By the Act of March 3, 1823, entitled "An act to confirm certain
claims to lots in the Village of Peoria, in the State of Illinois,"
the Surveyor of Public Lands was directed to survey the lots. A
certified copy of such survey is admissible in evidence. The survey
in question was made in 1840.
Before the survey was made, Ballance made an entry of the
quarter section of which the lot in controversy makes a part, and a
patent was issued to him by which the United States granted it to
him and his heirs, subject to the rights of any and all persons
claiming under the act of Congress above mentioned.
This saving clause was designed to exonerate the United States
from any claim of the patentee in the event of his ouster by
persons claiming under the acts of Congress, and cannot be
construed as separating any lots or parcels of land from the
operation of the grant or as affording another confirmation of
titles existing under the acts of Congress described in it.
The possession of Ballance under this patent was adverse to that
of a claimant under the Peoria grant, and therefore the statute of
limitations ran upon it, he having had possession for more than
seven years, with a connected title in law or equity, deducible of
record from the state or the United States.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action of ejectment commenced in the circuit
Page 65 U. S. 176
court for the recovery of a part of two lots of land in the City
of Peoria by the defendant in error against the plaintiffs in
error.
The title of the plaintiff in the Circuit Court Forsyth
originated in the claim of Antoine Lapance, an inhabitant within
the purview of the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1823, entitled
"An act to confirm certain claims to lots in the Village of Peoria,
in the State of Illinois," which was surveyed the first of
September, 1840, by the surveyor of public lands, and for which a
patent issued on the first day of February, 1847. The plaintiff
produced from the Surveyor General's office a certified copy of the
survey according to which the location of the claim was made. This
testimony was objected to, but was received by the court, and we
think properly. An original of the plan of survey is retained in
the office of the Surveyor General, and a copy given by that
officer, who is required to keep it, upon general principles is
admissible in evidence.
United States v.
Percheman, 7 Pet. 51.
It was agreed on the trial that the defendant Ballance and those
under him had been in possession of the premises more than ten
years before the commencement of the suit. This possession was
shown by the facts that he had cultivated a portion of the quarter
section described in his patent for more than twenty years and had
resided on the quarter section for twelve years and had paid taxes
upon this parcel of land as a part of the said quarter section, but
not as a separate subdivision. The plaintiff had not paid any of
the taxes during that period. The defendant Ballance made an entry
of the quarter section of which the lot in controversy forms a part
in 1837, and a patent issued to him in 1838 by which the United
States gave and granted to him and his heirs, subject to the rights
of any and all persons claiming under the Act of Congress of 3
March, 1823, before referred to.
The defendant moved the court to instruct the jury that if they
believe from the evidence that said Ballance has had the actual
possession by residence on the land in controversy for more than
seven years under the title he has exhibited, the plaintiff cannot
recover, and that the words in the patent of Ballance of January
28, 1838,
"subject, however, to the rights
Page 65 U. S. 177
of all persons claiming under the Act of Congress of March 3,
1823, entitled 'An act to confirm certain claims to lots in the
Village of Peoria in the State of Illinois' cannot operate as to
lessen the estate vested by the granting part of the deed."
The court declined to give these instructions, but charged the
jury:
"That to constitute an adverse possession against the French
claimants by the possession of another portion of the quarter
section by the defendant, as his tenant, entry and possession must
have been under a claim of title inconsistent with that of the
French claimants. If the entry and possession were subject to the
rights of the claimants existing under the acts of Congress, then
such possession as stated could not be adverse so long as that
possession did not actually extend to the lot sued for."
The court further instructed the jury:
"That when the defendant made application for a preemption, he
stated it was made subservient to these French claims, and when the
patent was issued by the government to him for this fractional
quarter, it was made subject to these claims; therefore the grant
made by the government, as contained in the patent, did not
necessarily operate as a conveyance of the entire quarter section
to the grantee, but the clause inserted in the patent had the
effect of excluding from the operation of the grant that portion of
the quarter covered by these French claims; consequently, if at the
time of the grant to Ballance there was anyone capable of taking
lot 63 under the acts of Congress of 1820 and 1823, then lot 63 was
excluded by law and by the terms of the grant, and was excepted; in
other words, lot 63 was not granted to Ballance, and he took his
title subject to such exclusion or exception."
We think that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of
this patent. The patent recites that "full payment" had been made
by the grantee for the southwest fractional quarter of section
nine, in township eight north, of range eight east, containing one
hundred and forty-seven 43/100ths acres, according to the official
plat of the survey of said lands returned to the General Land
Office by the Surveyor General, which said tract has been purchased
by Charles Ballance. It proceeds to
Page 65 U. S. 178
declare that the United States had given and granted the said
tract above described, to have and to hold the same to him and his
heirs, subject, however, to the rights of any and all persons
claiming &c. This saving clause was designed to exonerate the
United States from any claim of the patentee in the event of his
ouster by persons claiming under the acts referred to, and cannot
be construed as separating any lots or parcels of land from the
operation of the grant or as affording another confirmation of
titles existing under the acts of Congress described in it. The
possession of Ballance under this patent was adverse to that of the
claimants under the acts of 1820 and 1823 in every case in which
their claim was not specifically admitted by him. He was in no
sense their tenant, nor did the saving in the act create any
fiduciary relation between him and any other person, so as to
prevent the operation of the statute of limitations. The patent
does not impose upon him any duty to recognize these claims. It
only requires him to accept the title of the United States with
knowledge that such claims exist, and that they do not intend to
deny or to destroy them nor to defend his title against them.
The case of
Bryan v.
Forsyth, 19 How. 334, involved a controversy for a
lot in the City of Peoria similarly situated as that which forms
the subject of this suit. The Court in that case said that a patent
with a saving like that we are considering was a fee simple title
in its face, and is such a title as will afford protection to those
claiming under it, either directly or having a title connected with
it, with possession for seven years, as required by the statute of
Illinois.
The act of limitations of Illinois (Revised statutes, 349, sec.
8) protects the claim of a person for lands which has been
possessed by actual residence thereon, having a connected title in
law or equity deducible of record from that state or the United
States.
The title of the defendant, and the possession which he was
admitted to have had, fulfilled the requisitions of the law, and
the court should have given the instructions asked for, and erred
in giving the instructions submitted to the jury.
Page 65 U. S. 179
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.