This Court has never reviewed the judgment of an inferior court
of a state where there was an appeal to the supreme court of the
state upon a subject within the jurisdiction of such court upon the
allegation that its proceedings were irregular or illegal and
contrary to the law of the state.
The present is such a case.
The Parish Court of New Orleans had exclusive jurisdiction over
property ceded by insolvents, and the courts of the United States
have no jurisdiction over such insolvencies.
An allegation of fraud in a bill filed to review such
proceedings in insolvency, which was afterwards abandoned, is not
sufficient to give to the circuit court jurisdiction to review the
proceedings of the state court.
Moreover, the complainant has no equitable claim to relief, his
assignors having no mortgage lien on the property, when the
judgments were assigned to the complainant.
Page 63 U. S. 474
The facts in the case were complicated, and not to be understood
by a brief narrative. The reader is therefore referred to the
opinion of the Court, in which they are historically related.
Page 63 U. S. 480
MR. JUSTICE WAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have given our best consideration to this record, in
connection with the minute statement made from it by the counsel of
the complainant, without having been able to find any cause for the
reversal of the judgment.
The plaintiff sued the defendants, John S. Preston and
Page 63 U. S. 481
Caroline M. Preston his wife, as the joint possessors of one
hundred and thirteen negroes, and their increase, to subject them,
and the revenues which had been derived from their labor, to the
payment of certain judgments which the plaintiff says he owns, as
the assignee of the Union Bank of Louisiana.
Those judgments had been obtained by that bank against Thomas
Barrett, a resident of the City of New Orleans. He alleges that
Barrett was the owner of the slaves when the judgments were
obtained, and that, by reason of that fact and the bank's
assignment to him, he had a judicial mortgage upon them, their
increase and revenues, to pay the judgments.
The suit was brought in the Third District Court of New Orleans,
when the defendants were sojourners there, and being cited to
answer, they appeared. Being citizens of the State of South
Carolina, they removed the cause to the United States Circuit Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in which it was filed on the
chancery side of the docket. There the defendants filed a dilatory
exception in bar of the action against them, which being overruled,
they were required to answer. And they did so.
They neither admit nor deny the original validity of the
judgments against Barrett nor the assignment of them to the
plaintiff, and they admit that the one hundred and thirteen slaves
had belonged to Barrett, but giving at the same time their
narrative of the manner in which Barrett had acquired title to
them, and the judicial proceedings under which they bought the
property. They state in their answer that Wade Hampton, of South
Carolina, being the owner of Whitehall Plantation in the Parish of
St. James in Louisiana, sold it on the 8th April, 1829, to Leroy
Pope for $100,000, payable in twenty years from the first day of
January, 1830, with interest at six percent per annum, payable
annually. That the seller took from Pope a mortgage on the
plantation and also an obligation that he would add to the
plantation seventy working hands, and mortgage them to Hampton,
with their increase, to secure the payment of Pope's purchase and
interest. Pope, on the 23d of February following, complied with his
obligation, by mortgaging seventy working hands and thirty-one
Page 63 U. S. 482
children to Hampton. He was then a resident of the parish of St.
James.
Pope, two years afterwards, on the 18th March, 1833, sold the
plantation and slaves to Thomas Barrett of New Orleans for
$151,034. In payment, Barrett assumed to pay the debt of $100,000
and the accruing interest annually to Hampton, and received the
property subject to the rights of Hampton upon the plantation and
slaves. Two days afterwards, Barrett conveyed one-half of his
purchase to Robert Bell, with an agreement that Bell's interest
should be considered as having attached from the day of Barrett's
purchase. Barrett failed to pay the interest, and, Hampton being
dead, his heirs brought suits for it, and these judgments were
obtained against him in January, 1838, March, 1839, and April,
1839. The judgments were recorded in New Orleans, where Barrett
lived, but the mortgages and conveyances given to Hampton, and his
conveyance of the plantation, were recorded, when they were
executed, in the Parish of St. James, where the slaves were, and
where Pope and Bell both lived.
Barrett became embarrassed, and applied for the benefit of the
insolvent laws of Louisiana, on the 12th May, 1840. In the schedule
of property surrendered to his creditors is found an item of
Whitehall Plantation and one hundred and fifty slaves, valued at
$210,000, subject to the bond for $100,000, and the interest due
thereon.
A meeting of Barrett's creditors was hold on the 15th June,
1840. Syndics were elected by them, with general discretionary
powers,
particularly with the power to sue for the partition of
any property whatsoever held and owned by the insolvent jointly
with others, and to claim partition in kind or by sale; also,
to appoint agents for the disposal of property out of New Orleans.
Amongst the creditors at this meeting who elected the syndics was
the Bank of Louisiana, by its representative, its president. In
October, after this meeting of the creditors, the heirs of Hampton
intervened in the insolvent proceedings, claimed their rights under
the mortgages upon Whitehall and upon the negroes, and they took a
rule upon Magoffin and Margan, the syndics of the creditors, to
show cause why the
Page 63 U. S. 483
plantation and negroes should not be sold, and the proceeds
applied to the payment of their claim. The rule was made absolute,
by a judgment recognizing their right as mortgagees, and ordering a
sale of the property.
At a subsequent meeting of the creditors, at which the Union
Bank of Louisiana was again represented by its president, the
creditors gave to the syndics a power to raise all mortgages
recorded against the insolvent on any estate owned by him alone, or
jointly with other persons, which had been surrendered to his
creditors,
with authority to make partition of the same
with the co-proprietors, either amicably or judicially.
Upon the petition of the syndics to the judge of the Parish
Court of New Orleans, that act of the creditors was homologated,
and the syndics were authorized by the court to do all which it
empowered them to perform, by the votes of the creditors who
appeared or who were represented at the meeting.
In conformity with such powers, the syndic instituted a suit,
alleging that Whitehall Plantation and slaves had been purchased
for the joint account of Barrett & Bell, and that an action of
partition was necessary, to enable them to liquidate that special
partnership. They also asked that the proceeds of the crop made on
the plantation might be deposited in bank, subject to the order of
the court, that an inventory and appraisement of the property
should be made, and returned into court, and that such proceedings
might be had as would lead to a prompt and final settlement of the
partnership.
Bell united in this petition, and declared himself to be a
creditor of the partnership; prayed for a settlement of its
affairs, and for the allowance in his favor of a lien on the
partnership property, for such sum as might be found due to
him.
The heirs of Hampton intervened in this partition suit, stating
their claims upon the property as mortgage creditors, and insisted
that the property should be sold, subject to the assumptions, by
whoever might become at the sale vendee, for the payment of their
claim, principal and interest.
Page 63 U. S. 484
On the 6th of February, 1841, the court gave a judgment
sustaining the claims of Hampton's heirs and directing the sale of
the property, with the condition,
"that the vendees should assume the payment to Mary Hamtpon,
John S. Preston and wife, and John L. Manning and wife, of
$100,000, payable on the 1st of January, 1856, with six percent
interest from the 1st of January, 1841, and further that it should
be taken as a term and condition of the sale, that the purchaser
should specially mortgage and keep mortgaged the plantation to the
intervenors, and the eighty-one slaves described in the inventory,
to them and their heirs and assigns."
The property was advertised and sold by the sheriff pursuant to
this judgment, was bought by the heirs of Hampton for $116,000, was
paid for by surrendering to the sheriff the bond of Leroy Pope for
$100,000, and by applying arrears of interest due on that bond to
the payment of $16,000. An account was filed a few days afterwards,
by the heirs of Hampton, of the whole amount due them, and after
giving credit for the $116,000, and there was still remaining due
$11,248.11 1/2.
A rule was then taken on both the plaintiff and defendants, by
the heirs of Hampton, for them to show cause why the account should
not be approved, and their demand against the partnership of
Barrett & Bell be liquidated, at the sum of $11,248.11 1/2, and
why the same should not be paid out of any money belonging to the
partnership.
Upon the rule a judgment was rendered on the 23d April, 1844,
according to its purport declaring that after having credited the
account with $116,000, there was still due to the heirs of Hampton,
by the partnership of Barrett & Bell, the sum of $11,248.11
1/2, and a judgment was passed in their favor for that sum against
Mrs. Caroline Bell, the heir of Robert Bell, and J. B. Hullen, who
had been elected the syndic of the creditors in the place of
Magoffin and Morgan. A representative of the Union Bank was
present, and voting for Hullen.
A final judgment was afterwards rendered settling all matters in
dispute between the parties to the suit. The proceeds
Page 63 U. S. 485
of the crop were appropriated to the payment of legal charges,
and, that being insufficient for that purpose, the heirs of Hampton
were required to pay $2,020.51, in satisfaction of them -- it being
declared that the legal charges were higher in rank than their
privilege upon the co-partnership fund. The heirs paid the amount,
and that was a final settlement of all the matters in controversy
between plaintiff, defendants, and intervenors.
Contemporary with the proceedings in the partition suit, the
matters connected with Barrett's insolvency were concluded in the
same court.
Among other acts done by the syndics, Magoffin and Morgan, was
their petition to the Parish Court of New Orleans to be discharged
from their office of syndics in the insolvency of Thomas Barrett
and Thomas Barrett & Co. They annexed to their petition an
account of the collections and disbursements which had been made by
them since their last account had been filed. They showed that they
were, as syndics, parties to a number of suits, which were still
pending; refer particularly to the partition suit instituted by
them, and still pending, against Robert Bell, as the partner of
Barrett; pray that the creditors of the insolvent may be ordered to
meet to elect other syndics, on account of their not being able to
act longer in that capacity, as their private affairs compelled
them to leave the State of Louisiana.
The court gave an order upon this petition, that the parties
interested show cause, within ten days from the publication of the
order, why the accounts of the syndics should not be homologated,
why the funds stated by the syndics should not be distributed in
accordance therewith, and why the syndics should not be discharged.
And it further ordered, that a meting of the creditors should be
held on Wednesday, the 9th May, to elect another syndic in place of
Magoffin and Morgan.
Such a meting was held. James B. Hullen was elected by the
creditors sole syndic, with all the powers which had been conferred
by the creditors at former meetings upon Magoffin and Morgan. They
were then discharged by the court from their functions as syndics,
upon their paying the balances
Page 63 U. S. 486
in their hands to the parties entitled thereto, reserving to
themselves, however, whatever claim they might have on the sale of
the Whitehall Plantation, and James B. Hullen was confirmed as sole
syndic of Barrett and Thomas Barrett & Co. This order was given
by the court on the 20th May, 1842.
Seven days after the meeting of the creditors had been held,
pursuant to the order of the court, Christopher Adams, Jr.,
president of the Union Bank, filed a paper in the court,
acknowledging himself to be fully cognizant of all the proceedings
of the meeting; that he was present at it; that the bank was a
creditor; that Hullen had been unanimously elected by the creditors
sole syndic, in place of the former syndics, on the same terms and
conditions that they had been, with the same powers which the
creditors had conferred upon the former syndics. And further shows,
that at the meeting on the 9th May, 1842, he had voted for the
dispensation of Hullen from giving the security required by law to
be given by syndics.
This narrative discloses the connection of the Hamptons with the
proceedings of the syndics, and in the partnership suit which they
had brought against Bell to settle his claim as a partner in the
purchase of the Whitehall Plantation and slaves. Thus matters
remained for nine years, no one supposing that there was any
irregularity in the judicial proceedings under which the heirs of
Hampton had bought the property, the bank all the time acquiescing
in the result. Indeed, nothing was done without the knowledge of
the bank; everything that was done was with its approbation. The
record shows that every step taken by the syndics for the
settlement of Barrett's insolvency was in conformity with the
powers which the creditors had given to them. But nine years after
the final and conclusive settlement of the whole matter in
controversy, the president and directors of the bank assigned to
the plaintiff in this suit five judgments, which the bank had
obtained against Thomas Barrett in 1838 and 1839. Upon this
assignment it is that the plaintiff now claims that these judgments
were a mortgage upon the Whitehall Plantation and slaves. He
Page 63 U. S. 487
alleges that all the proceedings in the Parish Court of the
Parish and City of New Orleans, in the matter of the insolvency,
were irregular; that the disposition of property surrendered by
Barrett for his creditors, and the creditors of Thomas Barrett
& Co., "were irregular, insufficient, null, and void," and had
been procured by fraudulent combination between the heirs of
Hampton with Bell, and with the syndics of the creditors, for the
purpose of defrauding the Union Bank particularly. He also alleges
that the Union Bank has not been a party to the suit of the
syndics, and that neither the bank nor himself are in any way bound
by its proceedings. And the fraud with which he charges the
defendants is that they claimed as creditors of Barrett, under the
mortgage which Leroy Pope had made to their ancestor, Hampton, when
the plantation was bought from him, and which Barrett assumed to
pay when he purchased from Pope, well knowing at the time that the
efficacy of the inscription of the mortgages upon both plantation
and slaves had expired, according to law, without any renewal of
the registry of them. The defendants deny, in their answer, the
fraud charged, or fraud of any kind, in their intervention in the
proceedings in insolvency. No attempt was made to prove it;
consequently, the plaintiff's whole case depends upon his assertion
that there are irregularities in the suit, and in the rendition of
a judgment, and under which the heirs of Hampton purchased the
property at sheriff's sale, which made that judgment a nullity. The
plaintiff is the assignee of the Union Bank, and the argument in
support of his claim as assignee is that he is entitled to a
judgment, subjecting the property to the payment of the judgments
which the bank had obtained against Barrett, unless the mortgages
of the bank were extinguished by the sale made by the sheriff to
the heirs of Hampton, and unless the settlement between the
syndics, Robert Bell, and the heirs of Hampton, upon the judgments
rendered in the cases of the syndics and Bell, are
res
judicata.
These positions are in themselves an abandonment of the charge
of fraud, originally made, and for no other purpose than to give to
the circuit court jurisdiction of the case
Page 63 U. S. 488
against the defendants, and without which the court could not
have taken jurisdiction. With what propriety, then, can this Court
now be called upon to review a judgment of the Parish Court of New
Orleans for any irregularity or illegality in the proceedings of
that court, if either existed, when there could have been an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for its correction? This Court
has never done so in any case in which the subject matter of a
suit, being within the jurisdiction of a state court, upon the
allegation that its judgment had been given contrary to the law of
a state.
See the cases of
Fonvergne v. City of New
Orleans, 18 How. 471;
Gaines v.
Chew, 2 How. 619,
43 U. S. 644,
and
Tarver v.
Tarver, 9 Pet. 174. The Parish Court of New Orleans
had, by law, full power over all the property ceded by the
insolvent, and over the claims of each of the creditors. It
exercised its jurisdiction, and the legality of its judgment cannot
be questioned by this court. Besides, the courts of the United
States have no jurisdiction over the settlement of insolvencies in
the state courts. The parish court had not only jurisdiction, but
exclusive jurisdiction, over the property surrendered, and the
distribution of it among the creditors of the insolvent. By the
laws of Louisiana, the property surrendered becomes vested in the
creditors, represented by the syndics as their trustee.
Schroeder v. Nicholson, 2 La. 354;
Morgan v.
Creditors, 7 La. 62;
Dwight v. Linn., 4 Ann. 492. And
the creditors of an insolvent who become parties to the insolvent
proceedings are prohibited from seeking remedies in any other court
of the State of Louisiana.
Jacobs v. Bogart, 7 Rob. 162;
Marsh v. Marsh, 9 Rob. 46;
Tyler v. Creditors, 9
Robinson. It is also declared, in the Civil Code, art. 165, sec.
3,
"that, in all matters relative to failures, all suits already
commenced, or which may be subsequently instituted against the
debtor, must be carried before the court in which the failure has
been declared,"
and
"where a party claims from the syndics goods which had been
surrendered by an insolvent, the suit may be brought before the
court where the
concurso is pending."
2 Robinson 348.
Page 63 U. S. 489
The want of jurisdiction, then, in the courts of the United
States, to review the proceedings of the Parish Court of New
Orleans, in a case of insolvency, is of itself sufficient to
prevent the court from giving to the plaintiff a decree in this
suit.
There are, however, other grounds sufficient, to be found in the
record, from which we have concluded that the plaintiff has neither
an equitable claim against the defendants in this proceeding, nor
any right, under the law of Louisiana, to subject the property in
controversy to the judgments of which he is the assignee. But we
shall confine ourselves to the discussion of one of them.
The judgments of the Union Bank, if they ever had at any time
mortgage rights against the Whitehall Plantation, and the slaves
upon it, better than the mortgages given by Leroy Pope at the time
of his purchase, and which were assumed by Barrett when he bought
the property, and which were equally obligatory upon Bell, when
himself and Barrett formed their particular partnership in respect
to that property, those judgments had been legally cancelled before
they were assigned to the plaintiff by the bank. It will be found
at pages 20 and 21 of the record, that the assignor of the
plaintiff united with the other creditors in giving to the syndics
the power to raise all mortgages granted by or recorded by Thomas
Barrett, or Thomas Barrett & Co., on any real estate owned by
Barrett, jointly with other persons, and surrendered by him to his
creditors, with power also to effect partitions of the said
property with his co-proprietors, either amicably or judicially
&c.
The creditors, too, authorized the syndics, or either of them,
to vote, deliberate, and give their opinion for them, at any
subsequent meeting of the creditors of Barrett, or Thomas Barrett
& Co. And the powers so given to the syndics were homologated
by the judge of the Parish Court of New Orleans. Under such a
power, the syndics might have erased the judicial mortgages of the
bank in the fair and
bona fide discharge of their relation
to the creditors as their trustees, and the bank would have been
bound by their action. But
Page 63 U. S. 490
they proceeded, according to law, to have the judicial mortgages
of the bank cancelled, and they were cancelled on the 1st of
February, 1841. This cancellation was made by the syndics, in
conformity with the thirty-second section of the Act of February,
1817, entitled, "An act relative to the voluntary surrender of
property, and to the mode of proceeding, as well for the direction
as for the disposal of debtors' estates," &c. The erasure and
cancellation of mortgages may be made in Louisiana, by consent or
by order of the court. Articles 3335, 3336. In this instance, the
erasure was made by the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction; when by the latter, it has the effect of a
res
judicata. 7 Rob. 382, 518; 11 Rob. 171. After the erasure so
made, there can be no subsequent reinscription of a mortgage. That
which was made in 1848 revived no lien upon the property which the
bank's mortgages may have had before they were erased. But there
was another erasure of the bank's judicial mortgages in a suit
brought by Barrett against it, before its assignment was made of
its judgments against Barrett to Hagan, the plaintiff. Rec., 83,
88, 94, 99, 103. It was done by a court having competent
jurisdiction, and it concluded the right of the bank to convey its
judgments to the plaintiff as judicial mortgages, though they might
be transferred as judgments to entitle the assignee to a
participation in any unadministered proceeds made from the sale of
the property surrendered by the insolvent for his creditors. But
neither the reinscription of 1848, nor the assignment to the
plaintiff, could have the effect to give to the plaintiff any claim
upon property of the insolvent which had been sold under the
judgment of a court having jurisdiction in insolvency. The property
now claimed by the plaintiff, as subject to his assignment, had
been recognized by the judgment of the Parish court to be subject
to the claims of the heirs of Hampton; had been ordered by the
court to be sold by the sheriff; had been sold by him, and
adjudicated to the purchasers; and the consideration money of the
purchase had been accounted for by the sheriff to the syndics of
the insolvent, and by them accounted for to the court, in strict
accordance with its order, nine years before the bank made an
Page 63 U. S. 491
assignment to Hagan. The sale could not have been in any way
subject to the judicial mortgages of the bank, nor could it in any
way affect the property purchased by the defendants. Indeed, there
can be no doubt that after the appearance of the bank in the
concurso of the creditors and its acquiescence with them
in fixing the terms for the sale of the property of the insolvent,
it must be taken as a waiver by the bank of all its rights to
pursue it for the payment of its judgments against Barrett, the
insolvent, and that it would look to the proceeds of its sale, as
the other creditors did, for the satisfaction of their respective
claims.
Egerton v. Creditors, 2 Rob. 201;
Saul v.
Creditors, 7 N.S. 446, 447. Without pursuing the discussion
further, we have concluded that the bank, when it assigned its
judgments to the plaintiff, had no mortgage lien on the Whitehall
Plantation and slaves to transfer; that the language of the
assignment, interpreted by the acknowledged acts of the bank in the
insolvency, cannot mean any such transfer, and that the judgment
and sale under the partition suit barred the bank from making such
an assignment, and the plaintiff from any such claim as he has made
in his bill.
We direct the affirmance of the decree of the circuit
court.