SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 22–58
_________________
UNITED STATES, et al., PETITIONERS
v. TEXAS, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit
[June 23, 2023]
Justice Alito, dissenting.
The Court holds Texas lacks standing to
challenge a federal policy that inflicts substantial harm on the
State and its residents by releasing illegal aliens with criminal
convictions for serious crimes. In order to reach this conclusion,
the Court brushes aside a major precedent that directly controls
the standing question, refuses to apply our established test for
standing, disregards factual findings made by the District Court
after a trial, and holds that the only limit on the power of a
President to disobey a law like the important provision at issue is
Congress’s power to employ the weapons of inter-branch
warfare—withholding funds, impeachment and removal, etc. I would
not blaze this unfortunate trail. I would simply apply settled law,
which leads ineluctably to the conclusion that Texas has
standing.
This Court has long applied a three-part test to
determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue. Under that test,
a plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove that it has been
subjected to or imminently faces an injury that is:
(1) “concrete and particularized,” (2) “fairly traceable to
the challenged action,” and (3) “likely” to be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”
Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S.
555, 560–561 (1992) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Under that familiar test, Texas clearly has standing to
bring this suit.[
1]
Nevertheless, the United States (the defendant
in this case) has urged us to put this framework aside and adopt a
striking new rule. At argument, the Solicitor General was asked
whether it is the position of the United States that the
Constitution does not allow any party to challenge a President’s
decision not to enforce laws he does not like. What would happen,
the Solicitor General was asked, if a President chose not to
enforce the environmental laws or the labor laws? Would the
Constitution bar an injured party from bringing suit? She
responded:
“
That’s correct under this Court’s
precedent, but the framers intended political checks in that
circumstance. You know, if—if an administration did something that
extreme and said we’re just not going to enforce the law at all,
then the President would be held to account by the voters, and
Congress has tools at its disposal as well.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 50
(emphasis added).
Thus, according to the United States, even if a
party clearly meets our three-part test for Article III standing,
the Constitution bars that party from challenging a President’s
decision not to enforce the law. Congress may wield what the
Solicitor General described as “political . . .
tools”—which presumably means such things as withholding funds,
refusing to confirm Presidential nominees, and impeachment and
removal—but otherwise Congress and the American people must simply
wait until the President’s term in office expires.
The Court—at least for now—does not fully
embrace this radical theory and instead holds only that, with some
small and equivocal limitations that I will discuss, no party may
challenge the Executive’s “arrest and prosecution policies.”
Ante, at 12, n. 5. But the Court provides no principled
explanation for drawing the line at this point, and that raises the
concern that the Court’s only reason for framing its rule as it
does is that no more is needed to dispose of
this case. In
future cases, Presidential power may be extended even further. That
disturbing possibility is bolstered by the Court’s refusal to
reject the Government’s broader argument.
As I will explain, nothing in our precedents
even remotely supports this grossly inflated conception of
“executive Power,” U. S. Const., Art. II, §1, which seriously
infringes the “legislative Powers” that the Constitution grants to
Congress, Art. I, §1. At issue here is Congress’s authority to
control immigration, and “[t]his Court has repeatedly emphasized
that ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power
of Congress more complete than it is over’ the
admission of aliens.”
Fiallo v.
Bell,
430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977). In the exercise of that power, Congress passed
and President Clinton signed a law that commands the detention and
removal of aliens who have been convicted of certain particularly
dangerous crimes. The Secretary of Homeland Security, however, has
instructed his agents to disobey this legislative command and
instead follow a different policy that is more to his liking. And
the Court now says that no party injured by this policy is allowed
to challenge it in court.
That holding not only violates the
Constitution’s allocation of authority among the three branches of
the Federal Government; it also undermines federalism. This Court
has held that the Federal Government’s authority in the field of
immigration severely restricts the ability of States to enact laws
or follow practices that address harms resulting from illegal
immigration. See
Arizona v.
United States,
567 U.S.
387, 401 (2012). If States are also barred from bringing suit
even when they satisfy our established test for Article III
standing, they are powerless to defend their vital interests. If a
President fails or refuses to enforce the immigration laws, the
States must simply bear the consequences. That interpretation of
executive authority and Article III’s case or controversy
requirement is deeply and dangerously flawed.
I
The Court’s opinion omits much that is
necessary to understand the significance of its decision, and I
therefore begin by summarizing the relevant statutory provisions,
the challenged Department of Homeland Security (DHS) action, and
the District Court’s findings of fact regarding the injury faced by
the State of Texas as the result of what DHS has done.
A
The relevant statutory provisions have figured
in several prior decisions, and in those cases we have recounted
how they came to be enacted and have clearly described what they
require. These provisions were part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which
was adopted “against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] to deal with increasing
rates of criminal activity by aliens.”
Demore v.
Kim,
538 U.S.
510, 518 (2003).[
2]
Congress concluded that a central cause of that failure was the
Attorney General’s “broad discretion to conduct individualized bond
hearings and to release criminal aliens from custody during their
removal proceedings.”
Id., at 519. To remedy this problem,
Congress “
subtract[ed] some of that discretion when it comes
to the arrest and release of criminal aliens.”
Nielsen v.
Preap, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 15)
(emphasis in original).
Two such limits are important here. First, 8
U. S. C. §1226(c) directs the Government to “take into
custody any alien” inadmissible or deportable on certain criminal
or terrorist grounds “when the alien is released” from criminal
custody, including when such an alien is released on “parole,
supervised release, or probation.” Second, §1231(a) imposes a
categorical detention mandate. Section 1231(a)(2) provides that the
Government “shall detain [an] alien” “[d]uring the removal period,”
which often begins either when an “order of removal becomes
administratively final” or when an “alien is released from
detention or confinement” not arising from immigration process,
§1231(a)(1)(B). This requirement is reinforced by the direction
that “[u]nder no circumstance during the removal period shall the
[Government] release an alien” found inadmissible or deportable
under almost any of the grounds relevant under §1226(c).
§1231(a)(2). And §1231(a)(1)(A) commands that the Government “shall
remove the alien” within the removal period.
All of our recent decisions interpreting these
provisions confirm that, for covered aliens,
shall means
shall; it does not mean “may.” See
Johnson v.
Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. ___, ___–___, and n. 2
(2021) (slip op., at 2–3, and n. 2);
Nielsen, 586
U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 16–17). Until quite recently,
that was the Government’s understanding as well. See
Biden
v.
Texas, 597 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at
8–9) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Actions taken by Congress when IIRIRA was
enacted underscore this conclusion. Because the provisions
described above left the Executive with no discretion to refrain
from arresting and detaining covered aliens, even during the time
immediately after IIRIRA’s enactment when the Executive was still
“expand[ing] its capacities” to enforce the new law, Congress
passed “transition rules [that] delayed the onset of the
Secretary’s obligation to begin making arrests as soon as covered
aliens were released from criminal custody.”
Nielsen, 586
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21). If the Executive had
possessed the discretion to decline to enforce the new mandates in
light of “resource constraints,” see
ante, at 8, those
transition rules would have been entirely “superfluous.”
Nielsen, 586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21).
Despite this clear text and background, the
majority now claims that the President’s “enforcement discretion”
survived these mandates,
ante, at 7, but there is no basis
for that conclusion. Certainly it is not supported by the cases it
cites. They either underscore the
general rule that the
Executive possesses enforcement discretion, see
Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S.
471, 490–491 (1999), or pair that general rule with the
observation that the
States cannot limit the Government’s
discretion in pursuing removal, see
Arizona, 567 U. S.,
at 396, 409. Nothing in those decisions is inconsistent with
Congress’s power to displace executive discretion, and the fact
that “five Presidential administrations” sometimes neglected the
mandates is likewise irrelevant. See
ante, at 8. As I have
stressed before, the Executive cannot “acquire authority forbidden
by law through a process akin to adverse possession,”
Biden
v.
Texas, 597 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip
op., at 15), and that is true even if the adverse possession is
bipartisan.
B
The events that gave rise to this case began
on January 20, 2021, when the Acting Secretary of DHS issued a
memorandum with “enforcement priorities” for the detention and
removal of aliens found to be in this country illegally. This
memorandum prioritized: (1) aliens “whose apprehension” implicated
“national security,” (2) aliens not present “before November 1,
2020,” and (3) aliens due to be released from criminal confinement
who had both been “convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ ” and were
“determined to pose a threat to public safety.” 606 F. Supp.
3d 437, 454 (SD Tex. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
§1101(a)(43) (defining “aggravated felony”). This prioritization
was inconsistent with the §1226(c) arrest mandate, which extends to
all aliens convicted of any crime within a long list of statutory
categories. 606 F. Supp. 3d, at 454–455.
In February, Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), an arm of DHS, issued a second memorandum that
slightly modified the earlier priorities and stated that
“ ‘preapproval’ ” would generally be required “for
enforcement actions” against persons outside these priority groups.
Id., at 455–456. This memorandum was also inconsistent with
the relevant statutes.
After some litigation regarding these two
memoranda, a new DHS Secretary issued a Final Memorandum
instructing that even aliens in priority groups need not
necessarily be apprehended and removed. App. 113–115. Rather, the
Final Memorandum directed DHS personnel to consider non-statutory
“aggravating and mitigating factors” in deciding whether to detain
an alien.
Id., at 114–115. It further stated that DHS
“personnel should not rely on the fact of [a qualifying]
conviction” when exercising “prosecutorial discretion.”
Id.,
at 115
. Thus, the Final Memorandum did not simply
permit deviations from the statutory mandates; it flatly
contradicted those mandates by stating that qualifying
convictions were insufficient grounds for initiating arrest,
detention, and removal.
C
Texas and Louisiana challenged this Final
Memorandum in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). After a 2-day bench trial, the District Court found in favor
of the States and made detailed findings of fact that bear on the
issue of standing.
Much of the District Court’s analysis of that
issue focused on the Final Memorandum’s effect on the “detainer”
system, 606 F. Supp. 3d, at 459–463, and it is therefore
important to understand how that system works in relation to the
relevant statutory provisions. When an alien in state custody for a
criminal offense is identified as falling within a category of
aliens whose apprehension and detention is required by §§1226(a)
and (c), the Government should lodge a “detainer” with the State so
that the Government can take the alien into custody when he or she
is released by the State. Then, when an alien is about to be
released, a cooperative State will notify DHS so that it can be
ready to assume its obligation under §§1226(a) and (c) to take the
alien into federal custody. When that occurs, the State is spared
the burdens it would have to bear if the alien, after release, had
been placed under state law on probation, parole, or supervised
release. But if DHS rescinds a detainer before such an alien is
released (or never lodges a detainer in the first place), those
burdens fall on the State.
After reviewing the parties’ evidence, the
District Court found that in the first month after the substantive
policy change brought about by the January 2021 DHS memorandum, ICE
had rescinded 141 detainers in Texas.[
3] Ninety-five of the criminal aliens whose detainers were
rescinded were then released on a form of state supervision.
Seventeen of them went on to violate their terms of supervision,
and four committed new crimes.
Id., at 459.
The court then examined what had taken place
during just the time “since the Final Memorandum became effective”
and found that “because of the Final Memorandum,” “ICE ha[d]
continued to rescind detainers placed on criminal aliens in
[Texas’s] custody,” and the court identified 15 specific cases in
which this had occurred.
Id., at 460. Rejecting the
Government’s claim that these dropped detainers were necessary in
light of “limited resources,” the court found that “the Government
. . . persistently underutilized existing detention
facilities” during the relevant time and that the average daily
detained population in April 2022 was less than 40% of the 3-year
high in August 2019.
Id., at 453, 481, 488.
Based on these findings of fact and historical
data, the District Court identified four categories of costs that
Texas had suffered and would continue to bear as a result of the
relevant DHS actions. First, the court calculated the
dollars-and-cents cost that Texas had to bear in order to supervise
criminal aliens who were released in violation of §§1226(a), (c).
Id., at 463. Second, it noted the costs associated with
criminal recidivism.
Id., at 464. Third, it found that some
juvenile offenders who “are not detained by ICE because of the
Final Memorandum” will attend Texas public schools (and at least
one juvenile due to be released will do so).
Ibid. Fourth,
it concluded that the hundreds of millions of dollars that Texas
annually spends on healthcare for illegal aliens would increase
when some criminal aliens not detained “because of the Final
Memorandum” make use of those services.
Id., at 465.
Concluding that these costs established Texas’s
injury for standing purposes, the District Court went on to hold
that the Final Memorandum was contrary to law and that Texas had
therefore established a violation of the APA.[
4] As I will explain, it is a common practice for
courts in APA cases to set aside an improper final agency action,
and that is what the District Court did here. It vacated the Final
Memorandum pending further action by DHS,
id., at 499, but
it declined to issue injunctive or declaratory relief,
id.,
at 501–502.
The Government asked the Court of Appeals to
stay the District Court’s order vacating the Final Memorandum, but
that court refused to do so and observed that the Government had
not “come close” to showing “ ‘clear error’ ” in the
District Court’s factual findings on the injuries that Texas had
already incurred and would continue to incur because of the Final
Memorandum. 40 F. 4th 205, 216–217 (CA5 2022).
II
Before I address the Court’s inexplicable
break from our ordinary standing analysis, I will first explain why
Texas easily met its burden to show a concrete, particularized
injury that is traceable to the Final Memorandum and redressable by
the courts.
Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560–561.
A
Injury in fact. The District Court’s
factual findings, which must be accepted unless clearly erroneous,
quantified the cost of criminal supervision of aliens who should
have been held in DHS custody and also identified other burdens
that Texas had borne and would continue to bear going forward.
These findings sufficed to establish a concrete injury that was
specific to Texas.
TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594
U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 9); see
ante, at 4
(conceding that such costs are “of course an injury”).
Traceability. The District Court found
that each category of cost would increase “
because of the
Final Memorandum,” rather than decisions that DHS personnel would
make irrespective of the directions that memorandum contains. 606
F. Supp. 3d, at 460, 464, 465 (emphasis added).
The majority does not hold—and in my judgment,
could not plausibly hold—that these findings are clearly erroneous.
Instead, it observes only that a “State’s claim for standing can
become more attenuated” when based on the “indirect effects” of
federal policies “on state revenues or state spending.”
Ante, at 9, n. 3. But while it is certainly true that
indirect injuries may be harder to prove, an indirect financial
injury that
is proved at trial supports standing. And that
is what happened here. As Justice Gorsuch notes, just a few years
ago, we found in a very important case that a State had standing
based in part on indirect financial injury.
Ante, at 3
(opinion concurring in judgment) (citing
Department of
Commerce v.
New York, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019)
(slip op., at 9–10)). There is no justification for a conflicting
holding here.
In any event, many of the costs in this case are
not indirect. When the Federal Government refuses or fails to
comply with §§1226(a) and (c) as to criminal aliens, the
direct result in many cases is that the State must continue
its supervision. As noted, the District Court made specific
findings about the financial cost that Texas incurred as a result
of DHS’s failure to assume custody of aliens covered by §§1226(a)
and (c). And the costs that a State must bear when it is required
to assume the supervision of criminal aliens who should be kept in
federal custody are not only financial. Criminal aliens whom DHS
unlawfully refuses to detain may be placed on state probation,
parole, or supervised release, and some will commit new crimes and
end up in a state jail or prison. Probation, parole, and
corrections officers are engaged in dangerous work that can put
their lives on the line.
Redressability. A court order that
forecloses reliance on the memorandum would likely redress the
States’ injuries. If, as the District Court found, DHS personnel
rescind detainers “because of ” the Final Memorandum, then
vacating that memorandum would likely lead to those detainers’
remaining in place.
B
While the majority does not contest
redressability, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence does, citing two
reasons. But the first is contrary to precedent, and the second
should not be addressed in this case.
The first asserted reason is based on the
inability of the lower courts to issue a broad injunction
forbidding enforcement of the Final Memorandum. See
§1252(f )(1).[
5] In this
case, the District Court did not issue injunctive relief. Instead,
it vacated the Final Memorandum, and Justice Gorsuch argues that
this relief did not redress Texas’s injuries because it does not
“require federal officials to change how they exercise [their
prosecutorial] discretion in the [Final Memorandum’s] Guidelines’
absence.”
Ante, at 6. There are two serious problems with
this argument.
First, §1252(f )(1) bars injunctive relief
by courts “
other than the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.)
As a result, redress in the form of an injunction
can be
awarded by this Court. According to the Court’s decision last Term
in
Biden v.
Texas, our authority to grant such relief
“le[ft] no doubt” as to our jurisdiction even if §1252(f )(1)
precluded the lower courts from setting aside an administrative
action under the APA. 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). We
have not been asked to revisit this holding, see
id., at
___–___ (Barrett, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3–4), and I would
not do so here.
Second, even if
Biden v.
Texas
could be distinguished and no injunctive relief can be awarded by
any court, setting aside the Final Memorandum satisfies the
redressability requirement. Our decision in
Franklin v.
Massachusetts,
505 U.S.
788 (1992), settles that question. There, the Court held that a
declaratory judgment regarding the lawfulness of Executive Branch
action satisfied redressability because “it [was] substantially
likely that the President and other executive . . .
officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation” of the
law “even though they would not be directly bound by such a
determination.”
Id., at 803 (opinion of O’Connor,
J.).[
6] Here, we need not
speculate about how DHS officers would respond to vacatur of the
Final Memorandum because the District Court found that the DHS
personnel responsible for detainers were rescinding them “because
of ” the Final Memorandum. 606 F. Supp. 3d, at 460. This
point was effectively conceded by the Government’s application for
an emergency stay pending our decision in this case. The Government
argued that the Final Memorandum was needed to guide prosecutorial
discretion, Application 38–39, and if the District Court’s order
were ineffectual, that would not be true. For these reasons, the
harm resulting from the Final Memorandum is redressed by setting
aside the Final Memorandum.
As to the concurrence’s second argument—that the
APA’s “set aside” language may not permit vacatur—the concurrence
acknowledges that this would be a sea change in administrative law
as currently practiced in the lower courts.
Ante, at 16
(opinion of Gorsuch, J.); see,
e.g.,
Data Marketing
Partnership, LP v.
United States Dept. of Labor, 45
F. 4th 846, 859 (CA5 2022) (“The default
rule is that vacatur is the appropriate remedy” under the APA);
United Steel v.
Mine Safety and Health Admin., 925
F.3d 1279, 1287 (CADC 2019) (“The ordinary practice is to vacate
unlawful agency action”).[
7] We
did not grant review on this very consequential question, and I
would not reach out to decide it in a case in which
Biden v.
Texas resolves the issue of redressability.
To be clear, I would be less troubled than I am
today if Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence had commanded a majority. At
least then, Congress would be free to amend §1252(f ). But the
majority reaches out and redefines our understanding of the
constitutional limits on otherwise-available lawsuits. It is
to this misunderstanding that I now turn.
III
The majority adopts the remarkable rule that
injuries from an executive decision not to arrest or prosecute,
even in a civil case, are generally not “cognizable.”
Ante,
at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Its reasoning has three
failings. First, it fails to engage with contrary precedent that is
squarely on point. Second, it lacks support in the cases on which
it relies. Third, the exceptions (or possible exceptions) that it
notes do nothing to allay concern about the majority’s break from
our established test for Article III standing. I address each of
these problems in turn.
A
Prior to today’s decision, it was established
law that plaintiffs who suffer a traditional injury resulting from
an agency “decision not to proceed” with an enforcement action have
Article III standing.
Federal Election Comm’n v.
Akins,
524 U.S.
11, 19 (1998). The obvious parallel to the case before us is
Massachusetts v.
EPA,
549 U.S.
497 (2007), which has been called “the most important
environmental law case ever decided by the Court.” R. Lazarus, The
Rule of Five: Making Climate History at the Supreme Court 1 (2020).
In that prior case, Massachusetts challenged the Environmental
Protection Agency’s failure to use its civil enforcement powers to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions that allegedly injured the
Commonwealth. Massachusetts argued that it was harmed because the
accumulation of greenhouse gases would lead to higher temperatures;
higher temperatures would cause the oceans to rise; and rising sea
levels would cause the Commonwealth to lose some of its dry land.
The Court noted that Massachusetts had a “quasi-sovereign
interes[t]” in avoiding the loss of territory and that our
federalist system had stripped the Commonwealth of “certain
sovereign prerogatives” that it could have otherwise employed to
defend its interests.
Massachusetts, 549 U. S., at
519–520. Proclaiming that Massachusetts’ standing claim was
entitled to “special solicitude,” the Court held that the
Commonwealth had standing.
Id., at 520.
The reasoning in that case applies with at least
equal force in the case at hand. In
Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court suggested that allowing Massachusetts to
protect its sovereign interests through litigation compensated for
its inability to protect those interests by the means that would
have been available had it not entered the Union. In the present
case, Texas’s entry into the Union stripped it of the power that it
undoubtedly enjoyed as a sovereign nation to police its borders and
regulate the entry of aliens. The Constitution and federal
immigration laws have taken away most of that power, but the
statutory provisions at issue in this case afford the State at
least
some protection—in particular by preventing the State
and its residents from bearing the costs, financial and
non-financial, inflicted by the release of certain dangerous
criminal aliens. Our law on standing should not deprive the State
of even that modest protection. We should not treat Texas less
favorably than Massachusetts. And even if we do not view Texas’s
standing argument with any “special solicitude,” we should at least
refrain from treating it with special hostility by failing to apply
our standard test for Article III standing.
Despite the clear parallel with this case and
the States’ heavy reliance on
Massachusetts throughout their
briefing, the majority can only spare a passing footnote for that
important precedent.
Ante, at 13, n. 6; see Brief for
Respondents 11, 12, 14, 16–18, 23; see also Brief for Arizona and
17 Other States as
Amici Curiae 7–12. It first declines to
say
Massachusetts was correctly decided and references the
“disagreements that some may have” with that decision.
Ante,
at 13, n. 6. But it then concludes that
Massachusetts “does
not control” since the decision itself refers to “ ‘key differences
between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s
decision not to initiate an enforcement action,’ ” with the
latter “ ‘not
ordinarily subject to judicial review.’ ”
Ante, at 13, n. 6 (quoting 549 U. S., at 527) (emphasis
added).
The problem with this argument is that the
portion of M
assachusetts to which the footnote refers deals
not with its key Article III holding, but with the scope of review
that is “ordinarily” available under the statutory scheme.
Importantly,
Massachusetts frames its statement about
declining enforcement as restating the rule of
Heckler v.
Chaney,
470 U.S.
821 (1985). See 549 U. S., at 527. And as the Court
acknowledges when it invokes
Heckler directly, that decision
is not about standing; it is about the interpretation of the
statutory exception to APA review for actions “committed to agency
discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2); see 470 U. S., at 823;
ante, at 11. And even in that context,
Heckler
expressly contemplates that any “presumption” of discretion to
withhold enforcement can be rebutted by an express statutory
limitation of discretion—which is exactly what we have here. 470 U.
S., at 832–833.
So rather than answering questions about this
case, the majority’s footnote on
Massachusetts raises more
questions about
Massachusetts itself—most importantly, has
this monumental decision been quietly interred? Cf.
ante, at
3 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
Massachusetts v.
EPA is not the
only relevant precedent that the Court brushes aside. “[I]t is well
established that [this Court] has an independent obligation to
assure that standing exists, regardless of whether it is challenged
by any of the parties.”
Summers v.
Earth Island
Institute,
555 U.S.
488, 499 (2009). Yet in case after case, with that obligation
in mind, we have not questioned the standing of States that brought
suit under the APA to compel civil enforcement.
In
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter
and Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 591 U. S. ___
(2020), two States sued under the APA and sought to compel the
Department of Health and Human Services to cease exercising
regulatory enforcement discretion that exempted certain religious
employers from compliance with a contraceptive-coverage mandate.
Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12). The issue of the
States’ standing was discussed at length in the decision below, see
Pennsylvania v.
President United States, 930 F.3d
543, 561–565 (CA3 2019), and in this Court, no Justice suggested
that the Constitution foreclosed standing simply because the States
were complaining of “the Executive Branch’s . . .
enforcement choices” regarding third parties.
Ante, at
7.
Just last Term in
Biden v.
Texas,
two States argued that their spending on the issuance of driver’s
licenses and the provision of healthcare for illegal immigrants
sufficed to establish Article III standing and thus enabled them to
sue to compel enforcement of a detain-or-return mandate. See
Texas v.
Biden, 20 F. 4th 928, 970–971 (CA5
2021). The Court of Appeals held that the States had standing,
ibid., and the majority in this Court, despite extended
engagement with other jurisdictional questions, never hinted that
Article III precluded the States’ suit. 597 U. S., at ___–___
(slip op., at 8–12).
If the new rule adopted by the Court in this
case is sound, these decisions and others like them were all just
wasted ink. I understand that what we have called “ ‘drive-by
jurisdictional rulings’ ” are not precedents, see
Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S.
500, 511 (2006), but the Court should not use a practice of
selective silence to accept or reject prominently presented
standing arguments on inconsistent grounds.
B
Examination of the precedents the majority
invokes only underscores the deficiencies in its analysis.[
8] The majority says that the “leading
precedent” supporting its holding is
Linda R. S. v.
Richard D.,
410 U.S.
614 (1973).
Ante, at 5. But as Justice Barrett notes,
this Court has
already definitively explained that the suit
to compel prosecution in
Linda R. S. was rejected “because
of the unlikelihood that the relief requested would redress
appellant’s claimed injury.”
Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S.
59, 79, n. 24 (1978); see
ante, at 2 (opinion
concurring in judgment).
The Court notes in a quick parenthetical that
the “
Linda R. S. principle” was once “cit[ed]
. . . in [the] immigration context” in
Sure-Tan,
Inc. v.
NLRB,
467 U.S.
883, 897 (1984),
ante, at 5. But
Sure-Tan’s
single “[c]f.” cite to
Linda R. S. provides the Court no
help. 467 U. S., at 897.
Sure-Tan only rejected (quite
reasonably) any standalone “cognizable interest in procuring
enforcement of the immigration laws” by a party who lacked any
“
personal interest.”
Ibid. (emphasis added). And it
did so, not as part of a standing analysis, but as part of its
explanation for rejecting two employers’ attempt to assert that
seeking to have employees deported as retaliation for union
activity was “an aspect of their First Amendment right ‘to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.’ ”
Id., at
896.
After these two inapposite precedents, the
majority’s authority gets even weaker. I agree with Justice Barrett
that neither
Heckler, nor
Castle Rock v.
Gonzales,
545 U.S.
748 (2005), has real relevance here.
Ante, at 4–5.
Castle Rock considered the “deep-rooted nature of
law-enforcement discretion” as a tool for interpreting a statute,
not as a constitutional standing rule. 545 U. S., at 761. And
as explained above,
Heckler is not about standing and only
states a presumptive rule. The Court’s remaining authorities are
likewise consistent with the understanding that prosecution
decisions are “
generally committed to an agency’s absolute
discretion” unless the relevant law rebuts the “presumption.”
Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831 (emphasis added). For
example,
TransUnion states that it is only when “unharmed
plaintiffs” are before the Court that Article III forecloses
interference with the “discretion of the Executive Branch.” 594
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (emphasis deleted).
In sum, all of these authorities point, not to
the majority’s new rule, but to the same ordinary questions we ask
in every case—whether the plaintiff has a concrete, traceable, and
redressable injury.
C
Despite the majority’s capacious understanding
of executive discretion, today’s opinion assures the reader that
the decision “do[es] not suggest that federal courts may never
entertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to
make more arrests or bring more prosecutions,” despite its
otherwise broad language covering the “exercise of enforcement
discretion over whether to arrest or prosecute.”
Ante, at 5,
9. The majority lists five categories of cases in which a court
would—or at least might—have Article III jurisdiction to entertain
a challenge to arrest or prosecution policies, but this list does
nothing to allay concern about the Court’s new path. The Court does
not identify any characteristics that are shared by all these
categories and that distinguish them from cases in which it would
not find standing. In addition, the Court is unwilling to say that
cases in four of these five categories are actually exempted from
its general rule, and the one remaining category is exceedingly
small. I will discuss these categories one by one.
First, the majority distinguishes
“selective-prosecution” suits by a plaintiff “to prevent his or her
own prosecution,”
ante, at 9. But such claims are ordinarily
brought as defenses in ongoing prosecutions, as in the cases the
Court cites, and are rarely brought in standalone actions where a
plaintiff must prove standing. This category is therefore little
more than a footnote to the Court’s general rule.
Second, the majority grants that “the
standing analysis
might differ when Congress elevates
de
facto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries,”
and it hypothesizes a situation in which Congress “(i) specifically
authorize[s] suits against the Executive Branch by a defined set of
plaintiffs who have suffered concrete harms from executive
under-enforcement and (ii) specifically authorize[s] the Judiciary
to enter appropriate orders requiring additional arrests or
prosecutions by the Executive Branch.”
Ante, at 10 (emphasis
added). It is puzzling why the presence or absence of such a
statute should control the question of standing under the
Constitution. We have said that the enactment of a statute may help
us to determine in marginal cases whether an injury is sufficiently
concrete and particularized to satisfy the first prong of our
three-part standing test.
Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 341 (2016). But once it is posited that a plaintiff has
personally suffered a “
de facto” injury,
i.e., an
injury in fact, it is hard to see why the presence or absence of a
statute authorizing suit has a bearing on the question whether the
court has Article III jurisdiction as opposed to the question
whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. In the end, however,
none of this may matter because the majority suggests that such a
statute might be unconstitutional.
Ante, at 10, and
n. 4.
Third, the majority tells us that the
standing outcome “
might change” if the Federal Government
“
wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities,” but that
statement is both equivocal and vague.
Ante, at 11 (emphasis
added). Under what circumstances might the Court say that the
Federal Government has “wholly abandoned” its enforcement duties?
Suppose the Federal Government announced that it would obey 80% of
the immigration laws or 70% of the environmental laws. Would the
Court say that it had “wholly abandoned” enforcement of these
bodies of law? What would happen if the Final Memorandum in this
case had directed DHS agents not to arrest anyone convicted of any
covered crime other than murder? DHS would still be enforcing the
arrest mandate as to one of the many covered crimes. Would this
only-murder policy qualify as complete abandonment? And why should
the ability of a particular party to seek legal redress for an
injury turn on the number of others harmed by the challenged
enforcement policy? Standing is assessed plaintiff by plaintiff.
The majority has no answers, and in the end, it cannot even bring
itself to commit to this complete-abandonment exception. It says
only that “the standing calculus
might” or “arguably
could” change.
Ibid. (emphasis added).
Fourth, the Court says that a plaintiff
might have standing to challenge an “Executive Branch’s arrest or
prosecution priorities
and the Executive Branch’s provision
of legal benefits or legal status . . . because the
challenged policy might implicate more than simply the Executive’s
traditional enforcement discretion.”
Ibid. Exactly what this
means is not easy to ascertain. One possibility is that the
majority is talking about a complaint that asserts separate claims
based on the grant or denial of benefits, the grant or denial of
legal status, and harms resulting from non-enforcement of a
statutory mandate. In that event, standing with respect to each
claim would have to be analyzed separately. Another possibility is
that the majority is referring to a claim asserting that
non-enforcement of a statutory requirement requiring the arrest or
prosecution of third parties resulted in the plaintiff ’s loss
of benefits or legal status. Such a situation is not easy to
imagine, and the majority cites no case that falls within this
category. But if such a case were to arise, there is no reason why
it should not be analyzed under our standard three-pronged
test.
Fifth, and finally, the majority states
that “policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who
have already been arrested
arguably might raise a different
standing question than arrest or prosecution policies.”
Ante, at 12 (emphasis added). The majority provides no
explanation for this (noncommittal) distinction, and in any event,
as the majority acknowledges, the States in this case challenged
noncompliance with the §1231(a)(2) detention mandate in addition to
the §1226(c) arrest requirement.
Ante, at 2, 13. The Court
points to what it sees as a “represent[ation]” by the Solicitor
General that the Final Memorandum does not affect “continued
detention of noncitizens already in federal custody.”
Ante,
at 12, n. 5. But as Justice Barrett notes, the Government
argued that when it chooses not to remove someone under the Final
Memorandum’s guidance, its mandatory detention obligation
ends—meaning it
is asserting discretion over continued
detention.
Ante, at 3 (opinion concurring in judgment).
In any event, arrest policy cannot be divided
from detention policy in this case. When a person is arrested, he
or she is detained for at least some period of time, and under the
detainer system involved here, “arrest” often simply means
transferring an immigrant from state custody to federal custody. As
best I can tell, the majority’s distinction between arrest and
detention is made solely to avoid the obvious inference that our
decision last Term in
Biden v.
Texas should have
dismissed the case for lack of standing, without analyzing “the
Government’s detention obligations.” 597 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 14).
In sum, with the exception of cases in the first
(very small) category (civil cases involving selective-prosecution
claims), the majority does not identify any category of cases that
it would definitely except from its general rule. In addition,
category two conflates the question of constitutional standing with
the question whether the plaintiff has a cause of action; category
three is hopelessly vague; category four is incomprehensible; and
category five actually encompasses the case before us.
IV
The Court declares that its decision upholds
“[o]ur constitutional system of separation of powers,”
ante,
at 9, but as I said at the outset, the decision actually damages
that system by improperly inflating the power of the Executive and
cutting back the power of Congress and the authority of the
Judiciary. And it renders States already laboring under the effects
of massive illegal immigration even more helpless.
Our Constitution gives the President important
powers, and the precise extent of some of them has long been the
subject of contention, but it has been widely accepted that “the
President’s power reaches ‘its lowest ebb’ when he contravenes the
express will of Congress, ‘for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system.’ ”
Zivotofsky
v.
Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 61 (2015) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting)
(quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,
343 U.S.
579, 637–638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
That is the situation here. To put the point
simply, Congress enacted a law that requires the apprehension and
detention of certain illegal aliens whose release, it thought,
would endanger public safety. The Secretary of DHS does not agree
with that categorical requirement. He prefers a more flexible
policy. And the Court’s answer today is that the Executive’s policy
choice prevails unless Congress, by withholding funds, refusing to
confirm Presidential nominees, threatening impeachment and removal,
etc., can win a test of strength. Relegating Congress to these
disruptive measures radically alters the balance of power between
Congress and the Executive, as well as the allocation of authority
between the Congress that enacts a law and a later Congress that
must go to war with the Executive if it wants that law to be
enforced.[
9]
What the majority has done is to apply Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s bad-man theory of the law to the separation of
powers. Under Holmes’s theory, as popularly understood, the law
consists of those things that a bad man cannot get away
with.[
10] Similarly, the
majority’s understanding of the “executive Power” seems to be that
a President can disobey statutory commands unless Congress, by
flexing its muscles, forces capitulation. That is not the
Constitution’s conception of “the executive Power.” Art. II, §1.
The Constitution, instead, requires a President to “take Care that
the Laws be
faithfully executed.” §3 (emphasis added).
Neither the Solicitor General nor the majority
has cited any support for the proposition that a President has the
power to disobey statutes that require him to take enforcement
actions, and there is strong historical evidence to the
contrary.[
11] The majority’s
conception of Presidential authority smacks of the powers that
English monarchs claimed prior to the “Glorious Revolution” of
1688, namely, the power to suspend the operation of existing
statutes, and to grant dispensations from compliance with
statutes.[
12] After James II
was deposed, that changed. The English Bill of Rights of 1689
emphatically rejected “the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or
the Execution of Laws by Rega[l] Authority without Consent of
Parl[i]ament” and “the pretended Power of Dispensing with Laws or
the Execution of Laws by Rega[l] Authorit[y] as it ha[s] bee[n]
assumed and exercised of late.”[
13]
By the time of the American Revolution, British
monarchs had long abandoned the power to resist laws enacted by
Parliament,[
14] but the
Declaration of Independence charged George III with exercising
those powers with respect to colonial enactments. One of the
leading charges against him was that he had “forbidden his
Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless
suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained;
and when so suspended, . . . ha[d] utterly neglected to
attend to them.”[
15]
By 1787, six State Constitutions contained
provisions prohibiting the suspension of laws,[
16] and at the Constitutional Convention, a
proposal to grant the President suspending authority was
unanimously defeated.[
17]
Many scholars have concluded that the Take Care Clause was meant to
repudiate that authority.[
18] See 1 Works of James Wilson 399, 440 (R. McCloskey
ed. 1967) (describing Clause as providing that the President holds
“authority, not to make, or alter, or dispense with the laws, but
to execute and act the laws”).
Early decisions are inconsistent with the
understanding of Executive Power that appears to animate the
majority. In 1806, Justice Patterson, while presiding over a
criminal trial, rejected the argument that the President could
authorize the defendant to violate the law.
United States v.
Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1201 (No. 16,342) (CC NY 1806). He
concluded:
“The president of the United States cannot
control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still
less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids. If he
could, it would render the execution of the laws dependent on his
will and pleasure; which is a doctrine that has not been set up,
and will not meet with any supporters in our government. In this
particular, the law is paramount.”
Id., at 1230.
In
Kendall v.
United States ex rel.
Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), the full Court rejected the
President’s claim that he had the authority to disregard a
statutory duty to pay certain sums to a government contractor: “To
contend that the obligations imposed on the President to see the
laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their
execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and is
entirely inadmissible.”
Id., at 613. This Court made the
obvious connection to the separation of powers: “vesting in the
President a dispensing power” would result in “clothing the
President with a power entirely to control the legislation of
congress, and paralyze the administration of justice.”
Ibid.; see also
Office of Personnel Management v.
Richmond,
496 U.S.
414, 435 (1990) (White, J., concurring) (citing
Kendall
to explain that the “Executive Branch does not have the dispensing
power on its own” and “should not be granted such a power by
judicial authorization”).
The original understanding of the scope of the
Executive’s prosecutorial discretion was not briefed in this case,
and I am reluctant to express a firm position on the question. But
it is indisputable that we have been provided with no historical
support for the position taken by the Solicitor General or the
majority.
* * *
This sweeping Executive Power endorsed by
today’s decision may at first be warmly received by champions of a
strong Presidential power, but if Presidents can expand their
powers as far as they can manage in a test of strength with
Congress, presumably Congress can cut executive power as much as it
can manage by wielding the formidable weapons at its disposal. That
is not what the Constitution envisions.
I end with one final observation. The majority
suggests that its decision rebuffs an effort to convince us to
“ ‘usurp’ ” the authority of the other branches, but that
is not true.
Ante, at 3. We exercise the power conferred by
Article III of the Constitution, and we must be vigilant not to
exceed the limits of our constitutional role. But when we have
jurisdiction, we have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to
exercise that authority
. Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v.
United States,
424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). Because the majority shuns that duty, I must
respectfully dissent.