This Court has no jurisdiction, under the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, of the question whether or not a law of a
state is in opposition to the Constitution of that state.
Therefore, where it is alleged that the constitution of a state
declares that private property shall not be taken for public uses,
and that the highest court of the state has sustained the validity
of a law which violates this constitutional provision, this Court
has no power to review that decision.
The fifth article of the amendments of the Constitution of the
United States was intended to prevent the government of the United
States from taking private property for public uses without just
compensation, and was not intended as a restraint upon the state
governments.
A law of the State of Mississippi for improving the navigation
of a river which empties itself into the Mississippi is not in
conflict with the act of Congress providing for the admission of
that state into the Union, which act guarantees the free navigation
of the Mississippi River.
Being admitted upon a footing of equality with the other states,
the State of Mississippi had the rightful power to change the
channels or courses of rivers within the interior of the state for
purposes of internal improvement.
And moreover, the law in question does not propose to affect the
navigation of the Mississippi River, but only a small stream
running into it.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 61 U. S. 87
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Upon a writ of error to the High court of Errors and Appeals of
the State of Mississippi, under the authority of the 25th section
of the Act of Congress of September 24, 1789, establishing the
judicial courts of the United States.
The plaintiff in error, by his bill in the state court, alleged
that he is the owner of a large and valuable plantation in the
State of Mississippi, situated on what is called Old River, being a
former bed of the Mississippi River, but which was cut off and made
derelict by a change in the course of the Mississippi in the year
1796. That the Homochitto River, in said state, empties its waters
into the said Old River at a point above or north of the
complainant's plantation, and at low stages of the waters of the
Mississippi the waters of the Homochitto pass around through the
bed of Old River and out by the narrows thereof into the
Mississippi. That the flow of the waters of the Homochitto removes
the deposits of mud occasioned by the overflow of the Mississippi,
and thus keeps open the outlet of Old River, to the great advantage
of the complainant, and of others similarly situated on Old
River.
That the Legislature of Mississippi, by a law approved on the
5th of March, 1850, entitled "An act regulating and defining the
powers of the commissioners of Homochitto River," appointed the
defendants commissioners for the purpose of
"improving the navigation of the Homochitto River and any outlet
from the same through Old River and Buffalo Bayou to the
Mississippi River, and for removing any obstructions in said
streams and excavating and digging a canal unto the Buffalo from
the Homochitto River, or from Old River into the Buffalo."
That said canal commences on Old River below the mouth of the
Homochitto River, and above the lands of the complainant, and will
neither begin, pass through, nor terminate upon, the lands of the
complainant. That the complainant and his grantors have ever
enjoyed and used the waters flowing through his and their lands for
agricultural and domestic purposes and for navigation in
transporting their crops to markets and receiving supplies
therefrom, first when Old River was a part of the Mississippi, and
since the cut-off in 1796, by the waters supplied to Old River from
the Homochitto, and the backwaters of the Mississippi in time of
floods. That by the said laws of Mississippi no compensation is
provided
Page 61 U. S. 88
for the injury to be done to the complainant by the diversion of
the waters of the Homochitto and Old River from the lands of
complainant, and the destruction of the navigation which said
waters afford to his plantation, because said canal or contemplated
outlet is not to be made upon the complainant's lands. The bill of
the complainant then charged that the laws of Mississippi are
invalid for having omitted to provide compensation for the injury
to be inflicted by them upon the complainant, and are, by that
omission, in violation of the fundamental laws both of the United
States and of the State of Mississippi, the constitutions of both
of which declare that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation being made therefor, and are
also in violation of the Act of Congress of March 1, 1817,
authorizing the people of Mississippi to form a constitution, and
of the ordinance passed on the 15th of August, 1817, in pursuance
of the act of Congress, both the act of Congress and ordinance
providing that the Mississippi River and the navigable rivers
leading into the same shall be common highways and forever free as
well to the inhabitants of Mississippi as to other citizens of the
United States.
To this bill a demurrer was interposed by the defendants in
error, and the cause having been carried to the High court of
Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, by that court the demurrer was
sustained and the bill dismissed, with costs.
The correctness or incorrectness of the decree of the High court
of Errors and Appeals is the subject of inquiry and decision now
before this Court. In the prosecution of our inquiry, it is proper
to disembarrass it of matters with which it has been attempted to
associate or surround it -- matters having no just connection
therewith and the introduction of which tends only to obstruct and
obscure the elucidation of truth.
Thus it is charged in the complainant's bill that the law
authorizing the improvement of the Homochitto River is void because
it violates the Constitution of Mississippi by omitting to provide
a compensation for the injury which might be done to individuals by
carrying that law into effect, the constitution of the state having
declared that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation being made therefor. In answer to this
charge it is sufficient to state that this Court never has and does
not assume the right to pronounce authoritatively upon the wisdom
or justice of the legislation of the states when operating upon
their own citizens and upon subjects of property clearly within
their own territory and appropriate cognizance, except so far as
the Constitution of the United States
Page 61 U. S. 89
expressly or by inevitable implication may have made it the duty
of this Court to control the action of the state governments. Nor
has it been deemed the province of this Court to abrogate or
overrule the interpretation put upon their own respective statutes
by the courts of the several states, whether such interpretation
had reference to the ordinary rights of person or property or to
the nature and extent of the legislative powers vested by the
constitutions of the several states and their coincidence with acts
of legislation performed under the delegation of those powers.
These are functions wisely and necessarily left by this Court
untouched in the state tribunals, the assumption of which by the
federal judiciary, as it would embrace every matter upon which the
governments of the states could operate, would in effect amount to
the annihilation of those governments. The doctrine of this Court
as here stated has been clearly affirmed.
In the case of
Jackson v.
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 289, this Court has declared that
it
"has no authority on a writ of error from a state court to
declare a state law void on account of its collision with a state
Constitution, it not being a case embraced in the Judiciary Act,
which alone gives power to issue a writ of error to the state
court."
This Court said "that they will therefore refrain from
expressing any opinion on the points made by counsel in relation to
the Constitution of New York."
See also the ruling of this
Court upon the construction of state laws in the cases of
Polk's Lessee v.
Wendal, 9 Cranch 87, and of the
West River
Bridge Company v. Dix, 6 How. 507. The conformity,
therefore, to the state constitution of the statute appointing the
commissioners of the Homochitto River and prescribing their powers
and duties was a question appropriately belonging to the state
court, and its decision of that question is not properly subject to
reexamination here.
The statute of Mississippi is next assailed on the charge that
it violates the 5th Article of the Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States, of which the clause in the Constitution of
Mississippi, relied on by the plaintiff in error, is a literal
transcript. In this charge is instanced another effort to confuse
and obstruct the only legitimate inquiry arising on the record
before us,
viz., that which relates to the authority of
the High court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, for their
decree pronounced in this cause.
To every person acquainted with the history of the federal
government it is familiarly known that the ten amendments first
engrafted upon the Constitution had their origin in the
apprehension that in the investment of powers made by that
Page 61 U. S. 90
instrument in the federal government, the safety of the states
and their citizens had not been sufficiently guarded. That from
this apprehension arose the chief opposition shown to the adoption
of the Constitution. That in order to remove the cause of this
apprehension and to effect that security which it was feared the
original instrument had failed to accomplish, twelve articles of
amendment were proposed at the first session of the first Congress,
and the ten first articles in the existing series of amendments
were adopted and ratified by Congress and by the states, two of the
twelve proposed amendments having been rejected. The amendments
thus adopted were designed to be modifications of the powers vested
in the federal government, and their language is susceptible of no
other rational, literal, or verbal acceptation. In this acceptation
this Court has repeatedly and uniformly expounded those amendments
in cases having reference to retroactive statutes, to the right of
eminent domain, to the execution of plans for internal improvement,
in opposition to which the clause in the Fifth Article of the
Amendments of the Constitution has been urged. In all such cases,
this Court has ruled that the clause in question was applicable to
the federal government alone, and not to the states, except so far
as it was designed for their security against federal power.
Indeed, so full, so emphatic, and conclusive is the doctrine of
this Court, as promulgated by the late Chief justice Marshall in
the case of
Baron v.
Baltimore, 7 Pet. 247,
32 U. S. 248,
that it would seem to require nothing less than an effort to
unsettle the most deliberate and best-considered conclusions of the
Court, to attempt to shake or disturb that doctrine. An extract
from the reasoning of the Chief Justice, so full, so unanswerable
on this point, may not be unfruitful of benefit as a guide to the
future. After stating that the case was brought before the Court in
virtue of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, the Chief Justice
proceeds:
"The plaintiff in error contends that it comes within that
clause of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution which inhibits the
taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favor of the
liberty of the citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain the
legislative power of a state as well as that of the United States.
If this proposition be untrue, the Court can take no jurisdiction
of the cause."
"The question thus presented we think of great importance, but
not of much difficulty."
"The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of
the United States for themselves -- for their own government,
Page 61 U. S. 91
and not for the government of the individual states. Each state
established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution
provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its
particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the
United States framed such a government for the United States as
they supposed best adapted to their situation and best adapted to
promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this
government were to be exercised by itself, and the limitations on
power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and we think
necessarily, applicable to the government created by the
instrument. They are limitations of power granted by the instrument
itself, not of distinct governments framed by different persons and
for different purposes."
"If these propositions be correct, the Fifth Amendment must be
understood as restraining the power of the general government, not
as applicable to the states. In their several Constitutions they
have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as
their own wisdom suggested -- such as they deemed most proper for
themselves. It is a subject on which they judge
exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther
than they are supposed to have a common interest."
Again, adverting to the causes which led to the proposal and
adoption of the amendments of the Constitution, the same judge
remarks,
ib., p.
32 U. S. 250 --
and these remarks embrace the whole series of articles adopted
--
"In almost every convention in which the Constitution was
adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were
recommended. These amendments demanded security against the
apprehended encroachments of the general government, not against
those of the local governments."
"In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed to
quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed
by the required majority in Congress and adopted by the states.
These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to
apply them to the state governments. This Court cannot so apply
them."
Vide also the cases of
Fox v.
Ohio, 5 How. 411, and of
West River
Bridge Company v. Dix, 6 How. 507.
From the aforegoing view it follows that neither the
Constitution and laws of Mississippi, as interpreted by the high
court of that state, nor the provision of the Fifth Article of the
Amendments of the federal Constitution, as construed by this Court,
can have any just applicability to the legitimate inquiry now
before us.
The remaining objection to the decree of the High Court of
Page 61 U. S. 92
Errors and Appeals -- that which is most directly pertinent to
the present controversy -- is that founded upon the allegation that
the Law of Mississippi of March 5, 1850, creating the Board of
Commissioners of the Homochitto for the purpose of improving the
navigation of that river and of any outlet from the same through
Old River and Buffalo Bayou to the Mississippi, and for excavating
a canal into the Buffalo from the Homochitto or from Old River to
the Buffalo, is a violation of the Act of Congress of the 1st of
March, 1817, authorizing the people of the Mississippi Territory to
form a constitution, which act declares
"That the Mississippi River and the navigable rivers and waters
leading into the same shall be common highways, and forever free as
well to the inhabitants of the State of Mississippi as to other
citizens of the United States."
In considering this Act of Congress of March 1, 1817, it is
unnecessary to institute any examination or criticism as to its
legitimate meaning or operation or binding authority farther than
to affirm that it could have no effect to restrict the new state in
any of its necessary attributes as an independent sovereign
government, nor to inhibit or diminish its perfect equality with
the other members of the Confederacy with which it was to be
associated. These conclusions follow from the very nature and
objects of the Confederacy, from the language of the Constitution
adopted by the states, and from the rule of interpretation
pronounced by this Court in the case of
Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 3 How. 223. The Act of Congress of March 1,
1817, in prescribing the free navigation of the Mississippi and the
navigable waters flowing into this river, could not have been
designed to inhibit the power inseparable from every sovereign or
efficient government, to devise and to execute measures for the
improvement of the state, although such measures might induce or
render necessary changes in the channels or courses of rivers
within the interior of the state, or might be productive of a
change in the value of private property. Such consequences are not
unfrequently and indeed unavoidably incident to public and general
measures highly promotive of and absolutely necessary to the public
good. And here it may be asked, whether the law complained of, and
the measures said to be in contemplation for its execution, are in
reality in conflict with the Act of Congress of March 1, 1817, with
respect either to the letter or the spirit of the act? On this
point may be cited the case of
Veazie v.
Moor, in 14 How. 568.
By the allegations of the bill it appears that this trace or
channel, which is distinguished by the appellation of Old River, is
not in fact, and never was, a separate navigable river. It
Page 61 U. S. 93
was once the bed or channel of the Mississippi, but, by natural
causes, the latter many years since changed its bed or course,
thereby rendering derelict the former bed or channel, which would
be wholly without water except what occasionally is forced into it
from freshets in the Mississippi and that which is received from
the current of the Homochitto. With no propriety of language, then,
can it be pretended that the contemplated communication between the
Homochitto and the Buffalo Bayou would be the violation of a law
which declares that the waters of the Mississippi, and the
navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, shall be common
highways and forever free as well to the inhabitants of the state
as to other citizens of the United States. Old River was once the
bed or a portion of the Mississippi, but never a separate navigable
river flowing into the Mississippi. Any improvement, therefore, in
the facilities of reaching the Mississippi by another river cannot
be an obstruction in what never was, in any correct sense of the
phrase, a navigable river leading or flowing into the
Mississippi.
But, for argument, let it be conceded that this derelict channel
of the Mississippi, called Old River, is in truth a navigable river
leading or flowing into the Mississippi; it would by no means
follow that a diversion into the Buffalo Bayou of waters, in whole
or in part, which pass from Homochitto into Old River would be a
violation of the Act of Congress of March 1, 1817, in its letter or
its spirit, or of any condition which Congress had power to impose
on the admission of the new state. It cannot be imputed to Congress
that they ever designed to forbid or to withhold from the State of
Mississippi the power of improving the interior of that state by
means either of roads or canals or by regulating the rivers within
its territorial limits, although a plan of improvement to be
adopted might embrace or affect the course or the flow of rivers
situated within the interior of the state. Could such an intention
be ascribed to Congress, the right to enforce it may be confidently
denied. Clearly Congress could exact of the new state the surrender
of no attribute inherent in her character as a sovereign
independent state or indispensable to her equality with her sister
states, necessarily implied and guaranteed by the very nature of
the federal compact. Obviously, and it may be said primarily, among
the incidents of that equality is the right to make improvements in
the rivers, watercourses, and highways situated within the state.
Thus situated, as appears on the face of the bill, are the derelict
bed of the Mississippi, called Old River, the Homochitto River, the
Buffalo Bayou, and the line of the canal by which it is proposed
that
Page 61 U. S. 94
the two last shall be united for the more easy and certain
access to the Mississippi.
The act of the Legislature of Mississippi, therefore, is
strictly within the legitimate and even essential powers of the
state, is in violation of neither the Constitution nor laws of the
United States, and presents no conjuncture or aspect by which this
Court would be warranted to supervise or control the decree of the
High court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi. We are therefore
of the opinion that the decree of that court be
Affirmed.