Where a steamer approaches an object at night, and the captain
is uncertain what it is, he should slacken his speed. If he does
not take this precaution, his vessel will be responsible in case of
a collision with another vessel.
The night was not so dark as to make it the duty of the schooner
to show a light. The schooner was discerned by the steamer in
sufficient -- time to have avoided the collision, if proper care
had been exercised.
[MR. JUSTICE WAYNE DID NOT SIT IN THIS CAUSE]
The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The district court decreed that the libellants should recover the
sum of three thousand dollars, they having claimed six thousand.
From this decree both parties appealed, but upon its being affirmed
in the circuit court as to both cross-appeals, the claimants of the
steamer were the only party who brought the case up to this
Court.
Page 62 U. S. 3
MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellees instituted their suit in the District Court of the
United States for the District of Maryland, sitting in admiralty,
against the steamer
Louisiana in a cause of collision
arising between the steamer and the schooner George D. Fisher, in
the Chesapeake Bay, in December, 1855, in which the latter was run
into and sunk and became a total loss.
The libellants charge that before and at the time of the
collision the schooner was bound on a voyage from Philadelphia to
Norfolk, through the Chesapeake Bay, and was properly manned and
equipped for that voyage, and carefully navigated.
Page 62 U. S. 4
That the steamer was seen from the schooner, shortly after ten
o'clock P.M., about eight or ten miles distant, steering up the
bay, the schooner making about four knots an hour, in a southwest
course, against the wind, which was blowing about south by east.
That when the steamer was within a half mile or a mile distant, she
appeared to be hauling to the westward, with the apparent intention
of crossing the schooner's bows, but shortly afterwards seemed to
be again hauling to the eastward, as if to drop under the
schooner's stern. That this last movement was made too late, the
distance between the two vessels being too inconsiderable to allow
it to be of any avail. That the moon was shining, and the schooner
might have been seen at a considerable distance. That the course of
the steamer was between north-northeast and northeast.
The claimants in their answer admit the fact of the collision,
and the consequent loss of the schooner, and that it was a
moonlight night, but say that it was cloudy in the western part of
the horizon, and, in consequence of heavy banks of snow clouds in
that quarter, it was impossible to see vessels coming in that
direction without lights at any considerable distance, and a
steamer, therefore, coming up the bay, could not make such
regulations as to speed and course as to avoid collisions, that
would have been practicable and proper under other and more
favorable circumstances. They allege that the schooner did not
carry a light, and was the only vessel seen without one, and in
consequence of this deficiency, and the character of the night, the
schooner was not visible, and could not be seen until the two
vessels were within the short distance of three or four hundred
yards.
In reference to the fact of the collision, they answer, that
when the schooner was first seen from the steamer, the schooner was
to the eastward, and proper action was had on board the steamer to
direct her course to the westward; but when the course of the
schooner in that direction was ascertained, the course of the
steamer was changed, and the boat was stopped and backed; but from
the proximity of the vessels at this time, it was impossible by any
effort to avoid the collision. The steamer was running at the rate
of fifteen miles an hour before
Page 62 U. S. 5
this time. The district court pronounced a decree of
condemnation, which was affirmed in the circuit court on
appeal.
The evidence convinces the court that the schooner might have
been distinctly seen from the steamer at a greater distance than a
half mile.
It is shown that another vessel was sailing in the wake of the
schooner, and was guided in her course by her, and that the
schooner was distinctly visible to those who were on board that
vessel at a greater distance.
It also satisfactorily appears that the schooner was in fact
discovered by the lookout on board the steamer when the vessels
were several hundred yards apart, and that, by careful management
of the steamer, the collision might then have been avoided.
The captain of the
Louisiana says:
"That after passing the Rappahannock lightboat, I saw a black
object; it appeared to be heading about south-southwest down the
bay; it was about two points or two points and a half to the east
of us. I could not tell at that moment whether it was a vessel at
anchor or under way, but directly discovered it was a vessel under
way, and she kept right hard off to the westward. This vessel had
no lights. I think the distance was from two hundred yards to two
hundred and fifty. As soon as I saw her jib, I called to Mr.
Marshall (pilot) to stop and back."
Cross-examined, he says:
"From the time I first saw the vessel until the time of the
collision, was, I should suppose, two minutes, more or less. The
vessel changed her course, and kept off hard to the westward. I saw
her jib, which enabled me to judge that it was a vessel under way.
The change took place immediately after I first saw the object.
When I first saw it, it looked like a cloud. I could not tell if it
was a vessel at anchor or under way. When I saw the jib, I first
knew it was a vessel under way."
Notwithstanding the uncertainty in the mind of this officer, the
vessel under his command continued on in her voyage with unabated
speed. No order was given to arrest her progress till a collision
with the schooner had become inevitable. This was a grave error,
and it was followed by disastrous consequences,
Page 62 U. S. 6
for which the owners must render indemnity. In the case of the
Birkenhead, 3 W.Rob. 75, the steamer was directed upon the
supposition that a sailing vessel under way was at anchor, and
proper precautions were taken under that hypothesis. The
circumstances were such as might have occasioned a mistake. But the
judge of the admiralty, with the advice of the Trinity masters,
condemned the steamer to compensate for the collision, saying "that
she should not have prosecuted her voyage in any uncertainty, but
should have eased or reversed her engines until the fact was
ascertained."
The case of the
James Watt, 2 W.Rob. 271, is similar in
its circumstances to the one under consideration. The master
testified, that when he discovered the sailing vessel, he ported
his helm without stopping to ascertain her course. "In my
apprehension," said the judge,
"the master of the James Watt would have acted, under the
circumstances, with greater prudence and caution, if, upon first
discovering the sailing vessel, instead of porting his helm, he had
continued his course at slacked speed, by easing his engines till
he was able to discover the course the sailing vessel was steering,
and then acting according to circumstances. If he had pursued this
course, it is apparent from the evidence that, in the short space
of about a minute after the sail was reported, he would have
discovered her course, and could have adopted the measures that
might altogether have prevented the collision."
The evidence shows that the George D. Fisher was making a
southwest course, and was close hauled upon the wind. That she did
not vary her course after the steamer came in sight. That the
steamer was first directed to the westward, and afterwards to the
eastward, and then stopped and backed, and that these contrary
movements were the result of the doubts of her officers as to the
position or course of the schooner. If the order to ease the
engines, or to stop, had been given in the first instance, the
probability is that the catastrophe would have been avoided.
The decisions of this Court have settled that this was the duty
of the steamer under such circumstances.
Peck v.
Sanderson, 17 How. 178. It is contended on the part
of the
Page 62 U. S. 7
appellees that the schooner is responsible for failing to carry
a light. In the case of
The Osmanli, 7 Notes of Cases 507,
the learned judge of the admiralty says:
"That no question has been more mooted and left more unsettled
than this -- whether it is the duty of a sailing vessel at night to
show a light? Beyond all doubt, it has been determined there is no
such general obligation; at the same time, there have been
occasions on which, for the sake of avoiding a misfortune, which
was in all human probability likely to occur, it became the duty of
a vessel to show a light."
In the present case, we have not been able to discover any fact
that imposed the obligation upon the schooner to do so. The night
was moonlight; and though the light was occasionally obscured, the
evidence does not show that it was so, to a degree that rendered
the navigation of the bay at all dangerous, if care, skill, and
vigilance, had been employed upon the different vessels.
The Court is of opinion that the schooner was discerned from the
steamer in sufficient time, and that the latter might have avoided
the collision by the exercise of proper care.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL dissented for want of constitutional power in
courts of the United States in admiralty.