In a collision which took place in the River Delaware, between a
steamship and a barge which was in tow of a propeller, the latter
was in fault.
The lookout was not properly stationed, being in a place where
his view was obstructed, and the propeller violated the rule which
requires steamers approaching each other from opposite directions
to port their helms, and pass each other on the larboard side.
A propeller with a barge in tow is not within the rule which
applies to sailing vessels, and which requires steamships to keep
out of their way.
Propellers have nearly the same speed as sidewheel steamers, and
quite as much power, and must be subject to the same rules of
navigation.
This was a case of collision between the steamship
Keystone
State and a barge called the
A. Groves, Jr., which
took place on the River Delaware, whereby the barge was sunk in the
river, and her cargo greatly damaged.
The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the
Court.
The libel was filed by the New York & Baltimore
Transportation Company against the owners of the
Keystone
State. The district court dismissed the libel, and the circuit
court, upon appeal, affirmed the decree. The libellants then
appealed to this Court.
Page 63 U. S. 468
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit
in rem against the steamship
The
Keystone State, brought by the appellants as the owners of the
barge known as the
A. Groves, Jr., to recover damages on
account of a collision which took place on the eighteenth day of
August, 1857, between the steamer and the barge on the River
Delaware, whereby the barge was sunk in the river and her cargo was
greatly damaged.
At the time of the disaster, the barge was in tow of a
propeller, called the
Artisan, which was also owned by the
appellants, and to which the barge was attached by a hawser about
one hundred and seventy feet in length. It occurred between one and
two o'clock in the morning, about twenty miles below the City of
Philadelphia, to which port the steamer was bound on her return
trip from Savannah in the State of Georgia.
According to the case made in the libel, the propeller, with
Page 63 U. S. 469
the barge in tow, was on her way from the City of New York to
the City of Baltimore with her usual complement of freight. She was
proceeding down the river on the eastern side of the channel, and
the steamer was coming up the river on the opposite side of the
channel, with ample room to have kept clear of the barge.
To show that neither the propeller nor the barge was in fault,
it is alleged by the libellants that both those vessels had proper
lights and that the propeller had sufficient lookouts properly
stationed on the vessel, and that they were vigilantly employed in
the performance of their duties. They also allege that the steamer,
when about three-quarters of a mile distant from the propeller,
changed her course more out into the stream of the river, heading
diagonally across the channel in the direction of the descending
vessels, and ran with great force and violence against the barge,
striking her on the starboard side near the after gangway and
cutting her down to such an extent that she immediately sank in the
river. In this connection they also allege that the barge, at the
time of the collision, was laden with a cargo of merchandise,
valued at seventy thousand dollars, and that the goods were damaged
by the disaster to an amount equal to half their estimated
value.
It is denied by the respondents that the circumstances attending
the collision are truly stated in the libel. On the contrary, they
aver that it was occasioned wholly through the fault and gross
negligence of those in charge of the descending vessels. To lay the
foundation for that theory, they allege that while the steamer was
proceeding up the river at mid-channel, in the regular course of
her voyage, and when about four miles below Marcus Hook, the second
mate, pilot, and lookout of the steamer, discovered lights directly
ahead, which appeared to be about three miles distant; that the
steamer continued her course up the channel, keeping the lights on
her larboard bow, but as near ahead as was practicable; that after
continuing that course for some time, and when about a mile distant
from the lights, they were found to be the lights of the propeller,
and appeared to be at mid-channel.
Page 63 U. S. 470
Orders were then given by the pilot of the steamer to port her
helm, so as to bring the lights of the propeller a point on the
larboard bow of the steamer; and the order was forthwith obeyed. At
that time, the steamer, as alleged in the answer, was heading
northeast by east; and she continued on that course, keeping the
lights of the propeller one point on her larboard bow, until she
approached within three hundred yards of the lights, when the
propeller suddenly starboarded her helm, and attempted to cross the
bows of the steamer. On seeing the propeller change her course in
that direction, the pilot of the steamer gave the signal to slow
and stop in immediate succession, and the orders, as alleged, were
promptly obeyed. Those orders were so far carried into effect that
the propeller passed on her course without injury; but the barge
was dragged by the hawser directly against the bows of the steamer,
and thereby received the damage, as alleged in the libel.
Such is the substance of the pleadings, respecting the
circumstances attending the collision, so far as it is necessary to
examine them at the present time.
After the hearing in the district court, a decree was entered
for the respondents, dismissing the libel; and on appeal to the
circuit court, that decree was affirmed -- whereupon the libellants
appealed to this Court.
As appears by the proofs, the steamer, at the time of the
collision, was well manned and equipped, and was in charge of a
branch pilot, fully qualified to conduct and manage steam vessels
on that river. She was a sidewheel steamer, of fifteen hundred tons
burden, engaged in carrying freight and passengers, and had proper
lights and sufficient and vigilant lookouts. They discovered the
lights of the propeller when she was three miles distant, and
continued to watch the lights till the collision occurred. On the
other hand, the propeller was a vessel of one hundred and
twenty-two tons burden, and the tonnage of the barge was about the
same.
Three men, the master, the wheelsman, and one of the watchmen,
were on the deck of the propeller at the time of the collision. All
of the other hands, including the pilot, were below. Of those on
deck, the master was standing forward
Page 63 U. S. 471
of the pilot house, but the watchman was standing aft the house,
which he admits was higher than his head, so that he could not see
over it. His position for a lookout was clearly an improper one, as
the view forward was entirely obstructed by the house of the
vessel.
Chamberlain v.
Ward, 21 How. 570. Lookouts stationed in positions
where the view forward, or on the side of the vessel to which they
are assigned, is obstructed by the lights or any part of the
vessel, do not constitute a compliance with the requirement of the
law.
To constitute such a compliance, they must be persons of
suitable experience, properly stationed on the vessel, and actively
and vigilantly employed in the performance of that duty.
In this case, however, it appears that the steamer was actually
seen by the master, who was in charge of the deck, in season to
have adopted every necessary precaution to have avoided the
disaster, but he admits that he did not pay much attention to the
approaching vessel. When he first saw her, he says she was
proceeding right up the river, but adds, that in the course of five
minutes she changed her course, and ran from the western towards
the eastern shore, which is the theory set up in the libel.
According to the evidence, the speed of the steamer was nine or ten
miles an hour, and that of the propeller was seven or eight miles
an hour, with an ebb tide. At the place where the collision
occurred, the channel of the river is about three-fourths of a mile
wide, and the evidence shows that there is a cove or bend in the
river below, so that a vessel coming up the river in the night-time
would appear to an inattentive or casual observer, standing on the
deck of a descending vessel, as being near the western shore, when
in point of fact she was at mid-channel. Witnesses on both sides
were examined as to the character of the night, and they generally
agree, that while it was somewhat cloudy, there were intervening
stars, and that it was not unusually dark.
Two propositions were chiefly relied on by the libellants. In
the first place it was insisted in their behalf, that the
propeller, with the barge in two, ought to be regarded in the
Page 63 U. S. 472
same light as a sailing vessel, and that it was the duty of the
steamer to keep out of the way. No authority was cited in support
of the proposition, and we are not aware of any decided case that
favors that view of the law. Steamers are required to keep out of
the way of sailing vessels, upon the ground that their power and
speed are far greater than vessels of the latter class, and because
those in charge of them can more readily and effectually command
and appropriate that power and speed so as to avoid a collision,
when it would be impossible for the sailing vessel to keep out of
the way.
St. John v.
Paine, 10 How. 583.
The
Genesee Chief, 12 How. 463.
Steamship Co. v.
Rumball, 21 How. 384. None of the reasons on which
the rule is founded, as applied to sailing vessels, exists in a
case like the present. Propellers have nearly the same speed as
sidewheel steamers, and quite as much power. Whether they obey the
helm as readily or not may admit of a question, but there is not
sufficient difference in that behalf to justify any discrimination
whatever in the application of the rules of navigation. If they
take other craft in tow, those in charge of them ought to augment
their vigilance in proportion to the embarrassments they have to
encounter, especially when they do not see fit to slacken their
speed.
It is insisted in the second place that the collision was
occasioned through the fault of the steamer; that she changed her
course and attempted to pass the bows of the propeller, as is
alleged in the libel.
On the part of the respondents, this proposition of facts is
denied, and they insist that the fault was committed by the
propeller in omitting to port her helm and go to the right. Beyond
question, the law is well settled that steamers approaching each
other from opposite directions are respectively bound to port their
helms and pass each other on the larboard side.
No attempt was made at the argument to controvert the
proposition, and it is too firmly established by decided cases to
require any argument in its support.
The Duke of Sussex, 1
Wm.Rob. 285.
The Gazelle, 1 Wm.Rob. 471.
The James
Watt, 2 Wm.Rob. 271.
St. John v.
Paine, 10 How. 558.
The
Oregon v. Rocca, 18 How. 572.
Wheeler v.
The
Page 63 U. S. 473
Eastern State, 2 Cur.C.C. 142. Much testimony was
introduced on the one side and the other upon this point, and it is
somewhat conflicting. All that can be done under the circumstances
with any possible advantage to either party will be to state our
conclusions upon the evidence. After a careful examination of the
depositions, we think it is clearly proved that both vessels as
they approached each other were near mid-channel. Most of the
witnesses on board the steamer expressly affirm that she was near
mid-channel when the lights of the propeller were first discovered,
and they all agree that her helm was not changed, except for the
purpose of bringing the lights of the propeller one point on her
larboard bow, until the propeller starboarded her helm, and
attempted to cross the bows of the steamer. That movement of the
propeller was a direct violation of the rules of navigation, and
was entirely without any excuse. Her master may have been deceived
as to the course of the steamer, by the slight bend in the river;
but if so, it is the misfortune of those who employed him that he
was not better acquainted with the navigation, or more attentive to
his duty.
The decree of the circuit court is therefore affirmed with
costs.