The provisions of the thirty-first section of the Act of
Congress, passed 30 April, 1790, entitled "An act for the
punishment of certain crimes against the United States," by which
prosecutions on penal statutes are limited, is general in its
provisions, so that they extend to penalties imposed after as
before the act and also to actions of debt, as well as to
informations and indictments.
An action of debt was instituted for the penalty of $2,000
imposed by the second section of the Act of Congress passed 22
March, 1794, "to prohibit the carrying on the slave trade from the
United States to any foreign place or country." 1 Story's L.U.S.
319.
The second section provides
"That all and every person building, fitting out, or equipping,
loading, or otherwise preparing or sending away any ship or vessel
knowing or intending that the same shall be employed in the slave
trade, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the act or any
ways aiding or abetting therein shall severally forfeit and pay the
sum of $2,000; one moiety thereof to the use of the United States
and the other moiety thereof to the use of him or her who shall sue
for and prosecute the same. "
Page 6 U. S. 337
To this suit the defendant pleaded that the cause of action set
forth in the plaintiff's writ and declaration did not accrue within
two years next before the date and issuing forth of the writ in
this case against him in manner and form as the plaintiff hath
declared, and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore, &c. To
which plea there was a general demurrer and joinder.
This plea was founded upon the thirty-first section of the act
of Congress, entitled "An act for the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States," passed 30 April, 1790. 1 Story's L.U.S.
83.
The section is in these words:
"That no person or persons shall be prosecuted, tried, or
punished for treason or other capital offense aforesaid, willful
murder or forgery excepted, unless the indictment for the same
shall be found by a grand jury within three years next after the
treason or capital offense aforesaid shall be done or committed,
nor shall any person be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any
offense not capital, nor for any fine or forfeiture under any penal
statute, unless the indictment or information for the same shall be
found or instituted within two years from the time of committing
the offense or incurring the fine or forfeiture as aforesaid,
provided that nothing, herein contained shall extend to any person
or persons fleeing from justice."
Upon the defense under this plea, the judges of the circuit
court were divided in opinion, and the same was certified to this
Court.
Page 6 U. S. 340
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This is an action of debt brought to recover a penalty imposed
by the act entitled "An act to prohibit the carrying an the slave
trade from the United States to any foreign place or country."
It was pleaded in bar of the action that the offense was not
committed within two years previous to the institution of the suit.
To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the circuit court being
divided on its sufficiency, the point has been certified to this
Court.
In the argument, the plaintiff has rested his case on two
points. He contends
1. That the act of Congress pleaded by the defendant is no bar
to an action of debt.
2. That if it be a bar, it applies only to the recovery of
penalties given by acts which existed at the time of its
passage.
The words of the act are, "nor shall any person be prosecuted,"
&c. It is contended that the prosecutions limited by this law
are those only which are carried on in the form of an indictment or
information, and not those where the penalty is demanded by an
action of debt.
But if the words of the act be examined, they will be found to
apply not to any particular mode of proceeding, but generally to
any prosecution, trial, or punishment
Page 6 U. S. 341
for the offense. It is not declared that no indictment shall be
found or information filed for any offense not capital or for any
fine or forfeiture under any penal statute unless the same be
instituted within two years after the commission of the offense. In
that case, the act would be pleadable only in bar of the particular
action. But it is declared that "no person shall be prosecuted,
tried or punished" -- words which show an intention not merely to
limit any particular form of action, but to limit any prosecution
whatever.
It is true that general expressions may be restrained by
subsequent particular words which show that in the intention of the
legislature, those general expressions are used in a particular
sense, and the argument is a strong one which contends that the
latter words describing the remedy imply a restriction on those
which precede them. Most frequently they would do so. But in the
statute under consideration, a distinct member of the sentence,
describing one entire class of offenses, would be rendered almost
totally useless by the construction insisted on by the attorney for
the United States. Almost every fine or forfeiture under a penal
statute may be recovered by an action of debt as well as by
information, and to declare that the information was barred while
the action of debt was left without limitation would be to
attribute a capriciousness on this subject to the legislature which
could not be accounted for, and to declare that the law did not
apply to cases on which an action of debt is maintainable would be
to overrule express words and to give the statute almost the same
construction which it would receive if one distinct member of the
sentence was expunged from it. In this particular case, the statute
which creates the forfeiture does not prescribe the mode of
demanding it; consequently either debt or information would lie. It
would be singular if the one remedy should be barred and the other
left unrestrained.
In support of the opinion that an act of limitations to criminal
prosecutions can only be used as a bar in cases declared by law to
be criminal at the time the act of limitations was passed unless
there be express words extending it to crimes to be created in
future, Cunningham's Law Dictionary has been cited.
Page 6 U. S. 342
The case in Cunningham is reported in 1 Salk. and 5 Mod., and
seems to be founded on the peculiar phraseology of the statute of
the 21 James I directing informations to be filed in the county in
which the offenses were committed. That statute was expounded to
extend only to offenses which at the time of its passage were
punishable by law. But the words of the act of Congress plainly
apply to all fines and forfeitures under any penal act whenever
that act might pass. They are the stronger because not many penal
acts were at that time in the code.
In expounding this law, it deserves some consideration that if
it does not limit actions of debt for penalties, those actions
might in many cases be brought at any distance of time. This would
be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws. In a country where
not even treason can be prosecuted after a lapse of three years, it
could scarcely be supposed that an individual would remain forever
liable to a pecuniary forfeiture.
The Court is of opinion that it be certified to the Circuit
Court for the District of Massachusetts that the issue in law
joined in this case ought to be decided in favor of the
defendant.