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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 25–83
_________________
ADRIAN JULES, PETITIONER
v. ANDRE
BALAZS PROPERTIES, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit
[May 14, 2026]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case addresses whether a federal court that
has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1
et seq., has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a
resulting arbitral award as to those claims under §9 and §10. The
Court holds that it does. Because a federal court in this scenario
has jurisdiction over the original claims and does not lose that
jurisdiction while the case is stayed pending arbitration, it
retains jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitral award
resolving those claims is valid and should be confirmed. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
therefore affirmed.
I
A
The FAA “authorizes a party to an arbitration
agreement to seek several kinds of assistance from a federal
court.”
Badgerow v.
Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 4 (2022). At
the front end, §3 of the FAA directs federal courts to stay any
lawsuit that involves an issue that is “referable to arbitration,”
and §4 allows federal courts to compel arbitration if a party to an
arbitration agreement refuses to arbitrate. During arbitration,
federal courts may facilitate the proceedings, including by
appointing an arbitrator under §5 and enforcing subpoenas under §7.
On the back end, and central here, after an arbitral award has
issued, federal courts may confirm, vacate, or modify such an award
under §9, §10, or §11. Under §9, a court must confirm an award upon
request “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in sections 10 and 11.” The grounds for vacatur and
modification are limited. See §10(a) (allowing vacatur for
“corruption, fraud, or undue means,” “partiality” or “misconduct”
by an arbitrator, and “where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers”); §11 (allowing modification of “material
miscalculation[s]” and in other narrow circumstances).
An FAA motion can arrive in federal court in one
of two ways. Sometimes (like in this case), an FAA motion arises in
a pre-existing lawsuit. In such cases, one party files a federal
suit and the other responds by arguing that the dispute is
arbitrable and so should not go forward in court. If the latter
party is right, the court must stay proceedings pending arbitration
under §3 and, upon request, must compel arbitration under
§4.[
2] (What else a court may
do in this scenario, including with respect to §9 and §10 motions
filed after arbitration has concluded and the parties return to
court, is the subject of this appeal.) In other cases, a
“freestanding” FAA motion can arrive in federal court outside of
any pre-existing federal case. For example, the parties may proceed
directly to arbitration under their contract but need assistance
enforcing a subpoena, and so apply to a court for aid under §7. Or
one party may refuse to respond to an out-of-court arbitration
demand at all, and the other side may seek an order compelling
arbitration under §4.
Regardless of how an FAA dispute begins, federal
jurisdiction is not always a foregone conclusion. For a federal
court to have jurisdiction over an arbitral dispute, it is not
enough that the dispute implicates the FAA. That is because the FAA
is “ ‘something of an anomaly’ in the realm of federal
legislation.”
Vaden v.
Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59
(2009). Although the FAA is a federal statute that provides federal
standards, it “does not itself create [federal] jurisdiction.”
Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 4. Instead, given the FAA’s
“nonjurisdictional cast,” a federal court must have an
“ ‘independent jurisdictional basis’ ” for granting FAA
relief.
Vaden, 556 U. S., at 59. That could come, for
example, in the form of diversity jurisdiction if a dispute under
the FAA arises between citizens of different States with over
$75,000 at issue. See 28 U. S. C. §1332(a). Or a court
may have federal-question jurisdiction if an FAA motion implicates
a federal issue (other than one under the FAA). See §1331.
In two prior cases, this Court has addressed how
to assess jurisdiction over FAA motions filed as “freestanding”
actions in federal court. First, in
Vaden v.
Discover
Bank, the Court held that §4 permits courts to assess
jurisdiction by “ ‘looking through’ ” a motion to compel
arbitration to the underlying dispute. 556 U. S., at 62.
There, the parties began with a contract dispute in state court,
but after one side filed counterclaims, the other side filed a §4
motion in federal court invoking the contract’s arbitration
agreement.
Id., at 54–55. The §4 motion itself did not
present a federal question; it invoked only a contractual right to
arbitrate.
Id., at 63. Nor was diversity jurisdiction
available.
Id., at 54, n. 1. Yet this was not the end
of the matter. As the Court observed, §4’s text authorizes relief
if a court, “ ‘save for [the arbitration] agreement, would
have jurisdiction’ ” over the dispute.
Id., at 62. The
Court thus held that courts should determine §4 jurisdiction “by
‘looking through’ a §4 petition to the parties’ underlying
substantive controversy,” even though that controversy is not
before the federal court.
Id., at 62–63. If that
“ ‘controversy between the parties,’ as they have framed it,
could be litigated in federal court,” even if no such claim was
ever filed in federal court, a court has jurisdiction to compel
arbitration.
Id., at 66.
Second, in
Badgerow v.
Walters,
the Court concluded that
Vaden’s look-through approach does
not apply to freestanding motions to confirm or vacate arbitral
awards under §9 or §10. 596 U. S., at 5. The parties in
Badgerow began by proceeding directly to an arbitration of
federal claims without filing suit in any court and without filing
any §3 or §4 motion.
Ibid. After the arbitration resolved
the federal claims at issue, one party sought confirmation of the
award in federal court, while the other sought vacatur.
Ibid. Like in
Vaden, the FAA motions presented no
(non-FAA) federal question on their face, and the parties were not
diverse. 596 U. S., at 9. The Court thus considered whether
Vaden’s “ ‘look-through’ approach to jurisdiction
applies to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under the
FAA’s Sections 9 and 10.” 596 U. S., at 5.
The Court held that it does not. The
look-through approach, the Court emphasized, is a “highly unusual”
“jurisdictional outlier.”
Id., at 12, 14. That is because
the look-through approach “locates jurisdiction not in the action
actually before the court, but in another controversy neither there
nor ever meant to be.”
Id., at 12; see
id., at 9
(similar).
Vaden grounded its anomalous approach largely in
§4’s “ ‘save for’ ” language, whereas “Sections 9 and
10,” the Court observed, “contain none of the statutory language on
which
Vaden relied.” 596 U. S., at 10–11. Accordingly,
Badgerow held that a court presented with a freestanding §9
or §10 motion may not look through that motion to a controversy
involving a federal issue that is “not before the court” in order
to establish jurisdiction.
Id., at 5.
B
Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules
worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. In
March 2020, the hotel ended his employment, citing staffing issues
related to the COVID–19 pandemic. Jules then sued in Federal
District Court in New York (where several respondents are
domiciled), alleging, among other things, that respondents
unlawfully discriminated against him in violation of federal and
state law.
Jules, however, had signed an arbitration
agreement before beginning work at the hotel, which stated that any
disputes related to his employment or termination thereof that
could not be resolved by negotiation or mediation must be resolved
by arbitration. Citing this agreement, respondents moved, as
relevant here, to stay federal proceedings pending arbitration
under §3. In 2021, the District Court held that the arbitration
agreement covered Jules’s claims and stayed proceedings.
Jules then commenced arbitration against
respondents. In 2023, the arbitrator issued a final award ruling
against Jules on all claims. In addition, the arbitrator awarded
about $34,500 in sanctions to respondents based on Jules’s and his
attorney’s misconduct (which included Jules refusing to participate
in the arbitral hearing on Jules’s claims).
Back in District Court, before the same court
that had previously stayed Jules’s claims pending arbitration,
respondents moved to confirm the award under §9. Jules opposed
confirmation while cross-moving to vacate the arbitral award under
§10 on various grounds. Relevant here, Jules argued that, under
Badgerow, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to confirm
the award because the §9 and §10 motions did not present federal
questions or satisfy the requirements for diversity jurisdiction,
given that the parties to the arbitration and award were nondiverse
and the amount in controversy was less than $75,000.
The District Court disagreed and confirmed the
arbitral award. The Second Circuit affirmed.
Badgerow, the
Second Circuit emphasized, “involved [a freestanding] action
commenced . . . for the sole purpose of vacating an
arbitral award.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a (Pet. App.). That made
it fundamentally “unlike the present action, which started as a
federal question suit before it was stayed pending arbitration.”
Ibid. In the latter situation, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, “the Supreme Court has held that a ‘court with the power
to stay the action under §3 has the further power to confirm any
ensuing arbitration award,’ ” regardless of whether there is
an independent jurisdictional basis for the §9 and §10 proceedings.
Ibid. (quoting
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v.
Bill
Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 202 (2000); alteration
omitted). Because nothing in
Badgerow undermined this
principle, the Second Circuit held that the District Court had
jurisdiction to confirm the award. See Pet. App. 7a.
Jules filed a timely petition for a writ of
certiorari seeking review of the Second Circuit’s conclusion that
Badgerow’s holding is limited to freestanding §9 and §10
applications without a pre-existing federal lawsuit. Two other
Courts of Appeals have agreed with the Second Circuit after
Badgerow, but the Fourth Circuit has held that
Badgerow’s holding applies to all §9 and §10 motions,
regardless of whether claims were filed in federal court before
they were resolved in arbitration. Compare
George v.
Rushmore Serv. Center, LLC, 114 F. 4th 226, 238, n. 16 (CA3
2024), and
Kinsella v.
Baker Hughes Oilfields Operations,
LLC, 66 F. 4th 1099, 1103 (CA7 2023), with
SmartSky
Networks, LLC v.
DAG Wireless, LTD., 93 F. 4th 175, 183
(CA4 2024). This Court granted certiorari to resolve the division
among the Courts of Appeals. 607 U.S. 1079 (2025).
II
This case asks whether a federal court with
pre-existing jurisdiction over claims that it stayed pending
arbitration under §3 can adjudicate a §9 or §10 motion even if that
motion does not present, on its face, an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction. The answer is yes. “[A] court with the power
to stay the action under §3 has the further power to confirm [or
vacate] any ensuing arbitration award.”
Cortez Byrd, 529
U. S., at 202 (addressing a different, venue-related question
under the FAA).
To start, unlike with the freestanding
applications at issue in
Vaden and
Badgerow, see
supra, at 3–4, assessing jurisdiction over a §9 or §10
motion in a case originally filed in federal court does not require
“looking through” the filed action. Instead, the court may assess
its jurisdiction by looking at the suit that is already before it.
As
Badgerow explained, “[j]urisdiction to decide [a] case
includes jurisdiction to decide [a] motion” within that case, and
usually “there is no need to ‘look through’ the motion in search of
a jurisdictional basis outside the court.” 596 U. S., at
15.
Here, the District Court had original
jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. §1331, over Jules’s
federal claims. It was this very jurisdiction that authorized the
court to adjudicate the arbitrability of Jules’s claims under the
parties’ contract to begin with, before staying litigation pending
arbitration. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while
the parties arbitrated. See
Hall Street Associates,
L. L. C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581
(2008) (“As for jurisdiction over controversies touching
arbitration, the [FAA] does nothing”). So when the parties returned
to court after arbitration with §9 and §10 motions, the court had
the same “jurisdiction to decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction
to decide th[ose] motion[s],” that it possessed from the start.
Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 15. “The court had federal
question subject matter jurisdiction and . . . never lost
it.” 1 I. Macneil, R. Speidel, & T. Stipanowich, Federal
Arbitration Law §9.2.3.1, p. 9:13 (1995).
The District Court’s pre-existing jurisdiction
means that this case is not “
Badgerow all over again.”
Contra, Brief for Petitioner 3. In
Badgerow, the first (and
only) thing that had occurred in federal court was the
confirm-or-vacate dispute under §9 and §10. See 596 U. S., at
5–6. In that circumstance, there were only two places a court could
look to find federal jurisdiction: the face of the FAA motions, on
the one hand, or the underlying dispute that “was not before” the
court, on the other.
Id., at 9
. Here, however, there
is an obvious third place to look for jurisdiction: the original
claims themselves. Because those claims were sufficient to
establish the District Court’s jurisdiction in this case under 28
U. S. C. §1331, they also established the District
Court’s authority to resolve the motions to confirm or vacate the
arbitral award resolving those claims.
It is true that, by the time the parties filed
the §9 and §10 motions here, the arbitrator had issued an award
that marked “a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute.” 596
U. S., at 9. As Jules argues, that out-of-court resolution
functioned like a release, which could serve as an affirmative
defense and be used to “resolve the original claim” filed in court.
Reply Brief 15 (citing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(c)(1), which lists “arbitration and award” as an
“affirmative defense”). The fact that the arbitral award may
“resolve” Jules’s original claims, however, only underscores why
the District Court’s original jurisdiction extends to the parties’
§9 and §10 motions. Those motions required the District Court to
assess whether there were grounds to vacate the award. See §9
(requiring confirmation “unless the award is
vacated . . . as prescribed in sectio[n] 10”). They
were thus integral to determining whether the award would continue
to serve as a valid defense to the original claims that had been
stayed, but were still pending, in District Court until the court
confirmed the award. Cf. Judgment in No. 1:20–cv–10500 (SDNY), ECF
Doc. 118, p. 1 (confirming arbitral award against Jules and
entering judgment on Jules’s claims).
Jules notes that, unlike dismissal based on an
affirmative defense, a §9 motion goes further and asks a court to
convert an arbitral award into a judgment of the court. See §13
(stating that an order confirming an arbitral award has the “same
force and effect” as a judgment in a federal action). That is
correct, but this Court has held that federal courts have the power
to incorporate private settlements into orders of the court when
resolving claims that are the subject of those settlements. In
Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
U.S. 375 (1994), for example, the Court made clear that a federal
“court is authorized to embody [a] settlement contract in its
dismissal order” and later “enforc[e]” that “settlement agreement.”
Id., at 381–382.[
3]
Similarly, the Court has recognized federal courts’ jurisdiction to
embody contracts “arrived at by negotiation between the parties” as
consent judgments in certain circumstances.
United States v.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237, n. 10 (1975)
(noting the “dual character” of such judgments). Federal courts
also routinely resolve disputes over private settlements in class
actions, which can be settled “only with the court’s approval.”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e); see,
e.
g.,
Sullivan v.
DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 293 (CA3
2011) (en banc) (addressing disputes over class settlement that
included an “agreed-upon injunction”). In each scenario, as here,
the parties reach a contractual resolution of claims filed in
federal court, and the federal court has jurisdiction to resolve
disputes over that private settlement and embody the settlement in
a court order resolving the case.
The FAA’s structure further confirms
jurisdiction here. This Court recently considered “whether §3
permits a court to dismiss [a] case instead of issuing a stay when
the dispute is subject to arbitration and a party requests a stay
pending arbitration.”
Smith v.
Spizzirri, 601 U.S.
472, 474 (2024). Given that §3 dictates that courts in this
situation “ ‘shall . . . stay’ ” proceedings,
the Court easily concluded that “a stay,” not dismissal, “is
required.”
Id., at 476–477. This conclusion, the Court
emphasized, “comport[ed] with the supervisory role that the FAA
envisions for the courts,” which includes “assist[ing] parties in
arbitration by . . . appointing an arbitrator, see 9
U. S. C. §5; enforcing subpoenas . . . , see
§7; and facilitating recovery on an arbitral award, see §9.”
Id., at 478. “Keeping [a] suit on the court’s docket makes
good sense in light of this potential ongoing role, and it avoids
costs and complications that might arise if a party were required
to bring a new suit and pay a new filing fee to invoke the FAA’s
procedural protections.”
Ibid.
Under the rule the Court adopts today, this
scheme continues to work well: The FAA requires a stay, rather than
dismissal, so that a court that has granted a §3 stay can
superintend the arbitration to the end, including through
confirmation or vacatur. On Jules’s theory, however, things would
fall apart. Without an independent jurisdictional basis (like
complete diversity and more than $75,000 at stake) on the face of a
§5, §7, §9, or §10 motion, Jules concedes that a court that grants
a mandatory §3 stay has little to do but wait until the arbitration
concludes and, finally, dismiss the claims. It would be curious for
§3 to mandate keeping cases on federal dockets for essentially no
reason at all in the cases where federal interests are likely at
their highest: those, like this one, involving live federal
questions. More plausibly, a court that grants a §3 stay retains
jurisdiction to see the case through and provide the FAA’s
“procedural protections” along the way.
Ibid.
III
Jules’s remaining counterarguments are without
merit. First, and primarily, he points to
Badgerow. In his
view,
Badgerow makes clear that the FAA is a “reticulated”
framework whose “text,” alone, governs federal jurisdiction over
FAA disputes and requires an independent jurisdictional basis for
all §9 and §10 motions. Reply Brief 1–2. As explained, however,
this overreads
Badgerow, which nowhere converted the
“nonjurisdictional” FAA,
Vaden, 556 U. S., at 59, into
a “reticulated” jurisdictional scheme. The problem for the losing
party in
Badgerow was that, without the look-through
approach authorized by §4, there was no federal jurisdiction to be
found in the case. See 596 U. S., at 9, 12. Because §9 and §10
did not provide a textual basis for applying the look-through
approach, the Court held that it was not available.
Id., at
14. Respondents here, to the contrary, are not asking for any
“highly unusual” look-through rule.
Id., at 12. Instead, the
court in this case secured federal jurisdiction, in one of the most
usual ways imaginable, based on the federal claims Jules filed in
federal court under 28 U. S. C. §1331. Respondents merely
asked the District Court to use the tools provided by the FAA to
finally resolve those claims. Nothing in
Badgerow or the FAA
eliminates the District Court’s jurisdiction to do so.[
4]
Second, Jules disputes whether §9 and §10
applications should really be considered motions in a pending case.
Instead, he argues, they should be treated as entirely “new federal
actions” for purposes of assessing jurisdiction, even when filed in
pre-existing suits, because §9 and §12 of the FAA require service
and notice of such applications. Brief for Petitioner 22–23. This
Court has explained, however, that §3’s mandatory stay is aimed
precisely at “avoid[ing] [the] costs and complications” of
“bring[ing] a new suit,”
Spizzirri, 601 U. S., at 478,
and even Jules admits that neither service of process nor a whole
new proceeding is always necessary, see Reply Brief 6, n. 1.
The service provisions in §9 and §12 (the latter of which,
governing service of §10 motions, does not even mention
“jurisdiction”) do not impose the strict jurisdictional rule Jules
favors.
Third, Jules turns to §8 of the FAA, which
governs certain maritime arbitrations. Section 8 provides that,
when “the basis of jurisdiction” is “in admiralty,” a party may
“begin his proceeding . . . by libel and seizure of the
vessel.” Jules notes that in such cases, §8 also provides that “the
court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed
with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its
decree upon the award.” To Jules, this shows that Congress knew how
to authorize the kind of “jurisdictional anchor” respondents seek
here, yet declined to provide such a basis for jurisdiction in §9
or §10.
The Court disagrees. Section 8 merely instructs
that, in one class of admiralty cases where a plaintiff invokes
in rem jurisdiction over a vessel “as security for
compliance with any arbitral award,”
The Anaconda v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 322 U.S. 42, 44 (1944), the
court holding the vessel must retain jurisdiction to confirm or
vacate such award. District courts would likely have jurisdiction
over such proceedings even without §8 under 28 U. S. C.
§1333, which provides “original jurisdiction” over admiralty cases.
It appears, then, that §8 does little more than provide specific
procedural rules governing how courts ought to handle a distinct
form of admiralty arbitration involving seized vessels. It does not
shed light on how jurisdiction, more broadly, should function in
other FAA disputes.
Finally, Jules resorts to policy. Allowing
courts to exercise jurisdiction in cases like this one, he worries,
will encourage parties to “engage in useless federal litigation for
the sole purpose of creating a jurisdictional anchor” later on,
Brief for Petitioner 34, disrupting the “ ‘sensible
. . . division of labor’ ” between state and federal
courts that
Badgerow recognized, Brief for Petitioner 31
(quoting 596 U. S., at 18). Even without such gamesmanship, he
continues, respondents’ rule will make federal jurisdiction turn on
the “happenstance” of whether one party to an arbitral dispute
filed a federal case before proceeding to arbitration. Brief for
Petitioner 14.
Setting aside that “ ‘[i]t is not for this
Court to employ untethered notions of what might be good public
policy to [determine] our jurisdiction,’ ”
Badgerow,
596 U. S., at 16, Jules’s policy arguments lack force on their
own terms. For one thing, his concerns about protective anchor
suits are conjectural. Even in courts that have long embraced
Badgerow’s rule for freestanding §9 and §10 motions but
agree with the result the Court reaches today for pre-existing
cases, Jules identifies no epidemic of useless filings clogging up
federal courts.[
5] That may be
because filing a precautionary federal anchor suit runs a serious
risk of forfeiting the right to arbitrate. Cf.
Morgan v.
Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 413, 418–419 (2022). Or it may
be because securing a postarbitration federal forum is not all that
valuable to parties who, on the front end, do not know whether they
will emerge from arbitration a winner or loser and thus may not be
able to tell which forum’s law might prove most advantageous.
Either way, there is no evidence suggesting that Jules’s concerns
about manufactured federal jurisdiction will come to pass. There
thus seems to be little risk that confirm-or-vacate litigation will
flood federal courts. The “typical FAA application” under §9 and
§10, after all, likely involves those who adhered to their
arbitration agreements to begin with.
Badgerow, 596
U. S., at 15.
Nor is it anomalous for federal jurisdiction to
turn, at least in part, on the happenstance of how litigation
proceeded. “[A]ctual litigation” generally “define[s] the parties’
controversy,” even if “events could have unfolded differently.”
Vaden, 556 U. S., at 68. “[A] party’s ability to gain
adjudication . . . in federal court often depends on how
that question happens to have been presented.”
Ibid.,
n. 17; see,
e.
g.,
Kokkonen, 511
U. S., at 380–382 (explaining that jurisdiction may depend on
whether a court happened to “retain jurisdiction” expressly over a
settlement agreement).
In any event, even if Jules’s policy concerns
had some merit, there are countervailing concerns on the other
side. Jules’s rule would significantly diminish “the supervisory
role that the FAA envisions for the courts,”
Spizzirri, 601
U. S., at 478, by forcing them to stay proceedings under §3
for essentially no reason in most cases. It would also undermine
the efficiency interests at the heart of the FAA by forcing parties
who were previously in federal court (often, as here, against their
wishes) to launch a fresh state-court proceeding, complete with “a
new filing fee,” to secure confirmation or vacatur of an arbitral
award.
Ibid.; cf.
Hall Street, 552 U. S., at 588
(noting that §§9–11 “substantiat[e] a national policy favoring
arbitration” by helping to “resolv[e] disputes straightaway”).
Jules’s approach could also lead to
unnecessarily complex dual-track litigation. Here, as is often the
case when a §3 stay is needed, the parties disputed not only
whether the arbitral award should be confirmed or vacated, but also
whether the dispute was arbitrable to begin with. See Pet. App.
4a–5a. Because orders staying an action pending arbitration under
§3 or compelling arbitration under §4 can generally be appealed
only after final judgment, see §16(b), such appeals will usually
occur only after an arbitral award issues and the claims pending in
federal court are dismissed. That process neatly unfolded here: The
same District Court that initially held Jules’s claims to be
arbitrable later confirmed the resulting award and entered
judgment; then, both the arbitrability and confirmation issues went
up to the Second Circuit together. Under Jules’s preferred rule,
however, confirm-or-vacate proceedings would likely commence in
state court just as the arbitrability appeal begins in federal
court. At that point, a state court may confirm an arbitral award
on claims that a federal court of appeals may ultimately hold were
never properly subject to arbitration in the first place.[
6] It is unclear why Congress would
have wanted wasteful, bifurcated, and possibly inconsistent
proceedings like that.
* * *
In
Badgerow, the question was whether
anything in §9 or §10 of the FAA affirmatively authorized an
unusual approach premising jurisdiction on claims never filed
before the court. Here, the question is instead whether there is
anything in the FAA that precludes the normal operation of federal
jurisdiction regarding live claims that are still pending before a
federal court. There is not. A federal court with jurisdiction to
stay claims pending arbitration under §3 of the FAA has the same
jurisdiction to resolve motions to confirm or vacate a resulting
arbitral award. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly,
is affirmed.
It is so ordered
.