The ultimate object of the patent laws being to benefit the
public by the use of the invention after the temporary monopoly
shall have expired, one who conceals his invention and uses it for
his own profit is not entitled to favor if another person should
find out and use the invention.
But this does not include the case of an inventor who forbears
to apply for a patent until he has perfected his invention or
tested its value by experiments.
Whether or not an inventor intended to do this or negligently to
postpone his claims to a patent -- as for instance, by acquiescing
with full knowledge in the use of his invention by others -- are
questions which ought properly to be left to the jury.
If a person should surreptitiously obtain knowledge of the
invention and use it, he would have no right to continue to use it
after the inventor should have obtained a patent.
The facts in the case, the instructions asked for and refused
upon the trial in the circuit court, and also those given to the
jury by the court, are all set forth in the opinion of the Court.
Under these instructions, the jury found a verdict for the
plaintiff and assessed his damages in the sum of two thousand
dollars.
Page 62 U. S. 323
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action on the case in the circuit court of the
United States instituted by the defendant in error against the
plaintiffs for the recovery of damages for an alleged infringement
by the latter of the rights of the former as a patentee. No
question was raised upon the pleadings or the evidence in this case
as to the originality or novelty of the invention patented, nor
with respect to the identity of that invention with the machine
complained of as an infringement of the rights of the patentee, nor
as to the use of that machine. These several facts were conceded,
or at any rate were not controverted, between the parties to this
suit.
Under the plea of not guilty, the defendant in the circuit court
gave notice of the following defenses to be made by him:
1. A license from the plaintiff to use his invention.
2. A right to use that invention in virtue of the seventh
section of the Act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1839, which
section provides
"That every person or corporation who has or shall have
purchased or constructed any newly invented machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, prior to the application of the inventor
or discoverer for a patent shall be held to possess the right to
use, and vend to others to be used, the specific machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, so made or purchased,
without liability therefor to the inventor or any other person
interested in such invention."
To the relevancy and effect of the evidence adduced with
reference to the two defenses thus notified, and to the questions
of law arising upon the issues made by those defenses, this
controversy is properly limited.
Upon the trial in the circuit court, in support of this defense,
evidence was introduced tending to show that the plaintiff
Page 62 U. S. 324
constructed a machine in substantial conformity with his
specification as early as 1846, and that in 1849 he had several
such machines in operation, on which he made harness to supply all
such orders as he could obtain; that he continued to run these
machines until he obtained his letters patent; that he repeatedly
declared to different persons that the machine was so complicated
that he preferred not to take a patent, but to rely on the
difficulty of imitating the machine and the secrecy in which he
kept it. And the defendants also gave evidence tending to prove
that the first of their machines was completed in the autumn of
1853 and the residue in the autumn of 1854, and that in the course
of that fall, the plaintiff had knowledge that the defendants had
built or were building one or more machines like his invention and
did not interpose to prevent them.
The plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove that the first
machine built by him was never completed so as to operate; that his
second machine was only partially successful, and improvements were
made upon it; that in 1849 he began four others, and completed them
in that year, and made harness on them, which he sold when he could
get orders; that they were subject to some practical difficulties,
particularly as it respected the method of marking the harness and
the liability of the bobbin to get out of the clutch; that he was
employed in devising means to remedy these defects, and did remedy
them; that he also endeavored to simplify the machine by using only
one ram-shaft; that he constantly intended to take letters patent
when he should have perfected the machine; that he applied to Mr.
Keller for this purpose in February, 1853, but the model and
specifications were not sent to Washington till November, 1854;
that he kept the machines from the view of the public, allowed none
of the hands employed in the mill to introduce persons to view
them, and that the hands pledged themselves not to divulge the
invention; that among the hands employed by the plaintiff was one
Kendall Aldridge, who left the plaintiff's employment in the autumn
of 1852 and entered into an arrangement with the defendants to copy
the plaintiff's machine for them, and did so, and that it was by
Aldridge and
Page 62 U. S. 325
under his superintendence, and by means of the knowledge which
he had gained while in the plaintiff's employment under a pledge of
secrecy, that the defendant's machines were built and put in
operation, and that one of the defendants had procured drawings of
the plaintiff's machine and has taken out letters patent for it in
England.
Each party controverted the facts thus sought to be proved by
the other.
The defendant's counsel prayed the court to instruct the jury as
follows:
"1. That it is the duty of an inventor, if he would secure the
protection of the patent laws, to apply for a patent as soon as his
machine if he has invented a machine is in practical working order,
so as to work regularly every day in the business for which it was
designed, and if he does not so apply, he has no remedy against any
persons who possess themselves of the invention with his knowledge
and without his notification to desist or of his claims as an
inventor before he applies for his patent."
"2. That a machine can no longer be considered as an experiment
or the subject of experiment when it is worked regularly in the
course of business and produces a satisfactory fabric in quantities
sufficient to supply the entire demand for the article."
"3. That in order to justify the delay of the plaintiff in
applying for a patent after his machine was in practical working
order on the ground of the desire to improve and perfect it, the
plaintiff must show some defect in construction or difficulty in
the operation or mode of operation which he desired and expected to
remove by further thought and study, and if no such thing is shown,
then the machine must be held to have been completed and finished
in the sense of the patent law at the time it was put in regular
working use and operation."
"4. That under the 7th section of the act of 1839, entitled
&c., if the jury are satisfied that the machines for the use of
which the defendants are sued were constructed and put in operation
before the plaintiff applied for his patent, then the defendants
possessed the right to use, and vend to others to be
Page 62 U. S. 326
used, the specific machines made or purchased by them, without
liability therefor to the plaintiff, and the jury are to inquire
and find only the fact of such construction before the date of the
plaintiff's application in order to render a verdict for the
defendants."
"5. That under said section of said act, if the machines used by
the defendants were purchased or constructed by them before the
application of the plaintiff for his patent, with the knowledge of
the plaintiff, then they must be held to possess the right to use,
and vend to others to be used, the machines so purchased or
constructed; and the jury are to inquire into and find only the
fact of such purchase or construction, and that the plaintiff had
knowledge of the same, in order to render a verdict for the
defendants."
"6. That under said section of said act, if the machines used by
the defendants were purchased or constructed by them before the
application of the plaintiff for his patent, without the knowledge
of the plaintiff, and without his notifying the defendants of his
claim as the inventor, and requiring them to desist from such
construction, then they must be held to possess the right to use,
and vend to others to use, the machines so purchased or
constructed; and the jury are to inquire only into and find the
fact of such purchase or construction, and that the plaintiff had
knowledge of the same, and did not notify the defendant to desist
from such purchase or construction of his claims as inventor, in
order to render a verdict for the defendants."
The court set aside all those prayers for instructions, and did
instruct the jury as follows:
"1. That if Aldridge, under a pledge of secrecy, obtained
knowledge of the plaintiff's machine -- and he had not abandoned it
to the public -- and thereupon, at the instigation of the
defendants, and with the knowledge, on their part, of the
surreptitiousness of his acts, constructed machines for the
defendants, they would not have the right to continue to use the
same after the date of the plaintiff's letters patent.
But if
the defendants had these machines constructed before the
plaintiff's application for his letters patent, under the belief
authorized by him that he
Page 62 U. S. 327
consented and allowed them so to do, then they might
lawfully continue to use the same after the date of the plaintiff's
letters patent, and the plaintiff could not recover in this action.
And that if the jury should find that the plaintiff's declaration
and conduct were such as to justify the defendants in believing he
did not intend to take letters patent, but to rely on the
difficulty of imitating his machine, and the means he took to keep
it secret, this would be a defense to the action. And they were
further instructed that to constitute such an abandonment to the
public as would destroy the plaintiff's right to take a patent, in
a case where it did not appear any sale of the thing patented had
been made, and there was no open public exhibition of the machine,
the jury must find that he intended to give up and relinquish his
right to take letters patent. But if the plaintiff did intend not
to take a patent, and manifested that intent by his declarations or
conduct, and thereupon it was copied by the defendant, and so went
into use, the plaintiff could not afterwards take a valid
patent."
"To which refusal to give the instructions prayed for, as well
as to the instructions given, the defendants, by their counsel,
excepted before the jury retired from the bar; and, as the matter
thereof did not appear of record, prayed the court to allow and
seal this bill of exceptions; which, being found correct, has been
allowed and sealed accordingly by the presiding judge."
"B. R. CURTIS"
"[L.S.] Justice Sup. Ct. U.S."
The first ground of defense assumed under the notice from the
defendant in the court below --
viz., a license from the
patentee -- may at once be disposed of by the remark that no
evidence was offered on the trial bearing directly or remotely upon
the fact of an actual license from the patentee, either to the
defendant or to any person whomsoever. The defense then must depend
exclusively upon the proper construction of the section of the law
above cited, and the application of that section to the conduct of
the parties, as shown by the bill of exceptions.
It is undeniably true that the limited and temporary
monopoly
Page 62 U. S. 328
granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive
profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or community at
large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and
securing that monopoly. This was at once the equivalent given by
the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and
skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the
same important objects. The true policy and ends of the patent laws
enacted under this government are disclosed in that article of the
Constitution, the source of all these laws,
viz., "to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts," contemplating
and necessarily implying their extension, and increasing adaptation
to the uses of society.
Vide Constitution of the United
States, art. I, sec. 8, clause 9. By correct induction from these
truths, it follows that the inventor who designedly, and with the
view of applying it indefinitely and exclusively for his own
profit, withholds his invention from the public comes not within
the policy or objects of the Constitution or acts of Congress. He
does not promote, and, if aided in his design, would impede, the
progress of science and the useful arts. And with a very bad grace
could he appeal for favor or protection to that society which, if
he had not injured, he certainly had neither benefited nor intended
to benefit. Hence, if, during such a concealment, an invention
similar to or identical with his own should be made and patented,
or brought into use without a patent, the latter could not be
inhibited nor restricted, upon proof of its identity with a machine
previously invented and withheld and concealed by the inventor from
the public. The rights and interests, whether of the public or of
individuals, can never be made to yield to schemes of selfishness
or cupidity; moreover, that which is once given to or is invested
in the public cannot be recalled nor taken from them.
But the relation borne to the public by inventors, and the
obligations they are bound to fulfill in order to secure from the
former protection, and the right to remuneration, by no means
forbid a delay requisite for completing an invention, or for a test
of its value or success by a series of sufficient and practical
experiments; nor do they forbid a discreet and reasonable
Page 62 U. S. 329
forbearance to proclaim the theory or operation of a discovery
during its progress to completion, and preceding an application for
protection in that discovery. The former may be highly advantageous
as tending to the perfecting the invention; the latter may be
indispensable in order to prevent a piracy of the rights of the
true inventor.
It is the unquestionable right of every inventor to confer
gratuitously the benefits of his ingenuity upon the public, and
this he may do either by express declaration or by conduct equally
significant with language -- such, for instance, as an acquiescence
with full knowledge in the use of his invention by others, or he
may forfeit his rights as an inventor by a willful or negligent
postponement of his claims, or by an attempt to withhold the
benefit of his improvement from the public until a similar or the
same improvement should have been made and introduced by others.
Whilst the remuneration of genius and useful ingenuity is a duty
incumbent upon the public, the rights and welfare of the community
must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. Considerations
of individual emolument can never be permitted to operate to the
injury of these. But, whilst inventors are bound to diligence and
fairness in their dealings with the public, with reference to their
discoveries, on the other hand, they are by obligations equally
strong entitled to protection against frauds or wrongs practiced to
pirate from them the results of thought and labor, in which nearly
a lifetime may have been exhausted; the fruits of more than the
viginti annorum lucubrationes, which fruits the public are
ultimately to gather. The shield of this protection has been
constantly interposed between the inventor and fraudulent spoliator
by the courts in England, and most signally and effectually has
this been done by this Court, as is seen in the cases of
Pennock & Sellers v.
Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, and of
Shaw v.
Cooper, 7 Pet. 292. These may be regarded as
leading cases upon the questions of the abrogation or
relinquishment of patent privileges as resulting from avowed
intention, from abandonment or neglect, or from use known and
assented to.
Thus, in the former case, the court, on
27 U.
S. interpreting the phrase
"
not known or used before the application for a
patent,
Page 62 U. S. 330
make the inquiry, 'what is the true meaning of the words
not
known or used,' &c. They cannot mean that the thing
invented was not known or used before the application by the
inventor himself, for that would be to prevent the only means of
his obtaining a patent. The USE as well as the KNOWLEDGE of his
invention must be indisputable, to enable him to ascertain its
competency to the end proposed, as well as to perfect its component
parts. The words, then, to have any rational interpretation, must
mean
not known or used by others before the application.
But how known or used? If it were necessary, as it well might be,
to employ others to assist in the original structure or use by the
inventor himself, or if before his application his invention
should be pirated by another, or used without his consent,
it can scarcely be supposed that the legislature had within its
contemplation such knowledge or use."
Further on in the same case, page
27 U. S. 19, the
Court said,
"If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the
knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention, if he should
for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make and sell
his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it,
relying on his superior skill and knowledge of the structure, and
then, and then only, when the danger of competition should force
him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to take out
a patent, and thus exclude the public from any further use than
what would be derived under it during his fourteen years, it would
materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and
give a premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate
their discoveries."
In
Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet., this Court, on page
32 U. S. 319,
in strict coincidence with the decision in 2 Pet. say,
"The knowledge or use spoken of in the statute could have
referred to the public only, and cannot be applied to the inventor
himself; he must necessarily have a perfect knowledge of the thing
invented and its use before he can describe it, as by law he is
required to do preparatory to the emanation of a patent. But there
may be cases in which the knowledge of the invention
may be
surreptitiously obtained, and communicated to the public, that
do not affect the right of the inventor. Under such
circumstances,
Page 62 U. S. 331
no presumption can arise in favor of an abandonment of the right
to the inventor to the public, though an acquiescence on his part
will lay the foundation for such a presumption."
The real interest of an inventor with respect to an assertion or
surrender of his rights under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, whether it be sought in his declarations or acts, or
in forbearance or neglect to speak or act, is an inquiry or
conclusion of
fact, and peculiarly within the province of
the jury, guided by legal evidence submitted to them at the
trial.
Recurring now to the instruction from the judge at circuit in
this case, we consider that instruction to be in strict conformity
with the principles hereinbefore propounded and with the doctrines
of this Court as declared in the cases of
Pennock v.
Dialogue and
Shaw v. Cooper. That instruction
diminishes or excludes no proper ground upon which the conduct and
intent of the plaintiff below, as evinced either by declarations or
acts, or by omission to speak or act, and on which also the justice
and integrity of the conduct of the defendants were to be examined
and determined. It submitted the conduct and intentions of both
plaintiff and defendants to the jury, as questions of
fact
to be decided by them, guided simply by such rules of law as had
been settled with reference to issues like the one before them, and
upon those questions of fact the jury have responded in favor of
the plaintiff below, the defendant in error. We think that the
rejection by the court of the prayers offered by the defendants at
the trial was warranted, by the character of those prayers, as
having a tendency to narrow the inquiry by the jury to an imperfect
and partial view of the case, and to divert their minds from a full
comprehension of the merits of the controversy.
The decision of the circuit court is affirmed, therefore,
with costs.