ascertaining the means &c., of the petitioner
and "judging of the propriety of the grant."
And 2d. Because the land was not severed from the public domain
by the description in the concession, or by authorized survey, or
by any definite occupation.
It may, I think, be inferred from the whole opinion, that if the
concession had described any tract which could be identified, and
the petitioner had occupied it, the claim would have been
confirmed, notwithstanding the omission to present the order to the
procurador. In the case at bar, the governor is ordered to put the
petitioner in possession "in
conformity with what is prescribed
in the laws and dispositions on colonization."
The 2d article of the law of 1824, declares that "those lands of
the nation, which are not the property of any individual,
corporation or town, are the subject of this law, and may be
colonized."
The first step to be taken by the governor, in execution of the
order, would have been to ascertain whether the land was within the
colonization law -- that is, whether it was the land of the nation,
or belonged to any private individual; precisely as the procurador
was to ascertain whether by putting the petitioner in possession,
any injury would result to third parties.
To construe this dispatch as an absolute grant of a specific
tract, we must suppose Castillero to have practiced on the
government a gross fraud, either by concealing or misstating the
facts. For, even admitting that he had reason to believe that the
mine itself was not within the limits of Berreyesa, he must have
known that a tract of two leagues measured in all directions from
the mouth of the mine, would certainly have included a portion of
his land.
The counsel for the claimants, feeling, no doubt, the force of
this objection, suggested that it was intended that inquiry should
be made by the governor, and the two leagues were to be located in
such a way as not to include private land. But this admission
proves that the duties to be performed by the governor, were
exactly those assigned to the procurador del Comun, in
Page 67 U. S. 335
the case referred to; and if the order to put in possession was
not a grant in that case, neither can it be so considered in
this.
The case at bar is in some respects, stronger than that
reported, for here the order was addressed to the executive of a
department to whom, by the laws, in conformity to which the order
was to be executed, it belonged to issue the formal title for the
land, while the functions of the procurador were merely to inquire
into and report the circumstances of the petitioner, and to mark
off and sever from the public domain the land granted.
Had the governor and departmental assembly, in ignorance of the
application of Castillero, and the action of the supreme government
upon it, regularly granted the same land to another person, in
strict conformity with the colonization laws, I cannot doubt that
his title, though subsequent in date to the dispatch of Lanzas,
would have prevailed; and on the reception of that dispatch the
governor would either have refrained from executing it at all, or
would, more probably, have allowed Castillero to take his two
leagues out of the nearest body of ungranted land.
In the very ingenious brief filed by the counsel for the United
States, it is observed:
"The theory of government for the Mexican territories or
departments was that all the powers of government were exercised
immediately by the local political chief or governor, through whom
the will of the supreme central authority at the City of Mexico was
transmitted, and by the action of which functionary, and not
otherwise, it became operative on persons and things. It was a
government of governments -- the plan which Spain established in
the beginning for the government of the Indies, and which Mexico
continued to this extent without a change. Its model was the
organization of an army. It was the same whether the sovereign's
will was expressed in the form of a general law, or some particular
disposition like a grant; all were alike instructions to an
inferior officer. They were not binding on him until known, nor
effective until obeyed -- until he had done or suffered another to
do that which was required."
"The local representative of the national sovereignty was
Page 67 U. S. 336
invested with all the active powers of government in this
department. He alone could manifest the grantor's will, and from
Mexico no more could come than the impulse which should move him to
act. In these titles, nothing was done here, even the mining title
being an original grant in Mexico. The local representative has
never acted, and therefore there has been no expression of the
grantor's will."
In this lucid exposition of the general theory on which the vast
governmental machinery of the ancient Spanish monarchy, and
measurably that of Mexico, were constructed, I entirely concur. But
if it be argued that because the will of the sovereign was
ordinarily communicated to and executed by subordinate agents, he
had no power himself directly to act upon persons and things
without intervention of the local authority, I cannot assent to the
conclusion; for the will of an absolute sovereign can be manifested
in whatever form he may choose to adopt; and had the King of Spain
seen fit to make, under his own hand and seal, a grant to a subject
in a remote province, I cannot suppose that the royal patent in the
subject's hands would not have been respected by the subordinate
authorities, notwithstanding that the title had been transferred,
and the grant consummated without their intervention.
Nor is it certain that the order of the sovereign to a
subordinate to make a grant to a subject, or do any other act in
the performance in which he is interested, is a mere nullity, until
known to and obeyed by the inferior officer.
If, as is admitted, the impulse which moves the subordinate to
act, rightfully proceeds from the central authority -- if the
subordinate has no discretion in the premises, but must obey, and
his duties are purely ministerial and executive, it would seem that
the sovereign disposition which required him to act, cannot be
regarded as a mere nullity, even though never in fact obeyed.
Such, I understand to have been the ruling of the Supreme Court
in a recent case, where an order to the governor that a particular
island should be assigned to an individual was held itself "to
adjudicate the title;" the formal issuing of the title papers
Page 67 U. S. 337
being a merely ministerial act to be performed by the
governor.
It is true, that, in that case, the order was received and
obeyed and the title issued. But, the language of the Supreme Court
is explicit, that the dispatch "operated of itself
to
adjudicate the title to the claimants." This case will be more
fully considered hereafter.
But whether a notice of the superior will must have been given
to the local representative of the government, and that will must
have been obeyed before it could affect the rights of persons, or
the condition of things; or whether, as seems to be considered by
the Supreme Court, the sovereign disposition, though unknown to,
and unobeyed by, the local authority, had an immediate and
independent operation, it is clear that by the uniform practice of
the Spanish and Mexican governments, the dispositions of the
sovereign authority always contemplated the instrumentality of the
local subordinate.
If, therefore, in this case the government had known that the
tract solicited was public land, and that no objection whatever
existed to making the grant, it would have been a signal departure
from its ancient and established practice to issue the grant
directly to the applicant.
In treating, then, this dispatch as an order to make a grant, we
suppose the government to have conformed to its immemorial and
traditional usages. While to consider the dispatch as itself
conveying the title, and containing merely an order to the governor
to put the claimant in possession of land already granted to him by
the direct act of the supreme government, is to suppose the latter
to have adopted an exceptional mode of proceeding, inconsistent
with that pursued in the island's case, and with the theory on
which the whole system of government was organized.
For these reasons I cannot regard the dispatch of Lanzas as a
direct grant of the two leagues referred to.
Taking this view of the dispatch, we cannot account for the very
explicit declarations of the Mexican commissioners, that
Page 67 U. S. 338
no grants had been made of land in California subsequent to May
13, 1846.
For, even if their researches had extended to the official
correspondence of Ministers of Relations who had held office from
the date of the declaration, and they had discovered the dispatch
of Lanzas, they regarded it but as an order to the governor to make
a grant, which they knew could never have been acted on. The truth
of their declarations, therefore, to the American commissioner, is
thus entirely consistent with the genuineness of the documents,
while, if the dispatch be considered to import an absolute and
present grant, we are driven to choose between two alternatives --
one, that the commissioners were guilty of a deliberate falsehood
-- the other, that the dispatch itself is a forgery.
But the dispatch, though not itself a grant, is, nevertheless,
evidence that the supreme government acceded to Castillero's
petition, and it is, at least, an order that a grant should be made
to him by the government of California, in conformity with the
colonization laws,
i.e. if the land were vacant and no
other insuperable objection existed.
Giving then this construction to the dispatch, let us consider
its legal effect -- and here we are fortunately not without
authority to guide us.
In the case of
Andres Castillero v. The
United States, 23 How. 464, the claimant relied on
a dispatch of the Minister of Interior, in many respects resembling
that of Castillo Lanzas.
In that dispatch the Minister informs the governor, that in
consideration of the services and merits of Castillero, the
president directs him (the Minister)
"to recommend Castillero very efficaciously to your Excellency
and the departmental junta, in order that before proceeding to the
distribution which should be made conformably to the laws, and as
is directed in the order of this date, of the lands of the islands
adjacent to that peninsula, there be assigned to that individual
the one which he may select of those nearest to the place where he
should reside with the troops under his orders. "
Page 67 U. S. 339
It will be noticed that the terms of this dispatch are not in
some respects so strong as those of the dispatch of Lanzas.
It is not said that the president has acceded to a petition for
any particular island or tract of land. Castillero is merely
"recommended very efficaciously to the governor and departmental
junta," and this recommendation is made in order that there be
"assigned" to him the island he may select &c.;
contemplating, evidently the execution and delivery by the governor
of the formal title for the island so selected. In the Lanzas
dispatch, the president's assent to the petition is communicated to
the governor, "in order
that he may put Castillero in
possession of the land" -- an expression which has afforded
room for the construction that no further title paper was designed
to be issued.
In the Santa Cruz Island case, the Supreme Court held that "the
dispatch of the government operated to adjudicate the title." Its
language is:
"They (the governor and the junta) were accordingly directed not
to proceed to make adjudications under the previous order until the
assignment of the title to this claimant was perfected, but they
were
not required to make the assignment or to cause it to be
made."
"To accomplish that purpose, and to carry into effect the
command of the president, two things only were necessary to be
done; one was to be performed by the claimant, and the other was a
ministerial act. It was the claimant who was to make the selection,
and if it was a proper one, near the place where he was stationed
with his troops, nothing remained but to make the assignment as
described in the dispatch. Emanating as the dispatch did from the
supreme power of the nation,
it operated of itself to
adjudicate the title to the claimant, leaving no discretion to be
exercised by the authorities of the department. Neither the
governor nor the assembly nor both combined, could withhold the
grant after a proper selection, without disobeying the express
command of the supreme government.
Nothing, therefore, remained
to be done, but to issue the title papers, and that was
Page 67 U. S. 340
the proper duty of the governor as the Executive organ of
the department."
This language would seem too clear for misconstruction. It seems
to me an express decision, that an order of the supreme government
directing the governor of a department to make a grant, operates to
adjudicate the title to the land specified. It could not, however,
have been meant that the order itself was an absolute grant; for it
was evident that the formal grant was to be made by the governor,
and besides it did not refer to any particular island, but to such
island as Castillero might select; and it was only after the
selection was made and found to be a proper one, that the title
attached to any particular piece of land.
If such were the effect of the order of Pesada, I am unable to
perceive why the Castillo Lanzas dispatch must not be considered to
have had a like operation. The direction in that dispatch to the
governor to put Castillero in possession in conformity with the
laws and dispositions on colonization, confided no more discretion
to him than the duty of seeing that the island selected was a
proper one, confided to the governor in the case before the Supreme
Court, and if the issuing of the title papers in that case was a
"merely ministerial act," to be done in respect of land, the title
of which had already been adjudicated to the claimant, the same
view must be taken of the action, which construing the Lanzas
dispatch least favorably for the claimants, Governor Pico was in
this case ordered to take.
It is contended that the president of Mexico had no authority to
make the order for a grant contained in the Lanzas dispatch.
But, 1st. It is apparent, both from the action of the supreme
government in this case, as well as in that of the islands on the
coast, that it exercised the power.
The presumption, therefore, arises, that it had the authority it
exercised.
"The public acts of public officers purporting to be exercised
in an official capacity, and by public authority, are not to be
presumed to be usurped, but a legitimate authority previously given
or subsequently ratified, which is equivalent."
United States v.
Arredondo, 6 Pet. 728.
Page 67 U. S. 341
2. The Colonization Law of 1824, while it enjoined upon the
states of the Confederation the duty of making laws or regulations
for colonizing within their respective limits, committed the whole
subject of colonization in the territories to the supreme
executive.
The 16th article of that law provides, that "the Executive shall
proceed in conformity with the principles established to the
colonization of the territories."
In pursuance of this authority the supreme executive, in 1828,
framed the regulations which prescribed the mode in which the
colonization of the territories should be effected.
It was from the dispositions thus made by the supreme executive,
that the governor and junta in the Territory of California derived
all their powers with respect to the granting of land.
Had the president seen fit to confide the authority to grant,
either to the governor alone, to the prefects of the Partidas, or
to local Commissioners, he might have done so, or he might have
retained it exclusively to himself.
The regulations, in fact, provided that concessions made by the
governor should not be definitely valid unless approved by the
departmental assembly; and, in case its approval was not obtained,
the governor was to report to the supreme government for its
decision.
Grants made to "empresarios" were, by the 7th regulation, not to
be held as definitely valid until the approval of the supreme
government was obtained.
It thus appears, not only that the authority of the governors
with respect to colonization was not immediately conferred by any
law of Congress, and owed its existence to discretionary
regulations of the supreme executive, but that by those very
regulations the executive reserved to itself an important part of
the granting power. After the adoption of the central system, and
the division of the whole republic into departments, the right to
dispose of all the lands belonging to the nation seems to have been
confided to the supreme executive. The law of 1837 gave to the
president authority to sell or pledge
Page 67 U. S. 342
them, and by his decree of 11th of March, 1842, other important
and fundamental changes in the colonization laws with regard to
foreigners were made by General Santa Anna.
It is said by making a grant directly to an individual, or in
directing the governor of a department to make one, the president
violated an existing law, which even an absolute monarch cannot do;
for he may abrogate or modify the law, yet while it remains
unrepealed he cannot violate it.
The general principle is admitted, but its application to this
case is not perceived.
That the president, by the law of 1824, could have reserved to
himself the whole right of making grants in the territories, has
already been shown. Such a disposition, though not in accordance
with the ordinary policy of the Spanish and Mexican governments,
which entrusted the administration of local affairs to local
subordinates by whom the orders of the supreme government were
carried into effect, would, nevertheless, have been legal and
within the limits of the discretion confided to the Executive by
the law of 1824.
This power he still retained, notwithstanding that he had framed
general regulations on the subject for the guidance of the
governments of the territories; for those regulations were the mere
creature of the president, and could not deprive him or his
successors of the general powers given him by law, or of the right
to act directly in special cases by making the grant himself, or by
ordering the governor to do so.
The governor of a department had no power to grant lands by
virtue of his office, or conferred on him as such by law.
All his authority to grant was derived from the regulations of
the Executive, of whom he was but the agent and the instrument. He
was at all times subject to Executive instructions, and the
president might at his discretion withdraw any lands from
colonization, prescribe new qualifications for grantees, or in any
other manner modify the governor's authority with respect to
grants, or direct him as to its exercise.
That he did so interpose with regard to certain mission lands
which the governor and assembly were about to grant is well
Page 67 U. S. 343
known, and this Court has decided grants in violation of the
order of the Executive to be invalid. The islands cases and the
case at bar furnish additional instances of the exercise of the
same power.
I confess myself unable to understand how a grant by the
president, still less an order to his local subordinate to make a
grant, can be deemed such a violation of the law as no absolute
monarch could commit, or indeed any violation of law
whatsoever.
3d. The question is decided by the Supreme Court in the case
which has been referred to.
If the supreme government had power to direct the title papers
to be issued, and the dispatch operated to adjudicate the title in
that case, it must be deemed to have possessed the same authority,
and a similar operation must be attributed to the dispatch in the
case at bar.
But it is urged that a distinction should be drawn between the
cases, on the ground that islands on the coast were not within the
Colonization Law of 1824, and therefore might be granted directly
by the supreme executive, but that he had no authority to act in
relation to lands embraced within the provisions of that law,
except in obedience to it, and in conformity with the regulations
of 1828.
It has already been shown that under the Colonization Law, the
president had authority either directly to grant or to order the
governor to grant public lands in the territories. But his power to
grant islands was also derived from the same law, and in making the
grant of the island of Santa Cruz, the validity of which has been
affirmed by the Supreme Court, he acted in strict obedience to
it.
It will also be seen that the judgment of the Supreme Court is
not based on the supposed existence of any authority in the
executive not derived from the law of 1824, and also that his right
to repeal or modify at his will, in a particular case, his own
general regulations which imposed rules on the subordinate local
authorities, is impliedly recognized in the decisions referred
to.
Page 67 U. S. 344
The 4th article of the law of 1824 provides, that
"the lands embraced within the twenty leagues bordering on any
foreign nation, or within ten leagues of the seacoast, cannot be
colonized without the previous approbation of the supreme executive
power."
As by the previous section of the law, the Congresses of the
various states were directed to enact laws and regulations for
colonization within their respective territories, while by Art. 16
a similar duty was enjoined upon the supreme executive with respect
to lands within the territories, it is obvious that the 4th article
was intended chiefly to restrict the power of the states rather
than that of the executive, whose assent to the grant was all that
was required.
In the case of
United States v.
Arguello, 18 How. 548, it was held by the Supreme
Court that the "colonization" spoken of in the 4th article must be
construed to mean colonization by foreigners, and not the
distribution of lands to individuals and families.
The power of the governors of California to grant lands within
the ten littoral leagues might perhaps have been sustained, even if
the 4th article be construed to apply to grants to individuals, on
the ground that the absence of any express prohibition in the
regulations, and the constant exercise of the power with the full
knowledge of the supreme government, authorize the presumption that
the approval required by the 4th article was in fact given.
However this may be, it is clear that the governors of
California did not assume to grant the islands on the coast without
the previous permission of the supreme government. Application for
such permission was accordingly made, and it was finally
communicated to the departmental authorities in the dispatch of
Pesada of July 20, 1838.
When, therefore, the president ordered a grant of an island to
be made, which order the governor obeyed by issuing the title
papers, the grant was in strict conformity with the colonization
laws.
For that law confided to the supreme executive, as has been
Page 67 U. S. 345
observed, the whole subject of colonization within the
territories, nor did it impose any limits on the exercise of his
discretion, except that the colonization was to be conducted
according to the principles established by the law.
Those principles were of a general character, and fixed nothing
as to the particular agencies or mode to be adopted in conferring
the title upon the colonist.
In the case of lands within the ten littoral leagues, the law
itself forbade their colonization without the previous approbation
of the supreme executive power. The general regulations, therefore,
by which the supreme executive authorized the governors and juntas
of the departments to grant public lands, were never construed to
authorize them to grant the islands on the coast, and as observed
by the Supreme Court, the power to make such grants was neither
claimed nor exercised by the departmental authorities prior to the
20th day of July, 1838, when the "previous approbation of the
supreme executive" required by the law was communicated to
them.
That approbation having been thus obtained, the departmental
authorities proceeded to grant; and in so doing acted in precise
conformity with the colonization laws.
It had appeared to this Court, that the effect of that dispatch
was simply to communicate to the departmental authorities the
assent of the supreme executive that the islands should be granted,
and thus to bring them within the general regulations which
prescribed the mode in which all grants should be made.
Those regulations required the concurrence of the departmental
assembly to give definitive validity to the grant by the governor,
but inasmuch as the Supreme Court had decided that even without the
concurrence the grant was valid, unless the grantee's right had
been forfeited by abandonment, it seemed to me that a similar rule
should be observed with respect to the grants of islands, which, by
the previous assent of the supreme executive, had been brought
within the general regulations.
This view, however, the Supreme Court decided to be erroneous,
and held that the dispatch prescribed a new rule on the subject,
and that the general regulations did not apply to it.
Page 67 U. S. 346
The mode of granting indicated in the dispatch of Pesada was,
therefore, to be strictly followed, and inasmuch as the
departmental assembly had not concurred, the grant to Osio was
adjudged to be void.
But the reversal of the decision of the district court on this
point, in no way shows that the Supreme Court did not consider
grants of islands, when made in pursuance of either the general or
special regulations of the executive, as not made under the
colonization law.
On the contrary, it appears to me manifest, that neither in the
case of Osio, nor in that of Castillero, do the Supreme Court base
their decision on the idea that grants of islands were not within
the colonization law of 1824; but that they reject the first claim,
because in their opinion the grant was not made in the manner
prescribed by the executive, to whom that law committed the whole
power over the subject, and they confirm the second claim because
the executive instructions were followed. It is explicitly stated
in the opinion, "that it is immaterial whether or not the power to
grant the islands on the coast was vested in the governor"
(
i.e. by the General executive regulations of 1828), for
the effect of the dispatch "was to repeal the previous regulations
on the subject, and to substitute a new one in their place."
As this power of making regulations, with respect to
colonization in the territories, was conferred, in terms, on the
supreme executive, by the Colonization law, and was precisely that
which it exercised when the General executive regulations of 1828
were framed, I confess myself unable to perceive how a grant of an
island on the coast, made in obedience to executive instructions,
was not, in every respect, a grant under the Colonization laws, nor
can I discover any foundation for the distinction attempted to be
drawn between the case at bar and that of the island of Santa Cruz.
The lands, in both cases, were open to grant under the general law;
and even, if the granting of the islands on the coast to
individuals be considered to be embraced within the provisions of
the 4th article, and that grants of lands within the littoral
leagues were not, the only distinction between
Page 67 U. S. 347
the cases would be, that in one the previous assent of the
executive was necessary, while in the other it was not. Each, when
regularly granted, must be held to have been granted under the
colonization laws. When, therefore, in the Santa Cruz Island case,
the Supreme Court held that the dispatch of the minister, ordering
one of the islands to be assigned to Castillero, "operated to
adjudicate the title," the same construction must be given to the
dispatch in this case, which states that the president has acceded
to a petition for two leagues, and orders the governor to put the
petitioner in possession.
As, then, the Lanzas dispatch "operated to adjudicate the title"
to the claimant, he must be held to have acquired an inchoate
title, which, if founded on such equitable considerations as would
have bound the former government to complete it by issuing the
formal title papers, this government is equally bound to
respect.
Had the claimant been an ordinary colonist, and relying on the
action of the supreme government on his petition, settled upon and
occupied the land, building a house upon and cultivating it, and
had the United States found him in the enjoyment of an undisputed
possession, it cannot, I think, be doubted that his possession
would have been undisturbed and his title confirmed, even though he
had neglected to obtain from the governor the formal grant.
But no such possession was taken in this case, nor was the
concession received in California or even known to have been made,
until after the subversion of the Mexican authority.
The question therefore arises: were there any antecedent
equitable considerations on which the concession was founded, such
as would have bound the conscience of the Mexican government to
perfect it?
That an antecedent consideration, such as the patriotic and
public services of the grantee, is one which a court of equity
cannot disregard, has been expressly decided by the Supreme
Court.
In the case of
Fremont v. the United States, the Court
said:
"The grant was not made merely to carry out the policy of
Page 67 U. S. 348
the colonization laws, but in consideration of the previous
public and patriotic services of the grantee; and although this
cannot be regarded as a money consideration, making the transaction
a purchase from the government, yet it is the acknowledgment of a
just and equitable claim, and when the grant was made on that
consideration, the title in a court of Equity ought to be as firm
and valid as if it had been purchased with money on the same
conditions."
58 U. S. 17
How. 558.
If, then, antecedent considerations of this nature are to be
looked to, in determining whether the former government was under
any equitable obligation to perfect the title of the claimant, it
is perhaps not easy to imagine a case where the merits of the
petitioner and the consideration rendered by him for a small tract
of land in a remote department could be greater.
The immense value of the discovery he had made to the great
mining interests of Mexico, need not be dwelt upon. Our own
experience in California enables us at once to appreciate how
indispensable is an ample and cheap supply of quicksilver to the
development of mines of the precious metals. But to Mexico the
discovery was, as justly observed by one of the counsel for the
claimants, "the unsealing of a hidden fountain of wealth, as
precious to her as the rains and dews and living streams are to the
nations that live by tillage."
For years it had been the policy of Mexico to stimulate
explorations for and to encourage the working of quicksilver mines.
By the laws of February 20, 1822, and 7th October, 1823, which
imposed duties on gold and silver, quicksilver was expressly
exempted from contribution.
In 1842, the Junta de Fomento was established, and empowered "to
fix the mode in which the working of quicksilver mines was to be
supplied, rewarded, stimulated and protected."
By the decree of May 24, 1843, rewards of $35,000, and of $5 per
quintal, were promised to successful miners; and by the decrees of
July 5 and September 25th of the same year, the junta was empowered
to work, to supply and protect quicksilver mines, and to cause
researches for them to be made throughout the Republic.
Page 67 U. S. 349
When, therefore, Castillero announced the discovery of a mine
surpassing in richness that of Almaden in Spain, upon which Mexico
had so long been dependent, and desired a grant of two leagues in a
department where land was commonly distributed gratuitously in
tracts five times as large, he had equitable claims upon the
government far surpassing "the public and patriotic services of
Alvarado," which the Supreme Court declares to have been an
equitable consideration, as strong as if the grant had been
purchased with money.
Compared with the service rendered and about to be rendered to
the Mexican nation by Castillero, the consideration on which the
ordinary colonization grants were founded was insignificant; for
that consideration merely consisted in building a house,
cultivating a few acres of an immense tract, and suffering wild
cattle to roam at will over the remainder.
The fact that he was working the mine showed that Castillero had
already effected a settlement upon the land, and its further
development insured an accession to the population of the country
far greater than could have been obtained by any other disposition
of the public domain.
The purpose for which he sought the land, apprised the
government that it was of a kind not usually fit for cultivation,
for it was required to supply wood for his burnings. In thus
assisting his enterprise, the nation had as great an interest as
Castillero himself, for it was the attainment of an object to which
their attention, their efforts, and no inconsiderable portion of
their revenues had long been devoted.
It has appeared to me that all these circumstances constitute an
equitable consideration for the inchoate title or concession
obtained by Castillero, and that they were sufficient to create an
equitable obligation on the former government, and therefore, on
this, to complete and make good the inceptive rights he had
acquired.
It is urged by the counsel for the United States that even if
the Castillo Lanzas dispatch be considered a grant, it nevertheless
is void, because no possession of the land was given before the 7th
of July, 1846, when the Mexican authority in California was
Page 67 U. S. 350
subverted, and the United States acquired the land by the
adverse title of conquest.
It is not denied that, as maintained in the brief of the counsel
for the United States, in questions of prize or no prize, the
liability of the property captured to condemnation depends upon the
fact whether the possession and actual control of it have passed
from the hands of the enemy to those of a neutral.
Nor is it questioned that, where the territory is ceded by one
sovereign to another, the nationality of the inhabitants of the
ceded territory is not changed until the stipulations of the treaty
are executed by a formal delivery given, and by possession
taken.
It is also admitted that, by the Roman law, and by most systems
of jurisprudence, the property in a thing cannot be transferred
without a delivery of the possession of the thing, either actual,
or feigned and constructive; and that ordinarily, he who first
obtains possession shall hold the thing even as against a prior
purchaser, to whom it has not been delivered. In the transfer of
land the same principle prevailed at the common law, and a
symbolical delivery of the land, or livery of seizin, was
indispensable to render a feoffment operative.
This, however, is now unnecessary in conveyances under the
Statute of Uses.
In the grants made by the governors of California, we
accordingly find that "the judicial delivery of possession by the
corresponding Judge" was always contemplated. This proceeding would
seem to have been designed for a double purpose: 1st., to complete
the transfer of the property, by a formal delivery or tradition of
the thing, thus adding the
jus in re to the
jus ad
rem, and, 2d, to designate and sever from the public domain
the tract granted by measuring its extent and establishing its
boundaries.
Whether, if the boundaries are distinctly designated in the
grant, the judicial delivery of possession was in strictness
necessary to complete the right of property in the grantee, may be
doubted; for at common law the King's grant was held to import
Page 67 U. S. 351
livery of seizin, and the same principle is said to prevail at
civil law.
But whether technically necessary or not, it is settled by the
decisions of the Supreme Court, that the want of a judicial
delivery of possession is no obstacle to the confirmation of a
grant of lands in California.
The occupation and settlement which, in the Louisiana and
Florida cases, were considered to constitute the true grounds of
the claimant's equity, were required by the Supreme Court to be
shown, not because the technical rule required a formal delivery of
possession to complete the transfer of the right of property, but,
because the petitioner, by occupying and cultivating his land under
an inchoate title, and an implied promise of a grant, had rendered
to the former government a consideration which bound its conscience
and that of its successors to perfect the title.
The question then, in this and other cases, is not whether a
formal and technical delivery of possession has been made, but
whether a consideration has been given for the grant, either
antecedent by public services, the payment of money and the like,
or subsequent, by occupation, settlement &c., which in equity
required the former government to convert the inchoate title
actually obtained into a perfect title. If, at the acquisition of
the country, the conscience of the former government was bound by
this obligation it is equally binding upon us; and the claimant,
whether a resident or a foreign Mexican, has a right of property
which the United States have agreed by the treaty to respect.
Whether the consideration rendered, and the equitable claims on
the bounty of the Mexican government possessed by Castillero, are
sufficient to create such an obligation, is a question which,
perhaps, depends rather on the spirit in which his claims are
looked upon than upon any definite rule of law. It has appeared to
me, as before stated, that the consideration rendered by him to the
Mexican government did not merely constitute a claim upon its
bounty; but that when he had obtained the assent of the supreme
authority to a grant of a specific tract
Page 67 U. S. 352
of land, when orders had been issued to make him a grant and to
put him in possession, the execution of which was prevented solely
by the outbreak of war, the inchoate title so obtained ought to be
respected by the United States.
But if the fact of possession and occupation be insisted on as
indispensable, it is to be remembered that the land solicited and
ordered to be granted to Castillero, was two leagues "on the land
of his mining possession."
It is not disputed that early in December, 1845, he had occupied
and worked the mine.
Possession of it had been given to him by the alcalde, in a
loose and informal manner, it is true, but still sufficient to give
an official sanction to his occupation, more than six months before
the conquest of the country; and from December, 1845, he and his
assigns have continued to hold it. As, then, the mine was within
the two leagues solicited, and as he had already taken possession
of, and was working it, he may, perhaps, be considered, after the
order of Lanzas was issued, to have been in possession of the lands
referred to in that order.
In no cases was any other possession taken by the California
rancheros of the large tracts -- sometimes eleven square leagues in
extent -- granted to them, than by building a rude house of abode,
cultivating a small portion of the land, and stocking the remainder
with a greater or less number of wild cattle or horses.
I am aware that in this view of the claimant's equities, I have
the misfortune to differ from the circuit judge.
But on the best consideration I have been able to give to the
subject, it has appeared to me not only warranted by the decisions
of the Supreme Court, but in accordance with the dictates of the
enlarged, and, so to speak, generous justice, which should animate
a great and a conquering nation in dealing with the rights of the
vanquished.
But it is said that if Castillero obtained from the supreme
government a grant of two leagues on his mining possession, it
proves one of two propositions -- either that he was guilty of a
gross fraud in suppressing the fact, that such a grant would
include private land, or that the supreme government committed
Page 67 U. S. 353
a violation of law equally gross, in attempting to grant the
lands of private individuals.
Had the title set up been a formal and absolute grant of two
leagues, to be measured in every direction from the mouth of the
mine, the observation would have possessed much force. But such is
not the import of the Lanzas dispatch; on the contrary, it directs
the governor to put the petitioner in possession of the land
solicited, "in conformity with the laws and dispositions on
colonization," a direction which rendered it certain that, in the
location of the grant, private rights would be respected. Had the
supreme government known that a tract of two leagues, measured in
every direction from the mouth of the mine, would include private
land, the precautions used in framing the order to the governor
would have sufficed for the protection of the owner; and the
dispatch is, in effect, but the expression of the president's
assent to a grant of two leagues on land of the petitioner's mining
possession, and an order to the governor to execute the grant;
provided, and so far as it could be done, without injury to third
persons.
It cannot, therefore, be inferred from this dispatch, either
that Castillero practiced a fraud on the government, or that the
latter committed, or intended to commit, a violation of any private
rights whatever.
The last objection to the validity of the Lanzas dispatch which
I shall notice, is that contained in the seventh division of the
printed argument filed by the counsel for the United States.
The same point had been raised and fully considered by the Court
in the case of
Palmer v. United States. As the decisions
of this Court have not been reported, it has been thought most
convenient to append that opinion to this, adding to it such
further observations as may seem appropriate:
"Before proceeding to an examination of the merits of this case,
a general objection to the validity of the grant must be
considered. The grant purports to have been executed on the 25th of
June, 1856, subsequently to the declaration of war between the
United States and Mexico. "
Page 67 U. S. 354
It is contended, on the part of the United States, that on
general principles of public law, grants made
flagrante
bello when conquest has been set on foot, and actual
occupation is imminent and inevitable, have no validity against the
subsequent conqueror. The question has not heretofore been
presented to this Court. It has been discussed with much ingenuity
and ability.
It is urged that in the conduct of war, and the determination of
its objects, the political department is supreme, and that the
judiciary are bound by the view taken by the political branch of
the government; that although Congress has alone power to declare
war, to the executive is given the right of shaping it to its ends,
or of declaring its objects.
To ascertain its objects, resort must, therefore, be had to
executive acts, and as the executive acts in this case
unequivocally indicate that a principal object of the war was to
acquire California, that acquisition was thus brought within the
scope of the war, and must be so regarded by the courts.
To this point, the case of
Harcourt v.
Gaillard, 12 Wheat. 523, is cited.
Such being the object or scope of the war, it is urged that the
intended conquest of California embraced not only the establishment
of sovereign rights in the territory, but also the acquisition of
the public property within it.
That the proprietary rights to be acquired by the conquest are
as essential, though not as important a part of the fruits of
conquest, as the political, the commercial, and other advantages
proposed to be obtained, and that no part of these objects of the
conquest is to be ignored.
The conquest of California, including the acquisition of the
public domain, having been thus shown to have been the object, or
brought within the scope of the war, it was urged that any grants
of public land made after the conquest was projected, and when it
was about to be effected, though before it actually occurred, must
be deemed to be in fraud of the rights of the incoming conqueror,
and invalid as against him.
The foregoing statement is believed to present the outline of
the argument submitted on the part of the United States.
Page 67 U. S. 355
Both the premises and the conclusion must be examined.
If the conquest of California was the object of the war, it must
be so considered because that object was avowed by competent
authority when war was declared; or because it was made the object
of the war, after its commencement, by the political branch of the
government.
It may be admitted that this government had long regarded
California, or the Bay of San Francisco, as an important and
desirable acquisition. The instructions of the president to Mr.
Slidell indicate the wish of the executive to obtain it by purchase
and cession, as Louisiana and Florida have been acquired.
It by no means follows that the intention to obtain it by force
of arms, or conquest, can be attributed to Congress, still less
that such was its object or motive in declaring war.
The law by which war was declared, recognizes it as previously
existing by the act of Mexico; and it is known that hostilities
arose by the invasion by Mexico of a territory claimed by the
United States to be within their limits. Such was not, therefore,
the object for which war was declared, or its existence recognized
-- nor could it constitutionally have been.
It is observed by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY, in
Fleming v.
Page,, 9 How. 614,
"The genius and character of our institutions are peaceful, and
the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the
purpose of aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the general
government to vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its
own rights and the rights of its citizens.
A war, therefore,
declared by Congress, can
never be presumed to be
waged for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of
territory."
As a limitation upon the power of Congress, this distinction
may, practically, be unimportant. As every war in which the country
may be engaged must be regarded by all branches of the government,
and even by neutrals, as a just war; and as nations can readily
cloak a spirit of rapacity and aggression under professions of
justice and moderation, it is at all times easy, should our country
be actuated by such a spirit, to declare an aggressive war, to be
undertaken in self-defense and an intended
Page 67 U. S. 356
conquest to be desired only as a compensation for past or
security against future injuries.
But the distinction is important when a court is asked to
presume that conquest was the object of the war.
Under our government, at least, such a presumption cannot be
indulged.
The conquest of California being thus shown not to have been the
object for which war was declared, we may next inquire whether, by
the acts of the executive under its power to conduct the war, it
became such, or was brought within its scope, in the sense in which
the phrase was used at the bar?
In his annual message to Congress, in December, 1846, the
president distinctly states that the war originated in the attempt
of Mexico to reconquer Texas to the Sabine. After adverting to the
considerations which had induced the executive to interpose no
obstacles to the return of Santa Anna, the latter being more
favorably disposed to peace than Paredes, who was then at the head
of affairs, the president observed:
"The war has not been waged with a view to conquest, but having
been commenced by Mexico, it has been carried into the enemy's
country, and will be vigorously prosecuted there, with a view to
obtain an honorable peace, and thereby secure ample indemnity for
the expenses of the war, as well as our much injured citizens, who
have large pecuniary demands against Mexico."
Similar declarations are frequently and emphatically repeated by
the president in various communications to Congress, and in the
correspondence between the American commissioner and the Mexican
authorities.
The object of the war, therefore, as indicated by executive acts
and declarations, was not conquest, or, if conquest, it was that of
a safe and honorable peace.
It is true, that after the military occupation of California,
and after our arms had been everywhere successful, and perhaps at
the commencement of hostilities, the executive and the nation may
have confidently anticipated that by the treaty of peace we would
acquire California. As Mexico was known to be impoverished and
distracted by civil dissensions, it was obvious
Page 67 U. S. 357
that the only indemnity she could afford us for the expenses of
the war was the cession of a portion of her territory.
The instructions of the Secretary of State to Mr. Trist, show
that the extension of the boundaries of the United States over New
Mexico and Upper California, for a sum not exceeding $20,000,000,
was a condition
sine qua non of any treaty.
The extraordinary success of our arms, the fact that we already
held possession of a great part of the Territory of the enemy, and
virtually of his capital, our great expenditures of blood and
treasure, entitled us to retain a portion, at least, of our
conquest as the only indemnity we could obtain. But we were willing
to restore a considerable part of our possessions, and to pay for
that retained by us a large amount of money.
But such views and intentions on the part of the executive, as
to the condition on which the war should cease, are very different
from waging it with a view to conquest. The war cannot, then, in
any just sense, be deemed to have been declared by Congress, or
conducted by the executive, with a view to conquest.
The power of the president in the conduct of the war was that of
a commander-in-chief of the army and navy. He had authority to
direct and control military operations. As part of the treatymaking
power, he could determine when and on what conditions a treaty of
peace should be made. But he had no power to impress upon the war a
purpose different from that with which it was commenced, and which,
as MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY declares, Congress could not
constitutionally entertain. "The law declaring war," observes the
same great authority in the case above cited,
"does not imply the authority to the president to enlarge the
limits of the United States by subjugating the enemy's country. The
United States, it is true, may extend its boundaries by treaty or
conquest, and may demand the cessation of territory as the
condition of peace, to indemnify its citizens for the injuries they
suffered, or to reimburse the government for the expenses the
war."
"But this can be done only by the treatymaking power, or the
legislative authority, and it is not a part of the authority
Page 67 U. S. 358
conferred upon the president by the declaration of war. His duty
and his power are purely military. As commander-in-chief, he is
authorized to direct the military and naval forces placed by law at
his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most
effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade
the hostile country, and subjugate it to the sovereignty and
authority of the United States. But his conquests do not enlarge
the boundaries of the United States, nor extend the operations of
our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned them by
the legislative power."
It is true that in the case in which these observations are
made, the point to be determined was whether enemies' territory
which in the course of hostilities had come into our military
possession became a part of the United States, and subject to our
general laws. But they are important to this case as defining the
power of the president in war to be merely that of the military
commander-in-chief; that territory can be acquired only by the
treatymaking and legislative authority, and consequently that the
fact that hostilities are by the military authority directed
against a particular portion of the enemy's territory cannot be
said to make the acquisition of that territory the object of the
war.
It is therefore apparent that the war with Mexico cannot be
regarded by the judicial department of this government as commenced
or conducted with the object of effecting the conquest of
California.
The most that can be said is that its military occupation was
effected as a means of crippling and subduing the enemy, and with
the expectation, on the part of the executive, that we would retain
and finally insist upon the cessation of the territory so
subjugated by our arms as an indemnity for our injuries and
expenses.
The nature and amount of indemnity to be required, the extent of
territory to be ceded, depended upon the will of the Senate and the
executive as the treatymaking power, and until that will was
expressed in the treaty, the intention to effect the permanent
acquisition of all California cannot be attributed to the
Page 67 U. S. 359
political power any more than a similar intention with regard to
those conquests which at the close of the war was restored.
If, then, it were a principle of public law that all alienations
of public domain by a sovereign are invalid as against an enemy who
has commenced or is prosecuting a war with the object of conquering
the territory within which the property is situated, or who has set
on foot expeditions for the purpose with sufficient power to attain
the end, as proved by the event, the facts of this case would
hardly admit of its application.
But assuming the facts as contended for by the United States, we
proceed to inquire whether such a rule of law exists. The right of
Mexico to dispose of her public domain in California before the war
is admitted. It is not denied that that right ceased, as against
the United States, when the latter effected the conquest of the
country and subverted the Mexican authority.
If it ceased before the actual conquest and displacement of the
Mexican authority, it must be because the determination of the
United States to effect the conquest, and the making preparation to
carry out its determination, gave to the latter some inchoate or
inceptive right to the territory subsequently conquered, and the
title consummated by the conquest relates back by a kind of fiction
to the date of its inception.
We have been unable to discover any trace or intimation of such
a doctrine in any writer on the laws of war.
The rights derived from conquest are derived from force alone.
They are recognized because there is no one to dispute them, not
because they are in a moral sense rightful and just. The conquest
of an enemy's country, admitted to be his, is not, therefore, the
assertion of an antecedent right.
It is the assertion of the will and the power to wrest it from
him.
Even where a conquest is effected to obtain an indemnity justly
due, it is not the assertion of any antecedent right to the
particular territory conquered, but only of the general right to a
compensation for injury.
The right of the conqueror is therefore derived from the
conquest alone. It originates in the conquest, not in the
intention
Page 67 U. S. 360
to conquer, though coupled with the ability to effect his
purpose, nor even in the
right to conquer as means of
obtaining satisfaction for injury.
It is the fact of conquest, not the intention or power to
conquer, which clothes him with the rights of a conqueror.
The rights acquired by the conquest are temporary and precarious
until the
jus post liminii is extinguished, and if a
reconquest is effected, the rights of the sovereign who has
temporarily been displaced revive, and are deemed to have been
uninterrupted.
The term "title by conquest" expresses, therefore, a fact and
not a right. Until the fact of conquest occurs, the conqueror can
have no rights. To affirm that a title acquired by conquest relates
back to a period anterior to the conquest is almost a contradiction
in terms.
Until, then, the conquest is effected, the rights of the
existing sovereign remain unimpaired. He can therefore dispose of
the public property at his discretion, nor can that right be
effected by the determination of an enemy to conquer the territory,
and by his preparations for the purpose, though the event may
demonstrate the conquest to have been practicable.
The case of
Harcourt v. Gaillard has been cited by the
counsel of the United States in support of the doctrine contended
for by them.
The distinction between that case and the case at bar is
obvious.
In
Harcourt v. Gaillard, the question was as to the
validity of a grant by a British governor of land within a
territory claimed to belong to the United States. As our government
had asserted and maintained by arms its title to the disputed
tract, the Judicial Department were not at liberty to declare the
claim to be wrongful and to recognize the right of any other
sovereign over the territory in question.
The title of the United States was in no sense acquired by
conquest, Her title was antecedent to the war -- it was merely
maintained by arms and recognized by the treaty of peace.
The question presented was, in the language of the Court,
Page 67 U. S. 361
"one of disputed boundaries, within which the power that
succeeds in war is not obliged to recognize as valid any acts of
ownership exercised by his adversary."
Had the claim been that of conquest alone, the case would have
presented, says the Court, more difficulty.
"That ground would admit the original right of the Governor of
Florida to grant, and if so, his right to grant
might have
continued until the treaty of peace, and the grant to Harcourt
might, in that case, have had extended to it the principles of
public law which are applicable to territories acquired by
conquest, whereas the right set up by South Carolina and Georgia
denies all power in the grantor over the soil."
The distinction is made still more apparent in a subsequent part
of the opinion of the Court:
"War is a suit prosecuted by the sword,
and where the
question to be decided is one of
original claim to
territory, grants of soil made
flagrante bello by the
party that fails, can only derive validity from treaty
stipulations. It is
not necessary here to consider the
rights of the
conqueror in case of actual
conquest."
(P.
25 U. S.
528.)
The latter is precisely the question to be considered in the
case at bar.
The argument of the counsel for the United States can,
therefore, derive no support from the case referred to.
It is proper, however, to observe that the case of
Harcourt
v. Gaillard, was not cited by the counsel as directly in
point. It was thought to establish that all grants of territory
brought within the scope of the war are invalid; that the case of
disputed boundaries presents one illustration of the general
principle, while the case at bar furnishes another.
It has seemed to me, however, that the principle of that
decision relates exclusively to the case of disputed boundaries,
and that the distinction is clearly drawn between that case and one
like the present; that between them, the obvious difference exists
that the former is a case of "original claim to territory," while
the other is "one of actual conquest."
It is said, on the part of the United States, that if a
belligerent can, after a declaration of war, grant any portion of
his property,
Page 67 U. S. 362
he can grant the whole, and thus might, by granting himself
away, escape responsibility. The case supposed is an extreme one.
It can rarely occur that a nation will seek safety by
self-destruction.
But in such case the adversary might refuse to recognize such a
voluntary suicide as affecting his rights. For the purpose of
obtaining satisfaction he might justly treat the nationality sought
to be extinguished as still existing. But in all courts his rights
would be enforced against the successor or grantee of the
extinguished sovereign.
The question would them be purely political, for the new
sovereign, whether to carry on the war or accede to the demands of
the enemy of his grantor, and for the latter whether to prosecute
the war against the new sovereign. Little aid, however, can be
derived from the consideration of such extreme and improbable
cases.
It is further urged that the doctrine contended for on behalf of
the United States is in the prize law.
It may perhaps be admitted that a theory of maritime prize
formerly obtained, which assumed that a belligerent has a vested
right by the declaration of war in all sea-borne private property
of the other belligerent; that no such property can be the subject
of lawful sale; that all contracts of sale touching belligerent
property of any sort, though valid on land, are invalidated by the
mere fact of such property being embarked on the ocean, and that if
transferred to a neutral after the declaration of war it is a
lawful prize to the other belligerent.
Such is not now the received law of nations. It is now admitted
that the
bona fide sale of the ships of belligerents to
neutrals in time of war is lawful and valid unless made
in
transitu.
In the
Johanna Emilia, 29 Eng.L. & Eq. 562, Dr.
Lushington says:
"It is not denied that it is competent for neutrals to purchase
the property of enemies in another country, whether consisting of
ships or anything else.
They have a perfect right to do so, and
no belligerent right can override it. "
Page 67 U. S. 363
Such is the doctrine maintained by our government.
See
opinion of Mr. Attorney General Cushing October 8, 1855.
If a sale to a neutral of a ship
in transitu is held
invalid as against a belligerent, it is not by reason of any
inchoate right or lien acquired by the latter by the mere
declaration of war, or because the right of the enemy to dispose of
his property is invalidated by the declaration of war, but because
a sale of a ship
in transitu is taken as proof of
collusion and fraud, and as showing that no absolute transfer has,
in fact, been made. The soundness of even this rule is doubted by
the Attorney General in the opinion referred to.
A sale of a ship not
in transitu by a belligerent to a
neutral is valid as against a subsequent captor, no matter how
imminent the danger of capture would have been had she remained
enemy's property, and no matter what may be the number of hostile
fleets fitted out to cruise against her and similar property of the
belligerent.
It appears, then, that the law of nations, with regard to prize
of war, does not recognize the principle contended for.
It is urged, however, that this principle lies at the foundation
of the doctrine of
post liminii.
It is argued that a state of war implies the reciprocal denial,
by each belligerent, of all rights on the other.
That each relies upon force alone -- force to retain or force to
take.
They are thus in
aequali jure.
The principle, therefore, by which, on a reconquest, the
original title revives and is deemed to have been uninterrupted is
founded on the presumption that the displaced sovereign intended a
reconquest when he was displaced, and his title on a reconquest
relates back to the time when he is presumed to have formed such
intention. If then (it is argued) the title by reconquest relates
back to the time of the formation of the intention to reconquer,
the title by conquest must relate back to a similar period, for a
state of war implies the negation of all antecedent right on either
side. The only difference between the cases being that in the case
of a reconquest, the intention to
Page 67 U. S. 364
reconquer is presumed until the
jus post liminii is
extinguished, while in the case of conquest, that intention must be
shown by the political acts and declarations of the conqueror.
The argument is ingenious, but the premises are, I think,
erroneous.
It is assumed that a new title is acquired by a sovereign who
recovers territories from which he has temporarily been driven.
On the contrary, he holds it by his original title, which could
only have been displaced by a permanent conquest. But the fact that
he recovers the territory proves that what seemed a conquest was
but a temporary dispossession. The invader, therefore, acquired no
rights, nor did the original sovereign lose any. He continues to
rule, not by a newly acquired title which relates back to any
former period, but by his ancient title, which, in contemplation of
law, has never been divested.
Nor is it true that war is the reciprocal denial of all rights
by the belligerents, with respect to the territories of either.
A conqueror does not deny that the territory seized was, at the
time of the conquest, the territory of his enemy, any more than the
attaching creditor denies the property attached to be that of his
debtor.
On the contrary, he asserts it to be his. He seizes it as the
property of his enemy, and because it is his. He asserts no
antecedent title in himself. He declares not that the territory was
his, but that he will make it his by conquest.
The title or right acquired by a conquest is not the same as
that of the original possessor.
It is temporary and precarious, and ceases the moment the
conqueror is expelled. If, indeed, a title by conquest can be said
ever to have existed when the event has proved that the attempted
conquest could not be maintained.
The title of the original owner is wholly unaffected by the
temporary dispossession, and even during his dispossession, it is
treated as valid and subsisting, until the
jus post
liminii has been extinguished.
The extinction of the
post liminii is necessary to
ripen the
Page 67 U. S. 365
temporary and merely possessory right of the conqueror into such
an ownership of the territory as neutrals can recognize.
If these views be correct, the case of a reconquest does not
present the instance supposed of a title relating back to the
period of the formation of the intention to reconquer.
But the further discussion of this subject would require more
time and space than can be devoted to it.
It might, I think, be demonstrated that a rule which supposes
all rights of a sovereign, with respect to territory subsequently
conquered, to cease as against the conqueror not when war is
declared, but when the war is prosecuted with the object of
conquest, when expeditions are fitted out for the purpose, and when
the conquest is "imminent and inevitable," is not susceptible of
practical application as a rule of international law.
That those rights must continue until the date of actual
conquest, or of the treaty of cession, or else must cease at the
declaration of war, and that an attempt to estimate the "imminency"
of the conquest at any intermediate period, or to try the validity
of the exercise of sovereign rights, by calculating the chances of
war at a particular moment, would be impracticable and
illusory.
On the whole, I am of opinion that the right of Mexico to grant
her public domain in California continued until the conquest of the
country by the United States.
It is further urged on the part of the United States that grants
made after the 13th May are not protected by the treaty of peace
because such was not the intention of the parties.
That the Mexican commissioners who negotiated the peace, and who
represented the claimants as well as the Mexican government,
solemnly, and after special inquiry, declared that none such
existed, and that the treaty was negotiated on the faith of this
declaration.
It is admitted that such a declaration was made, and embodied in
the project of the treaty submitted to the Senate.
Had this declaration been contained in the treaty as adopted and
ratified, it might very possibly have been regarded as a
Page 67 U. S. 366
covenant or stipulation that no such grants should be deemed
valid by the United States.
But the clause containing it was struck out by the Senate, not
by the general vote which struck out the whole of the 10th article,
of which this declaration formed a part, but by a distinct vote
upon the question whether this particular clause should stand as a
part of the treaty.
The Court cannot assume, therefore, that a treaty was assented
to by the United States on the faith of this declaration by Mexico,
else why strike it out? It may not unreasonably be supposed that
the Senate refused to allow the declaration to remain because they
were willing that grants made after the 13th May, if any such there
were, should be submitted to the courts and rejected or confirmed
as might be just.
But assuming that the treaty was concluded on the faith of this
declaration, the rights of an individual to his property cannot be
affected by it.
The stipulation in the treaty by which the property of the
inhabitants of the ceded territory was secured conveyed to them no
additional rights. "An article to secure this object, so deservedly
held sacred in the view of policy as well as of justice and
humanity, is always required and never refused." 12 Wheat.
25 U. S.
536.
"When such an article is submitted to the courts, the inquiry is
whether the land in controversy was the property of the claimant
before the treaty."
United States v.
Arredondo, 6 Pet. 712.
If, then, the land in controversy was the private property of
the claimant when the country was acquired, it must have remained
such, though no treaty had been made. The United States do not
claim to have acquired the ownership of any other property than the
public property of the enemy, nor could they justly have demanded
that Mexico should assent by the treaty to the confiscation of any
property the right to which was vested in private individuals.
If, then, the United States have been willfully or accidentally
deceived as to the amount of property held in private ownership
Page 67 U. S. 367
in the ceded territory, they may have a right to demand a return
of some portion of the pecuniary equivalent paid by them.
The fraud or mistake of the Mexican commissioners can have no
effect upon a private right held sacred by the laws and usages of
all civilized nations, which was not derived from the treaty, and
which, had it been known to exist, the United States would have
been bound to respect.
These observations are made with reference to the general
proposition maintained at the bar --
viz., that the
declaration by Mexico that no grants had been made subsequent to
May 13, 1846, invalidated all such grants to the same extent as if
a stipulation to that effect had been embodied in the treaty.
In the brief filed in the case at bar, the Court is invited to
review the grounds of the foregoing opinion, and the question is
discussed by the counsel of the United States with characteristic
ingenuity and ability.
The authority chiefly relied on in support of the position taken
by the counsel for the United States, is Bynkershoek.
"We make war," says the author,
"because we think that our enemy, by the injury he has done us,
has merited the destruction of himself and all his adherents; as
this is the object of our warfare, it is immaterial what means we
embrace to accomplish it. . . . A nation which has injured another
is considered, with everything that belongs to it, as confiscated
to the nation that has received the injury. To carry that
confiscation into effect may certainly be the object of the war if
the injured nation thinks proper."
The doctrine here maintained, that in war, poison and every
species of fraud may rightfully be used, has received the general
condemnation of mankind. It may be the censure on Bynkershoek is
not wholly deserved, inasmuch as he expresses no approval of those
practices, but differs from other writers mainly in distinguishing
between the absolute rights of war and those voluntary
relinquishments of them which are dictated by humanity and
generosity.
Page 67 U. S. 368
But if it be admitted that humanity, Christianity, and the
usages and rules observed by all civilized nations (which
constitute public law) forbid even in war the use of certain means,
the discussion whether such rights abstractly exist would seem to
be a disputation savoring rather of the subtlety of the schools
than of that practical sense which seeks to discover and establish
the actual rules by which nations in a state of war are
governed.
That the rights of war as deduced by Bynkershoek from a
consideration of its abstract nature are mitigated by the laws of
war as established by the general consent of nations with respect
to the effects of conquest, as well as to the mode of warfare, is
proved by the general recognition of the principle that, on the
conquest of an enemy's territory, private rights of property are to
be protected.
But if "a nation which has injured another is to be considered
as confiscated, with all that belongs to it, to the nation that has
received the injury," this confiscation must extend to private as
well as public property.
A declaration of war undoubtedly involves the assertion of the
right to measure and forcibly to exact an indemnity for the wrong
which has occasioned the war.
To seize, to conquer, or to destroy an enemy's goods, his
territory or his armed adherents, are but the means of exacting
this indemnity.
As a matter of theoretical speculation, we may consider the
seizure, the conquest, or the destroying as done by virtue of a
previous fictitious or hypothetical confiscation of property or
forfeiture of life incurred at the date of the declaration of war.
But the necessity of such a theory is not very apparent. For the
right to subdue the enemy being admitted, as a means of obtaining
an indemnity for previous wrongs, the supposed constructive
confiscation can add nothing to the rightfulness of those acts. It
is for this reason said, in the opinion above cited, that
"the conquest of an enemy's country, admitted to be his, is not
the assertion of an antecedent right. It is the assertion of the
will and power to wrest it from him."
On which the counsel for the United States observes: "Then all
governments are highwaymen!
Page 67 U. S. 369
Forcibly to take without antecedent right is a very good
definition of robbery."
The inference is not just. Conquest is undoubtedly the assertion
of a right, but it is the right to conquer which results from a
state of war.
It is not the assertion of a previous right or title to the
territories conquered.
Whether in so doing the belligerent is acting like a highwayman,
depends upon the moral justification for the war, an inquiry into
which neither neutrals nor the courts of the belligerent can
enter.
The hypothesis of an antecedent confiscation, to enforce which
the seizure is effected, in no way affects the question. The moral
justification of the supposed confiscation has still to be
considered -- in other words, the justice and rightfulness of the
war.
But whatever be the reasonableness or necessity of supposing
this theoretic confiscation by belligerents, of everything
belonging to the enemy, it is manifest that by the laws of nations
the confiscation is waived where territory is conquered, so far as
respects private property; and especially where the conqueror, by
the terms of the treaty of cession, has bound himself to respect
all rights of private property existing at the date of the
conquest.
To repudiate that obligation with respect to any property held
in private ownership on the ground that, though private property
when the conquest was effected, it was public property ten or
twenty or thirty years before, when the war commenced, and that a
writer on public law has said, that the declaration of war is a
confiscation of all the property of the enemy, and that the
conquest was merely carrying into effect the confiscation, would
seem an attempt to justify the breach of a plain and positive
obligation, which needs but to be stated to be condemned.
The obvious and natural construction of the treaty is, I think,
manifestly the true one,
viz., that all private property
bona fide acquired, and held as such by a legal or
equitable title obtained under the former government, is to be
respected by the belligerent,
Page 67 U. S. 370
to whom by conquest and treaty the rights of sovereignty have
been transferred.
I do not think it necessary further to discuss this question. It
is enough to say that I have attentively considered all that is
urged by way of argument or illustration in the brief filed by the
counsel for the United States. I have found nothing to which the
answer did not appear to me easy, or which has shaken my confidence
in the justness of the views previously entertained by the
court.
The question might well have been dismissed without argument,
for we have an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court on the
point. In the case of
United States v.
Pico, 23 How. 326, the Court said:
"In the act of Congress of 1851 and the decisions of this Court
that day (
viz., July 7, 1846, the date of the capture of
Monterey and constructively, of the conquest of California) is
referred to as the epoch at which the power of the Governor of
California, under the authority of Mexico, to alienate the public
domain ceased."
As, however, the point then before the Court was the
determination of the precise date of subversion of the former
government, and to decide upon the validity of acts done under
Mexican authority
after that event -- while the validity
of acts done previous to it was not questioned, nor does the point
raised in this case appear to have been presented to the Court -- I
have thought it not improper to examine at some length the acute
and ingenious argument submitted by the counsel for the United
States.
I have given to this case much and anxious consideration. The
preparation of this opinion has required more labor than even its
great length would indicate.
Voluminous as it is, I am nevertheless aware that it is in many
respects incomplete.
To have treated at length every point in the case would have
extended it far beyond all reasonable limits.
I cannot conclude my labors on this most important case without
acknowledging the great assistance which the Court
Page 67 U. S. 371
has derived from the very able and eminent counsel engaged in
it.
Their indefatigable and exhaustive industry has presented to the
Court every argument, authority and illustration which profound and
patient study not only of the American and English but of the
Mexican and Spanish laws could suggest, together with every view of
the complicated facts in the case and of their relations to each
other which could assist the Court in its study of the mass of
depositions which have been taken.
To the Court has been left merely the duty of considering the
suggestions and collecting and combining the abundant materials
contained in the briefs of counsel.
On the whole case, my opinion is:
That the claimants are entitled to seven pertenencias, to be
measured in the manner, of the form, and of the dimensions
prescribed in the Ordenanzas de Mineria of 1783.
And also that they are entitled to two square leagues of land,
to be located on the land of their mining possession, but in such a
way as not to include any land granted in private ownership by
competent authority previously to July 7, 1846.