Where several parties set up conflicting claims to property,
with which a special tribunal may deal, as between one party and
the government, regardless of the rights of others, the latter may
come into the ordinary courts of justice and litigate the
conflicting claims.
Therefore, in a case where the register and receiver of public
lands have been imposed upon by
ex parte affidavits, and
the patent has been obtained by one having no interest secured to
him in virtue of the preemption laws, to the destruction of
another's right who had a preference of entry which he preferred
and exerted in due form, but which right was defeated by false
swearing and fraudulent contrivance brought about by him to whom
the patent was awarded in such a case, the jurisdiction of the
courts of justice is not ousted by the regulations of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The controversy referred to the northeast quarter of section 18,
in township 16 south, range 25 west of the fifth principal
meridian, south of Red River, in the County of Lafayette.
The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
The bill was filed by Wynn, who alleged that he would have got a
patent but for Garland's proving a preemption right in the land,
under the act of 1830, to exist in Hemphill. After various
proceedings, the circuit court state court decreed against Wynn.
The supreme court of the state reversed this decree, and ordered
Garland to convey the land in question to Wynn, upon payment of two
hundred dollars, with interest, or in case of neglect, that the
decree should stand as a conveyance &c.
From this decree, Garland appealed to this Court.
The principal points of law involved in the argument were 1st,
whether or not Wynn could interpose between the United
Page 61 U. S. 7
States and the patentee, and 2d whether the decision of the
officers of the land office was not conclusive upon all person
except the United States, and upon them also until the patent was
vacated by regular judicial authority.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In November, 1842, William Wynn the complainant below proved
that he had a preference of entry to the quarter section of land in
dispute, according to the act of 1838, and his entry was
allowed.
In February, 1843, Samuel Hemphill made proof that he had a
right of preemption to the same land, under the act of May 26,
1830. The two claims coming in conflict, it was decided by the
register and receiver at the local land office, that Hemphill had
the earlier and better right to enter the land, and in this
decision the Commissioner of the General Land Office concurred.
Wynn's entry being the oldest, it was set aside, his purchase
money refunded, and a patent certificate was awarded to Samuel
Hemphill, who assigned it to Garland, the plaintiff in error, to
whom the patent issued. The benefit of the patent was decreed to
Wynn by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, to reverse which decree,
Garland prosecutes his writ of error out of this Court.
It appears from the allegations and evidence that Garland
procured the proofs, and was in fact the principal in obtaining a
preference of entry in the name of Hemphill, and in causing Wynn's
elder entry to be vacated, that the whole proceeding, on the part
of Garland and Hemphill, was a mere imposition on the officers
administering the public lands, that Hemphill never had any
improvement on the northeast quarter of section 18, but that his
improvement was on the northwest quarter of section 17, which
adjoins the quarter section in controversy, and that Garland
induced the witnesses, who made the proof before the register and
receiver to establish Hemphill's preference of entry, to confound
the quarter sections and their dividing lines, and misrepresented
the extent of the cleared and occupied by Hemphill in 1829 and
1830, so that the witnesses ignorantly swore that the improvement
and cultivation were in part on the northeast quarter of section
18, which was wholly untrue, and by which false swearing Wynn's
entry was set aside and Garland obtained a patent of the land.
Garland insists, by an amended answer in the nature of a
distinct plea, that by the law of the land, the circuit court had
no authority or jurisdiction to set aside or correct the decision
of the register and receiver, and that their adjudication
Page 61 U. S. 8
and judgment in granting and allowing the preemption rights to
and in the name of Samuel Hemphill was final and conclusive, and
cannot be inquired into, or in any manner questioned, modified, or
set aside.
This matter was put in issue, and the court below, when it
decreed for the complainant, necessarily decided against the bar to
relief set up and claimed under an authority of the United
States.
The question is have the courts of justice power to examine a
contested claim to a right of entry under the preemption laws, and
to overrule the decision of the register and receiver, confirmed by
the commissioner, in a case where they have been imposed upon by
ex parte affidavits, and the patent has been obtained by
one having no interest secured to him in virtue of the preemption
laws, to the destruction of another's right, who had a pretense of
entry, which he preferred and exerted in due form, but which right
was defeated by false swearing and fraudulent contrivance brought
about by him to whom the patent was awarded?
The general rule is that where several parties set up
conflicting claims to property, with which a special tribunal may
deal, as between one party and the government, regardless of the
rights of others, the latter may come into the ordinary courts of
justice, and litigate the conflicting claims. Such was the case of
Comegys v.
Vasse, 1 Pet. 212, and the case before us belongs
to the same class of
ex parte proceedings, nor do the
regulations of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, whereby
a party
may be heard to prove his better claim to enter,
oust the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. We announce this to
be the settled doctrine of this Court.
It was, in effect, so held in the case of
Lytle
v. State of Arkansas, 9 How. 328; next, in the case
of
Cunningham v.
Ashley, 14 How. 377, and again in the case of
Bernard v.
Ashley, 18 How. 44.
It is ordered that the decree of the supreme court of
Arkansas be in all things affirmed.
