The act of Congress passed on the 26th of February, 1845, 5
Stat. 726, confines the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts upon the lakes to matters of contract and tort arising in,
upon, or concerning steamboats and other vessels employed in the
business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in
different states and territories upon the lakes.
It does not extend, therefore, to a case where there was a
shipment of goods from a port in a state to another port in the
same state, both being in Wisconsin. And this is so although the
vessel was a general ship, and bound, upon the voyage in question,
to Chicago, a port in the State of Illinois.
What would be done in a case of general average, the Court does
not now decide.
Page 62 U. S. 245
The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The libel states that the goods in question were shipped on
board the Fashion at the port of Two Rivers, in the State of
Wisconsin, to be delivered at the port of Milwaukee, in the same
state, and that the master, by reason of negligence and the
unskillful navigation of the vessel, and of her unseaworthiness,
lost them in the course of the voyage.
The respondent sets up, in the answer, the seaworthiness of the
vessel, and that the goods were jettisoned in a storm upon the
lake.
The evidence taken in the court below was directed principally
to these two grounds of defense; but, in the view the Court has
taken of the case, it will not be important to notice it.
The Act of Congress of 26 February, 1845, prescribing and
regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts in admiralty upon
the lakes, and which was held by this Court in the case of
The Genesee
Chief, 12 How. 443, to be valid and binding,
confines that jurisdiction to
"matters of contract and tort, arising in, upon, or concerning
steamboats and other vessels . . . employed in business of commerce
and navigation between ports and places in different states and
territories upon the lakes, and navigable waters connecting said
lakes,"
&c.
This restriction of the jurisdiction to business carried on
between ports and places in different states was doubtless
suggested by the limitation in the Constitution of the power in
Congress to regulate commerce. The words are: "Congress
Page 62 U. S. 246
shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." In the case
of
Gibbon v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 194, it was held that this power
did not extend to the purely internal commerce of a state. Chief
justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court in that
case, observed:
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that
commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between
man and man in a state, or between parts of the same state, and
which does not extend to or affect other states."
Again, he observes:
"The genius and character of the whole government seem to be
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the states
generally, but not to those which are completely within a
particular state, when they do not affect other states, and with
which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing
some of the general powers of the government. The completely
internal commerce of a state, then, he observes, may be considered
as reserved for the state itself."
Ib., 22 U. S. 195
This distinction in the act of 1845 is noticed by the present
CHIEF JUSTICE in delivering the opinion in
The Genesee
Chief. He observed:
"The act of 1845 extends only to such vessels when they are
engaged in commerce between the states and territories. It does not
apply to vessels engaged in the domestic commerce of a state."
This restriction of the admiralty jurisdiction was asserted in
the case of
New Jersey Steam
Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 392,
the first case in which the jurisdiction was upheld by this Court
upon a contract of affreightment.
It was then remarked that
"the exclusive jurisdiction of the court in admiralty cases was
conferred on the national government, as closely connected with the
grant of the commercial power. It is a maritime court, instituted
for the purpose of administering the law of the seas. There seems
to be ground, therefore, for restraining its jurisdiction, in some
measure, within the limit of the grant of the commercial power,
which would confine it, in cases of contract, to those
concerning
Page 62 U. S. 247
the navigation and trade of the country upon the high seas
&c., with foreign countries and among the several states."
"Contracts growing out of the purely internal commerce of the
state &c., are generally domestic in their origin and
operation, and could scarcely have been intended to be drawn within
the cognizance of the federal courts."
The contract of shipment in this case was for the transportation
of the goods from the port of Two Rivers to the port of Milwaukee,
both in the State of Wisconsin, and upon the principles above
stated, the objection to the jurisdiction of the court below would
be quite clear, were it not for the circumstance that the vessel at
the time of this shipment was engaged in a voyage to Chicago, a
port in another state. She was a general ship, with an assorted
cargo, engaged in a general carrying business between ports of
different states, and there is some ground for saying, upon the
words of the act of 1845, that the contracts over which the
jurisdiction is conferred, are contracts of shipment with a vessel
engaged in the business of commerce between the ports of different
states. But the Court is of opinion that this is not the true
construction and import of the act. On the contrary, that the
contracts mentioned relate to the goods carried as well as to the
vessel, and that the shipment must be made between ports of
different states.
This view of the act harmonizes with the limitation of the
jurisdiction as expressed, independently of any act of Congress, in
the case of
New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchant's
Bank, before referred to.
We confine our opinion upon the question of jurisdiction to the
case before us -- namely to the suit upon the contract of shipment
of goods between ports and places of the same state.
The Court is of opinion that the district court had no
jurisdiction over it in admiralty, and that the jurisdiction
belonged to the courts of the state.
It may be that in respect to a vessel like the present, having
cargo on board to be carried between ports of the same state, as
well as between ports of different states, in cases of sale or
bottomry of a cargo for relief of the vessel in distress, of
voluntary stranding of the ship, jettison, and the like, where
Page 62 U. S. 248
contribution and general average arise, that the federal courts
shall be obliged to deal incidentally with the subject, the
question being influenced by the common peril in which all parties
in interest are concerned, and to which ship, freight, and cargo,
as the case may be, are liable to contribute their share of the
loss.
A small part of the goods in question in this case were shipped
for the port of Chicago, but are not of sufficient value to warrant
an appeal to this Court.
The decree of the court below dismissing the libel
affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WAYNE, MR. JUSTICE CATRON, and MR. JUSTICE GRIER,
dissented.
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL concurs in the decree for the dismission of
the libel in this case, but not for the reasons assigned by the
Court.
It being my opinion, as repeatedly declared, that the admiralty
jurisdiction, under the Constitution of the United States is
limited to the high seas, and does not extend to the internal
waters of the United States, whether extending to different states
or comprised within single states. If there be any inefficiency in
this view of the admiralty powers of the government, the fault is
chargeable on the Constitution, and on the want of foresight in
those who framed that instrument, and it can be legitimately
remedied by an amendment of the Constitution only.