Where a bill of exchange was drawn in proper form and protested
for nonacceptance, parol evidence of an understanding between the
drawer and the party in whose favor the bill was drawn, calculated
to vary the terms of the instrument, was not admissible.
Wiley & Co. were citizens of New York, and Brown a citizen
of Texas.
The cause of action was the following bill of exchange:
"$2,359.26 SHREVEPORT, March 23, 1854"
"On or before the 1st of May next, 1855, please pay to order L.
M. Wiley & Co. twenty-three hundred and fifty-nine and
twenty-six one hundredths dollars, for value received, and charge
same to my account, without further advice."
"TAYLOR BROWN"
"
Messrs. Campbell & Strong, merchants, New
Orleans"
"By W. L. McMURRAY"
This draft was presented and protested for nonacceptance on the
10th of June, 1854, more than ten months before the time when it
was payable, and it appeared from the record that the suit was
instituted against the drawer in February, 1855, nearly three
months before the maturity of the bill.
The petition, as amended, contained the usual averments of the
drawing of the draft, its presentation for acceptance, protest, and
notice of dishonor.
The defense was that there were two bills of similar character,
except that one was payable in May, 1854, and the other in May,
1855, and that it was agreed by the parties that the second should
not be presented for acceptance until the first was taken up. These
pleas were, on motion of the plaintiffs' counsel, stricken out.
The cause then came on for trial, and the defendant offered
evidence to prove these facts the result of which is stated in the
following extract from the bill of exceptions:
Page 61 U. S. 443
"The defendant's counsel then offered to prove, that at the time
the draft was delivered, it was expressly stipulated and agreed by
and between W. L. McMurray, the agent of the defendant, and Charles
Keith, the agent of the plaintiffs that the said draft should not
be presented for acceptance until the defendant should provide for
the payment of a previous draft, drawn by the same party in favor
of the same parties upon the same drawees, falling due in April,
1854, according to an understanding had with the drawees, and that
said draft would not have been delivered to plaintiffs' agent, if
he had not have agreed to hold it up. This was objected to by
plaintiffs' counsel, and the objection sustained, to which ruling
and decision of the court the defendant excepts.'"
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant
brought the case up to this Court.
Page 61 U. S. 447
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Wiley & Co., plaintiffs below, declared on a bill of
exchange drawn by Taylor Brown on Messrs. Campbell & Strong, of
New Orleans, to order of plaintiff, dated 23d of March, 1854, and
payable on the 1st of May, 1855. It was presented for acceptance on
the 10th of June, 1854, and was protested for nonacceptance, of
which the drawer had due notice.
It is admitted the bill was given for full value, but the
defendant set up by way of special plea and offered to prove to the
jury a parol agreement between him and the plaintiffs that this
bill should not be presented for acceptance till after a certain
other draft, payable in May, 1854, was provided for by placing
funds in the hands of the drawees, who had agreed to accept the
last bill after funds had been received to meet their acceptance of
the first.
It is the rejection of this defense by the court below that is
the subject of exception. It presents the question whether parol
evidence should have been received to vary, alter, or contradict
that which appears on the face of the bill of exchange.
When the operation of a contract is clearly settled by general
principles of law, it is taken to be the true sense of the
contracting parties. This is not only a positive rule of the common
law, but it is a general principle in the construction of
contracts. Some precedents to the contrary may be found in some of
our states, originating in hard cases, but they are generally
overruled by the same tribunals from which they emanated on
experience of the evil consequences flowing from a relaxation of
the rule. There is no ambiguity arising in this case which needs
explanation. By the face of the bill, the owner of it had a right
to demand acceptance immediately and
Page 61 U. S. 448
to protest it for nonacceptance. The proof of a parol contract
that it should not be presentable till a distant, uncertain, or
undefined period tended to alter and vary, in a very material
degree, its operation and effect.
See Thompson v. Ketchum,
8 John. 192
Any number of conflicting cases on this subject might be cited.
It will be sufficient to refer to the decisions of this Court,
those of Texas, where the suit was brought, and of Louisiana, where
the contract was made.
In
Bank of United States v.
Dunn, 6 Pet. 56, this Court declared
"That there is no rule better settled or more salutary in its
application them that which precludes the admission of parol
evidence to contradict or substantially vary the legal import of a
written agreement."
The case of
Brochmore v. Davenport, 14 Tex. 602, a case
precisely similar to the present, adopts the same rule. The case of
Robishat v. Folse, 11 La., and of
Barthet v.
Estebene, 5 Ann. 315, and several others acknowledge the same
doctrine, thereby overruling some early cases in Louisiana which
had departed from it.
This being the only point urged by plaintiff in error as a
ground of reversal, the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.
