Priority of the United States, in cases of insolvency.
In all cases of insolvency or bankruptcy of a debtor of the
United States, it is entitled to priority of payment out of his
effects.
The United States was the holder of a foreign bill of exchange
drawn by the bankrupt, negotiated in the regular course of trade
and returned protested for nonpayment, and is entitled to a
preference out of the estate of the bankrupt to the whole amount of
the claim.
It is undoubtedly a well established principle in the exposition
of statutes that every part is to be considered, and the intention
of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true
that where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, that construction is to be avoided unless the meaning
of the legislature be plain, in which case it must be obeyed.
That the consequences are to be considered in expounding laws,
where the intent is doubtful is a principle not to be contradicted,
but it is also true that it is a principle which must be applied
with caution and which has a degree of influence dependent on the
nature of the case to which it is applied when rights are
infringed.
Where fundamental principles are overthrown, when the general
system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must
be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of
justice to suppose a design to effect such objects. But when only a
political regulation is made which is inconvenient, if the
intention of the legislature be expressed in terms which are
sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind when the
words are taken in their ordinary sense, it would be going a great
way to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them
to avoid an inconvenience which ought to have been contemplated in
the legislature when the act was passed, and which in its opinion
was probably overbalanced by the particular advantages it was
calculated to produce.
Of the priority to which the United States is entitled it is to
be remarked that no lien is created. No
bona fide transfer
of property in the ordinary course of business is overreached. It
is only a priority in payment, which, under different
modifications, is a regulation in common use, and this priority is
limited to a particular state of things when the debtor is living,
though it takes effect generally if he be dead. As the Court can
never be unmindful of the solemn duty imposed on the judicial
department when a claim is supported by an act which conflicts with
the Constitution, so the Court can never be unmindful of its duty
to obey laws which are authorized by that instrument.
It has been truly said that under a Constitution conferring
specific powers, the power contended for must be granted or it
cannot be exerted. The power of Congress to give the priority to
debts due to the United States is claimed under the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into
execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the government
of the United States or in any department or officer thereof.
Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered
to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a
power granted by the Constitution.
Page 6 U. S. 359
This writ of error was prosecuted by the United States, who was
plaintiff in the court below.
The questions submitted to the Court, in the argument upon the
writ of error were:
1. Whether an attachment laid by the United States, on property
of the bankrupt in the hands of the Collector of Newport in Rhode
Island after the commission of bankruptcy had issued is available
against the assignees?
2. Whether the United States is entitled to be first paid and
satisfied, in preference to the private creditors, a debt due to
the United States by Peter Blight as endorser of a foreign bill of
exchange out of the estate of the bankrupt in the hands of his
assignees?
Page 6 U. S. 385
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question in this case is whether the United States, as
holders of a protested bill of exchange which has been negotiated
in the ordinary course of trade, is entitled to be preferred to the
general creditors where the debtor becomes bankrupt?
The claim to this preference is founded on the fifth section of
the act entitled "An act to provide more effectually for the
settlement of accounts between the United States and receivers of
public money." The section is in these words:
"And be it further enacted that where any revenue officer or
other person hereafter becoming indebted to the United States, by
bond or otherwise, shall become insolvent, or where the estate of
any deceased debtor, in the hands of executors or administrators,
shall be insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased,
the debt due to the United States shall be first satisfied, and the
priority hereby established shall be deemed to extend as well to
cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all
his debts, shall make a voluntary assignment thereof or in which
the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent
debtor shall be attached by process of law as to cases in which an
act of legal bankruptcy shall be committed."
That these words, taken in their natural and usual sense, would
embrace the case before the court seems not to be controverted.
"Any revenue officer, or other person, hereafter becoming indebted
to the United States by bond or otherwise" is a description of
persons which, if neither explained nor restricted by other words
or circumstances, would comprehend every debtor of the public,
however his debt might have been contracted.
Page 6 U. S. 386
But other parts of the act involve this question in much
embarrassment.
It is undoubtedly a well established principle in the exposition
of statutes that every part is to be considered and the intention
of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true
that where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, that construction is to be avoided unless the meaning
of the legislature be plain, in which case it must be obeyed.
On the abstract principles which govern courts in construing
legislative acts no difference of opinion can exist. It is only in
the application of those principles that the difference discovers
itself.
As the enacting clause in this case would plainly give the
United States the preference it claims, it is incumbent on those
who oppose that preference, to show an intent varying from that
which the words import. In doing this, the whole act has been
critically examined, and it has been contended with great ingenuity
that every part of it demonstrates the legislative mind to have
been directed towards a class of debtors entirely different from
those who become so by drawing or endorsing bills in the ordinary
course of business.
The first part which has been resorted to is the title. On the
influence which the title ought to have in construing the enacting
clauses much has been said, and yet it is not easy to discern the
point of difference between the opposing counsel in this respect.
Neither party contends that the title of an act can control plain
words in the body of the statute, and neither denies that, taken
with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the
intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind
labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes
everything from which aid can be derived, and in such case the
title claims a degree of notice and will have its due share of
consideration.
The title of the act is unquestionably limited to "receivers
Page 6 U. S. 387
of public money" -- a term which undoubtedly excludes the
defendants in the resent case.
The counsel for the defendants have also completely succeeded in
demonstrating that the four first sections of this act relate only
to particular classes of debtors, among whom the drawer and
endorser of a protested bill of exchange would not be comprehended.
Wherever general words have been used in these sections, they are
restrained by the subject to which they relate, and by other words
frequently in the same sentence, to particular objects, so as to
make it apparent that they were employed by the legislature in a
limited sense. Hence it has been argued with great strength of
reasoning that the same restricted interpretation ought to be given
to the fifth section likewise.
If the same reason for that interpretation exists, if the words
of the act generally, or the particular provisions of this section,
afford the same reason for limiting its operation which is afforded
with respect to those which precede it, then its operation must be
limited to the same objects.
The fifth section relates entirely to the priority claimed by
the United States in the payment of debts.
On the phraseology of this act it has been observed that there
is a circuity of expression which would not have been used if the
intention of the legislature had been to establish its priority in
all cases whatever. Instead of saying "any revenue officer or other
person hereafter becoming indebted to the United States," the
natural mode of expressing such an intent would have been "any
person indebted to the United States," and hence it has been
inferred that debtors of a particular description only were in the
mind of the legislature.
It is true the mode of expression which has been suggested is at
least as appropriate as that which has been used; but between the
two there is no difference of meaning, and it cannot be pretended
that the natural sense of words is to be disregarded, because that
which they import might have been better or more directly
expressed.
Page 6 U. S. 388
As a branch of this argument, it has also been said that the
description commences with the very words which are used in the
beginning of the first section, and from that circumstance it has
been inferred that the same class of cases was still in view. The
commencing words of each section are "any revenue officer or other
person." But the argument drawn from this source, if the subject be
pursued further, seems to operate against the defendants. In the
first section the words are, "any revenue officer or other person
accountable for public money." With this expression completely in
view, and having used it in part, the description would probably
have been adopted throughout had it been the intention of the
legislature to describe the same class of debtors. But it is
immediately dropped and more comprehensive words are employed. For
persons "accountable for public money" persons "hereafter becoming
indebted to the United States, by bond or otherwise" are
substituted. This change of language strongly implies an intent to
change the object of legislation.
But the great effort on the part of the defendants is to connect
the fifth with the four preceding sections, and to prove that as
the general words in those sections are restricted to debtors of a
particular description, the general words of the fifth section
ought also to be restricted to debtors of the same description. On
this point lies the stress of the cause.
In the analysis of the foregoing parts of the act, the counsel
for the defendants have shown that the general terms which have
been used are uniformly connected with other words in the same
section, and frequently in the same sentence, which necessarily
restrict them. They have also shown that the provisions of those
parts of the act are of such a nature that the words, taking the
natural import of the whole sentence together, plainly form
provisions only adapted to a class of cases which those words
describe if used in a limited sense.
It may be added that the four first sections of the act are
connected with each other and plainly contain provisions on the
same subject. They all relate to the
Page 6 U. S. 389
mode of proceeding on suits instituted in courts, and each
section regulates a particular branch of that proceeding. Where the
class of suits is described in the first section, it is natural to
suppose that the subsequent regulations respecting suits apply to
those which have been described.
The first section directs that suits shall be instituted against
revenue officers and other persons accountable for public money,
and imposes a penalty on delinquents, where a suit shall be
commenced and prosecuted to judgment.
The second section directs that certain testimony shall be
admitted at the trial of the cause.
The third section prescribes the condition under which a
continuance may be granted. And
The fourth section respects the testimony which may be produced
by the defendant. These are all parts of the same subject, and
there is strong reason, independent of the language of the act, to
suppose that the provisions respecting them were designed to be
coextensive with each other.
But the fifth section is totally unconnected with those which
precede it. Regulations of a suit in court no longer employ the
mind of the legislature. The preference of the United States to
other creditors becomes the subject of legislation, and as this
subject is unconnected with that which had been disposed of in the
foregoing sections, so is the language employed upon it without
reference to that which had been previously sued. If this language
was ambiguous, all the means recommended by the counsel for the
defendants would be resorted to in order to remove the ambiguity.
But it appears to the majority of the Court to be too explicit to
require the application of those principles which are useful in
doubtful cases.
The mischiefs to result from the construction on which the
United States insists have been stated as strong motives for
overruling that construction. That the consequences
Page 6 U. S. 390
are to be considered in expounding laws where the intent is
doubtful is a principle not to be controverted, but it is also true
that it is a principle which must be applied with caution, and
which has a degree of influence dependent on the nature of the case
to which it is applied. Where rights are infringed, where
fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of
the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be
expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice
to suppose a design to effect such objects. But where only a
political regulation is made, which is inconvenient, if the
intention of the legislature be expressed in terms which are
sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind when the
words are taken in their ordinary sense, it would be going a great
way to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them
to avoid an inconvenience which ought to have been contemplated in
the legislature when the act was passed and which, in their
opinion, was probably overbalanced by the particular advantages it
was calculated to produce.
Of the latter description of inconveniences are those occasioned
by the act in question. It is for the legislature to appreciate
them. They are not of such magnitude as to induce an opinion that
the legislature could not intend to expose the citizens of the
United States to them when words are used which manifest that
intent.
On this subject it is to be remarked that no lien is created by
this law. No
bona fide transfer of property in the
ordinary course of business is overreached. It is only a priority
in payment, which, under different modifications, is a regulation
in common use, and this priority is limited to a particular state
of things when the debtor is living, though it takes effect
generally if he be dead.
Passing from a consideration of the act itself and the
consequences which flow from it, the counsel on each side have
sought to strengthen their construction by other acts
in pari
materia.
Page 6 U. S. 391
The act of 3 March, 1797, has been supposed to be a continuation
of legislative proceeding on the subject which was commenced on 3
March, 1795, by the act, "for the more effectual recovery of debts
due from individuals to the United States," which relates
exclusively to the receivers of public money.
Admitting the opinion that the act of 1797 was particularly
designed to supply the defects of that of 1795 to be correct, it
does not seem to follow that a substantive and independent section,
having no connection with the provisions made in 1795, should be
restricted by it.
The act of 1795 contains nothing relative to the priority of the
United States, and therefore will not explain the fifth section of
the act of 1797, which relates exclusively to that subject. But the
act of 1797, neither in its title nor its enacting clauses,
contains any words of reference to the act of 1795. The words which
are supposed to imply this reference are "to provide more
effectually." But these words have relation to the existing state
of the law on all the subjects to which the act of 1797 relates,
not to those alone which are comprehended in the act of 1795. The
title of the act of 1795 is also "for the more effectual recovery
of debts," and consequently refers to certain preexisting laws. The
act of 1797 therefore may be supposed to have in view the act of
1795 when providing for the objects contemplated in that act; but
must be supposed to have other acts in view when providing for
objects not contemplated in that act.
As, therefore, the act of 1795 contains nothing respecting the
priority of the United States, but is limited to provisions
respecting suits in court, the act of 1797 may be considered in
connection with that act while on the subject of suits in court;
but when on the subject of preference, must be considered in
connection with acts which relate to the preference of the United
States.
The first act on this subject passed on 31 July, 1789, section
the twenty-first, and gave the United States a preference only in
the case of bonds for duties.
Page 6 U. S. 392
On 4 August, 1790, an act was passed on the same subject with
that of 1789, which repeals all former acts, and reenacts in
substance the twenty-first section, relative to the priority of the
United States.
On 2 May, 1792, the priority previously given to the United
States is transferred to the sureties on duty bonds who shall
themselves pay the debt, and the cases of insolvency, in which his
priority is to take place, are explained to comprehend the case of
a voluntary assignment, and the attached effects of an absconding,
concealed, or absent debtor.
Such was the title of the United States to a preference in the
payment of debts previous to the passage of the act of 1797. It was
limited to bonds for the payment of duties on imported goods and on
the tonnage of vessels. An internal revenue had been established
and extensive transactions had taken place, in the course of which
many persons had necessarily become indebted to the United States.
But no attempt to give them a preference in the collection of such
debts had been made.
This subject is taken up in the sixth section of the act of
1797. The term "revenue officer," which is used in that act, would
certainly comprehend any persons employed in the collection of the
internal revenue; yet it may be well doubted whether those persons
are contemplated in the foregoing sections of the act. They relate
to a suit in court, and are perhaps restricted to those receivers
of public money who have accounts on the books of the Treasury. The
head of the department in each state most probably accounts with
the Treasury, and the subcollectors account with him.
If this be correct, a class of debtors would be introduced into
the fifth section by the term "revenue officer," who are indeed
within the title, but not within the preceding enacting clauses of
the law.
But passing over this term, the succeeding words seem to the
majority of the Court certainly to produce this effect. They are,
"or other person hereafter becoming indebted to the United States,
by bond or otherwise." If this section was designed to place
Page 6 U. S. 393
the collection of the internal revenue on the same footing of
security with the external revenue, as has been argued by one of
the counsel for the defendants, a design so reasonable that it
would naturally be attributed to the legislature, then the debtors
for excise duties would be comprehended within it; yet those
debtors cannot be brought within the title or the previous enacting
clauses of the bill.
The fifth section then would introduce a new class of debtors,
and if it does so in any case, the act furnishes no principle which
shall restrain the words of that section to every case to which
they apply.
Three acts of Congress have passed, subsequent to that under
particular consideration, which have been supposed to bear upon the
case.
The first passed on 11 July, 1798, and is entitled
"An act to regulate and fix the compensation of the officers
employed in collecting the internal revenues of the United States
and to insure more effectually the settlement of their
accounts."
The thirteenth section of this act refers expressly to the
provisions of the act of March, 1797, on the subject of suits to be
instituted on the bonds given by the officers collecting the
internal revenue, and shows conclusively that in the opinion of the
legislature, the four first sections of that act did not extend to
the case of those officers; consequently, if the fifth section
extends to them, it introduces a class of debtors distinct from
those contemplated in the clauses which respect suits in court. The
fifteenth section of this act takes up the subject which is
supposed to be contemplated by the fifth section of the act of
1797, and declares the debt due from these revenue officers to the
United States to be a lien on their real estates and on the real
estates of their sureties from the institution of suit thereon. It
can scarcely be supposed that the legislature would have given a
lien on the real estate without providing for a preference out of
the personal estate, especially where there was no real estate,
unless that preference was understood to be secured by a previous
law.
The same observation applies to a subsequent act of the same
session for laying a direct tax. A lien is reserved
Page 6 U. S. 394
on the real estate of the collector, without mentioning any
claim to preference out of his personal estate.
The last law which contains any provision on the subject of
preference passed on 2 March, 1799. The sixty-fifth section of that
act has been considered as repealing the fifth section of the act
of 1797, or of manifesting the limited sense in which it is to be
understood.
It must be admitted that this section involves the subject in
additional perplexity, but it is the opinion of the Court that on
fair construction, it can apply only to bonds taken for those
duties on imports and tonnage which are the subject of the act.
From the first law passed on this subject, every act respecting
the collection of those duties had contained a section giving a
preference to the United States in case of the insolvency of the
collectors of them.
The act of 1797, if construed as the United States would
construe it, would extend to those collectors if there was no other
provision in any other act giving a priority to the United States
in these cases. As there was such a previous act, it might be
supposed that its repeal by a subsequent law would create a doubt
whether the act of 1797 would comprehend the case, and therefore
from abundant caution it might be deemed necessary still to retain
the section in the new act respecting those duties. The general
repealing clause of the act of 1799 cannot be construed to repeal
the act of 1797 unless it provides for the cases to which that act
extends.
It has also been argued that the bankrupt law itself affords
ground for the opinion that the United States does not claim a
general preference. The words of the sixty-second section of that
law apply to debts generally as secured by prior acts. But as that
section was not upon the subject of preference, but was merely
designed to retain the right of the United States in its existing
situation, whatever that situation might be, the question may well
be supposed not to have been investigated at that time, and the
expressions of the section were probably not considered with a view
to any influence they might have on those rights.
Page 6 U. S. 395
After maturely considering this doubtful statute and comparing
it with other acts
in pari materia, it is the opinion of
the majority of the Court that the preference given to the United
States by the fifth section is not confined to revenue officers and
persons accountable for public money, but extends to debtors
generally.
Supposing this distinction not to exist, it is contended that
this priority of the United States cannot take effect in any case
where suit has not been instituted, and in support of this opinion
several decisions of the English judges with respect to the
prerogative of the Crown have been quoted.
To this argument the express words of the act of Congress seem
to be opposed. The legislature has declared the time when this
priority shall have its commencement, and the Court thinks those
words conclusive on the point. The cases certainly show that a
bona fide alienation of property before the right of
priority attaches will be good, but that does not affect the
present case. From the decisions on this subject, a very ingenious
argument was drawn by the counsel who made this point. The bankrupt
law, he says, does not bind the King, because he is not named in
it; yet it has been adjudged that the effects of a bankrupt are
placed beyond the reach of the King by the assignment made under
that law, unless they shall have been previously bound. He argues,
that according to the understanding of the legislature, as proved
by its acts relative to insolvent debtors and according to the
decisions in some of the inferior courts, the bankrupt law would
not bind the United States although the sixty-second section had
not been inserted. That section therefore is only an expression of
what would be law without it, and consequently is an immaterial
section; as the King, though not bound by the bankrupt law, is
bound by the assignment made under it, so he contended that the
United States, though not bound by the law, is bound by the
assignment.
But the assignment is made under and by the direction of the
law, and a proviso that nothing contained in the law shall affect
the right of preference claimed by the United States is equivalent
to a proviso that the assignment shall not affect the right of
preference claimed by the United States.
Page 6 U. S. 396
If the act has attempted to give the United States a preference
in the case before the Court, it remains to inquire whether the
Constitution obstructs its operation.
To the general observations made on this subject it will only be
observed that as the Court can never be unmindful of the solemn
duty imposed on the judicial department when a claim is supported
by an act which conflicts with the Constitution, so the Court can
never be unmindful of its duty to obey laws which are authorized by
that instrument.
In the case at bar, the preference claimed by the United States
is not prohibited, but it has been truly said that under a
Constitution conferring specific powers, the power contended for
must be granted or it cannot be exercised.
It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested
by the Constitution in the government of the United States or in
any department or officer thereof.
In construing this clause, it would be incorrect and would
produce endless difficulties if the opinion should be maintained
that no law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to
give effect to a specified power.
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it
might be said with respect to each that it was not necessary
because the end might be obtained by other means. Congress must
possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means
which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by
the Constitution.
The government is to pay the debt of the union, and must be
authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to
effect that object. It has consequently a right to make remittances
by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will
render the transaction safe.
This claim of priority on the part of the United States
Page 6 U. S. 397
will, it has been said, interfere with the right of the state
sovereignties respecting the dignity of debts, and will defeat the
measures they have a right to adopt to secure themselves against
delinquencies on the part of their own revenue officers.
But this is an objection to the Constitution itself. The
mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the
necessary consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United
States on all subjects to which the legislative power of Congress
extends.
As the opinion given in the court below was that the plaintiffs
did not maintain their action on the whole testimony exhibited, it
is necessary to examine that testimony.
It appears that the plaintiffs have proceeded on the transcripts
from the books of the Treasury under the idea that this suit is
maintainable under the act of 1797. The Court does not mean to
sanction that opinion, but, as no objection was taken to the
testimony, it is understood to have been admitted. It is also
understood that there is no question to be made respecting notice,
but that the existence of the debt is admitted and the right of the
United States to priority of payment is the only real point in the
cause.
The majority of this Court is of opinion that the United States
is entitled to that priority, and therefore the judgment of the
circuit court is to be reversed and the cause to be remanded for
further proceedings.
Judgment reversed.
WASHINGTON, J.
Although I take no part in the decision of this cause, I feel
myself justified by the importance of the question in declaring the
reasons which induced the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania to
pronounce the opinion which is to be reexamined here. In any
instance where I am so unfortunate as to differ with this Court I
cannot fail to doubt the correctness of my own opinion. But if I
cannot feel convinced of the
Page 6 U. S. 398
error, I owe it, in some measure, to myself and to those who may
be injured by the expense and delay to which they have been exposed
to show at least that the opinion was not hastily or
inconsiderately given.
The question is has the United States a right in all cases
whatever to claim a preference of other creditors in the payment of
debts. At the circuit court, the counsel for the United States
disclaimed all idea of founding this right upon prerogative
principles, and yet, if I am not greatly mistaken, the doctrine
contended for places this right upon ground at least as broad as
would have been asserted in an English court.
The whole question must turn upon the construction of acts of
Congress, and particularly that of 3 March, 1797. The title of the
law is "An act to provide more effectually for the settlement of
accounts between the United States and receivers of public money."
The first section describes more specially the persons who are the
objects of the law, points out the particular officer whose duty it
shall be to institute suits against those public delinquents thus
marked out, declares the rate of interest to be recovered upon
balances due to the United States, and imposes a forfeiture of
commissions on the delinquent. The 2d section defines the kind of
evidence to be admitted on the part of the United States in the
trial of suits in all cases of delinquency. The 3d section gives to
the United States in such actions a preference of all other suitors
in court by directing the trial of such causes to take place at the
return term upon motion unless the defendant will make oath that he
is entitled to credits which have been submitted to the
consideration of the accounting officers of the Treasury and
rejected. The 4th section takes up the case of the defendant, and
declares under what circumstances he shall be entitled to the
benefit of offsets.
Page 6 U. S. 399
The 5th section brings us to an important part of the trial and
furnishes a rule to govern the court in the judgment it is to
render in cases where the claim of the United States might, by
reason of the insolvency of the debtor, go unsatisfied unless
preferred to that of a private citizen. The 6th section is general
in its terms, and relates to executions where the defendant or his
property is to be found in any district other than that in which
the judgment was rendered. This is a concise view of the different
parts of this act, and I shall now examine more particularly the
expressions of the 5th section, taken in connection with those
which precede it.
The words are
"That where any revenue officer or other person hereafter
becoming indebted to the United States by bond or otherwise shall
become insolvent, the debt due to the United States shall be first
satisfied. . . . It is conceded that the words 'or other person'
are broad enough to comprehend every possible case of debts due to
the United States, and therefore a literal interpretation is
contended for by those who advocate the interest of the United
States. On the other side, a limitation of those expressions is
said to be more consonant with the obvious meaning of the
legislature, which contemplates those debtors only who are
accountable for public money."
Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in
general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to
mean what it has plainly expressed, and consequently, no room is
left for construction. But if, from a view of the whole law or from
other laws
in pari materia, the evident intention is
different from the literal import of the terms employed to express
it in a particular part of the law, that intention should prevail,
for that in fact is the will of the legislature.
Page 6 U. S. 400
If a section be introduced which is a stranger to and
unconnected with the purview of the act, it must nevertheless take
effect according to its obvious meaning, independent of all
influence from other parts of the law. Nay, if it be a part of the
same subject and either enlarges or restrains the expressions used
in other parts of the same act, it must be interpreted according to
the import of the words used if nothing can be gathered from such
other parts of the law to change the meaning. But if in this latter
case general words are used which import more than seems to have
been within the purview of the law or of the other parts of the
law, and those expressions can be restrained by others used in the
same law or in any other upon the same subject, they ought in my
opinion to be restrained. So if the literal expressions of the law
would lead to absurd, unjust, or inconvenient consequences, such a
construction should be given as to avoid such consequences if, from
the whole purview of the law and giving effect to the words used,
it may fairly be done. These rules are not merely artificial; they
are as clearly founded in plain sense, as they are certainly
warranted by the principles of the common law.
The subject intended to be legislated upon is sometimes stated
in a preamble, sometimes in the title to the law, and is sometimes,
I admit, misstated or not fully stated. The preamble of an act of
Parliament is said to be a key to the knowledge of it and to open
the intent of the lawmakers, and so I say as to the title of a law
of Congress, which, being the deliberate act of those who make the
law, is not less to be respected as an expression of their
intention than if it preceded the enacting clause in the form of a
preamble. But neither the title nor preamble can be resorted to,
for the purpose of controlling the enacting clauses, except in
cases of ambiguity or where general expressions are used
inconsistent or unconnected with the scope and purview of the whole
law. They are to be deemed true unless contradicted by the enacting
clauses, and it is fair in the cases I have stated to argue from
them.
Page 6 U. S. 401
The object of this law, then, as declared by the title is to
provide for the effectual settlement of debts due to the United
States from receivers of public money. To effect this, suits are
directed, the species of evidence to support the claim on the part
of the plaintiff is pointed out, and a speedy trial provided; on
the part of the defendant, a limited right to oppose the claim by
offsets is provided, and the claim of the United States is to have
a preference of other creditors, where the debtor is unable to
satisfy the whole. Here, then, is one entire connected subject, the
different provisions of the law constituting the links of the same
chain, the members of the same body. It will not, I presume, be
denied that the first three sections of the law apply to those only
who are declared by the title to be the objects of its provisions.
The 4th section is the first which uses general expressions,
without a reference to those who had before been spoken of, and yet
I think it will hardly be contended that this section is not
closely and intimately connected with the same subject. When we
come to the 5th section, the reference to the first three sections
is again resumed, with the addition of the words "or any other
person." So that instead of the words "revenue officers or other
persons accountable for public money," used in the first section,
this section uses the words "revenue officers or other persons
indebted to the United States."
Now it is obvious that these expressions may have precisely the
same meaning, so as to comprehend the same persons, although the
latter may be construed to include persons not within the meaning
of the first section. For persons accountable for public money are
also others than revenue officers indebted to the United States,
and the latter may, by a construction conformable to the other
parts of the law, means persons accountable for public money; and
by an extended construction they may comprehend others who in no
sense of the expressions used can be said to be accountable for
public money.
It is then to be inquired is the Court bound by any known rules
of law to give to the words thus used in the 5th section a meaning
extensive enough to comprehend persons never contemplated by the
title of the law and most
Page 6 U. S. 402
sedulously excluded by the first three sections? Does justice to
the public or convenience to individuals demand it? Is such a
construction necessary in order to give effect to anyone expression
used by the legislature? Shall we violate the manifest intention of
the legislature if we stop short of the point to which we are
invited to go in the construction of this section? To all these
questions I think myself warranted in answering in the
negative.
1. As to the first. Do the principles of equity or of strict
justice discriminate between individuals standing
in equali
jure and claiming debts of equal dignity?
The nature of the debt may well warrant a discrimination, but
not so if the privilege be merely of a personal nature. The
sovereign may, in the exercise of his powers, secure to himself
this exclusive privilege of being preferred to the citizens, but
this is no evidence that the claim is sanctioned by the principles
of immutable justice. If this right is asserted, individuals must
submit; but I do not find it in my conscience to go further in
advancement of the claim than the words of the law, fairly
interpreted, in relation to the whole law, compel me. But I do not
think that Congress meant to exercise their power to the extent
contended for. First because in every other section of the law they
have declared a different intent, and secondly because it would not
only be productive of the most cruel injustice to individuals, but
would tend to destroy, more than any other act I can imagine, all
confidence between man and man. The preference claimed is not only
unequal in respect to private citizens, but is of a nature against
which the most prudent man cannot guard himself. As to public
officers and receivers of public money of all descriptions, they
are or may be known as such, and any person dealing with them does
it at the peril of being postponed to any debts his debtor may owe
to the United States should he become unfortunate. He acts with his
eyes open, and has it in his power to calculate the risk he is
willing to run. But if this preference exists in every possible
case of contracts between the United States and an individual,
Page 6 U. S. 403
there is no means by which any man can be apprised of his danger
in dealing with the same person.
2. Is this broad construction necessary in order to give effect
to the expressions of the law? I have endeavored to show that all
accountable agents are other persons than revenue officers indebted
to the United States. The words, then, "other persons" are
satisfied by comprehending all those persons to whom the first
section extends.
3. Is this construction rendered necessary to fulfill the
manifest intent of the legislature? So far from it that to my mind
it is in direct opposition to an intention plainly expressed by all
the other parts of the law. To prove this, I again refer to the
title of the law; to the first three sections, which are in strict
conformity with it, and that too by express words, and to the
fourth section, which is so plainly a part of the same subject that
it cannot be construed to go further than those which precede it.
Is the fifth section a stranger to the others, unnaturally placed
there, without having a connection with the other sections? If this
be the case, I have already admitted rules of construction strong
enough to condemn the opinion I hold. But let us examine this
point.
The object of the first four sections is to enforce by suit,
where necessary, the payment of debts due to the United States from
a particular class of debtors. It points out the officer who is to
order the suit, declares at what term the cause shall be tried,
lays down rules of evidence to be regarded in support of the
action, extends to the defendant the benefit of making offsets,
under certain qualifications, and then most naturally, as I
conceive, comes the fifth section, relating to the judgment which
the court is to render, in case a contest should ensue between the
United States and individual creditors, on account of inability in
the debtor to satisfy the whole. What if an individual creditor
should attach the property of the debtor, before the United States
had taken steps to recover their debt? Or if the debtor should
assign away his property, or it should be claimed
Page 6 U. S. 404
by assignees under a commission of bankruptcy, or the defendant,
being an executor, should plead fully administered, except so much
as would be sufficient to satisfy judgments, bond debts, or other
debts superior in dignity to that of the United States? This
section establishes a plain rule by which the court must proceed in
rendering its judgment whenever those cases occur. What would have
signified all the other provisions of the law unless a rule of
decision had been prescribed in cases where otherwise the United
States might never obtain the fruit of those steps which their
officers were pursuing?
Can a section in a law which professes to afford a remedy in a
particular case by process of law be said not to belong to the law
when it leads to the point of a judgment which is the consummation
of the proceedings in the case? I think not, and therefore I cannot
acquiesce in the opinion that the 5th section is unconnected with
the other parts of the law.
I have before observed that the 4th section is the first which
uses general expressions, without reference to those which had
before been particularly mentioned, but that when we come to the
5th section, the reference is again taken up, with the addition of
those words which produce the difficulty of the case.
Now I ask, in the first place, what necessity was there for
departing from the mode of expression used in the 4th section,
which, for the first time, is general, without particular reference
to any of the persons before described? Would it not have been as
well in the 5th as in the 4th section to say "that where any
individual becoming indebted to the United States shall become
insolvent," &c.? What reason can be assigned for the
specification of revenue officers, one class of persons mentioned
expressly in the 1st section, intended in the 2d and 3d, by plain
words of reference, and clearly meant in the 4th, when it must be
admitted that the words used in the 4th section, or the words
"other persons" in the 5th, would have comprehended revenue
officers, if they were broad enough to include every description of
persons indebted to the United States?
Page 6 U. S. 405
Unless they are construed to limit and restrain the generality
of the words "other persons," they are absolutely without any use
or meaning whatever. If the preceding sections had applied only to
revenue officers, then from necessity we must have construed the
words "other persons" as broad as their natural import would
warrant, because otherwise they would have been nugatory, and we
would have found no rule in the law itself by which to limit the
generality of the expression.
But when the law professes in its title to relate to all
accountable agents besides revenue officers, and the first section
specifies, amongst these agents, "revenue officers," we have a rule
by which to restrain the sweeping expressions in the 5th section,
viz., "or other person accountable, or indebted as
aforesaid." This construction renders the law uniform throughout,
and consistent with what it professes in every other section.
In confirmation of this construction, the 62d section of the
bankrupt law does, in my opinion, deserve attention. If the United
States was, at the time that law passed, entitled to a preference
in every possible case by virtue of the general expressions in the
law I have just been considering, what necessity was there for
limiting the saving of the right of preference to debts due to the
United States "as secured or provided by any law heretofore
passed." This mode of expression leads me to conclude that the
legislature supposed there were some cases where this preference
had not been provided for by law. If not, it would certainly have
been sufficient to declare that the bankrupt law should not extend
to or affect the right of preference to prior satisfaction of debts
due the United States.